Re: FWD: Squirrelmail XSS + SQL security bug?

2004-07-06 Thread Román Medina

Hi Jeroen,

 Sam, could you please forward you incoming mail about security issues to
 someone who has more time to look into it?

Well, I wouldn't lose time doing so. Better to upgrade to latest 1.4.3a.
Yes, contrary to the Debian backporting policy, but in this case there
are sufficient reasons to make the exception (and it's less intrusive
than completely removing SM from Woody, as I listened before). I wouldn't
trust an old 1.2.6 version; not without some guarantees than SM team would
provide a detailed info of applied security fixes. And that's not the
case, as stated by Matt. In this case, I agree with him: SM team should
make a little effort to document such bugs instead of silently patching. I
told this to SM developpers when I contacted them one month ago. Security
through obscurity is not good at all.

 I disclosed in a _detailed way_ several bugs:
 [RS-2004-1] http://www.rs-labs.com/adv/RS-Labs-Advisory-2004-1.txt

 This wasn't reported in the Debian BTS.

I was unaware of Debian BTS when I reported the vuln. Anyway, it should be
sufficient to notify it to security email address. People who reports
security bugs doesn't necesarily need to know about bug tracking systems
or the way a vendor archives or deals with a reported bug.

Moreover, security teams should monitorize public security mailing-lists
like Bugtraq. So if the usual communication channels fail (for instance,
e-mail to security address), at least you are aware of public vulns) (and
then you can feed your internal / external BTS, or act as whatever you
want).

 I (the person uploading that version) was not aware of this, partly
 because you didn't file a bug in the BTS about this. Note however that

As I have told, to file a bug is not my duty (although I would have made
it if I had known of BTS' existence). I reported the bug to SM developpers
(_before_ making it public, that's important, and letting sufficient time
for the bug to be fixed) and also to Debian maintainer _as a courtesy_ (I
don't have the time nor resources to notify all distros which use SM; I
did the exception with Debian because I use Debian and I like it).

 - I don't know whether or not the old XSS bugs which I reported to
 affect
 Debian Woody (read RS-2004-1) are still uncovered. I'm afraid it is...

 Thanks for the direct pointer, I assume you did contact
 [EMAIL PROTECTED] about this?

I should check my outbox to verify this (I think I placed
[EMAIL PROTECTED] in cc). In all cases:
- You can assume _at least_ Debian maintainer (Sam) was notified.
- I recall to have talked about this with Matt, so I assume he is / was
also aware of this. Indeed he replied in a public mailing-list to my
advisory post so he should read it:
http://seclists.org/lists/fulldisclosure/2004/Jun/0029.html

 Also, statements like this won't help you very much if you want a
 serious resonse:

 | Please, learn the lesson and repeat with me: Debian stable software
 | is not always as secure as we usually thought. Oddly enough, Debian
 | unstable was free of these bugs :-)

This is my personal opinion and I'm free to think like this. I'm not
imposing anything.

 But Debian unstable keeps getting lots of other bugs, so is often no
 alternative :)

Well, from security perspective I prefer unstable. Same applies to
usability perspective (I don't like outdated versions of certain
software). Again this is my personal opinion. I respect Debian Woody
policy but I don't support it. Better not to speak about this (flame-war
risk! :-)).

 If Debian isn't notified of security bugs, they can't fix them. Weird

Don't blame me. Your statement is easily refutable: If Debian maintainers
don't answer to important mails (I know the email address was fine because
I previosly had contacted Sam using the same method; and I insisted trying
to re-contact) and Debian security team is unaware of public security
mailing-lists (or they answer to certain threads without reading the
original post :-?) it's not my fault. Please, don't start the war. I'm
only defending my position :)

 that you here claim unstable was free of these bugs, while above you
 claim Debian unstable _had_ these bugs at the time of your advisory. So,
 which one of the two is it? Or are there more issues involved than the
 ones detailed in RS-2004-1?

Please, read my adv with more attention. Let's quote from it:
* From summary part:
A vulnerability has been discovered in SM... --- This is the NEW bug.
As a side effect of my research I discovered that older known SM flaws were
still present in latest Debian stable (Woody) package. I will also discuss
them here (there is no need to issue another advisory only for that ;-)).
But _please note_ that if I don't explicitly mention it, I will always be
referring to the new (and recently discovered) bug. --- I mention the
old bugs too and clearly referred to Woody.
* From Affected versions:
The (new) bug could be reproduced with latest version of SM (both stable
and devel branchs) (*). In particular:
- 

Re: FWD: Squirrelmail XSS + SQL security bug?

