Re: Wiretap Act Does Not Cover Message 'in Storage' For Short Period (was Re: BNA's Internet Law News (ILN) - 2/27/03)
John says: Next time, before disagreeing with someone: a) Please read what he actually wrote, and b) Don't quote snippets out of context. Three sentences later, at the end of the paragraph that began as quoted above, I explicitly pointed out that cellphone transmissions are a more-protected special case. Well, I did the first and, I thought, avoided the second. I misunderstood what you meant. Sorry. Will - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Wiretap Act Does Not Cover Message 'in Storage' For Short Period
At 4:57 PM -0500 3/5/03, John S. Denker wrote: Tim Dierks wrote: In order to avoid overreaction to a nth-hand story, I've attempted to locate some primary sources. Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines: > http://laws.lp.findlaw.com/getcase/9th/case/9955106p&exact=1 [US v Councilman:] http://pacer.mad.uscourts.gov/dc/opinions/ponsor/pdf/councilman2.pdf Well done. Thanks. I'd be interested in any opinions on how this affects the government's need to get specific wiretap warrants; I don't know if the law which makes illicit civilian wiretapping illegal is the same code which governs the government's ability (or lack thereof) to intercept communications. 0) IANAL. But as to the question of "same code", the answer is clearly "no". I2ANAL, but I don't think that's clear at all, unless your are talking about specific paragraphs within the Wiretap Act and the Stored Communications Act. 1) As to government-authorized intercepts, see http://www.eff.org/Privacy/Surveillance/Terrorism_militias/20011031_eff_usa_patriot_analysis.html which gives a plain-language discussion of at least eight different standards under which some sort of authorization could be obtained. Also note that neither Konop nor Councilman involved government intercepts, so you can't learn anything about authorized intercepts by studying them. Also note that post-9/11 laws have superseded everything you might previously have known on the subject. The Konop decision specifically talks about government intercepts. See section B7, for example. They even discuss the post 9/11 situation in B6. 2) As to intercepts by civilians, it's wrong, and it may be punishable under many different theories and standards, including invasion of privacy, copyright infringement, computer trespass, computer vandalism, simple theft of things of value, and who-knows-what else. Add the Railway Labor Act in this case. 4) Crypto-related sidelight: I wonder what would have happened if Konop had encrypted his sensitive data. (eBook format or the like. :-) Then could he have used the draconian provisions of the DMCA against his opponent (Hawaiian Airlines)? There are some who would argue that the simple password protection scheme Knopp used would be a "technological protection" covered under DMCA. However, the penalty for access to protected material, as opposed to trafficking in technology, is a $2000 fine, which may not seem draconian to an airline. Arnold Reinhold - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Wiretap Act Does Not Cover Message 'in Storage' For Short Period(was Re: BNA's Internet Law News (ILN) - 2/27/03)
Will Rodger wrote: John says: > Wireless is a horse of a different color. IANAL but > the last time I looked, there was no federal law > against intercepting most wireless signals, but you > were (generally) not allowed to disclose the contents > to anyone else. No longer, if it ever was. It's a crime, as evidenced by the wireless scandal a few years back when some Democrat partisan intercepted communications of Republican leadership in Florida, then talked. The simple act of interception was illegal. Next time, before disagreeing with someone: a) Please read what he actually wrote, and b) Don't quote snippets out of context. Three sentences later, at the end of the paragraph that began as quoted above, I explicitly pointed out that cellphone transmissions are a more-protected special case. - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Wiretap Act Does Not Cover Message 'in Storage' For Short Period(was Re: BNA's Internet Law News (ILN) - 2/27/03)
John says: Wireless is a horse of a different color. IANAL but the last time I looked, there was no federal law against intercepting most wireless signals, but you were (generally) not allowed to disclose the contents to anyone else. No longer, if it ever was. It's a crime, as evidenced by the wireless scandal a few years back when some Democrat partisan intercepted communications of Republican leadership in Florida, then talked. The simple act of interception was illegal. Will Rodger - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Wiretap Act Does Not Cover Message 'in Storage' For Short Period(was Re: BNA's Internet Law News (ILN) - 2/27/03)
