Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
On 04 Oct 2013, at 20:00, meekerdb wrote: On 10/4/2013 7:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Physical time, on the contrary is most plausibly a quantum notion, and should normally emerge (assuming comp) from the interference of all computations + the stable first person (plural) points of view. I don't think physical time is even a single concept. There is t that goes in the equations, there is a general relativistic time- like killing vector, there is the direction of increase of local entropy, there is expansion of the universe,... A lot of interesting questions in physics arise from studying how these relate to one another. I agree. Here by physical time I was thinking of the t in the time dependent Schroedinger equation. It might be, already in physics, a dispensable parameter (like in DeWitt-Wheeler equation H = 0). All notions of time must be recovered from 0, 1, 2, 3, ... + addition + multiplication (+ the points of view, but they are derived). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: A challenge for Craig
On 04 Oct 2013, at 20:06, meekerdb wrote: On 10/4/2013 7:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: When a consciousness is not manifested, what is it's content? Good question. Difficult. Sometimes ago, I would have said that consciousness exists only in manifested form. That's what I would say. I have to confess that salvia has put a doubt on this. I cannot reject this as an hallucination, because the experience does not depend on the fact that it is an hallucination. A bit like a blind person cannot say that he saw something but that is was an hallucination. I have no certainty at all in those matter. But I am much less sure about that, and such consciousness state might be something like heavenly bliss or hellish terror, depending on the path where you would lost the ability of manifesting yourself. Recognizing that consciousness means different things: perception, self-modeling, awareness of self-modeling, self-evaluation,... I think we can at least see what it is like to not have some of these forms of consciousness because we generally have at most one at a given time - and sometimes we don't have any of them. Here the salvia experience is tremendously interesting, as we loose many things, like memory, sense of self, body, notions of time and space, etc. yet we remain conscious, with the weird feeling that we are conscious for the first time, and the last time, and that we remember something that we know better than everything we might have believed to know. It is a quite paradoxical state of mind, and coming back from it, it gives a sense that consciousness is fundamentally something statical, making time illusory. I thought that consciousness needed that time illusion, but now I am less sure about that. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
On 05 Oct 2013, at 01:16, Russell Standish wrote: On Fri, Oct 04, 2013 at 04:51:02PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: Read AUDA, where you can find the mathematical definition for each pronouns, based on Kleene's recursion theorem (using the Dx = xx trick, which I promised to do in term of numbers, phi_i, W_i, etc. but 99,999% will find the use of them in UDA enough clear for the reasoning. Yet, I have made AUDA as I was told some scientists were allergic to thought experiments, and indeed studied only AUDA (and got no problem with it). Hi Bruno, You meade this comment before, and I just passed over it, because it didn't seem that relevant to the thread. I am familiar with your AUDA from your Lille thesis, of course, but don't recall anywhere where you discuss formalisation of pronouns. Perhaps you do this in another treatment of the AUDA I haven't read? Or perhaps you have some slightly different idea in you mind that I'm missing? Just wondering... I thought I have explained this very often, but perhaps I have been unclear, or took some understanding of Gödel 1931 for granted? Bp (intended for its arithmetical interpretation, thus Gödel's beweisbar) is the third person I; like in I have two legs, or like in front of my code or body (scanned by the doctor). I refer often to it by 3-I. This is standard self-reference. Bp p, is the knower, which plays the role of the first person in AUDA. It is a solipsistic person unable to provide any definition or name for who he is. It is the Plotinus universal soul, or the inner God of the East. It is the non duplicable being which is unable to feel the split in duplication experience. From his own perspective he is not duplicable, not nameable, and not a machine (!). The other hypostases are variant of those above. Normally Bp Dt should give a first person plural, and is as much nameable, and definable in arithmetic than the 3-I. It is really the 3-I + a reality (Dt). The sensible person, in a reality is the knower + reality (Bp p Dt). OK? To sum up: Bp = 3-I, Bp p = 1-I. The Dt can be added, and just transform the provability into probability (which needs ([]p - p), in formal treatment). Bruno Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
On Sat, Oct 05, 2013 at 09:40:18AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Oct 2013, at 01:16, Russell Standish wrote: On Fri, Oct 04, 2013 at 04:51:02PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: Read AUDA, where you can find the mathematical definition for each pronouns, based on Kleene's recursion theorem (using the Dx = xx trick, which I promised to do in term of numbers, phi_i, W_i, etc. but 99,999% will find the use of them in UDA enough clear for the reasoning. Yet, I have made AUDA as I was told some scientists were allergic to thought experiments, and indeed studied only AUDA (and got no problem with it). Hi Bruno, You meade this comment before, and I just passed over it, because it didn't seem that relevant to the thread. I am familiar with your AUDA from your Lille thesis, of course, but don't recall anywhere where you discuss formalisation of pronouns. Perhaps you do this in another treatment of the AUDA I haven't read? Or perhaps you have some slightly different idea in you mind that I'm missing? Just wondering... I thought I have explained this very often, but perhaps I have been unclear, or took some understanding of Gödel 1931 for granted? Bp (intended for its arithmetical interpretation, thus Gödel's beweisbar) is the third person I; like in I have two legs, or like in front of my code or body (scanned by the doctor). I refer often to it by 3-I. This is standard self-reference. Bp p, is the knower, which plays the role of the first person in AUDA. It is a solipsistic person unable to provide any definition or name for who he is. It is the Plotinus universal soul, or the inner God of the East. It is the non duplicable being which is unable to feel the split in duplication experience. From his own perspective he is not duplicable, not nameable, and not a machine (!). The other hypostases are variant of those above. Normally Bp Dt should give a first person plural, and is as much nameable, and definable in arithmetic than the 3-I. It is really the 3-I + a reality (Dt). The sensible person, in a reality is the knower + reality (Bp p Dt). OK? To sum up: Bp = 3-I, Bp p = 1-I. The Dt can be added, and just transform the provability into probability (which needs ([]p - p), in formal treatment). Bruno I get that Bp is the statement that I can prove p, and that Bp p is the statement that I know p (assuming Theatetus, of course), but in both cases, I would say the pronoun I refers to the same entity. English, and AFAIK French, do not make a distinction between 3-I and 1-I, so this is some new terminology that you have introduced, with unclear connection to real pronouns. Why do you say they are pronouns? Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics
On 04 Oct 2013, at 23:30, John Mikes wrote: Richard: I grew into denying probability in cases where not - ALL - circumstances are known. I agree with this. That is why there are many other attempt to study ignorance and beliefs (like believability theories, which is like probability, except they can sum and go above 1). Now I am not sure Dizadji-Bahmani is successful on his critics on branching indifference, which of ourse can be seen as part of the first person indeterminacy in the (more general) comp or arithmetical duplication situations. Bruno Since we know only part of the infinite complexity of the WORLD, we buy in for a mistake if fixing anything like 'probability'. The same goes for statistical: push the borderlines abit further away and the COUNT of the studied item (= statistical value) will change. Also the above argument for probability is valid for results as 'statistical' values. JM On Fri, Oct 4, 2013 at 12:27 PM, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote: Foad Dizadji-Bahmani, 2013. The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics persists. British Jour. Philosophy of Science IN PRESS. ABSTRACT. Everettian quantum mechanics (EQM) results in ‘multiple, emergent, branching quasi-classical realities’ (Wallace [2012]). The possible outcomes of measurement as per ‘orthodox’ quantum mechanics are, in EQM, all instantiated. Given this metaphysics, Everettians face the ‘probability problem’—how to make sense of probabilities, and recover the Born Rule. To solve the probability problem, Wallace, following Deutsch ([1999]), has derived a quantum representation theorem. I argue that Wallace’s solution to the probability problem is unsuccessful, as follows. First, I examine one of the axioms of rationality used to derive the theorem, Branching Indifference (BI). I argue that Wallace is not successful in showing that BI is rational. While I think it is correct to put the burden of proof on Wallace to motivate BI as an axiom of rationality, it does not follow from his failing to do so that BI is not rational. Thus, second, I show that there is an alternative strategy for setting one’s credences in the face of branching which is rational, and which violates BI. This is Branch Counting (BC). Wallace is aware of BC, and has proffered various arguments against it. However, third, I argue that Wallace’s arguments against BC are unpersuasive. I conclude that the probability problem in EQM persists. http://www.foaddb.com/FDBCV.pdf Publications (a Ph.D. in Philosophy, London School of Economics, May 2012) ‘The Probability Problem in Everettian Quantum Mechanics Persists’, British Journal for Philosophy of Science, forthcoming ‘The Aharanov Approach to Equilibrium’, Philosophy of Science, 2011 78(5): 976-988 ‘Who is Afraid of Nagelian Reduction?’, Erkenntnis, 2010 73: 393-412, (with R. Frigg and S. Hartmann) ‘Confirmation and Reduction: A Bayesian Account’, Synthese, 2011 179(2): 321-338, (with R. Frigg and S. Hartmann) His paper may be an interesting read once it comes out. Also available in: ‘Why I am not an Everettian’, in D. Dieks and V. Karakostas (eds): Recent Progress in Philosophy of Science: Perspectives and Foundational Problems, 2013, (The Third European Philosophy of Science Association Proceedings), Dordrecht: Springer I think this list needs another discussion of the possible MWI probability problem although it has been covered here and elsewhere by members of this list. Previous discussions have not been personally convincing. Richard -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Aaronson's paper
On 05 Oct 2013, at 03:07, meekerdb wrote: On 10/4/2013 2:14 PM, LizR wrote: On 5 October 2013 06:53, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: He comes to this because he's *defined* Knightian uncertainty as radical unpredictability without randomness. I don't see why it doesn't entail randomness, especially if it comes from quantum fluctuations during the big bang. I found that a little puzzling too. But I happen to be reading Scott's book Quantum Computing Since Democritus too; and in it he gives more of an explanation. He notes that there are some things which are undetermined but which it doesn't seem possible to assign a probability distribution to, more precisely there are quite different probability distributions that seem equally applicable. He discusses a few examples. The Doomsday argument is one that is probably known to everyone on this list. I agree with this. In the doomsday argument the use of Bayes formula is valid, but the premisse ask for an ASSA (absolute self-sampling assumption, in Bostrom terms). He notes that one could estimate a probability using a self-sampling assumption or a self-indicial assumption and they produce different answers. His general conclusion is that there are undetermined things that are not random. OK. I think he would put Bruno's FPI in that class. FPI needs only the RSSA, and I don't think it falls in the class. Indeed, the distribution is given by the usual binomial or normal, coupled or not with the UD. And apparently that's what he thinks initial conditions of the universe could be. Of course that makes the whole point very weak. he has to assumled some primitive physical reality, with a strange and incomprehensible cause or start. Incidentally, I highly recommend the book. But even if it doesn't, it still doesn't seem to me to lead to free will worth having. I agree with Dennett there: Determinism can provide all the freedom worth having. I agree with this. Even interesting and relevant notion of free-will, for which indeterminacy of any kind is useless. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