2004-07-06 Thread Jeroen van Wolffelaar
On Tue, Jul 06, 2004 at 12:47:21PM +0200, Rom?n Medina wrote:
 
 Hi Jeroen,
 
  Sam, could you please forward you incoming mail about security issues to
  someone who has more time to look into it?
 
 Well, I wouldn't lose time doing so. Better to upgrade to latest 1.4.3a.
 Yes, contrary to the Debian backporting policy, but in this case there
 are sufficient reasons to make the exception (and it's less intrusive
 than completely removing SM from Woody, as I listened before). I wouldn't
 trust an old 1.2.6 version; not without some guarantees than SM team would
 provide a detailed info of applied security fixes. And that's not the
 case, as stated by Matt. In this case, I agree with him: SM team should
 make a little effort to document such bugs instead of silently patching. I
 told this to SM developpers when I contacted them one month ago. Security
 through obscurity is not good at all.

I agree with what you say about the SM team, as much as getting a
cc/forward of commit mails that fix a security issue, would already be
great.

Simply putting a new major upstream release (1.4.x instead of 1.2.x)
won't be accepted for a security update, and also because XSS issues
are not that a severe issue, I don't think there is any reason to remove
1.2.x from woody. Those XSS, and especially the SQL injection needs to
be fixed though.

Thanks for your very detailed mail, I'll look into it w.r.t. remaining
woody issues. I also saw three CVE's assigned to squirrelmail in 2004,
none of them have been patched by Debian. I'll trace that down.

  I disclosed in a _detailed way_ several bugs:
  [RS-2004-1] http://www.rs-labs.com/adv/RS-Labs-Advisory-2004-1.txt
 
  This wasn't reported in the Debian BTS.
 
 I was unaware of Debian BTS when I reported the vuln. Anyway, it should be
 sufficient to notify it to security email address. People who reports
 security bugs doesn't necesarily need to know about bug tracking systems
 or the way a vendor archives or deals with a reported bug.
 
 Moreover, security teams should monitorize public security mailing-lists
 like Bugtraq. So if the usual communication channels fail (for instance,
 e-mail to security address), at least you are aware of public vulns) (and
 then you can feed your internal / external BTS, or act as whatever you
 want).

I fully agree with you, sorry, I didn't intend to 'blame' you for not
reporting it in the BTS. It would have made things easier/go faster, but
I agree, it is by no means your fault it didn't happen. It'd be
appreciated if you could do so though.
 
  I (the person uploading that version) was not aware of this, partly
  because you didn't file a bug in the BTS about this. Note however that
 
 As I have told, to file a bug is not my duty (although I would have made
 it if I had known of BTS' existence). I reported the bug to SM developpers
 (_before_ making it public, that's important, and letting sufficient time
 for the bug to be fixed) and also to Debian maintainer _as a courtesy_ (I
 don't have the time nor resources to notify all distros which use SM; I
 did the exception with Debian because I use Debian and I like it).

Then the problem was with Debian internally, that this wasn't
forwarded/fixed... again, sorry for insinuating you should have filed a
bug :)
 
  - I don't know whether or not the old XSS bugs which I reported to
  affect
  Debian Woody (read RS-2004-1) are still uncovered. I'm afraid it is...
 
  Thanks for the direct pointer, I assume you did contact
  [EMAIL PROTECTED] about this?
 
 I should check my outbox to verify this (I think I placed
 [EMAIL PROTECTED] in cc). In all cases:
 - You can assume _at least_ Debian maintainer (Sam) was notified.

...

 - I recall to have talked about this with Matt, so I assume he is / was
 also aware of this. Indeed he replied in a public mailing-list to my
 advisory post so he should read it:
 http://seclists.org/lists/fulldisclosure/2004/Jun/0029.html

I don't know what happened to this. In answer to this question of yours:

http://seclists.org/lists/fulldisclosure/2004/Jun/0046.html
| 
| #ifdef _security_perspective_
| #define usual_channels bugtraq other_lists
| #endif
| #ifdef _devel_perspective_
| #define usual_channels changelog_file
| #endif
| printf(My usual channels are: %s, usual_channels);
| 
| It was some kind of pseudocode :-) Question: which perspective are
| using Debian maintainers to monitorize their packages? In the
| particular case of SM, the old XSS issues were listed in ChangeLog,
| but .deb package was not updated. Why?

Debian maintainers should monitor upstream, especially changelogs of new
versions, and preferable also upstream devel mailinglists.

