Re: Consciousness is information?

2009-05-10 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 08 May 2009, at 19:15, Torgny Tholerus wrote:

>
> Bruno Marchal skrev:
>> On 07 May 2009, at 18:29, Torgny Tholerus wrote:
>>
>>
>>> Bruno Marchal skrev:
>>>
>>>
 you are human, all right?

>>> I look exactly as a human.  When you look at me, you will not be
>>> able to know if I am a human or a zombie, because I behave exacly  
>>> like a
>>> human.
>>>
>> So you believe that human are not zombie, and you agree that you are
>> not human.
>> Where do you come from? Vega? Centaur?
>>
>
> I come from Stockholm, Sweden.  I was constructed by my parents.  In
> reality I think that all humans are zombies, but because I am a polite
> person, I do not tell the other zombies that they are zombies.  I do  
> not
> want to hurt the other zombies by telling them the truth.

Truth? you mean your theory. As far as I know, you may be a zombie,  
although I believe that you are conscious and only believe you are a  
zombie.
Or you could suffer from a sort of radical blindsight, making you  
belief you lack consciousness. You should perhaps consult.
And I appreciate very much your attempt to be polite, and your  
willingness to not hurt other ... zombie.

but you should not worry, because if we are zombie, we will only fake  
being hurt, you know.

A french poet said, after he died  (!) :  "friends, pretend only to  
cry because poet pretends only to dye". (Faites semblant de pleurer  
mes amis puisque les poêtes font semblant de mourrir").


>
>
>>> Yes it is right.  There is no infinity of natural numbers.  But the
>>> natural numbers are UNLIMITED, you can construct as many natural
>>> numbers as you want.  But how many numbers you construct, the  
>>> number of
>>> numbers will always be finite.  You can never construct an  
>>> infinite number of
>>> natural numbers.
>>>
>> This is no more ultrafinitism. Just the usal finitism or  
>> intuitionism.
>> It seems I recall you have had a stronger view on this point.
>> Ontologically I am neutral on this question. With comp I don't need
>> any actual infinity in the third person ontology. Infinities are not
>> avoidable from inside, at least when the inside view begins some  
>> self-
>> reflexion studies.
>>
>
> I was an ultrafinitist before, but I have changed my mind.


Excellent. The ability of changing its mind is a wonderful gift.



> Now I accept
> that you can say that the natural numbers are unlimited.  I only deny
> actual infinities.

I can deny them ontologically, and with comp, their existence is  
absolutely undecidable. yet they are also unavoidable on the  
epistemological planes, once we search truth.




> The set of all natural numbers are always finite,

Of course, but you mean "constructed natural number". You stay at the  
1-pov. I have no problem for translating.


>
> but you can always increase the set of all natural number by adding  
> more
> natural numbers to it.

Life will be harder.


>
>
>>> An ordinary computer can never be arithmetically unsound.
>>>
>> ? (this seems to me plainly false, unless you mean "perfect" for
>> "ordinary". But computers can be as unsound as you and me.
>> There is no vaccine against soundness: all computers can be unsound
>> soo or later. there is no perfect computer. Most gods are no immune,
>> you have to postulate the big unnameable One and be very near to It,
>> to have some guaranty ... if any ...
>>
>
> OK, I misunderstood what you meant by "unsound", I thougth you meant
> something like "unlogical".  But now I see that you mean something  
> like
> "irrational".  And I sure am irrational.

By unsound I meant that you believe in some false arithmetical  
proposition. But trivially so, and by using intuitionist arithmetic,  
and modal logics, you could make your point.


>
>
>>
>>> I do not want to be tortured, I behave as if I try to avoid that as
>>> strongly as I can.  Because I behave in this way, I answer "no" to
>>> your question, because that answer will decrease the probability  
>>> of you
>>> torturing me.
>>>
>> Do you realize that to defend your point you are always in the
>> obligation, when talking about any first person notion, like
>> consciousness, fear, desire, to add "I behave like ". But if you
>> can do that successfully you will make me doubt that you are a  
>> zombie.
>> Or ... do you think a zombie could eventually find a correct theory  
>> of
>> consciousness, so that he can correctly fake consciousness, and  
>> delude
>> the humans?
>>
>
> An intelligent zombie can correctly fake consciousness, and I am an
> intelligent zombie.


