Re: Natural Order & Belief
Sorry, John. I set your subscription to "no email" thinking you wanted to unsubscribe. I've changed it back now. For future reference you can check your subscription status at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/subscribe. - Original Message - From: Kim Jones To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Saturday, December 16, 2006 8:19 AM Subject: Re: Natural Order & Belief Dear John, This is ancient history judging from the post date. Just the same - I saw a post from you some time ago with the single word in the subject line "unsubscribe". I'm not dreaming - I saw it. Did you lean on the big, bright yellow unsubscribe button by mistake? Kim Jones On 16/12/2006, at 8:53 AM, John M wrote: Dear list: this was the last post I received (I think I am subscribed) Have I been (or the list?) terminated? John Mikes - Original Message - From: Bruno Marchal To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Tuesday, November 21, 2006 5:27 AM Subject: Re: Natural Order & Belief John, You are right, I was wrong. Those deeds are not contingent. They probably appears automatically when one give a name to God. Perhaps, "God" could be "defined" by this: it is the one which is such that once you give it a name or a definition trouble appears. Obviously such a sentence should not be taken to much literally (if we do we are led to an obvious inconsistency). So, from now on, each time I use the word "God" it will means the impersonal big unnameable 0-person point of view, that is Plotinus' ONE, and/or some of its possible arithmetical (set theoretical) interpretation(s), that is arithmetical truth (resp. set theoretical truth). I will recall the theory in my reply to Tom Caylor. Bruno Le 20-nov.-06, à 18:03, John M a écrit : > > Bruno: > How far Occident? Quetzealcoatle was not much better. > Orientals? did they care at all? they were occupied > with their lovers. Germanics and Scandinavians? no > better, not to spek about Maori, African, Hawaiian > etc. > requiring virgins to be thrown into the Volcano. The > priests of the smarter ones ate them. > Did you notice the Catholic homophag rite: "Take it > and eat it: it is my body. Drink it: it is my blood. > And literary thousands of protestant rites follow > suit. > Muslims cleaned that up, they concentrate on heavennly > sex (hueis). > Sorry if I hurt feelings. > John > > --- Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > >> >> >> Le 18-nov.-06, à 21:49, John M a écrit : >> >>> Why do the religions (almost all of them) depict a >> god after the worst >>> human >>> characters: jealous, flatterable, requiring praise >> and blind >>> obedience, >>> vengeful, irate, picking favorites, >>> even sadistic and not caring? Why does he punish >> for deeds done >>> exactly as >>> he created the sinner? >> >> >> I disagree with the "(almost all of them)". True, >> since a long time, in >> Occident, the main religions are based on such a >> "God", probably >> because he looks like the "terrifying father", very >> useful to >> manipulate people by fear and terror. >> >> But this is contingent, and eventually I take that >> sad contingent truth >> as a supplementary motivation to come back on >> "serious theology", by >> which I mean 3-person sharable theology (even if >> such a theology does >> talk about first person unsharable notion). >> >> Bruno >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> >> > > > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ No virus found in this incoming message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.409 / Virus Database: 268.14.11/543 - Release Date: 11/20/2006 --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order & Belief)
Bruno Marchal writes: > Le 15-déc.-06, à 02:04, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : > > > Who says the Nazis are wrong when they assert they are good? > > I was not saying that they were wrong. I was saying that they were bad. > > Who says this? All self-referentially correct machine sufficnetly rich > to prove elementary theorems in arithmetic. > > For showing this it is just enough to accept that the notion of > "goodness" is of a type having greater or equal complexity that the > notion of consistency or truth (which is intuitively reasonable). > > To sum up: a lobian machine saying "I am true" is false. (note that > saying "I am provable" makes it true by ... Lob's theorem itself!). > A lobian machine asserting "I am consistent" is inconsistent (Godel) > A lobian machine asserting "I am intelligent" is stupid, > A lobian machine asserting "I am stupid" is ... stupid too (beginners > are often wrong on this). > A lobian machine asserting "I am good" is bad, > A lobian machine asserting "I am bad" is bad (too!) > A lobian machine asserting "I am virtuous" provably lacks virtue. > (provably, not probably) > > Apparently self-referentially correct lobian machine are enough wise > for never attributing to themselves any "moral" quality. They cannot > judge their own defect in the matter. This doesn't help us decide what is good or bad though. "Good" and "bad" are just placeholders, like x and y. > > We could look at a particular incident where capital punishment was > > proposed, let's say > > for murder. Everyone might agree on the facts of the crime and the > > effects of executing > > the perpetrator, but still strongly disagree about whether it is right > > or wrong. So of course > > the capital punishment debate does involve rational discussion and > > maybe some people will > > switch sides if appropriate evidence is presented, but in the end you > > will have a situation > > where there is just disagreement on an axiom. > > Again this shows that good/bad is not different from true/false, even > just in arithmetic. Why is the consensus on arithmetic so much greater than the consensus on ethics and aesthetics? > Recall the admittedly counterintuitive truth (admitting the consistency > of Peano Arithmetic): the new theory obtained by adding to Peano > arithmetic the statement that Peano arithmetic is inconsistent, is a > consistent theory (albeit probably not "reasonable", but what does that > mean?). > > The elementary atoms of good and bad are related to what we have > "learned" since life begun, like drinking water is good, self-burning > is bad, or any elementary pleasure/pain qualia in company of some > amount of self-referential correctness. You can describe what is pleasant, what is more likely to lead to you continuing to live, what is more likely to lead to the survival of the species, what is more likely to lead to happy lives for most people: I have no problem with that. You can also define "good" as that which is more likely to bring these things