Re: UDA query

[Brent Meeker]

Quentin Anciaux wrote:



2010/1/8 Brent Meeker >


Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

2010/1/7 Brent Meeker mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com>>:

 


A program that generates S2 as it were out of nowhere,
with false
memories of an S1 that has not yet happened or may
never happen, is a
perfectly legitimate program and the UD will generate
it along with
all the others. If the UD is allowed to run forever,
this program will
be a lower measure contributor to S2 than the program
that generates
it sequentially;
 


How do you know this?
   



Why S2 is unlikely to appear out of nowhere is equivalent to
the White
Rabbit problem in ensemble theories, which has been often
discussed
over the years on this list. Russell's "Theory of Nothing" book
provides a summary. The general idea is that structures
generated by
simpler algorithms have higher measure, and it is simpler to
write a
program that computes a series of mental states iteratively
than one
that computes a set of disconnected mental states from ad hoc
data.

 


and similarly in any physicalist theory. But although
S2 may guess from such considerations that he is more
likely to have
been generated sequentially, the point remains that
there is nothing
in the nature of his experience to indicate this. That
is, the fact
that S2 remembers S1 as being in the past and
remembers a smooth
transition from S1 to S2 is no guarantee that S1
really did happen in
the past, or even at all.
 


We're assuming that thought is a kind of computation, a
processing of
information.  And we're also assuming that this processing
can consist of
static states placed in order.  So given two static
states, what is the
relation  that makes their ordering into a computational
process?  One
answer would be that they are successive states generated
by some program.
But you seem to reject that.  To say that S2 remembers S1
doesn't seem to
answer the question because "remembering" is itself a
process, not a static
state.  I tried to phrase it in terms of the entropy, or
information
content, of S1 and S2 which would be a static property -
as for example, if
S2 simply contained S1.  But that hardly seems a proper
representation of
states of consciousness - I'm certainly not conscious of
my memories most of
the time.  Even as I type this I obviously remember how to
type (though
maybe not how to spell :-) ) but I'm not conscious of it.
   



You've made this point in the past but I still don't
understand it. If
S1 and S2 are periods of experience generated consecutively in
your
brain in the usual manner, do you agree that you would still be
experience them as consecutive if they were generated by chance by
causally disconnected processes?


No, I don't.  Of course if they had durations of seconds or minutes, I
would experience much the same thing.  But it is not at all convincing
to me that the experience at the beginning and end of the period would
be identical - and hence in the limit of infinitesimal duration,
discrete states I'm not sure what the experience would be, if any
at all.


The requirement would be only that
the respective experiences have the same subjective content in
both
cases. Memory is only one aspect of subjective content, if an
important one. If S1-S2 spans the typing of a sentence, then
both S1
and S2 have to remember how to type and what the sentence they are
typing is.


But here you have allowed S1 and S2 to be processes with significant
duration and even overlap.  They are no longer discrete, static
states.


It may seem to be unconscious but obviously it can't be
completely unconscious, otherwise it could be left out without
making
any difference. Your digestion is an example of a completely
unconscious process that need not be taken into account in a
simulation of your mind. Another example is your name: you may
have no
awareness at all of your name during S1-S2 so i

Re: Why I am I?

[RMahoney]

pretty cool thread (read most but skimmed thru some of it though).

I've spent the past 35 or so years (i'm now 56) pondering the subject
of "why I am I" and doing thought experiment after thought experiment
with cloning, copies, changing "I" one particle at a time until I am
"you" or someone else, and ultimately came to the conclusion as
someone posted midway thru this thread of the concept of the
universal person or universal soul... consciousness is basically
universal, there is no priority of one bit of consciousness over
the other. Within just my own life, the organism I was 35 years
ago is not the organism I am today, I am only connected to that
former organism by sequential events in time and space, threaded
together. With an advanced technology I could become
"Tom Cruise" by sequential changes particle by particle,
memory by memory, thought by thought, until I became the
currently existing Tom Cruise. Would my "I" which changed
over the course of 35 years from my former "I" be any different
than Tom Cruise's "I" that was changed over time (bit by bit)
from my former "I"? Thought experiments like these made me
realize we're all essentially the same universal concept, we're
all just unique pieces of the whole of the everything. It's just
really cool to find "like" thinking by a string search on the web,
having done all this thinking in isolation and coming to the
same conclusion as other minds have. What brought me to
this site was a string search for "everything possible exists",
something I now believe and was just curious if there was
any text on the web with the same line of thinking. It was my
answer to the other question I've always had as to why does
the universe exist at all? I came to my own conclusion that if
anything exists (which apparently it does), then every possible
event must exist, every possible outcome from one state to
the other must exist, and if it existed once, nothing stops it
from existing again, and actually, every possible event not
only exists but has always existed and will always exist.
Kind of expands the universe quite a bit, virtually infinite.
There's not only me, but every possible outcome of
my life. There's every possible outcome of my mom
& dad's reproduction, some of which produce me but
nearly infinitely conditions that do not produce my starting
organism. My dad wouldn't have existed, if it weren't for the
lightning strike that killed his mom's first husband. So I'm
here because I am just one of nearly infinite possibilities
of consciousness. Disconcerting, at times, where I used
to think, "glad it's them and not me" (like tortured terrorist
victims), well, we're all the same basically, and while the
whole of everything contains terrible things, including
the very worst of possibilities, it also contains the very best
as well. Having figured this much out to my satisfaction
actually gives me a very contented, peaceful and secure
feeling.