The .deb package was not updated because the Debian maintainer for
squirrelmail was too busy, why the security team didn't update woody
yet, maybe they were too busy too. I have a suggestion how to
potentially improve this, I'll send a separate mail about it.

  But Debian unstable keeps getting lots of other 

Re: Bug#257165: udev: input device permissions

2004-07-06 Thread Rick Moen
Quoting Itay Ben-Yaacov ([EMAIL PROTECTED]):

 Now, people using sid accept the potential consequences, but the
 consequences for sarge should be somewhat lesser...

Actually, the consequences for sarge (while it's still the testing
branch) will tend generally to be somewhat _greater_ than for sid, since
it benefits from neither guaranteed Security Team support (stable
branch) nor from immediate release of maintainer uploads (unstable
branch).  Anyone who runs the testing branch implicitly undertakes to 
stay on top of needed security updates via whatever manual
administrative oversight works for that sysadmin's local system.  Caveat
user.

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Rick Moen woman she meets, and then teams up with three complete strangers
[EMAIL PROTECTED]   to kill again.  -- Rick Polito's That TV Guy column,
  describing the movie _The Wizard of Oz_


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Proposal/suggestion for security team w.r.t. published vulerabilities

2004-07-06 Thread Jeroen van Wolffelaar
Hi,

As I promised in [1], a suggestion for the Debian security team.

Since the security team is generally very busy sorting out any kind of
vulnerability, sometimes fixes can take a little bit longer than usual,
especially if the impact is relatively low.

Taking the Social Contracts 'We will not hide problems', and those
vulerabilities that have already been made public, I think it'd be a
good idea if the security team, once a vulnerability is already made
public, for example via a Bugtraq or something, or some other
vendor/upstream announced it, files a bug (tag woody usually I guess) in
the BTS about it. There is no longer reason to hide the problem, i.e.,
keep it away from the BTS once it is published. This also enables other
people to

1) see there is a security defect in that package in woody
2) help solving it by adding patches, so the security team only has to
check the patches

As an example, take CAN-2004-0519, CAN-2004-0520 and CAN-2004-0521, all
three not yet solved in woody, but also not filed in the BTS (hm, two of
them directly refer to a patch[2][3] solving it...).


Therefore, I'd like to ask the security team to file grave bugs with
security+woody on packages for which a vulnerability has been made
public, and a security announcement isn't nearly-ready. I can't imagine
this would interfere too much with the issue tracker or whatever the
security team internally uses to track issues.

Or is there some reason filing bugs like I described here isn't
wanted?

--Jeroen

[1] http://lists.debian.org/debian-security/2004/07/msg00030.html
[2] http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=squirrelmail-cvsm=108532891231712
[3] http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=squirrelmail-cvsm=108309375029888

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Re: Proposal/suggestion for security team w.r.t. published vulerabilities

2004-07-06 Thread Michael Stone
On Tue, Jul 06, 2004 at 08:06:36PM +0200, Jeroen van Wolffelaar wrote:
As an example, take CAN-2004-0519, CAN-2004-0520 and CAN-2004-0521, all
three not yet solved in woody, but also not filed in the BTS (hm, two of
them directly refer to a patch[2][3] solving it...).
Go ahead and file the bug.
Mike Stone
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Re: Proposal/suggestion for security team w.r.t. published vulerabilities

2004-07-06 Thread Jeroen van Wolffelaar
On Tue, Jul 06, 2004 at 03:08:38PM -0400, Michael Stone wrote:
 On Tue, Jul 06, 2004 at 08:06:36PM +0200, Jeroen van Wolffelaar wrote:
 As an example, take CAN-2004-0519, CAN-2004-0520 and CAN-2004-0521, all
 three not yet solved in woody, but also not filed in the BTS (hm, two of
 them directly refer to a patch[2][3] solving it...).
 
 Go ahead and file the bug.

mdz told me this isn't done for practical reasons: the BTS isn't very
suitable for tracking which versions are affected, and a sid upload can
close such a bug while it's still in woody. While I think it'd still be
possible without too much hassle, if they don't want to do so, I'm not
going to interfere in that.

For those two bugs, I'm simply mailing the security team myself, maybe
also file a bug, don't know yet.

