Re: interesting HMAC attack results
Forgery and Partial Key-Recovery Attacks on HMAC and NMAC Using Hash Collisions, by Scott Contini and Yiqun Lisa Yin (*) On Mon, 25 Sep 2006, Anton Stiglic wrote: Very interesting, I wonder how this integrates with the following paper http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/bellare06new.html (**) According to Section 1.4 of (*), the new result on HMAC does not contradict the analysis in (**). That is the assumption used by Mihir Bellare do not hold for MD4, MD5, and SHA-1. -- Regards, ASK - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
interesting HMAC attack results
http://eprint.iacr.org/2006/319 Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2006/319 Forgery and Partial Key-Recovery Attacks on HMAC and NMAC Using Hash Collisions Scott Contini and Yiqun Lisa Yin Abstract. In this paper, we analyze the security of HMAC and NMAC, both of which are hash-based message authentication codes. We present distinguishing, forgery, and partial key recovery attacks on HMAC and NMAC using collisions of MD4, MD5, SHA-0, and reduced SHA-1. Our results demonstrate that the strength of a cryptographic scheme can be greatly weakened by the insecurity of the underlying hash function. [I Heard about this paper from ekr's blog.] - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