RMahoney
-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: Why I am I?

[RMahoney]

pretty cool thread (read most but skimmed thru some of it though).
I've spent the past 35 or so years (i'm now 56) pondering the subject
of "why I am I" and doing thought experiment after thought experiment
with cloning, copies, changing "I" one particle at a time until I am
"you" or someone else, and ultimately came to the conclusion as
someone posted midway thru this thread of the concept of the
universal
person or universal soul... consciousness is basically universal,
there is no priority of one bit of consciousness over the other.
Within just my own life, the organism I was 35 years ago is not the
organism I am today, I am only connected to that former organism by
sequential events in time and space, threaded together. With an
advanced technology I could become "Tom Cruise" by sequential changes
particle by particle, memory by memory, thought by thought, until I
became the currently existing Tom Cruise. Would my "I" which changed
over the course of 35 years from my former "I" be any different than
Tom Cruise's "I" that was changed over time (bit by bit) from my
former "I"? Thought experiments like these made me realize we're all
essentially the same universal concept, we're all just unique pieces
of the whole of the everything. It's just really cool to find "like"
thinking by a string search on the web, having done all this thinking
in isolation and coming to the same conclusion as other minds have.
What brought me to this site was a string search for "everything
possible exists", something I now believe and was just curious if
there was any text on the web with the same line of thinking. It was
my answer to the other question I've always had as to why does the
universe exist at all? I came to my own conclusion that if anything
exists (which apparently it does), then every possible event must
exist, every possible outcome from one state to the other must exist,
and if it existed once, nothing stops it from existing again, and
actually, every possible event not only exists but has always existed
and will always exist. Kind of expands the universe quite a bit,
virtually infinite. There's not only me, but every possible outcome
of
my life. There's every possible outcome of my mom & dad's
reproduction, some of which produce me but nearly infinitely
conditions that do not produce my starting organism. My dad wouldn't
have existed, if it weren't for the lightning strike that killed his
mom's first husband. So I'm here because I am just one of nearly
infinite possibilities of consciousness. Disconcerting, at times,
where I used to think, "glad it's them and not me" (like tortured
terrorist victims), well, we're all the same basically, and while the
whole of everything contains terrible things, including the very
worst
of possibilities, it also contains the very best as well. Having
figured this much out to my satisfaction actually gives me a very
contented, peaceful and secure feeling.

RMahoney
-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: Why I am I?

[RMahoney]

pretty cool thread (read most but skimmed thru some of it though).
I've spent the past 35 or so years (i'm now 56) pondering the subject
of "why I am I" and doing thought experiment after thought experiment
with cloning, copies, changing "I" one particle at a time until I am
"you" or someone else, and ultimately came to the conclusion as
someone posted midway thru this thread of the concept of the universal
person or universal soul... consciousness is basically universal,
there is no priority of one bit of consciousness over the other.
Within just my own life, the organism I was 35 years ago is not the
organism I am today, I am only connected to that former organism by
sequential events in time and space, threaded together. With an
advanced technology I could become "Tom Cruise" by sequential changes
particle by particle, memory by memory, thought by thought, until I
became the currently existing Tom Cruise. Would my "I" which changed
over the course of 35 years from my former "I" be any different than
Tom Cruise's "I" that was changed over time (bit by bit) from my
former "I"? Thought experiments like these made me realize we're all
essentially the same universal concept, we're all just unique pieces
of the whole of the everything. It's just really cool to find "like"
thinking by a string search on the web, having done all this thinking
in isolation and coming to the same conclusion as other minds have.
What brought me to this site was a string search for "everything
possible exists", something I now believe and was just curious if
there was any text on the web with the same line of thinking. It was
my answer to the other question I've always had as to why does the
universe exist at all? I came to my own conclusion that if anything
exists (which apparently it does), then every possible event must
exist, every possible outcome from one state to the other must exist,
and if it existed once, nothing stops it from existing again, and
actually, every possible event not only exists but has always existed
and will always exist. Kind of expands the universe quite a bit,
virtually infinite. There's not only me, but every possible outcome of
my life. There's every possible outcome of my mom & dad's
reproduction, some of which produce me but nearly infinitely
conditions that do not produce my starting organism. My dad wouldn't
have existed, if it weren't for the lightning strike that killed his
mom's first husband. So I'm here because I am just one of nearly
infinite possibilities of consciousness. Disconcerting, at times,
where I used to think, "glad it's them and not me" (like tortured
terrorist victims), well, we're all the same basically, and while the
whole of everything contains terrible things, including the very worst
of possibilities, it also contains the very best as well. Having
figured this much out to my satisfaction actually gives me a very
contented, peaceful and secure feeling.
- Roy
-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: UDA query

