Re: CIA - the cryptographer's intelligent aid?
The thing about CIA is that it is commonly used in security (not cryptography) courses to mean Confidentiality, Integrity (of systems) and Availability (instead of Authentication). Availability of systems, services and information. For crypto I always talked about CAIN or PAIN (like in no PAIN no gain, or cryptography is allot of PAIN). -- note, I also prefer the word Confidentiality over Privacy, the latter being to high level and I usually reserve it to mean the hiding of who is communicating with who (anonymity systems...). When introducing digital signatures I always state that they provide integrity (as do MACs, which I introduce beforehand) but also the possibility of non-repudiation. And then I go on stating that it is very hard, if not impossible, to in fact implement non-repudiation. --Anton - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Any good books or URLs for WinXP crypto security?
NSA Windows hardening guides: http://nsa2.www.conxion.com/ --Anton - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
FC'04: 2nd Call for Participation
Financial Cryptography '04 9-12 February 2004 Key West, Florida, USA 2nd Call for Participation Note: Early registration ends on January 9th, 2004! Financial Cryptography is the premier international forum for education, exploration, and debate at the heart of one theme: Money and trust in the digital world. Dedicated to the relationship between cryptography and data security and cutting-edge financial and payment technologies and trends, the conference brings together top data-security specialists and scientists with economists, bankers, implementers, and policy makers. Financial Cryptography includes a program of invited talks, academic presentations, technical demonstrations, and panel discussions. These explore a range of topics in their full technical and interdisciplinary complexity: Emerging financial instruments and trends, legal regulation of financial technologies and privacy issues, encryption and authentication techologies, digital cash, and smartcard payment systems -- among many others. The conference proceedings containing all accepted submissions will be published in the Springer-Verlag Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS) series after the conference. A pre-proceedings containing preliminary versions of the papers will be distributed at the conference. FC'04 Keynote Speakers: Jack Selby- The Failure of eCash: New solutions, same old problems Ron Rivest- title to be announced Jacques Stern - Cryptography and French banking cards: past, present, future Simon Pugh- Security Risk Management of Transactions for Paypass Jon Peha - Bringing Payment Technology to the Unbanked More detailed information on the invited speakers is available on the web site, as well as the list of accepted papers and the preliminary schedule. Registration for Financial Cryptography 2004 is open; details and online registration can be found at http://fc04.ifca.ai along with information about discounted hotel accommodation and travel. Early registration ends on January 9th, 2004! Financial Cryptography is organized by the International Financial Cryptography Association (IFCA). More information can be obtained from the IFCA web site at http://www.ifca.ai or by contacting the conference general chair, Hinde ten Berge, at [EMAIL PROTECTED] - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
RE: Walton's Mountain notaries (identity requirements)
-Original Message- From: John Gilmore [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Monday, January 05, 2004 3:11 PM To: Carl Ellison Cc: 'Paul A.S. Ward'; [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: Walton's Mountain notaries (identity requirements) ... once again I heard the readings about the edict from Caesar that all people return to their home towns to be counted in a census. Maybe we can take a lesson from that - and have everyone return to people who have known the person, uninterrupted, from birth to the present in order to get anything notarized. Anyone who couldn't find such people just couldn't get anything notarized, I guess. It's a lot more complicated than that, Carl. Society can't demand impossible conditions from its citizens, as a precondition to existence. (This is true even if the condition is possible for 99% of the citizens; the other 1% have rights too.) Hi John. Of course it shouldn't. I was using that extreme example to drive home the point that the concept of identity (via notary, in this case) has been eroded out from under us and we don't have anything to replace it with. My guess is that a good replacement will not provide traceability but will meet our needs (for reputation). However, it's up to people like us to design that replacement. - Carl +--+ |Carl M. Ellison [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://theworld.com/~cme | |PGP: 75C5 1814 C3E3 AAA7 3F31 47B9 73F1 7E3C 96E7 2B71 | +---Officer, arrest that man. He's whistling a copyrighted song.---+ - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: [Fwd: Re: Non-repudiation (was RE: The PAIN mnemonic)]
Now that we've trashed non-repudiation ... just how is it different from authentication? In both cases, there is a clear technical meaning (though as with anything in mathematics, when you get right down to it, the details are complex and may be important): To produce an authenticator/non-repudiable signature, you must have access to the secret. There isn't, at this level, even any difference between the requirements for the two. Where we get into trouble is in attempting to bind the real world to the mathematics. In each case, the receiver wants to be able to say: 1. I can rely on the fact that X sent me this data, because it came with a signature that could be calculated only by X. What he *really* needs to say is: 2. I can rely on the fact that X sent me this data, because it came with a signature that could be calculated only by someone knowing X's secret. To go from 2 to 1, the receiver must also have: 3. I can rely on the fact that only X knows X's secret. In ordinary English usage, there is little difference between I've authenti- cated this message as coming from X and X can't deny that he wrote this message. We've learned that non-repudiation is a concept with relatively little use in the legal system. However, authentication (of a signature, document, whatever) is quite common (even if for the usual kinds of objects that need authentication, there is generally little to discuss). If the ultimate question is whether, as a legal matter, X is bound by some writing or whatever, authentication gets at the same basic question (which is only part, usually a small part, of the relevant legal issues). The problems that we've been discussion here are clear from 2 and 3: - Rely on is inherently outside of the cryptography or mathematics. It's only meaningful to the extent that there is some recourse (generally through agreements, but ultimately through the legal system) if you rely on something that turns out not be what you thought it was. - We identify X with an individual, but in fact X rarely knows the secret personally, and never does the actual calculations - some code running in some real physical machine does the work. So in fact we can't even begin to get 3; at best, we have: 3'. I can rely on the fact that, if X has shared his secret with Y (where Y is typically some equipment), then I can rely on X to be bound by whatever Y does. This is now so bizarre and removed from ordinary notions that it should be clear why it's unlikely be of much real-world use! -- Jerry - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
