Re: Probability
> Hi everyone, I am a complete layman but still got the illusion that > maybe one day I would be able to understand the probability part of MW > if explained in a simple way. I know it's the most controversal part > of MW and that there are several competing understandings of > probability in MW, but still: none of them make sense to me! If every > line of history is realized then how can any line of history be more > probable than any other? Mathematically, this isn't that hard to understand. For example, consider the equation (1 / (x^2)) between 1 and positive infinity on the x axis. The total area under the curve is 1, so it's a valid probability distribution. The area between x = 1 and x = 2 is 1/2, or 50%. So if you pick a "random" point on the real number line between 1 and infinity, using that distribution, half the time that point will land between 1 and 2. For any segment of the real line, you can determine exactly what the probability will be that a point will fall on it--even though the distribution extends forever. The fact that there's an infinite number of choices doesn't mean that those choices can't be normalized to a probability distribution. Gaussians (normal curves) describe most of the real data we measure in the sciences, in one way or another--and the mathematical expression for a Gaussian extends out forever. Physics is filled with probabilities over infinite domains. Anna --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Probability
Hi everyone, I am a complete layman but still got the illusion that maybe one day I would be able to understand the probability part of MW if explained in a simple way. I know it's the most controversal part of MW and that there are several competing understandings of probability in MW, but still: none of them make sense to me! If every line of history is realized then how can any line of history be more probable than any other? Kind regards, Thomas Laursen --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)
Hi Günther, > unfortunately I can't participate a lot at the moment because I'm quite > busy, but I try to follow some of the discussion, and would like to > pose > a question (to Bruno): > >>> Which is why I think philosophical zombies >>> are impossible. > > I also think they are impossible, and you (Bruno) have already hinted > once that you do not think them impossible, I don't think them impossible because I have seen such zombies! Indeed I have seen a false policeman on some road, they are for slowing down some cars. I don't attribute consciousness to cartoon policeman, so that they are zombies, at least when I am a failed by them. More exactly: I can conceive fake policemen in paper are not conscious, and that is all I need to accept I can be fail by some zombie. Thus I can conceive zombies. Developing this argument makes zombies logically conceivable, even, if I would refute the claim that a zombie acting exactly like I would act in any situation can exist. Accidental zombie can exist. It could depend what we put exactly in the term zombie. I criticize sometimes Bohm Quantum mechanics by invoking the fact that the "wave without particles" is full of zombies. > and here you clarify: > >> If this were true, then the movie graph (step 8 without occam) would >> not been needed. Arithmetical truth is provably full of philosophical >> zombies if comp is true and step 8 false. > > Which arithemetical truths would correspond to philosophical zombies? I > don't get this. This is different. If I am a digital machine, the complete description and even emulation of the computations leading to my mental state, at the right level (which exists once we assume the comp hyp of course) is entirely encoded into prove of statement like the machine described by the number 43554500901655 (say) on imput 4545665450098987 (say) go to the state 67567689043. Such a description constitute a provable arithmetical truth (it is a typical Sigma_1 truth, actually a Sigma_0 truth, meaning just it decidable. So it is just a theorem in computer science: computations are encodable (and thus encoded) in the (additive+multiplicative) relations existing between numbers. So, someone who does not believe in philosophical zombies, does not need the step 8 (the Movie Graph Argument MGA), because arithmetical truth does contains the computation describing, well, for example this very discussion we have here and now. For me the MGA is needed because I don't want to rely on the non existence of zombie. > > I follow you that 1st person is recoverable by a 3rd person number > theoretic description - or better, OMs are - but how would a zombie > come > about? Can you give an example? Just consider the computation which correspond to your actual real life. That computation is encoded (indeed an infinity of times) in the Universal Deploiement, which is itself encoded (indeed an infinity of times) in the set of all arithmetical truth. All right? Such a computation would define an arithmetical version of you, and would constitute a phisophical (indeed arithmetical) zombies. If you define the zombies as having a "material" body, then it is different (again we should then better define zombie). But this move is irrelevant *after* the MGA. Best regards, Bruno Marchal http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)
Hi Jason, Le 04-nov.-08, à 23:21, Jason Resch a écrit : > Bruno, > > Thanks I understand now. I must have misread previous posts of yours > because I had thought you had said "if I = the world, then the world > is not turing-emulable", but what you are saying is that "if I = the > world and the world is not turing emulable then comp is false". Exactly. Thanks for acknowledging. > Regarding step 6 I believe one's consciousness continues if they were > to "upload" their brain into a computer even if it necessitated the > destruction of their biological brain. To me this is no different > logically from teleportation, And that is all you need for going to the next step. > although I agree with Brent, if the simulated world in the computer is > entirely cut off from causal effects of the physical world where the > computer is running, then you have also created an entirely new > world/reality. I agree with this too. The only thing necessary to understand step 6, is that you do survive there like if it was teleportation. And in that context, the calculus of probability remains the same as in the five preceding steps. For example, if you understand step 5, you know that if a instantenous of you is done, and is not detsroyed, and if that copy is reinstantiated in the virtual Moscow tomorrow, and in the virtual Washington in one billion of years, the probability that you will "stay here" (and not find yourself in the virtual realities) is 1/3 (assuming 1/2 for perfect duplication). It means that Nozick's closer continuer identity theory fails with comp. If you get this, I guess you are ready to understand step 7. I would be pleased to know if you get the step 7. If everyone agree with step 7, we can proceed to step 8, which is a bit more difficult. In my older presentations (like my PhD thesis), I always begin with step 8, and I call it "the Movie Graph Argument". The older UDA was only 1...7. Only 1...7 shows that comp transform physics into a computer science probability calculus. The Movie Graph Argument singles out the difficulty to attach mind to matter, or consciousness to physical activity, oncer we *assume* the comp hyp. It is the Movie Graph Argument which shows that we don't have to run the UD in a concrete way. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---