Steven M. Bellovin wrote: The (U.S.) ban on wiretapping without judicial permission is rooted in a Supreme Court decision, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?navby=case&court=us&vol=389&invol=347) which held that a wiretap is a search which thus required a warrant. I don't think there's ever been any doubt that seizing a stored message required a warrant. But in an old case (OLMSTEAD v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438 (1928)) the Court had held that the Fourth Amendment only protected material things, and therefore *not* conversations monitored via a wiretap. That decision was overturned in Katz. Well, there could have been one other slight source of doubt, namely the theory that communications "with no expectation of privacy" are not private and intercepting them is free-for-all. Talking out loud in a public place, for instance. US laws going back to 1934 if not earlier made it clear that most wired transmissions were to be considered private. Wireless is a horse of a different color. IANAL but the last time I looked, there was no federal law against intercepting most wireless signals, but you were (generally) not allowed to disclose the contents to anyone else. I don't know what that means in practice. Perhaps I can act on the information, so long as I don't "disclose" it? Plus there is a welter of state laws. And cellphone transmissions are a more- protected special case. === In the communication industry (e.g. for tariff purposes) the usual test for whether something is a "stored" message is whether the storage adds value to the service. The delay that occurs in a store-and-forward network does not make it a "storage" service. This criterion has been very closely examined in connection with fly-by-night voice-over-IP telephony schemes, most of which are competitive only if they don't have to pay the tariffs that phone companies have to pay. The tariffs distinguish IP from telephony on the theory that IP is used to access "stored" data -- but if IP is used for telephony that theory goes out the window. Big mess. === The reason why wiretap warrants are (were?) harder to get is because they are insidious: If somebody comes to my house to sieze my papers I generally know about it. But if somebody siezes my bits while they are entrusted to some third party's wire, how am I supposed to know? For this reason and others, I very much doubt that Congress intended different treatment for -- data in transit on a wire versus -- data in transit in a store-and-forward switch. The intention, I assume, was a distinction between data in transit and data truly stored at the endpoint, under control of the end user. We should want the standards for siezing data in transit to be just as high as the standards for a "sneak and peek" search warrant, considerably higher than for an ordinary above-board search warrant. Since the Konop case didn't involve warrants or government searches, I doubt anything that judge says will have much effect on this issue. I think we should be much more worried about the USA PATRIOT act and the son-of-PATRIOT act that Ashcroft's aides say isn't being drafted. - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Wiretap Act Does Not Cover Message 'in Storage' For Short Period
Tim Dierks wrote: > In order to avoid overreaction to a nth-hand story, I've attempted to > locate some primary sources. > > Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines: > http://laws.lp.findlaw.com/getcase/9th/case/9955106p&exact=1 [US v Councilman:] > http://pacer.mad.uscourts.gov/dc/opinions/ponsor/pdf/councilman2.pdf Well done. Thanks. > I'd be interested in any opinions on how this affects the government's > need to get specific wiretap warrants; I don't know if the law which > makes illicit civilian wiretapping illegal is the same code which > governs the government's ability (or lack thereof) to intercept > communications. 0) IANAL. But as to the question of "same code", the answer is clearly "no". 1) As to government-authorized intercepts, see http://www.eff.org/Privacy/Surveillance/Terrorism_militias/20011031_eff_usa_patriot_analysis.html which gives a plain-language discussion of at least eight different standards under which some sort of authorization could be obtained. Also note that neither Konop nor Councilman involved government intercepts, so you can't learn anything about authorized intercepts by studying them. Also note that post-9/11 laws have superseded everything you might previously have known on the subject. 2) As to intercepts by civilians, it's wrong, and it may be punishable under many different theories and standards, including invasion of privacy, copyright infringement, computer trespass, computer vandalism, simple theft of things of value, and who-knows-what else. 3) As to unauthorized intercepts by government agents, in "theory" it is exactly the same as item (2), but in practice your chance of seeing anybody punished for it is comparable to your chance of seeing a State Trooper ticketed for speeding, tailgating, weaving, and failing to signal turns enroute to the donut shop. They're doing God's work, you know; why should mere laws and bills of rights apply to them? About the best you can realistically hope for is the exclusionary rule (illegally siezed evidence can't be used against you) but I wouldn't necessarily count on that. 4) Crypto-related sidelight: I wonder what would have happened if Konop had encrypted his sensitive data. (eBook format or the like. :-) Then could he have used the draconian provisions of the DMCA against his opponent (Hawaiian Airlines)? - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Wiretap Act Does Not Cover Message 'in Storage' For Short Period (was Re: BNA's Internet Law News (ILN) - 2/27/03)