[Quentin Anciaux]

2010/1/8 Brent Meeker 

> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>> 2010/1/7 Brent Meeker :
>>
>>
>>
>>> A program that generates S2 as it were out of nowhere, with false
 memories of an S1 that has not yet happened or may never happen, is a
 perfectly legitimate program and the UD will generate it along with
 all the others. If the UD is allowed to run forever, this program will
 be a lower measure contributor to S2 than the program that generates
 it sequentially;


>>> How do you know this?
>>>
>>>
>>
>> Why S2 is unlikely to appear out of nowhere is equivalent to the White
>> Rabbit problem in ensemble theories, which has been often discussed
>> over the years on this list. Russell's "Theory of Nothing" book
>> provides a summary. The general idea is that structures generated by
>> simpler algorithms have higher measure, and it is simpler to write a
>> program that computes a series of mental states iteratively than one
>> that computes a set of disconnected mental states from ad hoc data.
>>
>>
>>
>>> and similarly in any physicalist theory. But although
 S2 may guess from such considerations that he is more likely to have
 been generated sequentially, the point remains that there is nothing
 in the nature of his experience to indicate this. That is, the fact
 that S2 remembers S1 as being in the past and remembers a smooth
 transition from S1 to S2 is no guarantee that S1 really did happen in
 the past, or even at all.


>>> We're assuming that thought is a kind of computation, a processing of
>>> information.  And we're also assuming that this processing can consist of
>>> static states placed in order.  So given two static states, what is the
>>> relation  that makes their ordering into a computational process?  One
>>> answer would be that they are successive states generated by some
>>> program.
>>> But you seem to reject that.  To say that S2 remembers S1 doesn't seem to
>>> answer the question because "remembering" is itself a process, not a
>>> static
>>> state.  I tried to phrase it in terms of the entropy, or information
>>> content, of S1 and S2 which would be a static property - as for example,
>>> if
>>> S2 simply contained S1.  But that hardly seems a proper representation of
>>> states of consciousness - I'm certainly not conscious of my memories most
>>> of
>>> the time.  Even as I type this I obviously remember how to type (though
>>> maybe not how to spell :-) ) but I'm not conscious of it.
>>>
>>>
>>
>> You've made this point in the past but I still don't understand it. If
>> S1 and S2 are periods of experience generated consecutively in your
>> brain in the usual manner, do you agree that you would still be
>> experience them as consecutive if they were generated by chance by
>> causally disconnected processes?
>>
>
> No, I don't.  Of course if they had durations of seconds or minutes, I
> would experience much the same thing.  But it is not at all convincing
> to me that the experience at the beginning and end of the period would
> be identical - and hence in the limit of infinitesimal duration, discrete
> states I'm not sure what the experience would be, if any at all.
>
>
>  The requirement would be only that
>> the respective experiences have the same subjective content in both
>> cases. Memory is only one aspect of subjective content, if an
>> important one. If S1-S2 spans the typing of a sentence, then both S1
>> and S2 have to remember how to type and what the sentence they are
>> typing is.
>>
>
> But here you have allowed S1 and S2 to be processes with significant
> duration and even overlap.  They are no longer discrete, static states.
>
>
>  It may seem to be unconscious but obviously it can't be
>> completely unconscious, otherwise it could be left out without making
>> any difference. Your digestion is an example of a completely
>> unconscious process that need not be taken into account in a
>> simulation of your mind. Another example is your name: you may have no
>> awareness at all of your name during S1-S2 so it could safely be left
>> out of the simulation, although at S3 when you reach the end of your
>> post and you need to sign it you need to remember what it is.
>>
>>
>>
>
> You are relying on the idea of a digital simulation which is described
> by a sequence of discrete states.  But in an actual realization of such
> a simulation the discrete states are realized by causal sequences in
> time which are not of infinitesimal duration and overlap.
>

This as no impact on the computational level, what is important is the logic
state which is discrete. What is running on an actual computer is a
program... that the physical computer use 3V or 1V or less or that it can
handle 5*10^9 instructions per second or 5000 doesn't change that fact, the
program will run the same (with regard to the (external) execution speed).
If consciousness is "digitalisable" then it follows that it is composed of
discrete states with no dur

Re: UDA query

[Brent Meeker]

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

2010/1/7 Brent Meeker :

  

A program that generates S2 as it were out of nowhere, with false
memories of an S1 that has not yet happened or may never happen, is a
perfectly legitimate program and the UD will generate it along with
all the others. If the UD is allowed to run forever, this program will
be a lower measure contributor to S2 than the program that generates
it sequentially;
  

How do you know this?