about: that's how I define it personally. However, although there may be no disagreement on whether depriving a proportion of the population of food will make them unhappy, even on whether it will bring about the destruction of the species, someone who thinks differently to me could still say that the starvation policy is "good". For example, he could say that starvation is "noble" in a way which outweighs harm to the individual or the species, and that anyone who opposes the policy is actually doing terrible harm whilst honestly believing he is doing good. You would call the starvation advocate crazy, irrational, barbaric, and he would call you crazy, irrational and barbaric. However, neither of you is wrong about the facts and neither of you is making any errors in logic. And both "crazy" and "barbaric" necessarily have an element of cultural appropriateness in their definition. > >> But of course democracy does not > >> *necessarily* lead to the good. > > > > Just in that last sentence is the assumption that there is some other > > basis for > > the good than what the majority decides to say it is. > > > Yes, precisely. But because good/bad cannot be normative or even > defined, democracy works well in giving to the majority a way to revise > opinions after four years. "majority" by itself has nothing per se > related to "good". From Wikipedia: "In philosophy, normative is usually contrasted with positive, descriptive or explanatory when describing types of theories, beliefs, or statements. Descriptive (or constative) statements are falsifiable statements that attempt to describe reality. Normative statements, on the other hand, affirm how things should or ought to be, how to value them, which things are good or bad, which actions are right or wrong. > (BTW I do not favors any form of direct democracy, because by > controlling media you can make any majority decide wh
Re: computer pain
> > So your theory is that the electromagnetic field has an ability to learn which is not reflected in QED - it's some hitherto unknown aspect of the field and it doesn't show up in the field violating Maxwell's equations or > QED predictions? And further this aspect of the EM field is able to effect behavior - at least in brains? > > Apparently this aspect of the EM field is not affected by external fields; > otherwise thought processes would be affected by standing near power > lines and Van de Graf generators. It is essentially independent of EM fields as described by known physics. > > Brent Meeker > RE: 'EM fields that learn' The brain reconfigures itself according to learnt things. As the brain does this it alters the expression of electric fields in space. I don't call that 'electric fields learning'. RE: Etc This is not about electric fields. It's about rethinking the fabric of everything such that what we see electric fields doing in brain material becomes experiences. It's the answer to this question: "Given the EM dance we see in brain material, what sort of universe would make that 'experience', where 'experience' is a painting of what is 'not you'?" The answer to that question is not QED or QM or any other empirical law derived USING experience. Did you read the painting metaphor? I can't say it any clearer. Colin Hales --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Natural Order & Belief
Dear John, This is ancient history judging from the post date. Just the same - I saw a post from you some time ago with the single word in the subject line "unsubscribe". I'm not dreaming - I saw it. Did you lean on the big, bright yellow unsubscribe button by mistake? Kim Jones On 16/12/2006, at 8:53 AM, John M wrote: > Dear list: > this was the last post I received (I think I am subscribed) > Have I been (or the list?) terminated? > John Mikes > - Original Message - > From: Bruno Marchal > To: everything-list@googlegroups.com > Sent: Tuesday, November 21, 2006 5:27 AM > Subject: Re: Natural Order & Belief > > > John, > > You are right, I was wrong. Those deeds are not contingent. They > probably appears automatically when one give a name to God. > > Perhaps, "God" could be "defined" by this: it is the one which is such > that once you give it a name or a definition trouble appears. > > Obviously such a sentence should not be taken to much literally (if we > do we are led to an obvious inconsistency). > > So, from now on, each time I use the word "God" it will means the > impersonal big unnameable 0-person point of view, that is Plotinus' > ONE, and/or some of its possible arithmetical (set theoretical) > interpretation(s), that is arithmetical truth (resp. set theoretical > truth). > > I will recall the theory in my reply to Tom Caylor. > > Bruno > > > > > > Le 20-nov.-06, à 18:03, John M a écrit : > > > > > Bruno: > > How far Occident? Quetzealcoatle was not much better. > > Orientals? did they care at all? they were occupied > > with their lovers. Germanics and Scandinavians? no > > better, not to spek about Maori, African, Hawaiian > > etc. > > requiring virgins to be thrown into the Volcano. The > > priests of the smarter ones ate them. > > Did you notice the Catholic homophag rite: "Take it > > and eat it: it is my body. Drink it: it is my blood. > > And literary thousands of protestant rites follow > > suit. > > Muslims cleaned that up, they concentrate on heavennly > > sex (hueis). > > Sorry if I hurt feelings. > > John > > > > --- Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > >> > >> > >> Le 18-nov.-06, à 21:49, John M a écrit : > >> > >>> Why do the religions (almost all of them) depict a > >> god after the worst > >>> human > >>> characters: jealous, flatterable, requiring praise > >> and blind > >>> obedience, > >>> vengeful, irate, picking favorites, > >>> even sadistic and not caring? Why does he punish > >> for deeds done > >>> exactly as > >>> he created the sinner? > >> > >> > >> I disagree with the "(almost all of them)". True, > >> since a long time, in > >> Occident, the main religions are based on such a > >> "God", probably > >> because he looks like the "terrifying father", very > >> useful to > >> manipulate people by fear and terror. > >> > >> But this is contingent, and eventually I take that > >> sad contingent truth > >> as a supplementary motivation to come back on > >> "serious theology", by > >> which I mean 3-person sharable theology (even if > >> such a theology does > >> talk about first person unsharable notion). > >> > >> Bruno > >> > >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > No virus found in this incoming message. > Checked by AVG Free Edition. > Version: 7.1.409 / Virus Database: 268.14.11/543 - Release Date: > 11/20/2006 > > > > --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: computer pain