On 05 Oct 2013, at 10:05, Russell Standish wrote: On Sat, Oct 05, 2013 at 09:40:18AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Oct 2013, at 01:16, Russell Standish wrote: On Fri, Oct 04, 2013 at 04:51:02PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: Read AUDA, where you can find the mathematical definition for each pronouns, based on Kleene's recursion theorem (using the Dx = xx trick, which I promised to do in term of numbers, phi_i, W_i, etc. but 99,999% will find the use of them in UDA enough clear for the reasoning. Yet, I have made AUDA as I was told some scientists were allergic to thought experiments, and indeed studied only AUDA (and got no problem with it). Hi Bruno, You meade this comment before, and I just passed over it, because it didn't seem that relevant to the thread. I am familiar with your AUDA from your Lille thesis, of course, but don't recall anywhere where you discuss formalisation of pronouns. Perhaps you do this in another treatment of the AUDA I haven't read? Or perhaps you have some slightly different idea in you mind that I'm missing? Just wondering... I thought I have explained this very often, but perhaps I have been unclear, or took some understanding of Gödel 1931 for granted? Bp (intended for its arithmetical interpretation, thus Gödel's beweisbar) is the third person I; like in I have two legs, or like in front of my code or body (scanned by the doctor). I refer often to it by 3-I. This is standard self-reference. Bp p, is the knower, which plays the role of the first person in AUDA. It is a solipsistic person unable to provide any definition or name for who he is. It is the Plotinus universal soul, or the inner God of the East. It is the non duplicable being which is unable to feel the split in duplication experience. From his own perspective he is not duplicable, not nameable, and not a machine (!). The other hypostases are variant of those above. Normally Bp Dt should give a first person plural, and is as much nameable, and definable in arithmetic than the 3-I. It is really the 3-I + a reality (Dt). The sensible person, in a reality is the knower + reality (Bp p Dt). OK? To sum up: Bp = 3-I, Bp p = 1-I. The Dt can be added, and just transform the provability into probability (which needs ([]p - p), in formal treatment). Bruno I get that Bp is the statement that I can prove p, and that Bp p is the statement that I know p (assuming Theatetus, of course), but in both cases, I would say the pronoun I refers to the same entity. G* proves that they are the same, but G does not. It is (in God's eye) the same entity, but the machine is unable to know, or to prove that, and that explains the difference of the perspective. 3-I has a name/ description, but the 1-I has no name. English, and AFAIK French, do not make a distinction between 3-I and 1-I, so this is some new terminology that you have introduced, with unclear connection to real pronouns. Why do you say they are pronouns? Because 1-I and 3-I are variant of the pronoun I. Natural language use the same word, because we tend to confuse them. The duplication experiences are the simplest tool for distinguishing them. The Theatetus' definition, when applied to Gödel's beweisbar also distinguish them, rather miraculously. Plotinus and most serious people approaching the mind body problem saw the difference, but the 1-I is typically eliminated by the Aristotelian theologian (like the atheists, the fundamentalists, etc.). It is almost the difference between the body and the soul. The first does admit third person descriptions, the second has none (like Truth). Bruno Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Reformulation of the mind-body problem
In case you are intersted, here is a link to my last publication: Article title: The computationalist reformulation of the mind-body problem Reference: JPBM863 Journal title: Progress in Biophysics and Molecular Biology Corresponding author: Dr. Bruno Marchal First author: Dr. Bruno Marchal Final version published online: 5-OCT-2013 Full bibliographic details: Progress in Biophysics and Molecular Biology 113 (2013), pp. 127-140 DOI information: 10.1016/j.pbiomolbio.2013.03.014 Available online at: http://authors.elsevier.com/sd/article/S007961071300028X Please note that access to the full text of this article will depend on your personal or institutional entitlements. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: A challenge for Craig
On 5 October 2013 15:25, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: The question is whether swapping out part of the system for a functional equivalent will change the qualia the system experiences without changing the behaviour. I don't think this is possible, for if the qualia change the subject would (at least) notice That's the point I find questionable. Why couldn't some qualia change in minor ways and the system *not* notice because the system doesn't have any absolute memory to which it can compare qualia. Have you ever gone back to a house you lived in as a small child? Looks a lot smaller doesn't it. Brent If a normal brain does not notice changes or falsely notices changes then a brain with functionally identical implants will also fail to notice or falsely notice these changes. and say that the qualia have changed, which constitutes a change in behaviour. Therefore, the qualia and the behaviour are somehow inextricably linked. The alternative, that the qualia are substrate dependent, can't work. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The confluence of cosmology and biology
You may be absolutely correct, Professor, Standish, and likely are. But you
know, what I can say in response is that the programmer just is, which, of
course, bumps, what we know of causality. Or, more, precisely, a programmer
designs a program that creates a single hubble volume, or many, many. And, yes,
I am just moving the problem backwards, endlessly. I have of late become
curious about Boltzmann Brains resolving-confusing this issue of CA emerging
accidentally, versus a programmer. BB's may do this, as I have read that
Boltzmann and some contemporary physicists and mathematicians, consider this
BB(s) to arise out of the thermal disequalibrium, between the false vacuum, and
absolute vacuum in which the Hubble Volume began with. Allegedly, these BB's or
perhaps, just one BB, is said to have emerged from nothing (vacuum--false
vacuum) with false memories and a personality.
This is an absolutely, insane, notion, but the problem is-I sort of like it.
Maybe the programmer came from nothing, or get big CA? Or the Big CA percolated
up and created the big programer, or program, even? It is definitely, insane,
but also maybe insanely, great? To quote US skeptic, and Atheist, Michael
Shermer, Any sufficiently, advanced, ET is indistinguishable from God.
Shermer was rifting on Arthur C. Clarke's famous, quote, regarding technology,
as you already know. But rather then being repelled by the idea, I, personally,
feel good about it. I suppose there's no accounting for taste. or whom one may
encounter on a mailing list.
I am semi-serious in this proposal, that if this thinking turns out to at least
be conceivable, theoretically, then perhaps international SETI searches could
also include BB's as well as carbon-water beings such as ourselves? It might be
interesting to interview this big BB. I wouldn't even mind genuflecting,
because, hey, that's what us, primates, do when encountering a 'superior
being.'
Thanks for viewing this post (if you do?)
Mitch
-Original Message-
From: Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au
To: everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Fri, Oct 4, 2013 8:56 pm
Subject: Re: The confluence of cosmology and biology
On Fri, Oct 04, 2013 at 11:54:34AM -0400, spudboy...@aol.com wrote:
Very well, Professor Standish, given that, could the Hubble Volume
tself, then be considered as one CA? A CA that is 13.7 light years
cross, and thus, that old?
That sounds like what Wolfram proposes.
Is this CA, or all CA's something that emerges from thermo and fluid
ynamics, or does it require (sigh!) a programmer, in the Jurgen
chmidhuber, sense of the word?
I don't see why a programmer is required. Presumably, if is some sort
f CA, it just is.
Apologies for my obtuseness, but hey, this what all good primates do, connect
ots, make assumptions.