Why S2 is unlikely to appear out of nowhere is equivalent to the White
Rabbit problem in ensemble theories, which has been often discussed
over the years on this list. Russell's "Theory of Nothing" book
provides a summary. The general idea is that structures generated by
simpler algorithms have higher measure, and it is simpler to write a
program that computes a series of mental states iteratively than one
that computes a set of disconnected mental states from ad hoc data.

  

and similarly in any physicalist theory. But although
S2 may guess from such considerations that he is more likely to have
been generated sequentially, the point remains that there is nothing
in the nature of his experience to indicate this. That is, the fact
that S2 remembers S1 as being in the past and remembers a smooth
transition from S1 to S2 is no guarantee that S1 really did happen in
the past, or even at all.
  

We're assuming that thought is a kind of computation, a processing of
information.  And we're also assuming that this processing can consist of
static states placed in order.  So given two static states, what is the
relation  that makes their ordering into a computational process?  One
answer would be that they are successive states generated by some program.
But you seem to reject that.  To say that S2 remembers S1 doesn't seem to
answer the question because "remembering" is itself a process, not a static
state.  I tried to phrase it in terms of the entropy, or information
content, of S1 and S2 which would be a static property - as for example, if
S2 simply contained S1.  But that hardly seems a proper representation of
states of consciousness - I'm certainly not conscious of my memories most of
the time.  Even as I type this I obviously remember how to type (though
maybe not how to spell :-) ) but I'm not conscious of it.



You've made this point in the past but I still don't understand it. If
S1 and S2 are periods of experience generated consecutively in your
brain in the usual manner, do you agree that you would still be
experience them as consecutive if they were generated by chance by
causally disconnected processes? 


No, I don't.  Of course if they had durations of seconds or minutes, I
would experience much the same thing.  But it is not at all convincing
to me that the experience at the beginning and end of the period would
be identical - and hence in the limit of infinitesimal duration, 
discrete states I'm not sure what the experience would be, if any at all.



The requirement would be only that
the respective experiences have the same subjective content in both
cases. Memory is only one aspect of subjective content, if an
important one. If S1-S2 spans the typing of a sentence, then both S1
and S2 have to remember how to type and what the sentence they are
typing is. 


But here you have allowed S1 and S2 to be processes with significant
duration and even overlap.  They are no longer discrete, static states.


It may seem to be unconscious but obviously it can't be
completely unconscious, otherwise it could be left out without making
any difference. Your digestion is an example of a completely
unconscious process that need not be taken into account in a
simulation of your mind. Another example is your name: you may have no
awareness at all of your name during S1-S2 so it could safely be left
out of the simulation, although at S3 when you reach the end of your
post and you need to sign it you need to remember what it is.

  


You are relying on the idea of a digital simulation which is described
by a sequence of discrete states.  But in an actual realization of such
a simulation the discrete states are realized by causal sequences in
time which are not of infinitesimal duration and overlap.

Brent

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: UDA query

[Nick Prince]