How could a zombie know that he correctly fake consciousness?



>
>
 3) Do you have any "sort-of" feeling, insight, dreams, impression,
 sensations, subjective or mental life, ... ?

>>> I behave as if I have "sort-of" feelings, I behave as if I have
>>> insights, I behave as if I have dreams, I behave as if I have
>>> impressions, I behave as if I have sensations, I behave as if I  
>>> have a
>>> subjective or mental lif

Re: Quantum suicide and immortality

2009-05-10 Thread Brent Meeker

ZeroSum wrote:
> The Wiki article "Quantum suicide and immortality" (http://
> en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_suicide_and_immortality) states:
> 
> "Also, the philosopher David Lewis, in "How Many Lives Has
> Schrödinger's Cat?", remarked that in the vast majority of the worlds
> in which an immortal observer might find himself (i.e. the subset of
> quantum-possible worlds in which the observer does not die), he will
> survive, but will be terribly maimed. This is because in each of the
> scenarios typically given in thought experiments (nuclear bombing,
> Russian roulette, etc.), for every world in which the observer
> survives unscathed, there are likely to be far more worlds in which
> the observer survives terribly disfigured, badly disabled, and so on.

I think this is just a misinterpretation of the physics. All those scenarios 
and 
their effects are essentially classical.  In Julian Barbour's metaphor they are 
all strands in the same branch and are classically indistinguishable.  Since 
the 
brain is a classical information processor, they all correspond to the same 
conscious stream.  Since classically you are either killed or not, or maimed or 
not, there is are not huge numbers of worlds in which you are maimed to 
different degrees that are consciously distinct.

Brent

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Re: 3-PoV from 1 PoV?

2009-05-10 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 08 May 2009, at 17:49, Stephen Paul King wrote:


> I came upon the idea after considering how is it that the notion  
> of an "objective reality" when we know for a fact that all of our  
> knowledge does not come from any kind of direct contact with an  
> "objective reality", at best it is infered.

Yes. Even at the deepest level. Science transforms knowledge into  
belief by making us aware of the hypothetical nature of our mental  
construction.
I would say that science is the condition of genuine faith or bets.




> Leibniz' Monadology can be considered as a way to think of this idea  
> where each monad represents a 1-PoV.

Difficult to make sense. Leibniz is a complex and variable author. I  
have read the Monadology and consult some expert of Leibniz, but it  
remains hard to figure out how it works.




> A synchronization of many such 1PoV, given some simple consistensy  
> requirements, would in the large number limit lead to a notion of a  
> "common world of experience".

Don't you need some "common world of experience" to have a notion of  
synchronization?



> The 3PoV would follow from a form of inversion or reflection of  
> a 1PoV. For example, we form thoughts of or fellow humans from our  
> own experiences of ourselves. BTW: it seems to me that  
> consciousness, at least, requires some form of dynamic self-  
> modeling process. This implies that there is no such a thing as a  
> static consciousness.


I can agree. And you know the way I proceed. I start from elementary  
arithmetic, the 3-elementary ontology. If only because 99,9% of the  
humans agree on it, and it is already Turing universal and contains  
the whole universal deployment. The epistemology is given by adding  
some induction schema to the machine in there. It is illustrated by  
the going from Robinson arithmetic to Peano Arithmetic (emulated by  
Robinson arithmetic). It is enough to generate all "finite piece of  
histories", and we can get the many 1-pov by the "Theaetetical variant  
of the logic of provability/consistency ...

So, if you agree that all dynamics are contained in the block- 
arithmetical truth, consciousness is indeed related to "internal  
information flux", and so we can say there is no static consciousness,  
in that sense. But here we mix the 3-description with the 1- 
description, and from this we cannot conclude that we cannot have a  
conscious experience of static-ity or static-ness. With comp, just  
because it remains a lot of work, the question of traveling in many  
different physical directions is just open (obviously).


> Re the UD Measure problem: The idea i have is that we either  
> have our infinity within each Monad or try to find a way to derive a  
> measure of the infinity without reference to the only source of  
> definiteness that we have available: our conscious experience.