Thanks,
Mitch
-Original Message-
From: Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au
To: everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Thu, Oct 3, 2013 8:13 pm
Subject: Re: The confluence of cosmology and biology
There are plenty of examples, but it will take too long to extract the
literature. For example, the Navier-Stokes equations describing fluid
flow can be simulated via an appropriate hex tiling (close packed
spheres) CA (or generalised CA). I've seen people give examples of CAs
simulating the reaction-diffusion equations that Turing used for his
famous morphogenesis study.
Cheers
On Thu, Oct 03, 2013 at 05:38:45PM -0400, spudboy...@aol.com wrote:
Does anyone know any phenomena in nature or science that duplicates
the behavior of Cellular Automata? Does cell biology do the tasks
of CA, orbis this merely, a mathematical abstraction? Does anything
in physics come to mind, when refering to CA?
-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Wed, Oct 2, 2013 10:18 am
Subject: Re: The confluence of cosmology and biology
On 02 Oct 2013, at 03:56, Russell Standish wrote:
On Tue, Oct 01, 2013 at 02:54:51PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 01 Oct 2013, at 01:30, Russell Standish wrote:
The real universe is likely to be 11 dimensional, nonlocal with
around
10^{122} states, or 2^{10^{122}} possible universes, if indeed it
is a
CA at all. Needles in haystacks is a walk in the park by comparison.
CA are local. The universe cannot be a CA if comp is correct, and
the empirical violation of Bell's inequality confirms this comp
feature.
Bruno
There is no particular requirement for CAs to be local, although local
CAs are by far easier to study than nonlocal ones, so in practice they
usually are (cue obligatory lamp post analogy).
We can easily conceive quantum CA.
But those are not what is named simply CA (which locality is quite
typical).
You will not find quantum CA in Wolfram (well, in my edition).
Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
On Fri, Oct 4, 2013 at 10:39 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: the coin throw was random so you ended up in Moscow rather than Washington for no reason at all, but that's OK because there is no law of logic that demands every event have a cause. The point is that in this case the randomness is know to be due to the lack of precision in the data Exactly, lack of precision in the data. In the Many Worlds interpretation, and in all the duplicating chamber thought experiments I have see on this list, probability is not a property of the thing itself but just a measure of a lack of information. Not something like the self-duplication. What randomness is there in that? we know in advance that each copies can only see one city, Yes. and not both Yes, Bruno Marchal the Washington Man will not see Moscow, and Bruno Marchal the Moscow Man will not see Washington, and Bruno Marchal the Helsinki Man will not see Moscow or Washington; and of course Bruno Marchal will turn into things (PLURAL because Bruno Marchal has been duplicated) that see all 3 cities. and so the immediate result of the self-localization cannot be predicted by the guy in Helsinki. Without using personal pronouns please tell John K Clark the precise question to ask the guy in Helsinki that has a indeterminate answer, and just as important please make clear exactly who Bruno Marchal is asking the question to. You are playing with words Words are the only way we have to communicate and I am not playing and this is not a game. I have no doubt that if duplicating chambers were in common use in Shakespeare's day by now the English language would be very different, particularly in regard to personal pronouns; but that didn't happen so we are left with a very imperfect instrument to discuss these matters. Thus when talking philosophically about duplicating chambers personal pronouns must be used sparingly and with great care even if that results in inelegant prose. I have no clue, and I think that nobody has any clue about what you fail to understand. I no longer think there is anything there to understand. You oscillate between not new and trivial, and wrong, Yes, because your statements oscillate between not new, trivial, hopelessly vague, and just wrong. I said a long time ago that no philosopher in the last 200 years has said something that was clear, deep, non-obvious, and true that a scientist or mathematician hadn't said long before, and you are continuing in that grand tradition. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The confluence of cosmology and biology (errata)
On 04 Oct 2013, at 21:10, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 04 Oct 2013, at 17:48, spudboy...@aol.com wrote: Oh that's a typo, and I have never read the Many Forking Paths. It is a very good one, quoted by Everett, if I remember well. I think Liz thought on Tlon Uqbar Orbid Tertius. The first novel in Fiction, which contains the Forking Path novel. I like most novels in Fiction. Borgess is great. I meant of course Tlon Uqbar Orbis Tertius. Orbid is a typo. Orbis was the term which started this litlle sub-thread. Sorry. Bruno PS There might be ¨ on the o of Tlon (Tlön). Not entirely sure of the spelling. All that from personal memory, directly accessible from my organic memories, as the book itself seems to be in some box zmong boxes, I hope! Bruno It was funny how philosophers like Borges (a novelist), David Lewis, and Hugh Everett the 3rd got to the same conclusion. All about the same time. -Original Message- From: LizR lizj...@gmail.com To: everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Thu, Oct 3, 2013 5:54 pm Subject: Re: The confluence of cosmology and biology On 4 October 2013 10:38, spudboy...@aol.com wrote: Does anyone know any phenomena in nature or science that duplicates the behavior of Cellular Automata? Does cell biology do the tasks of CA, orbis this merely, a mathematical abstraction? Does anything in physics come to mind, when refering to CA? I think some chemical reactions are similar? (By the way I love the orbis - immediately made me think of Borges - but I'm guessing it was just a typo :) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
On Sat, Oct 5, 2013 at 5:05 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Fri, Oct 4, 2013 at 10:39 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: the coin throw was random so you ended up in Moscow rather than Washington for no reason at all, but that's OK because there is no law of logic that demands every event have a cause. The point is that in this case the randomness is know to be due to the lack of precision in the data Exactly, lack of precision in the data. In the Many Worlds interpretation, and in all the duplicating chamber thought experiments I have see on this list, probability is not a property of the thing itself but just a measure of a lack of information. Point? Flaw expressed as a complete idea and not as some partial attack on terms from the hedges? Not something like the self-duplication. What randomness is there in that? Point? Flaw expressed as a complete idea and not as some partial attack on terms from the hedges? we know in advance that each copies can only see one city, Yes. and not both Yes, Bruno Marchal the Washington Man will not see Moscow, and Bruno Marchal the Moscow Man will not see Washington, and Bruno Marchal the Helsinki Man will not see Moscow or Washington; and of course Bruno Marchal will turn into things (PLURAL because Bruno Marchal has been duplicated) that see all 3 cities. and so the immediate result of the self-localization cannot be predicted by the guy in Helsinki. Without