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: > Stathis wrote: > I can understand that, for example, a computer simulation of a storm is > not a storm, because only a storm is a storm and will get you wet. But > perhaps counterintuitively, a model of a brain can be closer to the real > thing than a model of a storm. We don't normally see inside a person's > head, we just observe his behaviour. There could be anything in there - a > brain, a computer, the Wizard of Oz - and as long as it pulled the > person's strings so that he behaved like any other person, up to and > including doing scientific research, we would never know the difference. > > Now, we know that living brains can pull the strings to produce normal > human behaviour (and consciousness in the process, but let's look at the > external behaviour for now). We also know that brains follow the laws of > physics: chemistry, Maxwell's equations, and so on. Maybe we don't > *understand* electrical fields in the sense that it may feel like > something to be an electrical field, or in some other as yet unspecified > sense, but we understand them well enough to predict their physical effect > on matter. Hence, although it would be an enormous task to gather the > relevant information and crunch the numbers in real time, it should be > possible to predict the electrical impulses that come out of the skull to > travel down the spinal cord and cranial nerves and ultimately pull the > strings that make a person behave like a person. If we can do that, it > should be possible to place the machinery which does the predicting inside > the skull interfaced with the periphery so as to take the brain's place, > and no-one would know the difference because it would behave just like the > original. > > At which step above have I made a mistake? > > Stathis Papaioannou > > --- > I'd say it's here... > > "and no-one would know the difference because it would behave just like > the original" > > But for a subtle reason. > > The artefact has to be able to cope with exquisite novelty like we do. > Models cannot do this because as a designer you have been forced to define > a model that constrains all possible novelty to be that which fits your > model for _learning_. Therein lies the fundamental flaw. Yes... at a given > level of knowledge you can define how to learn new things within the > knowledge framework. But when it comes to something exquisitely novel, all > that will happen is that it'll be interpreted into the parameters of how > you told it to learn things... this will impact in a way the artefact > cannot handle. It will behave differently and probably poorly. > > It's the zombie thing all over again. Of course that's just your theory of what would happen. So far as I know the experiment has never been carried out and is beyond current technology. > > It's not _knowledge_ that matters. it's _learning_ new knowledge. That's > what functionalism fails to handle. Being grounded in a phenomenal > representation of the world outside is the only way to handle arbitrary > levels of novelty. No phenomenal representation? = You are "model-bound" > and grounded, in effect, in the phenomenal representation of your > model-builders, who are forced to predefine all novelty handling in an "I > don't know that" functional module. Something you cannot do without > knowing everything a-priori! If you already know that you are god so why > are you bothering? > > Say you bring an artefact X into existence. X may behave exactly like a > human Y in all the problem domains you used to define you model. Then you > expose both to novelty nobody has seen, including you and that is > where the two will differ. The human Y will do better every time. You > can't program qualia. You have to have them and you can't do without them > in a 'general intelligence' context. > > Here I am on a sat morning...proving I have no life, yet again! :-) So your theory is that the electromagnetic field has an ability to learn which is not reflected in QED - it's some hitherto unknown aspect of the field and it doesn't show up in the field violating Maxwell's equations or QED predictions? And further this aspect of the EM field is able to effect behavior - at least in brains? Apparently this aspect of the EM field is not affected by external fields; otherwise thought processes would be affected by standing near power lines and Van de Graf generators. It is essentially independent of EM fields as described by known physics. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: computer pain
Stathis wrote: I can understand that, for example, a computer simulation of a storm is not a storm, because only a storm is a storm and will get you wet. But perhaps counterintuitively, a model of a brain can be closer to the real thing than a model of a storm. We don't normally see inside a person's head, we just observe his behaviour. There could be anything in there - a brain, a computer, the Wizard of Oz - and as long as it pulled the person's strings so that he behaved like any other person, up to and including doing scientific research, we would never know the difference. Now, we know that living brains can pull the strings to produce normal human behaviour (and consciousness in the process, but let's look at the external behaviour for now). We also know that brains follow the laws of physics: chemistry, Maxwell's equations, and so on. Maybe we don't *understand* electrical fields in the sense that it may feel like something to be an electrical field, or in some other as yet unspecified sense, but we understand them well enough to predict their physical effect on matter. Hence, although it would be an enormous task to gather the relevant information and crunch the numbers in real time, it should be possible to predict the electrical impulses that come out of the skull to travel down the spinal cord and cranial nerves and ultimately pull the strings that make a person behave like a person. If we can do that, it should be possible to place the machinery which does the predicting inside the skull interfaced with the periphery so as to take the brain's place, and no-one would know the difference because it would behave just like the original. At which step above have I made a mistake? Stathis Papaioannou --- I'd say it's here... "and no-one would know the difference because it would behave just like the original" But for a subtle reason. The artefact has to be able to cope with exquisite novelty like we do. Models cannot do this because as a designer you have been forced to define a model that constrains all possible novelty to be that which fits your model for _learning_. Therein lies the fundamental flaw. Yes... at a given level of knowledge