At 02:30 PM 3/5/2003 -0500, Steven M. Bellovin wrote: >From: Somebody > >Technically, since their signal speed is slower than light, even >transmission lines act as storage devices. > >Wire tapping is now legal. The crucial difference, from a law enforcement perspective, is how hard it is to get the requisite court order. A stored message order is relatively easy; a wiretap order is very hard. Note that this distinction is primarily statutory, not (as far as I know) constitutional. Furthermore, it's apparently not illegal for a non-governmental actor to retrieve stored information which they have access to, although it might be illegal for them to wiretap a communication even if they had access to the physical medium over which it travels. I disagree with "Somebody"'s claim; I don't think that claim would go anywhere in court, since a transmission clearly falls under the category of "wire communication", and it's clear that transmission lines are the very entities the wiretap act has always been intended to protect, so Congress' intent is quite clear, regardless of any argument about "storage". - Tim - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Wiretap Act Does Not Cover Message 'in Storage' For Short Period (was Re: BNA's Internet Law News (ILN) - 2/27/03)
In message <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, "R. A. Hettinga" wr ites: > >--- begin forwarded text > > >Status: RO >From: Somebody >To: "R. A. Hettinga" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> >Subject: Re: Wiretap Act Does Not Cover Message 'in Storage' For Short Perio >d (was Re: BNA's Internet Law News (ILN) - 2/27/03) >Date: Sun, 2 Mar 2003 14:09:05 -0500 > >Bob, > >Technically, since their signal speed is slower than light, even >transmission lines act as storage devices. > >Wire tapping is now legal. > No, that's not waht the decision means. Access to stored messages also requires court permission. The (U.S.) ban on wiretapping without judicial permission is rooted in a Supreme Court decision, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?navby=case&court=us&vol=389&invol=347) which held that a wiretap is a search which thus required a warrant. I don't think there's ever been any doubt that seizing a stored message required a warrant. But in an old case (OLMSTEAD v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438 (1928)) the Court had held that the Fourth Amendment only protected material things, and therefore *not* conversations monitored via a wiretap. That decision was overturned in Katz. The crucial difference, from a law enforcement perspective, is how hard it is to get the requisite court order. A stored message order is relatively easy; a wiretap order is very hard. Note that this distinction is primarily statutory, not (as far as I know) constitutional. --Steve Bellovin, http://www.research.att.com/~smb (me) http://www.wilyhacker.com (2nd edition of "Firewalls" book) - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Wiretap Act Does Not Cover Message 'in Storage' For Short Period (was Re: BNA's Internet Law News (ILN) - 2/27/03)
--- begin forwarded text Status: RO From: Somebody To: "R. A. Hettinga" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Subject: Re: Wiretap Act Does Not Cover Message 'in Storage' For Short Period (was Re: BNA's Internet Law News (ILN) - 2/27/03) Date: Sun, 2 Mar 2003 14:09:05 -0500 Bob, Technically, since their signal speed is slower than light, even transmission lines act as storage devices. Wire tapping is now legal. - Original Message - From: "R. A. Hettinga" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Clippable <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Sunday, March 02, 2003 3:04 PM Subject: Re: Wiretap Act Does Not Cover Message 'in Storage' For Short Period (was Re: BNA's Internet Law News (ILN) - 2/27/03) > > --- begin forwarded text > > > Status: RO > Date: Sun, 02 Mar 2003 14:27:00 -0500 > To: Tim Dierks <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, "R. A. Hettinga" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, >[EMAIL PROTECTED] > From: "Ronald L. Rivest" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > Subject: Re: Wiretap Act Does Not Cover Message 'in Storage' For Short > Period (was Re: BNA's Internet Law News (ILN) - 2/27/03) > > > Yes, I was amazed at this ruling as well. > > This ruling seems to fly in the face of the likely intent of > Congress when it passed Wiretap Act. > > If things continue in this direction, we will soon have > rulings and regulations that say: > > -- Carriers must put all calls in storage for a minimum > period of time, sufficient to allow wiretapping. > (Indeed, regulation may not be necessary, as digitization and > buffering of communications is common practice; the > transient use of storage to effect communications > efficiency and reliability should not provide a wiretap > loophole.) > > -- Wiretapping is OK for any phone calls that are routed > through a satellite. > > -- It is OK for the government to house soldiers in your > house, as long as there is even the tiniest opening somewhere in > your house (e.g. a window open, or a chimney flue) > so that "inside" and "outside" connect. > > -- Etc. > > I can also see a market developing for "storage-free" communications > carriers. What happens when you inquire of your carrier as to > whether it can provide such a guarantee or option? > > Cheers, > Ron > > At 09:42 PM 3/1/2003, Tim Dierks wrote: > >At 01:39 PM 2/27/2003 -0500, R. A. Hettinga wrote: > >>At 9:01 AM -0500 on 2/27/03, BNA Highlights wrote: > >> > WIRETAP ACT DOES NOT COVER MESSAGE 'IN STORAGE' FOR SHORT > >> > PERIOD > >> > BNA's Electronic Commerce & Law Report reports that a > >> > federal court in Massachusetts has ruled that the federal > >> > Wiretap Act does not prohibit the improper acquisition of > >> > electronic communications that were "in storage" no matter > >> > how ephemeral that storage may be. The court relied on Konop > >> > v. Hawaiian Airlines Inc., which held that no Wiretap Act > >> > violation occurs when an electronic communication is > >> > accessed while in storage, "even if the interception takes > >> > place during a nanosecond 'juncture' of storage along the > >> > path of transmission." Case name is U.S. v. Councilman. > >> > Article at > >> > <http://pubs.bna.com/ip/BNA/eip.nsf/is/a0a6m6y1k8> > >> > For a free trial to source of this story, visit > >> > http://web.bna.com/products/ip/eplr.htm > > > >This would seem to imply to me that the wiretap act does not apply to any > >normal telephone conversation which is carried at any point in its transit > >by an electronic switch, including all cell phone calls and nearly all > >wireline calls, since any such switch places the data of the ongoing call > >in "storage" for a tiny fraction of a second. > > > > - Tim > > > > > > > >- > >The Cryptography Mailing List > >Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to > >[EMAIL PROTECTED] > > Ronald L. Rivest > Room 324, 200 Technology Square, Cambridge MA 02139 > Tel 617-253-5880, Fax 617-258-9738, Email <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > > --- end forwarded text > > > -- > - > R. A. Hettinga > The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> > 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA > "... however it may d
Re: Wiretap Act Does Not Cover Message 'in Storage' For Short Period
At 01:47 PM 3/2/2003 +, MindFuq wrote: * Tim Dierks <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> [2003-03-02 12:27]: > > This would seem to imply to me that the wiretap act does not apply to any > normal telephone conversation which is carried at any point in its transit > by an electronic switch, including all cell phone calls and nearly all > wireline calls, since any such switch places the data of the ongoing call > in "storage" for a tiny fraction of a second. I believe the reason behind the 'in storage' rule is that someone could protect non-transmitted information under the Wiretap Act by transmitting it needlessly. Then they could say that because the information was transmitted, law enforcement now needs the more difficult to obtain wiretap permit just to search the premesis. You may be correct as to intent, but the originally forwarded article says: > The court relied on Konop > v. Hawaiian Airlines Inc., which held that no Wiretap Act > violation occurs when an electronic communication is > accessed while in storage, "even if the interception takes > place during a nanosecond 'juncture' of storage along the > path of transmission." Case name is U.S. v. Councilman. which includes the phrase "along the path of transmission." In order to avoid overreaction to a nth-hand story, I've attempted to locate some primary sources. Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines: http://laws.lp.findlaw.com/getcase/9th/case/9955106p&exact=1 My understanding is that Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines was a lawsuit by Robert Konop against his former employer, Hawaiian Airlines. Mr. Konop had operated a website where he published a variety of allegations about Hawaiian, and he restricted access to that site by username and password. A manager at Hawaiian gained the permission of two other employees of the airline to use their names in accessing the website; Konop found out about the access and sued Hawaiian. Among other grounds, he claimed that management viewing his site constituted an "interception" of electronic communications in violation of the wiretap act. I won't go into any argument about the plausibility of this claim; I'll just summarize the legal proceedings thereafter. The federal district court which heard the case granted summary judgement against Konop on the wiretap claims; the 9th circuit court of appeals then reversed the district court's decision on the wiretap claims. Thereafter, the 9th circuit withdrew that