If I interpret favorably what you say, this is the passage from UDA to  
AUDA, where I substitute "you working on UDA", by "the lobian  
universal machine working on UDA".

I don't insist on this because it can be misunderstood. AUDA looks  
like an elimination of the need to refer to "consciousness", but AUDA  
without a prior understanding of UDA, would be like a confusion  
between theology and computer science, comp can only relate them, not  
identify them it would be an error, explainable in AUDA (!), to  
confuse them. Only God confuses them; in  sense, but a creature which  
confuses them is either a zombie, or a fake zombie, or a person  
eliminativist.

You can regain consciousness in AUDA, by "defining" consciousness by  
the "belief (hope, bet, faith) in a reality".  But the bet is  
unconscious itself, and this is partially why we are bounded, at some  
level, to confuse this very basic belief with a knowledge.

Of course it is a knowledge, but only at the G* level, *we* cannot  
know that, once we bet there is a reality (whatever it is).

All this does not mean that you could not try an alternate theory were  
the 3-pov emerge from the 1-pov, but with comp, the basic ontology is  
very simple (numbers, addition and multiplication). And then 1-pov, or  
OMs, appears very sophisticated. They are given "intuitively" by all  
possible computations passing to a "current state", together with a  
topology derivable from the self-reference logic (I think you know  
that).

Bruno


> From: Bruno Marchal
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
> Sent: Tuesday, May 05, 2009 6:23 PM
> Subject: Re: Consciousness is information?
>
>
> On 05 May 2009, at 20:13, Stephen Paul King wrote:
>
>> Hi Bruno and Members,
>>
>> The comment that is made below seems to only involve a single  
>> consciousness and an exterior "reality". Could we not recover a  
>> very similar situation if we consider the 1-PoV and 3-PoV relation  
>> to hold to some degree over a multitude of consciouness  
>> (plurality). In the plurality case, the "objective doubtful but  
>> sharable possible reali

Re: Consciousness is information?

2009-05-10 Thread Torgny Tholerus

Quentin Anciaux skrev:
> Hi,
>
> 2009/5/8 Torgny Tholerus :
>   
>> I was an ultrafinitist before, but I have changed my mind.  Now I accept
>> that you can say that the natural numbers are unlimited.  I only deny
>> actual infinities.  The set of all natural numbers are always finite,
>> but you can always increase the set of all natural number by adding more
>> natural numbers to it.
>> 
> Then it's not the set of *all* natural numbers. You do nothing by
> adding a number... you don't create numbers by writing them down, you
> don't invent properties about them, it's absurd... especially for a
> zombie.
>   

What do you mean by *all*?  How do you define *all*?  Can you give a 
definition that is not a circular definition?

-- 
Torgny

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Re: Quantum suicide and immortality

2009-05-10 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

2009/5/10 ZeroSum :

> David Lewis' statement cuts to the core of the nature of
> consciousness. If each conscious observer on planet Earth (and let's
> assume the laws of physics don't limit consciousness to humans but
> includes any sentient animal life form) exists in "Many Worlds" (see
> Wiki topic on physicist "Hugh Everett III" at 
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hugh_Everett)
> then Houston, we've got a problem.
>
> The human population alone is over 6 billion conscious observers. Each
> observer can cause branching into an unfathomably huge number of
> parallel universes (or perhaps an infinite number). Everyone else, in
> addition to an incomprehensibly large number of people only born in
> some parallel universes, branches into their own parallel universes,
> extrapolating logically from the "Many Worlds" theory. Each one of us
> is essentially forced to consciously exist in parallel universes that
> continue coming into existence as the result of the actions of every
> other conscious observer on this planet. Include conscious non-human
> observers (animal and who knows what else) and Houston, we've got a
> really big problem... or is it really a problem?
>
> Instead of using this line of thinking to debunk the "Many Worlds"
> interpretation, I think this isn't such a big problem as it initially
> appears.
>
> For one thing, consider sleep walking.