--Jeroen

-- 
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Re: Proposal/suggestion for security team w.r.t. published vulerabilities

2004-07-06 Thread Matt Zimmerman
On Tue, Jul 06, 2004 at 09:13:18PM +0200, Jeroen van Wolffelaar wrote:

 On Tue, Jul 06, 2004 at 03:08:38PM -0400, Michael Stone wrote:
  On Tue, Jul 06, 2004 at 08:06:36PM +0200, Jeroen van Wolffelaar wrote:
  As an example, take CAN-2004-0519, CAN-2004-0520 and CAN-2004-0521, all
  three not yet solved in woody, but also not filed in the BTS (hm, two of
  them directly refer to a patch[2][3] solving it...).
  
  Go ahead and file the bug.
 
 mdz told me this isn't done for practical reasons: the BTS isn't very
 suitable for tracking which versions are affected, and a sid upload can
 close such a bug while it's still in woody. While I think it'd still be
 possible without too much hassle, if they don't want to do so, I'm not
 going to interfere in that.
 
 For those two bugs, I'm simply mailing the security team myself, maybe
 also file a bug, don't know yet.

You are free to file a bug, and sometimes this helps to get a response from
the maintainer; just note that these bugs will generally not be used by the
security team for tracking the status of the vulnerabilities.

-- 
 - mdz


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Re: Proposal/suggestion for security team w.r.t. published vulerabilities

2004-07-06 Thread Bernd Eckenfels
In article [EMAIL PROTECTED] you wrote:
 mdz told me this isn't done for practical reasons: the BTS isn't very
 suitable for tracking which versions are affected, and a sid upload can
 close such a bug while it's still in woody. While I think it'd still be
 possible without too much hassle, if they don't want to do so, I'm not
 going to interfere in that.

Well, I guess anybody is free to open bugs against packages if they hear
about vulnerabilities. I guess this even might help in some cases. But I
dont think security team can publish received vendor alerts before going
public date. Effectively this is hiding, but on the other hand it is also
respecting the wishes and requests of others. And not honoring them will
quickly lead to debian beeing cut-off from those alerts. So thats why
unpublished alerts are not posted.

Greetings
Bernd
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Project Freefire - http://www.freefire.org/


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Re: Proposal/suggestion for security team w.r.t. published vulerabilities

2004-07-06 Thread Jeroen van Wolffelaar
On Tue, Jul 06, 2004 at 10:39:09PM +0200, Bernd Eckenfels wrote:
 In article [EMAIL PROTECTED] you wrote:
  mdz told me this isn't done for practical reasons: the BTS isn't very
  suitable for tracking which versions are affected, and a sid upload can
  close such a bug while it's still in woody. While I think it'd still be
  possible without too much hassle, if they don't want to do so, I'm not
  going to interfere in that.
 
 Well, I guess anybody is free to open bugs against packages if they hear
 about vulnerabilities. I guess this even might help in some cases. But I
 dont think security team can publish received vendor alerts before going
 public date. Effectively this is hiding, but on the other hand it is also
 respecting the wishes and requests of others. And not honoring them will
 quickly lead to debian beeing cut-off from those alerts. So thats why
 unpublished alerts are not posted.

I'm only talking about published issues, of course, unpublished ones
shouldn't go into the BTS.

Having the security team file bugs for _published_ issues, will make
part of the work of the security team, managing which vulernabilities
exist and apply to woody, and aren't fixed yet, also available to
non-security team members, who then can possibly more effectively help on
security issues. I'll post a list of a few of such issues here later
tonight, that are exactly issues that could have been filed in the BTS.

--Jeroen

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Re: Bug#257165: udev: input device permissions

2004-07-06 Thread Mezig
Rick Moen wrote:
Quoting Itay Ben-Yaacov ([EMAIL PROTECTED]):
 

Now, people using sid accept the potential consequences, but the
consequences for sarge should be somewhat lesser...
   

Actually, the consequences for sarge (while it's still the testing
branch) will tend generally to be somewhat _greater_ than for sid, since
it benefits from neither guaranteed Security Team support (stable
branch) nor from immediate release of maintainer uploads (unstable
branch).  Anyone who runs the testing branch implicitly undertakes to 
stay on top of needed security updates via whatever manual
administrative oversight works for that sysadmin's local system.  Caveat
user.
 

Hi
1- Why if Itay, find a solution for the problem we had, doesn't it offer 
his solution to the community ; ethen, if he is on a single user machine ?

2 - Sorry, it's maybee a naive question, but as new Debian user, i'm 
very well-willing in the way or the Debian Free spirit tend to work :) !