using personal pronouns please tell John K Clark the precise question to ask the guy in Helsinki that has a indeterminate answer, and just as important please make clear exactly who Bruno Marchal is asking the question to. You are playing, because the guy in Helsinki is a third person description. The 3rd person pronoun is embedded in your question and you are asking for it to be removed while providing an answer concerning it. Whatever, John... I don't believe that you're seriously asking something this semantically unsound. You are playing with words Words are the only way we have to communicate and I am not playing and this is not a game. Your last question I responded to, is sufficient to let readers decide on that. It's a fine example of how you play and/or your alien conception of pronouns. I have no doubt that if duplicating chambers were in common use in Shakespeare's day by now the English language would be very different, particularly in regard to personal pronouns; but that didn't happen so we are left with a very imperfect instrument to discuss these matters. Why literally and metaphorically baroque hypothetical from the guy that hates philosophy? Not teleporting in Shakespeare's time is responsible for use of pronouns today?! Sorry, but this is worse than bad philosophy. And no philosophers to blame. John Clark produced that statement and is the philosopher he set out to shoot down in this thread. Thus when talking philosophically about duplicating chambers personal pronouns must be used sparingly and with great care even if that results in inelegant prose. Not so fast... you can also use informal language use ambiguity of interplay between pronouns, entities, and pov to obfuscate your own bogosity. Bruno's use corresponds to accepted standards in linguistics and, from what I understand, in mathematical logic as well. What does your hyper-complex use of pronouns correspond to? I have no clue, and I think that nobody has any clue about what you fail to understand. I no longer think there is anything there to understand. You never wanted to, despite your intelligence, so cut the pretense. You oscillate between not new and trivial, and wrong, Yes, because your statements oscillate between not new, trivial, hopelessly vague, and just wrong. I said a long time ago that no philosopher in the last 200 years has said something that was clear, deep, non-obvious, and true that a scientist or mathematician hadn't said long before, and you are continuing in that grand tradition. Again, you're that philosopher in this discussion, John. Not clear, deep, non-obvious, and true. So that is consistent: the philosopher that sheds light on nothing but obvious wrongs or redundant trivialities and obfuscations (your 3rd person description of philosophers starting this discussion) is first person John Clark making statements here. Again you mix up the 1p and 3p pronouns. Whether deliberate or not, is not the question. You claimed to have found a flaw; but if you keep mixing up these two to your heart's content, and use that as a vector for attacking from hedges with no theory or backup for your use of pronouns, then it is clear why you think you have found a flaw. PGC John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
On 05 Oct 2013, at 17:05, John Clark wrote:
On Fri, Oct 4, 2013 at 10:39 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
the coin throw was random so you ended up in Moscow rather than
Washington for no reason at all, but that's OK because there is no
law of logic that demands every event have a cause.
The point is that in this case the randomness is know to be due to
the lack of precision in the data
Exactly, lack of precision in the data. In the Many Worlds
interpretation, and in all the duplicating chamber thought
experiments I have see on this list, probability is not a property
of the thing itself but just a measure of a lack of information.
Not something like the self-duplication.
What randomness is there in that?
The randomness is well described in the diaries of those doing the
experience.
we know in advance that each copies can only see one city,
Yes.
and not both
Yes, Bruno Marchal the Washington Man will not see Moscow, and Bruno
Marchal the Moscow Man will not see Washington, and Bruno Marchal
the Helsinki Man will not see Moscow or Washington; and of course
Bruno Marchal will turn into things (PLURAL because Bruno Marchal
has been duplicated) that see all 3 cities.
But you have agreed that all bruno marchal are the original one (a
case where Leibniz identity rule fails, like in modal logics), so why
don't you listen to him, and indeed all of him.
If in Helsinki he predicted {W M}, the bruno marchal in W will see
that his prediction failed, as he must admit that he is not seeing M.
If in Helsinki he predicted W, then the bruno marchal in M will see
that the prediction failed. And, with comp, we accept that both the
people in W and in M are equal in bruno marchalness.
If in Helsinki he predicted (W or M), and that means he write W or M
in his diary (which will be destroyed and recreated in two copies,
then both bruno marchal will look at the diary, which assert W v
M, and both will see that indeed one disjunct have been realized, and
so both prediction win.
In UDA, first and third person are entirely described in term of
annihilation and reconstitution.
The notion of first person plural is defined similarly in term of
duplication of entire population, and this can already provide a
definition of entanglement in classical computer science term (but
that is premature here).
and so the immediate result of the self-localization cannot be
predicted by the guy in Helsinki.
Without using personal pronouns please tell John K Clark the precise
question to ask the guy in Helsinki that has a indeterminate
answer, and just as important please make clear exactly who Bruno
Marchal is asking the question to.
The question is what do you expect to live or feel, as a comp
believer when experiencing the step 3 protocol. More precisely, it
concerns the seeing of the cities involved: do you expect W, M, both,
etc.
The question is used in the traditional sense of you, before the
duplication. I just ask you the question, about what experience you
can expect (as you will not die, and not feel to be in both cities at
once).
The guy reason in comp, and knows already many things: that he will
survive (you have agreed on that), that he will not feel the split,
that he will see only city among W and M, that the experience will be
smooth, etc.
He knows that from his first person perspective he will feel nothing,
and find itself in one city, and that he could not have been sure
about which one.
In the 2^big n movie experience, a simple calculus shows that white
noise is the most reasonable answer.
You are playing with words
Words are the only way we have to communicate and I am not playing
and this is not a game. I have no doubt that if duplicating chambers
were in common use in Shakespeare's day by now the English language
would be very different, particularly in regard to personal
pronouns; but that didn't happen so we are left with a very
imperfect instrument to discuss these matters.
Thus when talking philosophically about duplicating chambers
personal pronouns must be used sparingly and with great care even if
that results in inelegant prose.
That is why I make it clear, and give precise definition, and notably
use the duplication experience to distinguish clearly the 1-I from the
3-I, and all this in a traditional third person discourse. The first
person discourse being here mainly the history of the experiences
described in the diaries.
