Re: Firefox? Re: Secret Storage API specification project

2009-07-13 Thread Anders Rundgren

Ian G wrote:

On 12/7/09 21:58, Anders Rundgren wrote:

Nelson B Bolyard wrote:

On 2009-07-12 05:51 PDT, Anders Rundgren wrote:

This is an interesting project.

What's not completely obvious is how this relates (or could relate) to
for example Firefox.

I must confess that I know absolutely nothing about NSS but I assume
that the soft-token uses obfuscation and an *optional* password as
the sole protection mechanism.


Why would you assume such a silly thing?


I'm not aware of any other methods for securing soft (file-based) 
secrets

unless you go under the skin of the operating system.



I think he means, the password and the encrypted store are next to 
each other on the disk, which reduces to obfuscation.


Whereas, afaik, Firefox doesn't do that, it insists that the user 
enter a password in, so the decrypted stuff is in memory only.


People who complain about that are completely right from a perfect 
security viewpoint, but are dead wrong from a market security 
viewpoint.  The platform that people use is a computer as delivered 
according to that old IBM spec -- disk drive, memory, CPU.


A tiny percentage know about things call trusted tokens, etc, but they 
are irrelevant to Mozilla's market.


So, in this case, Mozilla's products are more or less where we want 
them to be:  using a software encrypted store (with a stupid name) and 
having the user decrypt them when she starts it up.




iang
As I wrote in the initial posting, I know nothing about the inner 
workings of NSS.  AFAICT, the mentioned Secret Storage project would be 
redundant if NSS already uses the operating system to protect secrets, 
particularly since NSS is said to be a part of Linux.  Regarding 
passwords, by default Firefox does not require a password in order to 
use soft tokens.


Anders
still not enlightened
--
dev-tech-crypto mailing list
dev-tech-crypto@lists.mozilla.org
https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-tech-crypto


Re: Firefox? Re: Secret Storage API specification project

2009-07-12 Thread Nelson B Bolyard
On 2009-07-12 05:51 PDT, Anders Rundgren wrote:
 This is an interesting project.
 
 What's not completely obvious is how this relates (or could relate) to
 for example Firefox.
 
 I must confess that I know absolutely nothing about NSS but I assume
 that the soft-token uses obfuscation and an *optional* password as
 the sole protection mechanism.

Why would you assume such a silly thing?
-- 
dev-tech-crypto mailing list
dev-tech-crypto@lists.mozilla.org
https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-tech-crypto


Re: Firefox? Re: Secret Storage API specification project

2009-07-12 Thread Ian G

On 12/7/09 21:58, Anders Rundgren wrote:

Nelson B Bolyard wrote:

On 2009-07-12 05:51 PDT, Anders Rundgren wrote:

This is an interesting project.

What's not completely obvious is how this relates (or could relate) to
for example Firefox.

I must confess that I know absolutely nothing about NSS but I assume
that the soft-token uses obfuscation and an *optional* password as
the sole protection mechanism.


Why would you assume such a silly thing?


I'm not aware of any other methods for securing soft (file-based) secrets
unless you go under the skin of the operating system.



I think he means, the password and the encrypted store are next to each 
other on the disk, which reduces to obfuscation.


Whereas, afaik, Firefox doesn't do that, it insists that the user enter 
a password in, so the decrypted stuff is in memory only.


People who complain about that are completely right from a perfect 
security viewpoint, but are dead wrong from a market security 
viewpoint.  The platform that people use is a computer as delivered 
according to that old IBM spec -- disk drive, memory, CPU.


A tiny percentage know about things call trusted tokens, etc, but they 
are irrelevant to Mozilla's market.


So, in this case, Mozilla's products are more or less where we want them 
to be:  using a software encrypted store (with a stupid name) and having 
the user decrypt them when she starts it up.




iang
--
dev-tech-crypto mailing list
dev-tech-crypto@lists.mozilla.org
https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-tech-crypto