On Jan 7, 12:09 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> Hi Nick,
>
> On 07 Jan 2010, at 01:39, Nick Prince wrote:
>
>
>
> > Hi Bruno
> > OK so there is a good deal of the technical stuff that I've got to
> > catch up on yet before I can interpret what you are saying  (although
> > I think I can understand why the everettian imperative based on comp +
> > UDA is there).
>
> Nice. It is already a big part.
>
> >  However if I could for the moment get an intuitive
> > understanding of what you mean by a consistent extension then perhaps
> > that would help with what Brent brought up.  From what I gather you
> > are saying our next observer moment is based not on the laws of
> > physics but on what possibilities the UD brings up in UD*.
>
> Our "next" first person observer moment. This comes simply from the  
> fact that the UD generates my current state (at the doctor  
> substitution level or below) an infinity of times. In each computation  
> I have a well defined third person next state, but my next 1-state is  
> defined olny statistically on all my next 3-states in all computations  
> going through my current state.
>
> > As an
> > analogy, in conways game of life, the next screen output display (=OM
> > for the little inhabitants) depends on the rules put into the cellular
> > automata (I know this only accounts for a single little universe here
> > and there would be an infinity of universal numbers for the real
> > universe etc, but lets try to keep it simple for the sake of clarity).
>
> OK, but the distinction between 1-state and 3-state forces us to NOT  
> make that simplification. You will encounter a problem.
>
> > So in this game any (little) laws of physics (regularities in the
> > game) are emergent and would become evident to a conscious entity that
> > arose in the game.
>
> Only if you implement the game in an already  "self-multiplying"  
> computations. If not, then, from the first person points of view of  
> the little entities appearing in your game, they will survive  
> somewhere else in the UD*. They will survive "here" (in your game)  
> only from *your* point of view. But "your reality" is a white rabbit  
> universe from *their* point of view.
> Of course, if you do it concretely, what you will build is most  
> probably a quantum object implementing the game of life, and as such,  
> it could gives the right measure. But this is "accidental" in the  
> reasoning, and based on the fact that we know already our  
> neighborhoods are quantum (and/or comp) multiplied.
>
> > So here is a case where physics (regularities in
> > the little world) arise from "a program".  Is there any simple way
> > this analogy or example  can be adapted to demonstrate how the
> > consistent extensions we experience come about.  Does it have
> > something to do with the prescription of the UD.  If not then how does
> > my existence pick its next consistent extension.
>
> It is really the consciousness which picks the consistent extension.  
> It is your consciousness in Moscow which will pick up the consistent  
> extension "Nick + "I am in Moscow"". Similarly, your consciousness in  
> Washington will pick the Washington consistent extension. All the  
> consistent extension are picked, that is why we have to isolate a  
> measure on those extensions.
>
> > It's all to do with
> > what makes extensions "consistent".
>
> Not really. A non consistent extension does not exist, simply. Unless  
> 0 = 1. In auda, we can see that some extension lead to a belief into  
> inconsistency: those are the cul-de-sac worlds. They are consistent  
> ("0 = 1" does not belong to them, but "provable ("0 = 1")" belongs to  
> them, and they are dead end, they have no consistent extensions.
>
> This is subtle and related to the second incompleteness theorem (and  
> Löb theorem). Consistency entails the consistency of inconsistency.  
> Provable(false) does not entails false, because we cannot prove our  
> consistency (if we are consistent).
>
> If we are inconsistent we can prove everything (including the false, 0  
> = 1).
> But if we prove our inconsistency, we still cannot prove everything.  
> We may prove  only that we can prove everything, and that is  
> different, and that difference eventually plays a key role.
>
> You may think to buy the Davis Dover book "The undecidable". It  
> contains the original paper by Gödel, Turing, Church, Rosser and  
> Kleene, and also the formidable paper by Post (which initiate the  
> whole recursion theory), and also its incredible 1920-24 anticipation  
> (up to my thesis!).  And it is cheap.
>
> http://www.amazon.com/Undecidable-Propositions-Unsolvable-Computable-...
>
> His little other Dover book "computability and unsolvability" is  
> rather nice too, but you don't need it if you have the Mendelson or  
> the Cutland book.
>
> > If it's not physics then it must
> > be something
>
> It is arithmetic.
>
> > and is there  a simple analogy that can help me to grasp
> > it?  I find

Re: UDA query

[Stathis Papaioannou]

2010/1/7 Brent Meeker :

> I think what I asked about is different from simply assuming idealism.  It
> is carrying your thread of reasoning a few steps further. Suppose Platonic
> objects exist.  Suppose computations, as Platonic objects, are enough to
> instantiate consciousness.  Suppose consciousness consists of discrete
> states of this computation.  Suppose the fact that the states are connected
> by the computation is irrelevant to their instantiation of consciousness.
> The states are themselves Platonic objects.  So if we assume Platonic
> objects exist we will already have assumed these states to exist and
> consciousness to have been instantiated by them - with no reference to
> computation.

That could be and in fact it is probably closer to what Plato himself
meant. But mathematical objects seem to have a special status in that
they necessarily exist, whereas everything else (including God) exists
only contingently. You can't imagine the number 7 not existing or not
being prime. The special sense in which mathematical objects and
relationships exist (maybe not the right word) independently of any
material world is their Platonic realm, but it doesn't follow having
accepted this that other objects also exist in a separate Platonic
realm. However, if consciousness supervenes on computation and it does
not require actual physical implementation of the computation, then
consciousness piggybacks on the Platonic existence of computation.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou
-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: UDA query

[Bruno Marchal]

Hi Nick,

On 07 Jan 2010, at 01:39, Nick Prince wrote:



Hi Bruno
OK so there is a good deal of the technical stuff that I've got to
catch up on yet before I can interpret what you are saying  (although
I think I can understand why the everettian imperative based on comp +
UDA is there).


Nice. It is already a big part.