you can define how to learn new things within the knowledge framework. But when it comes to something exquisitely novel, all that will happen is that it'll be interpreted into the parameters of how you told it to learn things... this will impact in a way the artefact cannot handle. It will behave differently and probably poorly. It's the zombie thing all over again. It's not _knowledge_ that matters. it's _learning_ new knowledge. That's what functionalism fails to handle. Being grounded in a phenomenal representation of the world outside is the only way to handle arbitrary levels of novelty. No phenomenal representation? = You are "model-bound" and grounded, in effect, in the phenomenal representation of your model-builders, who are forced to predefine all novelty handling in an "I don't know that" functional module. Something you cannot do without knowing everything a-priori! If you already know that you are god so why are you bothering? Say you bring an artefact X into existence. X may behave exactly like a human Y in all the problem domains you used to define you model. Then you expose both to novelty nobody has seen, including you and that is where the two will differ. The human Y will do better every time. You can't program qualia. You have to have them and you can't do without them in a 'general intelligence' context. Here I am on a sat morning...proving I have no life, yet again! :-) Colin Hales --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Natural Order & Belief
Dear list: this was the last post I received (I think I am subscribed) Have I been (or the list?) terminated? John Mikes - Original Message - From: Bruno Marchal To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Tuesday, November 21, 2006 5:27 AM Subject: Re: Natural Order & Belief John, You are right, I was wrong. Those deeds are not contingent. They probably appears automatically when one give a name to God. Perhaps, "God" could be "defined" by this: it is the one which is such that once you give it a name or a definition trouble appears. Obviously such a sentence should not be taken to much literally (if we do we are led to an obvious inconsistency). So, from now on, each time I use the word "God" it will means the impersonal big unnameable 0-person point of view, that is Plotinus' ONE, and/or some of its possible arithmetical (set theoretical) interpretation(s), that is arithmetical truth (resp. set theoretical truth). I will recall the theory in my reply to Tom Caylor. Bruno Le 20-nov.-06, à 18:03, John M a écrit : > > Bruno: > How far Occident? Quetzealcoatle was not much better. > Orientals? did they care at all? they were occupied > with their lovers. Germanics and Scandinavians? no > better, not to spek about Maori, African, Hawaiian > etc. > requiring virgins to be thrown into the Volcano. The > priests of the smarter ones ate them. > Did you notice the Catholic homophag rite: "Take it > and eat it: it is my body. Drink it: it is my blood. > And literary thousands of protestant rites follow > suit. > Muslims cleaned that up, they concentrate on heavennly > sex (hueis). > Sorry if I hurt feelings. > John > > --- Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > >> >> >> Le 18-nov.-06, à 21:49, John M a écrit : >> >>> Why do the religions (almost all of them) depict a >> god after the worst >>> human >>> characters: jealous, flatterable, requiring praise >> and blind >>> obedience, >>> vengeful, irate, picking favorites, >>> even sadistic and not caring? Why does he punish >> for deeds done >>> exactly as >>> he created the sinner? >> >> >> I disagree with the "(almost all of them)". True, >> since a long time, in >> Occident, the main religions are based on such a >> "God", probably >> because he looks like the "terrifying father", very >> useful to >> manipulate people by fear and terror. >> >> But this is contingent, and eventually I take that >> sad contingent truth >> as a supplementary motivation to come back on >> "serious theology", by >> which I mean 3-person sharable theology (even if >> such a theology does >> talk about first person unsharable notion). >> >> Bruno >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> >> > > > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- No virus found in this incoming message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.409 / Virus Database: 268.14.11/543 - Release Date: 11/20/2006 --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: computer pain
Brent said: > Of course they describe things - they aren't the things themselves. > But the question is whether the description is complete. Is there > anything about EM fields that is not described by QED? Absolutely HEAPS! Everything that they are made of and how the components inteact to make something that naturally appears to us to look QEDish. > If you can find it you'll be famous by morning. Can you throw moiney instead? Much more useful! seriously Consider your statement: > Is there anything about EM fields that is not described by QED? No. And there's nothing more about quantum mechanical behaviour that us not described by quantum mechanics. There is nothing more about gravitational motion that is not described by the laws of gravitation and so on and so on. It's not that they are incomplete. They are irrelevant! It's that none of them depict underlying causality - only 'apparent causality' when viewed with our phenomenal consciousness. They were created grounded in our phenomenal fields. The killer assumption is that the descriptions of appearances that are our empirical laws contain all that is needed to describe our 'appearance generator' (which includes pain). Consider that our entire way of viewing the universe was through oil-paintings. Everything we know has been concocted through correlating the contents of oil paintings. Cows. Sunsets. Trees. :-) There is absolutely nothing in any 'law of correlated oil painting contents' that would predict the existence of oil paintings or the nature of paint. One day you decide to go look at what is producing the oil paintings...via an oil painting, of coursewhat do you see? An oil painting of a painter. You still know nothing about paint. But by god you know what the painter looks like, so you have a clue - a place to start. The problem is that you need to have a completely separate set of desriptions of a universe made of candidate 'something' that is capable of making perceivers to whom the universe appears like it does and therefore appears to be run by all the empirical laws we have. The descriptions of an underlying reality will look nothing like our current empirical laws. I would predict that the only exploration of the detail of such a system is computationally using cellular