I don't really understand what the problem is. That there are many
world in the MWI is already a given. Consciousness and quantum
immortality experiments don't create any more worlds than there
otherwise would be. In the multiverse as a whole, only a very small
number of worlds contain versions of you who survived a direct nuclear
blast. In almost all the worlds, you have died.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Quantum suicide and immortality

2009-05-10 Thread ZeroSum

The Wiki article "Quantum suicide and immortality" (http://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_suicide_and_immortality) states:

"Also, the philosopher David Lewis, in "How Many Lives Has
Schrödinger's Cat?", remarked that in the vast majority of the worlds
in which an immortal observer might find himself (i.e. the subset of
quantum-possible worlds in which the observer does not die), he will
survive, but will be terribly maimed. This is because in each of the
scenarios typically given in thought experiments (nuclear bombing,
Russian roulette, etc.), for every world in which the observer
survives unscathed, there are likely to be far more worlds in which
the observer survives terribly disfigured, badly disabled, and so on.
It is for this reason, Lewis concludes, that we ought to hope that the
many-worlds interpretation is false."

David Lewis' statement cuts to the core of the nature of
consciousness. If each conscious observer on planet Earth (and let's
assume the laws of physics don't limit consciousness to humans but
includes any sentient animal life form) exists in "Many Worlds" (see
Wiki topic on physicist "Hugh Everett III" at 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hugh_Everett)
then Houston, we've got a problem.

The human population alone is over 6 billion conscious observers. Each
observer can cause branching into an unfathomably huge number of
parallel universes (or perhaps an infinite number). Everyone else, in
addition to an incomprehensibly large number of people only born in
some parallel universes, branches into their own parallel universes,
extrapolating logically from the "Many Worlds" theory. Each one of us
is essentially forced to consciously exist in parallel universes that
continue coming into existence as the result of the actions of every
other conscious observer on this planet. Include conscious non-human
observers (animal and who knows what else) and Houston, we've got a
really big problem... or is it really a problem?

Instead of using this line of thinking to debunk the "Many Worlds"
interpretation, I think this isn't such a big problem as it initially
appears.

For one thing, consider sleep walking.

Sleep walkers can appear conscious, carry on conversations, drive
automobiles and operate machinery, essentially do things they can do
in the awake state. Only when they're sleep walking, they do not
remember those minutes or hours they did all these things. In essence
they "fast forwarded" through those events, even though other
observers may have carried on coversations with them, witnessed them
driving an automobile or doing other things, all the time thinking
these sleepwalkers were wide awake and conscious.

Suppose our existences in parallel universes is similar to if we were
sleepwalking? Suppose we are not conscious observers in those parallel
universes, but other conscious observers believe we are conscious as
well? Suppose others in this parallel universe we are in, are
similarly sleepwalking in that they are not conscious in this parallel
universe (but are conscious in another)? That leads to interesting
possibilities and questions. Do we somehow "choose" the parallel
universe where we are consciously present and awake? Do people close
to us likely "choose" to be present and conscious in the same parallel
universe we are present and conscious in, so in our relationship with
them, we're not talking to someone who is sleepwalking and really not
conscious? When we are in a parallel universe where we are not
consciously present, does this mean the human brain operates the body
like a biological machine, similarly to unconscious human-like
androids in the movie "I, Robot" that one could swear are real
sentient people?

The questions snowball along this line of thinking, as one wonders if
our consciousness moves from one parallel universe to another? If we
don't like our lives or the way the world has become, could our
consciousness latch on to another more favorable timeline while the
sleepwalking unconscious version of ourselves continues in the
parallel universe we consciously departed from? What mechanism causes
this change? Is it intensely wishing for a different outcome in our
lives, or a different world where the recession ended?

If each observer on this planet is capable of spawning branching
parallel universes, are there unconscious sleepwalking versions of us
in an infinite number of timelines? This leads to a very scary
question, could our consciousness "wake up" in some bazaar timeline
caused by other conscious observers, a place where we do not want to
exist? When we open our eyes in the darkness of our bedrooms, look at
the clock radio and breathe a sigh of relief that we were only
dreaming, is it possible what we just experienced wasn't a dream but a
conscious observance looking at another parallel universe from the
perspective of Schrödinger's Cat?


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