 However if I could for the moment get an intuitive
understanding of what you mean by a consistent extension then perhaps
that would help with what Brent brought up.  From what I gather you
are saying our next observer moment is based not on the laws of
physics but on what possibilities the UD brings up in UD*.


Our "next" first person observer moment. This comes simply from the  
fact that the UD generates my current state (at the doctor  
substitution level or below) an infinity of times. In each computation  
I have a well defined third person next state, but my next 1-state is  
defined olny statistically on all my next 3-states in all computations  
going through my current state.






As an
analogy, in conways game of life, the next screen output display (=OM
for the little inhabitants) depends on the rules put into the cellular
automata (I know this only accounts for a single little universe here
and there would be an infinity of universal numbers for the real
universe etc, but lets try to keep it simple for the sake of clarity).


OK, but the distinction between 1-state and 3-state forces us to NOT  
make that simplification. You will encounter a problem.





So in this game any (little) laws of physics (regularities in the
game) are emergent and would become evident to a conscious entity that
arose in the game.


Only if you implement the game in an already  "self-multiplying"  
computations. If not, then, from the first person points of view of  
the little entities appearing in your game, they will survive  
somewhere else in the UD*. They will survive "here" (in your game)  
only from *your* point of view. But "your reality" is a white rabbit  
universe from *their* point of view.
Of course, if you do it concretely, what you will build is most  
probably a quantum object implementing the game of life, and as such,  
it could gives the right measure. But this is "accidental" in the  
reasoning, and based on the fact that we know already our  
neighborhoods are quantum (and/or comp) multiplied.





So here is a case where physics (regularities in
the little world) arise from "a program".  Is there any simple way
this analogy or example  can be adapted to demonstrate how the
consistent extensions we experience come about.  Does it have
something to do with the prescription of the UD.  If not then how does
my existence pick its next consistent extension.


It is really the consciousness which picks the consistent extension.  
It is your consciousness in Moscow which will pick up the consistent  
extension "Nick + "I am in Moscow"". Similarly, your consciousness in  
Washington will pick the Washington consistent extension. All the  
consistent extension are picked, that is why we have to isolate a  
measure on those extensions.




It's all to do with
what makes extensions "consistent".


Not really. A non consistent extension does not exist, simply. Unless  
0 = 1. In auda, we can see that some extension lead to a belief into  
inconsistency: those are the cul-de-sac worlds. They are consistent  
("0 = 1" does not belong to them, but "provable ("0 = 1")" belongs to  
them, and they are dead end, they have no consistent extensions.


This is subtle and related to the second incompleteness theorem (and  
Löb theorem). Consistency entails the consistency of inconsistency.  
Provable(false) does not entails false, because we cannot prove our  
consistency (if we are consistent).


If we are inconsistent we can prove everything (including the false, 0  
= 1).
But if we prove our inconsistency, we still cannot prove everything.  
We may prove  only that we can prove everything, and that is  
different, and that difference eventually plays a key role.


You may think to buy the Davis Dover book "The undecidable". It  
contains the original paper by Gödel, Turing, Church, Rosser and  
Kleene, and also the formidable paper by Post (which initiate the  
whole recursion theory), and also its incredible 1920-24 anticipation  
(up to my thesis!).  And it is cheap.


http://www.amazon.com/Undecidable-Propositions-Unsolvable-Computable-Functions/dp/0486432289

His little other Dover book "computability and unsolvability" is  
rather nice too, but you don't need it if you have the Mendelson or  
the Cutland book.




If it's not physics then it must
be something


It is arithmetic.




and is there  a simple analogy that can help me to grasp
it?  I find I can always work out the technicalities better if I have
a "road map" or analogy to help.



Arithmetic defined all the lawful sequences of states. But from inside  
"1-persons" do not belong to any precise computations, but to an  
inf

Re: UDA query

[Stathis Papaioannou]

2010/1/7 Brent Meeker :

>> A program that generates S2 as it were out of nowhere, with false
>> memories of an S1 that has not yet happened or may never happen, is a
>> perfectly legitimate program and the UD will generate it along with
>> all the others. If the UD is allowed to run forever, this program will
>> be a lower measure contributor to S2 than the program that generates
>> it sequentially;
>
> How do you know this?

Why S2 is unlikely to appear out of nowhere is equivalent to the White
Rabbit problem in ensemble theories, which has been often discussed
over the years on this list. Russell's "Theory of Nothing" book
provides a summary. The general idea is that structures generated by
simpler algorithms have higher measure, and it is simpler to write a
program that computes a series of mental states iteratively than one
that computes a set of disconnected mental states from ad hoc data.