opinion, then affirmed the district court's original judgement against Konop. Thus, the end result is that the wiretap claim does not hold. Why? Amid other reasoning, the court refers to an old friend, Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Service. In summary, the fifth circuit court determined that e-mail stored on a machine was not protected by the wiretap act, because an "electronic communication" cannot be "intercepted" in the same way that a "wire communication" can be. This reasoning has been upheld with respect to voicemail messages. There is a footnote that specifically addresses the interesting question: that all electronic messages involve storage at some point, so the wiretap act is meaningless with respect to electronic communication. The crucial conclusion is: While this argument is not without appeal, the language and structure of the ECPA demonstrate that Congress considered and rejected this argument. Congress defined "electronic storage" as "any temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or electronic communication incidental to the electronic transmission thereof," 18 U.S.C. ยง 2510(17)(A), indicating that Congress understood that electronic storage was an inherent part of electronic communication. Nevertheless, as discussed above, Congress chose to afford stored electronic communications less protection than other forms of communication. United States of America vs. Bradford S. Councilman: http://pacer.mad.uscourts.gov/dc/opinions/ponsor/pdf/councilman2.pdf The Government charged Mr. Councilman with conspiracy to violate the wiretap act. Apparently, they claim that he used the contents of electronic mail passing through his service for commercial gain. The judge seems quite aware of the implications of the decision and the effect of the Konop precedent, but dismisses the charge. Based upon this rationale, it seems that one cannot be convicted of violating the wiretap act unless one actually taps into electric signals. For example, it would seem to continue to be illegal to intercept 802.11 RF signals, but possible not be illegal to plug a cable into an ethernet hub and copy all traffic on the subnet (since most hubs "store" packets internally for transmission), and perfectly OK to subvert a router to forward copies of all packets to you. I'd be interested in any opinions on how this affects the government's need to get specific wiretap warrants; I don't know if the law which makes illicit civilian wiretapping illegal is the same code which governs t
Re: Wiretap Act Does Not Cover Message 'in Storage' For Short Period
* Tim Dierks <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> [2003-03-02 12:27]: > > This would seem to imply to me that the wiretap act does not apply to any > normal telephone conversation which is carried at any point in its transit > by an electronic switch, including all cell phone calls and nearly all > wireline calls, since any such switch places the data of the ongoing call > in "storage" for a tiny fraction of a second. I believe the reason behind the 'in storage' rule is that someone could protect non-transmitted information under the Wiretap Act by transmitting it needlessly. Then they could say that because the information was transmitted, law enforcement now needs the more difficult to obtain wiretap permit just to search the premesis. Example: I heard of a case a while back where an office had fax printouts lying around. Because these fax printouts were not in transmission at the point of interception, there was no need for a wiretap permit. And I think that's reasonable. I'm not sure that your example is correct, because in the cases you mention the wiretap is not actually accessing stored information; it's accessing a transmission (which may be stored elsewhere). However, if the eavesdropper were able to access the data at the point of storage that you describe, then they probably could weasel out of the Wiretap Act. I would not think it's easy to read registers off a microprocessor externally. What annoys me is how the FBI got away with abusing this rule in the Scarfo case. They planted a keyboard logger on Scarfo's keyboard. Then they planted a bug on his serial port. The two bugs compared the keystroke to the data leaving the serial port, and if the keystroke didn't leave the serial port instantaneously, they captured it, and they were able to successfully argue that they didn't intercept a transmission. Obviously email is composed before being sent, so the slimey bastards use this to conduct a disclosure attack on information that would otherwise be protected by the wiretap laws. One might argue that they intercepted a transmission between the keyboard and the computer. Here's how they weasel out of that: Title 3 requires a wiretap warrent to intercept *electronic* transmissions. I believe the FBI uses a keyboard logger that detects the *mechanical* pushing of keys, probably specifically to circumvent the wiretap law. - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Wiretap Act Does Not Cover Message 'in Storage' For Short Period (was Re: BNA's Internet Law News (ILN) - 2/27/03)