automata and some simple basic relationships between instances of candidate 'something'. This is dual aspect science. Note that all it does is move the mystery back a bit! Say I am successful. I have 'assumed something' which behaves QMly, QEDly, ATOMly and QUALIAlyin a CA-noumenon of interacting 'assumed something' at the end of the day I still have a mystery of a similar kind... what is the "assumed something" made of? It may be we never know that, but at least we have a better grip on the natural world that is _sane_! Currently we either think the universe is literally made of appearances (nuts) or that there is a 'natural laws computer' running our empirical laws underneath run by whom? Aliens? (even more nuts). Personally I'd rather have a CA-noumenon/Empirical law science that is compatible with all empirical laws and that moves the mystery to a well defined place for others to work on...than these rather odd assumptions. So it's not that laws of science are wrong or inadequate or "complete", as you say above - it's that they are completely irrelevant in the context of a description of the universe inclusive of a perceiver of it, in it, made of it. Colin Hales --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order & Belief)
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > > Brent Meeker writes (quoting SP): > > There are several differences between the axioms of ethics and aesthetics > on > the one hand and those of logic, mathematics and science on the other. > One is > that you can bet that any sentient species would arrive at exactly the > same rules > of arithmetic and chemistry, but might have completely bizarre, or at > least very > different, notions of ethics and aesthetics. If this hypothetical species arose by evolution in competition with other species, then I think they would necessarily share basic values with us: They would have language and a desire to be accepted within a tribe. So they would generally value truth in statements - though not absolutely. They would consider it good to reproduce and they would consider their death and the death of any relatives as bad, particularly before they had reproduced. Although Hume said you can't get "ought" from "is", Darwinian evolution implies that certain "oughts" will be almost universal. >>> I don't know about that. The female praying mantis eats the male's head >>> after mating. >>> Is that a good way to behave? How would you explain your view to an >>> intelligent race >>> evolved from praying mantids (I had to look the plural up)? >> They would agree with it. Obviously the male preying mantis thinks it very >> important to reproduce - even a great risk to his life. It's good for the >> female to eat the male just as it it is good for her to eat other insects. >> However, I don't think an intelligent race can evolve without being social - >> certainly nothing like our kind of intelligence. I think social competition >> within the species is the primary driver of natural selection for "higher" >> intellectual functions. > > But is head-eating a good thing? A group of male mantids might get together > to form > an anti-head-eating movement, arguing that it is barbaric and no longer > necessary even > though it has always been the way and is probably genetically programmed. The > pro- > -head-eating majority would probably vehemently disagree. Everyone agrees on > the facts, > everyone is able to reason, but there are still two conflincting views on > what is "good". I agree. Values are something individuals have and male mantids might well hold different values about being eaten that do female mantids. The difficulty in deciding "good" and "bad" only arises when you try to apply terms generally; as though everyone must agree. I think it is more useful to think in terms of public policy. A society is more likely to be able to agree on whether to allow or prohibit mate eating than on whether to call it "good" or "bad". Abortion is a good example. Hardly anyone would call abortion "good", but most are willing to let it be personal decision, recognizing that there are other factors in one's life. > Another is that matters of ethics and > aesthetics are not really third person communicable: an alien species may > have > notions about these that can only be understood by someone with their > psychology. > This is because ethics and aesthetics at a fundamental level involve > emotion, whereas > science and logic do not. I don't think there are completely emotion free thoughts, nor can there be, in an intelligent being. The force of logic is a kind of feeling. People feel discomfort if they realize they are holding two contrary propositions. Any artificial intelligence would need artificial aesthetics. A mathematician who showed no judgement about which theorems to prove, and so proved things like 287+1=288, would be considered an idiot. Mathematicians are famous for their aesthetic valuation of proofs. >>> Yes, but with ethical statements the emotion is essential to its truth >>> value. Star Trek's Mr. >>> Spock (if he truly did lack all emotions) could honestly say he does not >>> know why it is bad to >>> cause suffering, or why Bach's music is beautiful. But he would be able to >>> understand >>> mathematical theorems regardless of whether he appreciated them >>> aesthetically. >> But he wouldn't care whether propositions of mathematics were true or false. >> He even wouldn't care that he held contrary ideas. And in that case he >> couldn't choose this act over that. In other words he'd be completely >> disfunctional. That's why I think emotion, in the general sense of having >> values, is essential to intelligence (even low level intelligence). > > It depends on how far you stretch the term "emotion". I wasn't stretching it to autonomous functions - but I think you could stretch "having or expressing values" that far. Our ancestral proto-cell in the primordial soup expressed a value of surviving as an entity separate from the soup; but I
Re: computer pain