>> and similarly in any physicalist theory. But although
>> S2 may guess from such considerations that he is more likely to have
>> been generated sequentially, the point remains that there is nothing
>> in the nature of his experience to indicate this. That is, the fact
>> that S2 remembers S1 as being in the past and remembers a smooth
>> transition from S1 to S2 is no guarantee that S1 really did happen in
>> the past, or even at all.
>
> We're assuming that thought is a kind of computation, a processing of
> information.  And we're also assuming that this processing can consist of
> static states placed in order.  So given two static states, what is the
> relation  that makes their ordering into a computational process?  One
> answer would be that they are successive states generated by some program.
> But you seem to reject that.  To say that S2 remembers S1 doesn't seem to
> answer the question because "remembering" is itself a process, not a static
> state.  I tried to phrase it in terms of the entropy, or information
> content, of S1 and S2 which would be a static property - as for example, if
> S2 simply contained S1.  But that hardly seems a proper representation of
> states of consciousness - I'm certainly not conscious of my memories most of
> the time.  Even as I type this I obviously remember how to type (though
> maybe not how to spell :-) ) but I'm not conscious of it.

You've made this point in the past but I still don't understand it. If
S1 and S2 are periods of experience generated consecutively in your
brain in the usual manner, do you agree that you would still be
experience them as consecutive if they were generated by chance by
causally disconnected processes? The requirement would be only that
the respective experiences have the same subjective content in both
cases. Memory is only one aspect of subjective content, if an
important one. If S1-S2 spans the typing of a sentence, then both S1
and S2 have to remember how to type and what the sentence they are
typing is. It may seem to be unconscious but obviously it can't be
completely unconscious, otherwise it could be left out without making
any difference. Your digestion is an example of a completely
unconscious process that need not be taken into account in a
simulation of your mind. Another example is your name: you may have no
awareness at all of your name during S1-S2 so it could safely be left
out of the simulation, although at S3 when you reach the end of your
post and you need to sign it you need to remember what it is.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou
-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: UDA query

[Bruno Marchal]

On 06 Jan 2010, at 20:18, Brent Meeker wrote:


Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 05 Jan 2010, at 19:59, Brent Meeker wrote:


Nick Prince wrote:
Is this because you think of your stream of consciousness as  
somehow

like a reel of film?  All the individual pictures could be cut from
the reel and laid out any which way but the implicit order is  
always

there.  I can understand this because all the spatio temporal
relationships for the actors in the film remain "normal" i.e obey  
the

laws of physics.


But there's the rub.  Why the laws of physics?  That's what somehow
needs to be explained.  Is there something about the UD that  
necessarily

generates law like sequences of states with high probability?



By definition, the UD "generates" all and only the (computable) law  
like sequences.


But only "law like" in the sense of being computable.  Not  
necessarily "law like" in conserving momentum in a 4-space with  
Lorentzian signature.


Yes. Other high level laws can emerge from the computable, note.



The UD executes all programs. It generates all the possible  
computations, those which terminate and those which don't terminate.
It is well defined mathematically, with respect to many equivalence  
results, closure results, Church thesis, etc.


Yes, I understand that.


A notion like "consistent extension" makes sense only for the  
"persons" relatively appearing "in" deeper computations, so the  
precise relation between "consistent extensions" and the UD needs  
the use of the Gödel Löb provability logics.


So do they allow a definition of "consistent extensions" such that  
"persons" can be identified with sequences of consistent extensions  
and those "persons" will define one or more universes in terms of  
intersubjective agreement?


Yes. Like "Brent + "I am in Moscow"" and "Brent + "I am in Washington"  
can appear to be to consistent extension of "Brent + "I am in  
Brussels"". Consistency is a personal and relative notion. "Brent + "I  
am in Moscow"" makes "I am in Moscow"" consistent with "Brent".  
"Brent" here denotes your set of beliefs, not your body.




 That's where you lose me - I don't see how this is to be done.


It is counter-intuitive (or better counter-Aristotelian-intuitive).  
But *you* are losing me. I don't see how we can avoid this, once  
"saying "yes" to the doctor. More in the post to Nick.


Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



-- 

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.

To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com.

To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: UDA query

[Bruno Marchal]

On 06 Jan 2010, at 20:10, Brent Meeker wrote:


Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 05 Jan 2010, at 19:57, Brent Meeker wrote:




Yes but the UD will generate infinitely more often the in order  
S1/S2/S3
than out of order... with what you are saying I don't even  
understand
what is a computation if not a rules ordered sequential state  
order.


Quentin


It seems strange that we start with the hypothesis that  
consciousness is a kind of computation - a sequential processing  
of information - and then arrive at picture in which there is no  
processing and sequence is just inferred.  On the one hand  
consciousness is a process, on the other hand it is static state.   
I suspect there is something wrong with the slicing of the stream  
of consciousness into zero-duration, non-overlapping states.