I do the same later, in arithmetic, by showing that the oldest
definition of knowledge, when applied in arithmetic, introduce a
similar distinction between third and first person discourse.
You have usually mocked away all those precisions.
I have no clue, and I think that nobody has any clue about what
you fail to understand.
I no longer think there is anything there to understand.
You oscillate
Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
On Fri, Oct 4, 2013 at 10:51 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Personal pronouns with no referent You never made any assertion explicit. Quote a passage of me with a personal pronoun without referent. The following is far far from complete, this just gives a taste of the incoherent use of personal pronouns: Mon, Nov 26, 2012 at 11:33 AM, Bruno Marchal said: the question is about which differentiation [you] will live and The Helsinki guy can not be sure if [he] will experience seeing W or M and [he] cannot predict [his] future 1view On Fri, Nov 9, 2012 at 11:56 AM, Bruno Marchal said: To evaluate [your] chance, in helsinki, to later feel to be the W or the M man after the duplication is done [blah blah] and the question was: where will [you] feel and [You] can do the thought experiment in a setting where in Helsinki [you] take some drug so that [you] become amnesic, and don't know more who [you] are On Fri, Nov 16, 2012 at 11:24 AM, Bruno Marchal said: from the 1p, after pushing the button and opening the box, [you] *feel* [blah blah] and it is simple to understand that [you] [blah blah] Sat, Sep 28, 2013 at 3:16 AM, Bruno Marchal said: in all cases [we] have one future, in the first person pov And just last Monday Bruno Marchal said: I want only evaluate [my] chance to see M, or W, when in helsinki I am told that I will be duplicated and by comp I know [I] will see only one city. this explains the indeterminacy. If [you] don't die, and know in advance that [you] can logically feel only one city, but that you are reconstituted in both city, you know that any program or god predicting where you will feel (you the guy still in Helsinki) Bruno Marchal the guy in Helsinki will never experience and has never experienced any city except Helsinki because otherwise the guy in Helsinki would not be the guy in Helsinki. will be refuted by necessarily one of the copies, and that's enough to refute it. Bruno Marchal the guy in Washington and Bruno Marchal the guy in Moscow don't know anything about what happened to Bruno Marchal the guy in Helsinki after the duplication was made, but whatever happened it is obvious that as some point Bruno Marchal has experienced Helsinki and Washington and Moscow. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
On Sat, Oct 5, 2013 at 12:28 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
you have agreed that all bruno marchal are the original one (a case
where Leibniz identity rule fails,
If you're talking about Leibniz Identity of indiscernibles it most
certainly has NOT failed. If the original and the copy are identical then
exchanging there position will not make a observable difference to a
outside observer nor to the original nor to the copy. So Leibniz would
conclude that if objectively it makes no difference and subjectively it
makes no difference then exchanging the position of the original and the
copy just plain makes no difference.
If in Helsinki [he] predicted {W M} [blah blah]
SEE! Bruno Marchal is incapable of expressing ideas without pronouns with
no referent. Was he making a prediction about
the future of Bruno Marchal or about the future of Bruno Marchal the
Helsinki Man? If it's about Bruno Marchal then the correct prediction would
be Helsinki Moscow and Washington, if it's about Bruno Marchal the Helsinki
Man the correct prediction can only be Helsinki. But who cares about
predictions?
the bruno marchal in W will see that his prediction failed, as [he]
must admit that [he] is not seeing M.
But he must admit he is NOT the only Bruno Marchal because he HAS
BEEN DUPLICATED! Bruno Marchal admits that he has been duplicated but
still insists on referring to he as if there were still only one, and
that's what makes the whole thing incoherent. And what on earth does a
prediction, correct or incorrect, have to do with a feeling of self
anyway?
and so the immediate result of the self-localization cannot be
predicted by the guy in Helsinki.
Without using personal pronouns please tell John K Clark the precise
question to ask the guy in Helsinki that has a indeterminate answer, and
just as important please make clear exactly who Bruno Marchal is asking the
question to.
The question is what do [you] expect to live or feel, as a comp
believer
SEE! Bruno Marchal just can't stop using those damn pronouns.
More precisely, it concerns the seeing of the cities involved: do [you]
expect W, M, both, etc.
SEE! Bruno Marchal just can't stop using those damn pronouns.
The question is used in the traditional sense of you, before the
duplication.
And that is exactly the problem, traditionally duplicating chambers do not
exist so the poor little pronoun you doesn't have to worry about the
complications such machines generate, but to really study this issue and
move into the big leagues Bruno Marchal must worry about them.
The guy reason in comp, and knows already many things: that he will
survive (you have agreed on that), that he will not feel the split
OK, so far so good the use of he is causing no problems.
that he will see only city
WHO THE HELL IS HE??