Yes, I was amazed at this ruling as well. This ruling seems to fly in the face of the likely intent of Congress when it passed Wiretap Act. If things continue in this direction, we will soon have rulings and regulations that say: -- Carriers must put all calls in storage for a minimum period of time, sufficient to allow wiretapping. (Indeed, regulation may not be necessary, as digitization and buffering of communications is common practice; the transient use of storage to effect communications efficiency and reliability should not provide a wiretap loophole.) -- Wiretapping is OK for any phone calls that are routed through a satellite. -- It is OK for the government to house soldiers in your house, as long as there is even the tiniest opening somewhere in your house (e.g. a window open, or a chimney flue) so that "inside" and "outside" connect. -- Etc. I can also see a market developing for "storage-free" communications carriers. What happens when you inquire of your carrier as to whether it can provide such a guarantee or option? Cheers, Ron At 09:42 PM 3/1/2003, Tim Dierks wrote: At 01:39 PM 2/27/2003 -0500, R. A. Hettinga wrote: At 9:01 AM -0500 on 2/27/03, BNA Highlights wrote: > WIRETAP ACT DOES NOT COVER MESSAGE 'IN STORAGE' FOR SHORT > PERIOD > BNA's Electronic Commerce & Law Report reports that a > federal court in Massachusetts has ruled that the federal > Wiretap Act does not prohibit the improper acquisition of > electronic communications that were "in storage" no matter > how ephemeral that storage may be. The court relied on Konop > v. Hawaiian Airlines Inc., which held that no Wiretap Act > violation occurs when an electronic communication is > accessed while in storage, "even if the interception takes > place during a nanosecond 'juncture' of storage along the > path of transmission." Case name is U.S. v. Councilman. > Article at > <http://pubs.bna.com/ip/BNA/eip.nsf/is/a0a6m6y1k8> > For a free trial to source of this story, visit > http://web.bna.com/products/ip/eplr.htm This would seem to imply to me that the wiretap act does not apply to any normal telephone conversation which is carried at any point in its transit by an electronic switch, including all cell phone calls and nearly all wireline calls, since any such switch places the data of the ongoing call in "storage" for a tiny fraction of a second. - Tim - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED] Ronald L. Rivest Room 324, 200 Technology Square, Cambridge MA 02139 Tel 617-253-5880, Fax 617-258-9738, Email <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Wiretap Act Does Not Cover Message 'in Storage' For Short Period (was Re: BNA's Internet Law News (ILN) - 2/27/03)
At 01:39 PM 2/27/2003 -0500, R. A. Hettinga wrote: At 9:01 AM -0500 on 2/27/03, BNA Highlights wrote: > WIRETAP ACT DOES NOT COVER MESSAGE 'IN STORAGE' FOR SHORT > PERIOD > BNA's Electronic Commerce & Law Report reports that a > federal court in Massachusetts has ruled that the federal > Wiretap Act does not prohibit the improper acquisition of > electronic communications that were "in storage" no matter > how ephemeral that storage may be. The court relied on Konop > v. Hawaiian Airlines Inc., which held that no Wiretap Act > violation occurs when an electronic communication is > accessed while in storage, "even if the interception takes > place during a nanosecond 'juncture' of storage along the > path of transmission." Case name is U.S. v. Councilman. > Article at > <http://pubs.bna.com/ip/BNA/eip.nsf/is/a0a6m6y1k8> > For a free trial to source of this story, visit > http://web.bna.com/products/ip/eplr.htm This would seem to imply to me that the wiretap act does not apply to any normal telephone conversation which is carried at any point in its transit by an electronic switch, including all cell phone calls and nearly all wireline calls, since any such switch places the data of the ongoing call in "storage" for a tiny fraction of a second. - Tim - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Wiretap Act Does Not Cover Message 'in Storage' For Short Period (was Re: BNA's Internet Law News (ILN) - 2/27/03)
At 9:01 AM -0500 on 2/27/03, BNA Highlights wrote: > WIRETAP ACT DOES NOT COVER MESSAGE 'IN STORAGE' FOR SHORT > PERIOD > BNA's Electronic Commerce & Law Report reports that a > federal court in Massachusetts has ruled that the federal > Wiretap Act does not prohibit the improper acquisition of > electronic communications that were "in storage" no matter > how ephemeral that storage may be. The court relied on Konop > v. Hawaiian Airlines Inc., which held that no Wiretap Act > violation occurs when an electronic communication is > accessed while in storage, "even if the interception takes > place during a nanosecond 'juncture' of storage along the > path of transmission." Case name is U.S. v. Councilman. > Article at > <http://pubs.bna.com/ip/BNA/eip.nsf/is/a0a6m6y1k8> > For a free trial to source of this story, visit > http://web.bna.com/products/ip/eplr.htm -- - R. A. Hettinga The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' -- - R. A. Hettinga The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