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: >> So you are saying the special something which causes >> consciousness and which functionalism has ignored >> is the electric field around the neuron/astrocyte. >> But electric fields were well understood even a >> hundred years ago, weren't they? Why couldn't >> a neuron be simulated by something like a SPICE model? >> Even if there is some new >> physics involved, once the equations are worked >> out then either with pencil and >> paper or with the aid of a computer you should >> be able to model the neuron: given >> starting parameters, work out what it is going to >> do in future. Do you disagree that this would be possible? >> >> Stathis Papaioannou > > Yes. I disagree. > > The problem is in the statement: > >> But electric fields were well understood even a >> hundred years ago, weren't they? > > NO! they are _not_ understood (explained) they are only described. The > descriptions do not say what an electric field is. They do not predict an > electric field. They do not say WHY maxwells equations are what they are. > There is no real explanation! No true 'understanding'. > > Nothing - I repeat - NOTHING is explained by science at this stage. What would you count as an explanation? >All > there is is a whole bunch of mathematical models describing how things > 'appear' (eg quantum mechanics). This is not 'what they are'. Making wave > its arms about like a model does not create "what they are". If there are > properties innate to the 'stuff' involved in a situation X they waving > stuff around like the model of situation X does not does not implement > those properties. > > This is a fundamental blockage in thinking. Everybody in physics and maths > thinks that equations drive things. Bollocks. They merely describe. Of course they describe things - they aren't the things themselves. But the question is whether the description is complete. Is there anything about EM fields that is not described by QED? If you can find it you'll be famous by morning. > I've just spent a month writing about this very thing. It's making me very > grumpy and frustrated that something 300 years old and really obvious > still hasn't sunk in. The universe is NOT made of model/descriptions of > its appearances! > > It's made of something that, in the right circumstances, delivers > appearances(to a suitably equipped agent made of it) and it behaves like > it does within those appearances when you look with the appearance > generator thus implemented (a brain). Models of the appearance are just > models of appearances! They are very predictive but are completely devoid > of all causality. Making a machine run as per the models won't do it. > > It's doesn't mean we can't achieve what we want in an artefact (pain) - it > just means that functionalist dreaming isn't enough. > > I found this today: > "The Explicit Animal" Raymond Tallis. He goes through the issues really > well and trashes functionalism properly. > > My preoccupation with electric fields is that they have correlated > perfectly with everything I have thrown at them for 5 years and they > predict everything. I don't see how an EM field can "predict". >The trick is to understand the kind of universe that > expresses something that looks like electric fields run by Maxwells > equations - NOT to run models according to maxwell's equations. > > cheers, > > colin If there is something more to electromagnetism, beyond what is described by Maxwells equations (and there certainly is), then do you agree that it too should be describable in some different or more complete model? Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order & Belief)
Le 15-déc.-06, à 02:04, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : > Who says the Nazis are wrong when they assert they are good? I was not saying that they were wrong. I was saying that they were bad. Who says this? All self-referentially correct machine sufficnetly rich to prove elementary theorems in arithmetic. For showing this it is just enough to accept that the notion of "goodness" is of a type having greater or equal complexity that the notion of consistency or truth (which is intuitively reasonable). To sum up: a lobian machine saying "I am true" is false. (note that saying "I am provable" makes it true by ... Lob's theorem itself!). A lobian machine asserting "I am consistent" is inconsistent (Godel) A lobian machine asserting "I am intelligent" is stupid, A lobian machine asserting "I am stupid" is ... stupid too (beginners are often wrong on this). A lobian machine asserting "I am good" is bad, A lobian machine asserting "I am bad" is bad (too!) A lobian machine asserting "I am virtuous" provably lacks virtue. (provably, not probably) Apparently self-referentially correct lobian machine are enough wise for never attributing to themselves any "moral" quality. They cannot judge their own defect in the matter. > We could look at a particular incident where capital punishment was > proposed, let's say > for murder. Everyone might agree on the facts of the crime and the > effects of executing > the perpetrator, but still strongly disagree about whether it is right > or wrong. So of course > the capital punishment debate does involve rational discussion and > maybe some people will > switch sides if appropriate evidence is presented, but in the end you > will have a situation > where there is just disagreement on an axiom. Again this shows that good/bad is not different from true/false, even just in arithmetic. Recall the admittedly counterintuitive truth (admitting the consistency of Peano Arithmetic): the new theory obtained by adding to Peano arithmetic the statement that Peano arithmetic is inconsistent, is a consistent theory (albeit probably not "reasonable", but what does that mean?). The elementary atoms of good and bad are related to what we have "learned" since life begun, like drinking water is good, self-burning is bad, or any elementary pleasure/pain qualia in company of some amount of self-referential correctness. >> But of course democracy does not >> *necessarily* lead to the good. > > Just in that last sentence is the assumption that there is some other > basis for > the good than what the majority decides to say it is. Yes, precisely. But because good/bad cannot be normative or even defined, democracy works well in giving to the majority a way to revise opinions after four years. "majority" by itself has nothing per se related to "good". (BTW I do not favors any form of direct democracy, because by controlling media you can make any majority decide what you want). Majority is wrong in general, but through democracy the majority can be less and less wrong (a little bit like science). > For example, if 51% of the > population decided to kill the other 49% and take all their > possessions, presumably > you would not think that was good. That is a sort of civil war. > This means that your idea of what is good is > somehow better than the decisision of the majority, and you only > favour democracy > because you think it is more likely to come up with laws in accordance > with your > ethical principles than most other forms of government. Isn't that a > little arrogant? Not at all. Democracy has just a better chance to *converge* on solutions acceptable by a majority, notably by making it possible to take into account opinion of minorities, but also to take account people's changes of mind. Democracy per se