But that problem occurs also with physics, as illustrated by the  
debate on "time" and "block universe". Also, we have to be careful:  
no where it has been said that consciousness is a kind of  
computation.


It's been said on this list several times (at least by me :-) ).


I would not brag on this. Physicalist does such identification mistake  
(mind = brain, for example).
Consciousness is a first person apprehension of itself, a belief/ 
kowledge in a reality, etc. It may associate (with some probability)  
to a particular computation, but it is better not to identify them.


It is subtle. A lot of identification will be true (= provable by G*),  
yet, not provable by the machine (not provable by G).
Those identification are "religious" (belongs to G* minus G). They are  
true but not provable, and this plays some key role for the  
understanding of what happens.










Obviously "consciousness" is not a kind of computation.
It's not obvious to me.  If the doctor says to me, "This artificial- 
hypothalmus I'm going to substitute for yours, does exactly the same  
input-output computations that your original does.", then I'll be  
much more inclined to say "yes" than if he says it doesn't do any  
computation.


This shows only that some computation can bear consciousness, not that  
consciousness is equal to a computation.
Being a first person notion, it is better (still slighty false) to  
attach consciousness to all "similar" computation in the UD.
Then the relative proportion of relative measure will distinguish  
between the probable experiences and the rare (white rabbit) one.






It is a property of (first) person, which, assuming mechanism, is  
invariant for a set of functional substitution.


What is invariant under the functional substitution if not the  
computations?


OK. And with comp, if the functional substitutions are done at the  
right level, consciousness will be preserved too, but this does not  
mean that the consciousness is the computation.
A functional substitution can preserve the fact that you are winning a  
chess game, but the state of "winning a chess game" is not a  
computation per se, it is something else, which can be locally attach  
to some computation, but no more.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: UDA query

[Bruno Marchal]

On 06 Jan 2010, at 19:57, Brent Meeker wrote:


Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


2010/1/6 Brent Meeker :



I can understand that view, but in that case why consider them
computations?  Why not just suppose all states of your  
consciousness (and
even other parts of the world) exist.  If they can be glued  
together by
inherent features or simply experienced without even an implicit  
order,
then computation seems irrelevant.  Of course that leaves the  
apparent
lawfulness of physics even further from possible explanation than  
the UD

theory.



We start off with what we observe: apparently there is a physical
world, and some parts of this physical world, called brains, seem to
give rise to consciousness. There is reason to think that computers
running a program can also give rise to consciousness. Taking this
hypothesis of computationalism seriously then leads to interesting
questions, such as whether there is a reason to suppose that
consciousness happens only when the computations are physically
instantiated (and what exactly that means), or whether their status  
as

platonic objects is enough to generate the associated consciousness.
In other words, there is a series of rational steps starting from  
what

we observe, and if any step is faulted the whole edifice falls;
whereas imply assuming idealism from the start is ad hoc and
unfalsifiable.



I think what I asked about is different from simply assuming  
idealism.  It is carrying your thread of reasoning a few steps  
further. Suppose Platonic objects exist.  Suppose computations, as  
Platonic objects, are enough to instantiate consciousness.  Suppose  
consciousness consists of discrete states of this computation.


I will insist that consciousness cannot consists of discrete states of  
computation. It may be associated to, attached to, etc. Consciousness  
is a first person notion, and computational state are third person  
notions. We cannot identify them. It is the same mistake than  
identifying mind and brain. Brain are assembly of molecules, minds are  
memories, informations, logical and pragmatical dispositions, etc.
In some thread this can be just an irrelevant  detail, but as we are  
going to the crux of the reasoning, we will have to be very careful.  
The devil is in the detail ...





Suppose the fact that the states are connected by the computation is  
irrelevant to their instantiation of consciousness.  The states are  
themselves Platonic objects.  So if we assume Platonic objects exist  
we will already have assumed these states to exist and consciousness  
to have been instantiated by them - with no reference to computation.


OK.




I think Bruno avoids this by saying consciousness consists of  
computationally connected sequences thru a given state - not the  
state itself - but I'm not sure why that should be.


Assuming digital mechanism, we can associate consciousness to a  
computation. This computation makes sense only with respect to a  
number or a machine which "do" (platonically) that computation. If  
not, all number can be said to code a computational state, and all  
sequence of states could define a computations, and the computations  
would be non enumerable, but the computations (without oracle), and  
considered in the third person way are enumerable: it is always  
generated by a precise phi_i(j).


Now, to associate a consciousness to a computation is not enough. The  
association has to be 1-person statistically stable. We have to take  
into account the global first person indeterminacy, which involved all  
computations.


I will come back on this in my comment to Nick's last post.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



-- 

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.

To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com.

To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.