Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-12-11 Thread Norman Samish
Hal,
You state, "Most mathematical proofs are too complex to be judged by 
other than the belief of the majority of mathematicians."  That's an 
interesting observation, and it shows that much of what we take as "proven," 
from math to religion, is something that we accept as true because 
authorities have said it's true.
It's certainly true that if a majority of mathematicians (or TOE 
theorists) claim that something that I don't understand is proven, then I'll 
accept it as proven UNLESS the "proof" is inconsistent.  By inconsistent I 
mean that if a set of formulae can be used to prove a contradiction, they 
are inconsistent.  I suppose that definition is the same as Bruno's.  Is 
that what you mean by inconsistent?
In any case, just because fifty million Frenchmen, mathematicians, TOE 
theorists, or True Believers of one sort or another, say that something is 
true, doesn't make it true.
And I don't believe that anything can be both true and inconsistent.
Norman


- Original Message - 
From: "Hal Ruhl" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Saturday, December 11, 2004 2:14 PM
Subject: Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model


Hi Norman:

I suppose a person would hope that a theory they propose is in some way
global but I was talking about the idea that "belief" is a factor in
mathematical as well as other discourse.

Bruno said in an earlier post in this thread:

"A proposition P is logically possible, relatively to
1) a consistent set of beliefs A
2) the choice of a deduction system D (and then consistent
 means "does not derive 0=1)."

Most mathematical proofs are too complex to be judged by other than the
belief of the majority of mathematicians.

Hal 




Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-12-11 Thread Jesse Mazer
Hal Ruhl wrote:
You wrote:
Well, what I get from your answer is that you're justifying the idea 
that the All is inconsistent in terms of your own concept of "evolving 
Somethings", not in terms of inconsistent axiomatic systems.
Just the reverse.  The evolving Somethings inevitably encompass the 
inconsistencies within the All [all those inconsistent systems [self or 
pairwise] each with their full spectrum of unselected "meaning".  That is 
why the Somethings evolve randomly and inconsistently.
OK, since I don't really understand your system I should have said something 
more general, like "you're justifying the idea that the All is inconsistent 
in terms of your own theoretical framework, not in terms of inconsistent 
axiomatic systems". So, again, you don't have any way of showing to a person 
who doesn't share your theoretical framework in the first place that 
"everything", i.e. the All, need be inconsistent.

I do not believe in TOE's that start with the natural numbers - where did 
that info come from?
I don't consider that to be "information" because it seems logically 
impossible that a statement such as "one plus one equals two" could be 
false. You might as well ask, "where do the laws of logic come from"? Do you 
consider the laws of logic to be "information"? If you don't think the laws 
of logic can be taken for granted, you could just solve the information 
problem by saying it is simultaneously true that there is "something rather 
than nothing" and also "nothing rather than something", even though these 
facts are contradictory.

If you grant that the "laws" of logic and mathematics contain no information 
because there is no possible world in which they could be otherwise, then 
you could always adopt a theory like Tegmark's which just says that the 
"everything" consists of all possible mathematical structures, although you 
might still have a problem with picking a measure on these structures if you 
want a notion of probability (to solve things like the 'white rabbit 
problem'), and if there is any element of choice in picking the measure that 
would be form of arbitrariness or "information" (see my post at 
http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m2606.html ).

Jesse



Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-12-11 Thread Hal Ruhl
Hi Norman:
I suppose a person would hope that a theory they propose is in some way 
global but I was talking about the idea that "belief" is a factor in 
mathematical as well as other discourse.

Bruno said in an earlier post in this thread:
"A proposition P is logically possible, relatively to
1) a consistent set of beliefs A
2) the choice of a deduction system D (and then consistent
means "does not derive 0=1)."
Most mathematical proofs are too complex to be judged by other than the 
belief of the majority of mathematicians.

Hal
At 03:44 PM 12/11/2004, you wrote:
Hal,
With reference to your "inconsistent" TOE model (which I do not claim to
understand), you state "My approach solves these issues for ME . . ."   You
also state "All universes over and over is in my belief system more
satisfying and may be able to put some handle on ideas such as "self aware"
and "free will" etc. at least for ME.  As to the individual beliefs,
understandings, or needs of others I can not speak."  (My capitalizations.)
Are you implying that your model is NOT "universal"?  Are you saying
that "reality" is subjective?
Norman
- Original Message -
From: "Hal Ruhl" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Saturday, December 11, 2004 11:56 AM
Subject: Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model
Hi Jesse
You wrote:
>>>Well, what I get from your answer is that you're justifying the idea
>>>that the All is inconsistent in terms of your own concept of "evolving
>>>Somethings", not in terms of inconsistent axiomatic systems.
Just the reverse.  The evolving Somethings inevitably encompass the
inconsistencies within the All [all those inconsistent systems [self or
pairwise] each with their full spectrum of unselected "meaning".  That is
why the Somethings evolve randomly and inconsistently.
>>>But in this case, someone who doesn't believe (or understand) your own
>>>theory in the first place need not agree that there's any reason to
>>>think a theory of everything would involve "everything" being
>>>inconsistent.
I do not believe in TOE's that assume structures such as just an Everything
thus yielding a theory with that assumption as irreducible
information.  After all where did that come from?
I do not believe in TOE's that assume a dynamic such as computers
simulating universes without a justification for a dynamic.
I do not believe in TOE's that start with the natural numbers - where did
that info come from?
If you select a particular meaning out of its spectrum of possible meanings
and assign it to a system is that not even more information in any such TOE?
My approach solves these issues for me and has only few small prices to pay:
Computer simulations or other dynamics will suffer random input.  But so
what?  For example a CA that tends to an attractor can be stabilized in a
reasonably self similar behavior off the attractor with the right amount of
random input.  Such an input to a universe is a decent explanation for an
accelerating expansion of that universe given a max info storage and a
fixed or increasing susceptibility to such input per unit volume.
One could not do a statistical extract of information [there is none] say
re why we find ourselves in this particular kind of universe.  But again so
what?  Why would that be a believable expectation of a TOE in the first
place?  All universes over and over is in my belief system more satisfying
and may be able to put some handle on ideas such as "self aware" and "free
will" etc. at least for me.
As to the individual beliefs, understandings, or needs of others I can not
speak.
Hal



Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-12-11 Thread Norman Samish
Hal,
With reference to your "inconsistent" TOE model (which I do not claim to 
understand), you state "My approach solves these issues for ME . . ."   You 
also state "All universes over and over is in my belief system more 
satisfying and may be able to put some handle on ideas such as "self aware" 
and "free will" etc. at least for ME.  As to the individual beliefs, 
understandings, or needs of others I can not speak."  (My capitalizations.)
Are you implying that your model is NOT "universal"?  Are you saying 
that "reality" is subjective?
Norman

- Original Message - 
From: "Hal Ruhl" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Saturday, December 11, 2004 11:56 AM
Subject: Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model


Hi Jesse

You wrote:

>>>Well, what I get from your answer is that you're justifying the idea
>>>that the All is inconsistent in terms of your own concept of "evolving
>>>Somethings", not in terms of inconsistent axiomatic systems.

Just the reverse.  The evolving Somethings inevitably encompass the
inconsistencies within the All [all those inconsistent systems [self or
pairwise] each with their full spectrum of unselected "meaning".  That is
why the Somethings evolve randomly and inconsistently.

>>>But in this case, someone who doesn't believe (or understand) your own
>>>theory in the first place need not agree that there's any reason to
>>>think a theory of everything would involve "everything" being 
>>>inconsistent.

I do not believe in TOE's that assume structures such as just an Everything
thus yielding a theory with that assumption as irreducible
information.  After all where did that come from?

I do not believe in TOE's that assume a dynamic such as computers
simulating universes without a justification for a dynamic.

I do not believe in TOE's that start with the natural numbers - where did
that info come from?

If you select a particular meaning out of its spectrum of possible meanings
and assign it to a system is that not even more information in any such TOE?

My approach solves these issues for me and has only few small prices to pay:

Computer simulations or other dynamics will suffer random input.  But so
what?  For example a CA that tends to an attractor can be stabilized in a
reasonably self similar behavior off the attractor with the right amount of
random input.  Such an input to a universe is a decent explanation for an
accelerating expansion of that universe given a max info storage and a
fixed or increasing susceptibility to such input per unit volume.

One could not do a statistical extract of information [there is none] say
re why we find ourselves in this particular kind of universe.  But again so
what?  Why would that be a believable expectation of a TOE in the first
place?  All universes over and over is in my belief system more satisfying
and may be able to put some handle on ideas such as "self aware" and "free
will" etc. at least for me.

As to the individual beliefs, understandings, or needs of others I can not
speak.

Hal








Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-12-11 Thread Hal Ruhl
Hi Jesse
You wrote:
Well, what I get from your answer is that you're justifying the idea 
that the All is inconsistent in terms of your own concept of "evolving 
Somethings", not in terms of inconsistent axiomatic systems.
Just the reverse.  The evolving Somethings inevitably encompass the 
inconsistencies within the All [all those inconsistent systems [self or 
pairwise] each with their full spectrum of unselected "meaning".  That is 
why the Somethings evolve randomly and inconsistently.

But in this case, someone who doesn't believe (or understand) your own 
theory in the first place need not agree that there's any reason to 
think a theory of everything would involve "everything" being inconsistent.
I do not believe in TOE's that assume structures such as just an Everything 
thus yielding a theory with that assumption as irreducible 
information.  After all where did that come from?

I do not believe in TOE's that assume a dynamic such as computers 
simulating universes without a justification for a dynamic.

I do not believe in TOE's that start with the natural numbers - where did 
that info come from?

If you select a particular meaning out of its spectrum of possible meanings 
and assign it to a system is that not even more information in any such TOE?

My approach solves these issues for me and has only few small prices to pay:
Computer simulations or other dynamics will suffer random input.  But so 
what?  For example a CA that tends to an attractor can be stabilized in a 
reasonably self similar behavior off the attractor with the right amount of 
random input.  Such an input to a universe is a decent explanation for an 
accelerating expansion of that universe given a max info storage and a 
fixed or increasing susceptibility to such input per unit volume.

One could not do a statistical extract of information [there is none] say 
re why we find ourselves in this particular kind of universe.  But again so 
what?  Why would that be a believable expectation of a TOE in the first 
place?  All universes over and over is in my belief system more satisfying 
and may be able to put some handle on ideas such as "self aware" and "free 
will" etc. at least for me.

As to the individual beliefs, understandings, or needs of others I can not 
speak.

Hal