John K Clark
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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
On 10/5/2013 1:05 AM, Russell Standish wrote: On Sat, Oct 05, 2013 at 09:40:18AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Oct 2013, at 01:16, Russell Standish wrote: On Fri, Oct 04, 2013 at 04:51:02PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: Read AUDA, where you can find the mathematical definition for each pronouns, based on Kleene's recursion theorem (using the Dx = xx trick, which I promised to do in term of numbers, phi_i, W_i, etc. but 99,999% will find the use of them in UDA enough clear for the reasoning. Yet, I have made AUDA as I was told some scientists were allergic to thought experiments, and indeed studied only AUDA (and got no problem with it). Hi Bruno, You meade this comment before, and I just passed over it, because it didn't seem that relevant to the thread. I am familiar with your AUDA from your Lille thesis, of course, but don't recall anywhere where you discuss formalisation of pronouns. Perhaps you do this in another treatment of the AUDA I haven't read? Or perhaps you have some slightly different idea in you mind that I'm missing? Just wondering... I thought I have explained this very often, but perhaps I have been unclear, or took some understanding of Gödel 1931 for granted? Bp (intended for its arithmetical interpretation, thus Gödel's beweisbar) is the third person I; like in I have two legs, or like in front of my code or body (scanned by the doctor). I refer often to it by 3-I. This is standard self-reference. Bp p, is the knower, which plays the role of the first person in AUDA. It is a solipsistic person unable to provide any definition or name for who he is. It is the Plotinus universal soul, or the inner God of the East. It is the non duplicable being which is unable to feel the split in duplication experience. From his own perspective he is not duplicable, not nameable, and not a machine (!). The other hypostases are variant of those above. Normally Bp Dt should give a first person plural, and is as much nameable, and definable in arithmetic than the 3-I. It is really the 3-I + a reality (Dt). The sensible person, in a reality is the knower + reality (Bp p Dt). OK? To sum up: Bp = 3-I, Bp p = 1-I. The Dt can be added, and just transform the provability into probability (which needs ([]p - p), in formal treatment). Bruno I get that Bp is the statement that I can prove p, and that Bp p is the statement that I know p (assuming Theatetus, of course), I'm suspicious of this definition of know anyway. There are many things (infinitely many) that I can prove, but it would take me time and effort to do so; so I don't *know* them. And in fact I can, in my life, only prove finitely many of them and I as I get older I suspect I'm forgetting old ones faster than I'm proving new ones. :-) Brent but in both cases, I would say the pronoun I refers to the same entity. English, and AFAIK French, do not make a distinction between 3-I and 1-I, so this is some new terminology that you have introduced, with unclear connection to real pronouns. Why do you say they are pronouns? Cheers -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: A challenge for Craig
On 10/5/2013 5:38 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 5 October 2013 15:25, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: The question is whether swapping out part of the system for a functional equivalent will change the qualia the system experiences without changing the behaviour. I don't think this is possible, for if the qualia change the subject would (at least) notice That's the point I find questionable. Why couldn't some qualia change in minor ways and the system *not* notice because the system doesn't have any absolute memory to which it can compare qualia. Have you ever gone back to a house you lived in as a small child? Looks a lot smaller doesn't it. Brent If a normal brain does not notice changes or falsely notices changes then a brain with functionally identical implants will also fail to notice or falsely notice these changes. But now this is a circular definition of functional. It no longer refers just to what is 3p observable; now functionally identical is to include 1p qualia and the argument purporting to prove qualia must be preserved if behavior is preserved is turned into a tautology. Brent and say that the qualia have changed, which constitutes a change in behaviour. Therefore, the qualia and the behaviour are somehow inextricably linked. The alternative, that the qualia are substrate dependent, can't work. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: A challenge for Craig
On 6 Oct 2013, at 7:03 am, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 10/5/2013 5:38 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 5 October 2013 15:25, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: The question is whether swapping out part of the system for a functional equivalent will change the qualia the system experiences without changing the behaviour. I don't think this is possible, for if the qualia change the subject would (at least) notice That's the point I find questionable. Why couldn't some qualia change in minor ways and the system *not* notice because the system doesn't have any absolute memory to which it can compare qualia. Have you ever gone back to a house you lived in as a small child? Looks a lot smaller doesn't it. Brent If a normal brain does not notice changes or falsely notices changes then a brain with functionally identical implants will also fail to notice or falsely notice these changes. But now this is a circular definition of functional. It no longer refers just to what is 3p observable; now functionally identical is to include 1p qualia and the argument purporting to prove qualia must be preserved if behavior is preserved is turned into a tautology. No, it refers only to externally observable behaviour. If your qualia are different this may affect your behaviour even if it's just to report that your qualia are different. But how could your behaviour be affected if the replacement is functionally identical? And if the qualia can change without behaviour changing then in what sense have the qualia changed? Not a minor change that doesn't get noticed but a gross change, like going completely blind or losing the ability to understand language. If consciousness is substrate dependent then such a thing should be possible. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: A challenge for Craig
On 10/5/2013 1:25 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 6 Oct 2013, at 7:03 am, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 10/5/2013 5:38 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 5 October 2013 15:25, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: The question is whether swapping out part of the system for a functional equivalent will change the qualia the system experiences without changing the behaviour. I don't think this is possible, for if the qualia change the subject would (at least) notice That's the point I find questionable. Why couldn't some qualia change in minor ways and the system *not* notice because the system doesn't have any absolute memory to which it can compare qualia. Have you ever gone back to a house you lived in as a small child? Looks a lot smaller doesn't it. Brent If a normal brain does not notice changes or falsely notices changes then a brain with functionally identical implants will also fail to notice or falsely notice these changes. But now this is a circular definition of functional. It no longer refers just to what is 3p observable; now functionally identical is to include 1p qualia and the argument purporting to prove qualia must be preserved if behavior is preserved is turned into a tautology. No, it refers only to externally observable behaviour. If your qualia are different this may affect your behaviour even if it's just to report that your qualia are different. But how could your behaviour be affected if the replacement is functionally identical? And if the qualia can change without behaviour changing then in what sense have the qualia changed? Not a minor change that doesn't get noticed but a gross change, like going completely blind or losing the ability to understand language. If consciousness is substrate dependent then such a thing should be possible. So you agree that there could be minor or subtle changes that went unnoticed? Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
On Sat, Oct 05, 2013 at 10:34:11AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Oct 2013, at 10:05, Russell Standish wrote: I get that Bp is the statement that I can prove p, and that Bp p is the statement that I know p (assuming Theatetus, of course), but in both cases, I would say the pronoun I refers to the same entity. G* proves that they are the same, but G does not. It is (in God's eye) the same entity, but the machine is unable to know, or to prove that, and that explains the difference of the perspective. 3-I has a name/description, but the 1-I has no name. What is the modal logic statement corresponding to I? This is most unclear. English, and AFAIK French, do not make a distinction between 3-I and 1-I, so this is some new terminology that you have introduced, with unclear connection to real pronouns. Why do you say they are pronouns? Because 1-I and 3-I are variant of the pronoun I. Natural language use the same word, because we tend to confuse them. Above, you stated that 1-I was Bp p and 3-I was Bp. How do those modal concepts relate to the English language pronoun I? Sorry to press on this - I just want to know if there is something interesting here. The duplication experiences are the simplest tool for distinguishing them. The Theatetus' definition, when applied to Gödel's beweisbar also distinguish them, rather miraculously. At this point in time, I do not see any connection between the UDA and the AUDA. They seem to be based on entirely different sets of propositions: UDA: COMP (Yes doctor, etc) AUDA: Theatetus and brethren, Sigma_1 restriction If you are alluding to the distinction between communicable and incommunicable statements, then I do understand the difference between G and G*\G. But these don't seem to be pronouns... Whether the G-G* distinction can be related to the FPI of the UDA, I'm not sure. Plausibly so, I would say, but not definitively proved, AFAICT, as they seem to be quite different theories. Plotinus and most serious people approaching the mind body problem saw the difference, but the 1-I is typically eliminated by the Aristotelian theologian (like the atheists, the fundamentalists, etc.). It is almost the difference between the body and the soul. The first does admit third person descriptions, the second has none (like Truth). Bruno Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The confluence of cosmology and biology
Sure, but a naked CA is far more probable than a Boltzmann brain that
in turn creates such a CA, ie more numerous in the Everything. So much
more so, that the BB idea would be negligible. An BBs creating BBs
would be even more exponentially suppressed.