is not ethical, it is meta-ethical. I am not saying that this or that is good or bad, just that such things are hard to decide and that the advantage of democracy is that, whatever is good or bad, working democratic systems can give a way for changing your mind (after 4 years, say) on difficult social or ethical questions. In a tyranny someone thinks at your place, and if you don't belong to the right club, you have not even any hope for a change. When you feel something is bad for you, it is arguable that the mere possibility of change is a good. You say (to Brent): > But is head-eating a good thing? A group of male mantids might get > together to form > an anti-head-eating movement, arguing that it is barbaric and no > longer necessary even > though it has always been the way and is probably genetically > programmed. The pro- > -head-eating majority would probably vehemently disagree. Everyone > agrees on the facts, > everyone is able to reason, but there are still two conflincting views > on what is "good". Like they are still many conflicting views on what is "true", "real" etc. This does not mean we cannot pro
RE: computer pain
Colin, I can understand that, for example, a computer simulation of a storm is not a storm, because only a storm is a storm and will get you wet. But perhaps counterintuitively, a model of a brain can be closer to the real thing than a model of a storm. We don't normally see inside a person's head, we just observe his behaviour. There could be anything in there - a brain, a computer, the Wizard of Oz - and as long as it pulled the person's strings so that he behaved like any other person, up to and including doing scientific research, we would never know the difference. Now, we know that living brains can pull the strings to produce normal human behaviour (and consciousness in the process, but let's look at the external behaviour for now). We also know that brains follow the laws of physics: chemistry, Maxwell's equations, and so on. Maybe we don't *understand* electrical fields in the sense that it may feel like something to be an electrical field, or in some other as yet unspecified sense, but we understand them well enough to predict their physical effect on matter. Hence, although it would be an enormous task to gather the relevant information and crunch the numbers in real time, it should be possible to predict the electrical impulses that come out of the skull to travel down the spinal cord and cranial nerves and ultimately pull the strings that make a person behave like a person. If we can do that, it should be possible to place the machinery which does the predicting inside the skull interfaced with the periphery so as to take the brain's place, and no-one would know the difference because it would behave just like the original. At which step above have I made a mistake? Stathis Papaioannou Colin Hales writes: > > So you are saying the special something which causes > > consciousness and which functionalism has ignored > > is the electric field around the neuron/astrocyte. > > But electric fields were well understood even a > > hundred years ago, weren't they? Why couldn't > > a neuron be simulated by something like a SPICE model? > > Even if there is some new > > physics involved, once the equations are worked > > out then either with pencil and > > paper or with the aid of a computer you should > > be able to model the neuron: given > > starting parameters, work out what it is going to > > do in future. Do you disagree that this would be possible? > > > > Stathis Papaioannou > > Yes. I disagree. > > The problem is in the statement: > > > But electric fields were well understood even a > > hundred years ago, weren't they? > > NO! they are _not_ understood (explained) they are only described. The > descriptions do not say what an electric field is. They do not predict an > electric field. They do not say WHY maxwells equations are what they are. > There is no real explanation! No true 'understanding'. > > Nothing - I repeat - NOTHING is explained by science at this stage. All > there is is a whole bunch of mathematical models describing how things > 'appear' (eg quantum mechanics). This is not 'what they are'. Making wave > its arms about like a model does not create "what they are". If there are > properties innate to the 'stuff' involved in a situation X they waving > stuff around like the model of situation X does not does not implement > those properties. > > This is a fundamental blockage in thinking. Everybody in physics and maths > thinks that equations drive things. Bollocks. They merely describe. > > I've just spent a month writing about this very thing. It's making me very > grumpy and frustrated that something 300 years old and really obvious > still hasn't sunk in. The universe is NOT made of model/descriptions of > its appearances! > > It's made of something that, in the right circumstances, delivers > appearances(to a suitably equipped agent made of it) and it behaves like > it does within those appearances when you look with the appearance > generator thus implemented (a brain). Models of the appearance are just > models of appearances! They are very predictive but are completely devoid > of all causality. Making a machine run as per the models won't do it. > > It's doesn't mean we can't achieve what we want in an artefact (pain) - it > just means that functionalist dreaming isn't enough. > > I found this today: > "The Explicit Animal" Raymond Tallis. He goes through the issues really > well and trashes functionalism properly. > > My preoccupation with electric fields is that they have correlated > perfectly with everything I have thrown at them for 5 years and they > predict everything. The trick is to understand the kind of universe that > expresses something that looks like electric fields run by Maxwells > equations - NOT to run models according to maxwell's equations. > > cheers, > > colin > > > > > > > > > > _ Be one of the first to try Windows Li
RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order & Belief)