3 - Don't be upset, if i'm wrong :(!
Note - I'm personnaly on an upgraded Knoppix 3.2, then sid.., to an 
almost sarge now, but considered - maybee am'i wrong ? - to be still a 
'testing'... ?
Everything works very fine, for instance and i'm realy positively 
astonished of it's 'stability'... :) ! And i first used a Mandrake, form 
The 7. to the 9.1., if you see what i mean about the 'spirit' ?

So, thanks for all the works you are doing andd soon maybee shall'i bee 
helpfull for something, out of translations ?

Sheers
Mi

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Re: Proposal/suggestion for security team w.r.t. published vulerabilities

2004-07-06 Thread Javier Fernández-Sanguino Peña
On Tue, Jul 06, 2004 at 08:06:36PM +0200, Jeroen van Wolffelaar wrote:
 Hi,
 
 As I promised in [1], a suggestion for the Debian security team.
 
 Since the security team is generally very busy sorting out any kind of
 vulnerability, sometimes fixes can take a little bit longer than usual,
 especially if the impact is relatively low.

Funny, you are observing that the security team is overworked and you 
suggest adding Yet Another Thing To Do (tm) to their list.

 Therefore, I'd like to ask the security team to file grave bugs with
 security+woody on packages for which a vulnerability has been made
 public, and a security announcement isn't nearly-ready. I can't imagine
 this would interfere too much with the issue tracker or whatever the
 security team internally uses to track issues.

Why does the security team have to do this? Anybody can do it. BTS reports
can serve as a reminder or as a way to inform both the maintainer and the
security team for known vulnerabilities. It also helps users who might
track bugs related to woody and, even now in a time close to release, it 
might help track bugs in sarge so that we don't ship a new release with 
software that includes security vulnerabilities.

Actually, the security team will probably appreciate bug submitters to do
the following:

1.- include a CVE name (in order to discriminate vulnerabilities to
previous ones). After all we _are_ CVE compatible (almost all DSAs include
CVE names)

2.- tag the bug based on the version that is vulnerable (woody, sarge, sid,
or all/some of them). Sometimes you might need to actually check out the 
code to see if the version in stable is vulnerable.

3.- provide a patch for the stable release

I know that the security team will probably appreciate if all this work is
done for publicly known vulnerabilities. A bug submitter  should make an 
effort (if he wants to help out the security team and not hinder it) to 
provide more info than just a Bugtraq post (which are in many cases 
incomplete or are simply not correct/true/relevant). He should also made an 
effort to review http://www.debian.org/security/nonvulns-woody and see if 
the issue has already been determined _not_ to affect woody.

 Or is there some reason filing bugs like I described here isn't
 wanted?

None I know of. Actually, there are bugs open in the BTS tagged 'security'
that might get a DSA when the security team finds the time to do it. There
are priorities regarding which packages should get DSAs first and there are
some packages, like the kernel, which are not that easy to publish DSAs
for.

The security team will probably appreciate people giving a hand in 
debugging these issues in detail (as opposed to just forwarding a Bugtraq 
mail)

Regards

Javier

PS: I don't imply that I do this myself correctly every time, I've probably 
reported security bugs incorrectly a number of times, these are just some 
good practice guidelines I believe bug submitters should adhere to.



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Re: Bug#257165: udev: input device permissions

2004-07-06 Thread Rick Moen
Quoting Mezig ([EMAIL PROTECTED]):

 1- Why if Itay, find a solution for the problem we had, doesn't it offer 
 his solution to the community ; ethen, if he is on a single user machine ?

That would be good.  I was only addressing Itay's assertion that the
consequences for sarge should be somewhat lesser.  That turns out not
to be the case (for now, while sarge = testing).

 Note - I'm personnaly on an upgraded Knoppix 3.2, then sid.., to an 
 almost sarge now, but considered - maybee am'i wrong ? - to be still a 
 'testing'... ?

Knoppix at any given point appears to be not-quite-sid, with maybe 10%
stable and 10% Something Else Entirely.  (I applaud your enthusiasm, and
don't mean to denigrate what you're using.  I'm just trying to describe
it accurately.)

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Re: Proposal/suggestion for security team w.r.t. published vulerabilities

2004-07-06 Thread Michael Stone
On Tue, Jul 06, 2004 at 11:51:21PM +0200, Jeroen van Wolffelaar wrote:
security issues. I'll post a list of a few of such issues here later
tonight, that are exactly issues that could have been filed in the BTS.
If you really have so much time I'm sure you can find better things to
do than post lists of things that could have been filed in the BTS. Such
as, for example, filing a patch in the BTS?
Mike Stone
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