Brent Meeker writes (quoting SP): > >>> There are several differences between the axioms of ethics and aesthetics > >>> on > >>> the one hand and those of logic, mathematics and science on the other. > >>> One is > >>> that you can bet that any sentient species would arrive at exactly the > >>> same rules > >>> of arithmetic and chemistry, but might have completely bizarre, or at > >>> least very > >>> different, notions of ethics and aesthetics. > >> If this hypothetical species arose by evolution in competition with other > >> species, then I think they would necessarily share basic values with us: > >> They would have language and a desire to be accepted within a tribe. So > >> they would generally value truth in statements - though not absolutely. > >> They would consider it good to reproduce and they would consider their > >> death and the death of any relatives as bad, particularly before they had > >> reproduced. Although Hume said you can't get "ought" from "is", Darwinian > >> evolution implies that certain "oughts" will be almost universal. > > > > I don't know about that. The female praying mantis eats the male's head > > after mating. > > Is that a good way to behave? How would you explain your view to an > > intelligent race > > evolved from praying mantids (I had to look the plural up)? > > They would agree with it. Obviously the male preying mantis thinks it very > important to reproduce - even a great risk to his life. It's good for the > female to eat the male just as it it is good for her to eat other insects. > However, I don't think an intelligent race can evolve without being social - > certainly nothing like our kind of intelligence. I think social competition > within the species is the primary driver of natural selection for "higher" > intellectual functions. But is head-eating a good thing? A group of male mantids might get together to form an anti-head-eating movement, arguing that it is barbaric and no longer necessary even though it has always been the way and is probably genetically programmed. The pro- -head-eating majority would probably vehemently disagree. Everyone agrees on the facts, everyone is able to reason, but there are still two conflincting views on what is "good". > >>> Another is that matters of ethics and > >>> aesthetics are not really third person communicable: an alien species may > >>> have > >>> notions about these that can only be understood by someone with their > >>> psychology. > >>> This is because ethics and aesthetics at a fundamental level involve > >>> emotion, whereas > >>> science and logic do not. > >> I don't think there are completely emotion free thoughts, nor can there > >> be, in an intelligent being. The force of logic is a kind of feeling. > >> People feel discomfort if they realize they are holding two contrary > >> propositions. Any artificial intelligence would need artificial > >> aesthetics. A mathematician who showed no judgement about which theorems > >> to prove, and so proved things like 287+1=288, would be considered an > >> idiot. Mathematicians are famous for their aesthetic valuation of proofs. > > > > Yes, but with ethical statements the emotion is essential to its truth > > value. Star Trek's Mr. > > Spock (if he truly did lack all emotions) could honestly say he does not > > know why it is bad to > > cause suffering, or why Bach's music is beautiful. But he would be able to > > understand > > mathematical theorems regardless of whether he appreciated them > > aesthetically. > > But he wouldn't care whether propositions of mathematics were true or false. > He even wouldn't care that he held contrary ideas. And in that case he > couldn't choose this act over that. In other words he'd be completely > disfunctional. That's why I think emotion, in the general sense of having > values, is essential to intelligence (even low level intelligence). It depends on how far you stretch the term "emotion". My body puts great effort into staying alive even when I am unconscious. You could say that it "wants" to stay alive, "choosing" one course of action over another in order to achieve this. But this seems quite different to what I mean by these terms when I am awake. It doesn't seem such a big deal to turn off life support once someone is brain dead even though the intact parts of his physiology are "desperately" trying to keep his body functioning. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PR
RE: computer pain
> > So you are saying the special something which causes > consciousness and which functionalism has ignored > is the electric field around the neuron/astrocyte. > But electric fields were well understood even a > hundred years ago, weren't they? Why couldn't > a neuron be simulated by something like a SPICE model? > Even if there is some new > physics involved, once the equations are worked > out then either with pencil and > paper or with the aid of a computer you should > be able to model the neuron: given > starting parameters, work out what it is going to > do in future. Do you disagree that this would be possible? > > Stathis Papaioannou Yes. I disagree. The problem is in the statement: > But electric fields were well understood even a > hundred years ago, weren't they? NO! they are _not_ understood (explained) they are only described. The descriptions do not say what an electric field is. They do not predict an electric field. They do not say WHY maxwells equations are what they are. There is no real explanation! No true 'understanding'. Nothing - I repeat - NOTHING is explained by science at this stage. All there is is a whole bunch of mathematical models describing how things 'appear' (eg quantum mechanics). This is not 'what they are'. Making wave its arms about like a model does not create "what they are". If there are properties innate to the 'stuff' involved in a situation X they waving stuff around like the model of situation X does not does not implement those properties. This is a fundamental blockage in thinking. Everybody in physics and maths thinks that equations drive things. Bollocks. They merely describe. I've just spent a month writing about this very thing. It's making me very grumpy and frustrated that something 300 years old and really obvious still hasn't sunk in. The universe is NOT made of model/descriptions of its appearances! It's made of something that, in the right circumstances, delivers appearances(to a suitably equipped agent made of it) and it behaves like it does within those appearances when you look with the appearance generator thus implemented (a brain). Models of the appearance are just models of appearances! They are very predictive but are completely devoid of all causality. Making a machine run as per the models won't do it. It's doesn't mean we can't achieve what we want in an artefact (pain) - it just means that functionalist dreaming isn't enough. I found this today: "The Explicit Animal" Raymond Tallis. He goes through the issues really well and trashes functionalism properly. My preoccupation with electric fields is that they have correlated perfectly with everything I have thrown at them for 5 years and they predict everything. The trick is to understand the kind of universe that expresses something that looks like electric fields run by Maxwells equations - NOT to run models according to maxwell's equations. cheers, colin --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