Cheers
On Sat, Oct 05, 2013 at 10:41:27AM -0400, spudboy...@aol.com wrote:
You may be absolutely correct, Professor, Standish, and likely are. But you
know, what I can say in response is that the programmer just is, which, of
course, bumps, what we know of causality. Or, more, precisely, a programmer
designs a program that creates a single hubble volume, or many, many. And,
yes, I am just moving the problem backwards, endlessly. I have of late become
curious about Boltzmann Brains resolving-confusing this issue of CA emerging
accidentally, versus a programmer. BB's may do this, as I have read that
Boltzmann and some contemporary physicists and mathematicians, consider this
BB(s) to arise out of the thermal disequalibrium, between the false vacuum,
and absolute vacuum in which the Hubble Volume began with. Allegedly, these
BB's or perhaps, just one BB, is said to have emerged from nothing
(vacuum--false vacuum) with false memories and a personality.
This is an absolutely, insane, notion, but the problem is-I sort of like it.
Maybe the programmer came from nothing, or get big CA? Or the Big CA
percolated up and created the big programer, or program, even? It is
definitely, insane, but also maybe insanely, great? To quote US skeptic, and
Atheist, Michael Shermer, Any sufficiently, advanced, ET is
indistinguishable from God. Shermer was rifting on Arthur C. Clarke's
famous, quote, regarding technology, as you already know. But rather then
being repelled by the idea, I, personally, feel good about it. I suppose
there's no accounting for taste. or whom one may encounter on a mailing list.
I am semi-serious in this proposal, that if this thinking turns out to at
least be conceivable, theoretically, then perhaps international SETI searches
could also include BB's as well as carbon-water beings such as ourselves? It
might be interesting to interview this big BB. I wouldn't even mind
genuflecting, because, hey, that's what us, primates, do when encountering a
'superior being.'
Thanks for viewing this post (if you do?)
Mitch
-Original Message-
From: Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au
To: everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Fri, Oct 4, 2013 8:56 pm
Subject: Re: The confluence of cosmology and biology
On Fri, Oct 04, 2013 at 11:54:34AM -0400, spudboy...@aol.com wrote:
Very well, Professor Standish, given that, could the Hubble Volume
tself, then be considered as one CA? A CA that is 13.7 light years
cross, and thus, that old?
That sounds like what Wolfram proposes.
Is this CA, or all CA's something that emerges from thermo and fluid
ynamics, or does it require (sigh!) a programmer, in the Jurgen
chmidhuber, sense of the word?
I don't see why a programmer is required. Presumably, if is some sort
f CA, it just is.
Apologies for my obtuseness, but hey, this what all good primates do, connect
ots, make assumptions.
Thanks,
Mitch
-Original Message-
From: Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au
To: everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Thu, Oct 3, 2013 8:13 pm
Subject: Re: The confluence of cosmology and biology
There are plenty of examples, but it will take too long to extract the
literature. For example, the Navier-Stokes equations describing fluid
flow can be simulated via an appropriate hex tiling (close packed
spheres) CA (or generalised CA). I've seen people give examples of CAs
simulating the reaction-diffusion equations that Turing used for his
famous morphogenesis study.
Cheers
On Thu, Oct 03, 2013 at 05:38:45PM -0400, spudboy...@aol.com wrote:
Does anyone know any phenomena in nature or science that duplicates
the behavior of Cellular Automata? Does cell biology do the tasks
of CA, orbis this merely, a mathematical abstraction? Does anything
in physics come to mind, when refering to CA?
-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Wed, Oct 2, 2013 10:18 am
Subject: Re: The confluence of cosmology and biology
On 02 Oct 2013, at 03:56, Russell Standish wrote:
On Tue, Oct 01, 2013 at 02:54:51PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 01 Oct 2013, at 01:30, Russell Standish wrote:
The real universe is likely to be 11 dimensional, nonlocal with
around
10^{122} states, or 2^{10^{122}} possible universes, if indeed it
is a
CA at all. Needles in haystacks is a walk in the park by comparison.
CA are local. The universe cannot be a CA if comp is correct, and
the empirical violation of Bell's inequality
Re: A challenge for Craig
On 6 October 2013 08:13, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: So you agree that there could be minor or subtle changes that went unnoticed? Yes, but it makes no difference to the argument, since subtle changes may be missed with a normal brain. To disprove functionalism you would have to show that it is possible to have an arbitrarily large change in consciousness and yet the subject would be unable, under any circumstances, to notice a change, nor would any change be externally observable. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: A challenge for Craig
On 5 October 2013 00:40, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: The argument is simply summarised thus: it is impossible even for God to make a brain prosthesis that reproduces the I/O behaviour but has different qualia. This is a proof of comp, Hmm... I can agree, but eventually no God can make such a prothesis, only because the qualia is an attribute of the immaterial person, and not of the brain, body, or computer. Then the prosthesis will manifest the person if it emulates the correct level. But if the qualia are attributed to the substance of the physical brain then where is the problem making a prosthesis that replicates the behaviour but not the qualia? The problem is that it would allow one to make a partial zombie, which I think is absurd. Therefore, the qualia cannot be attributed to the substance of the physical brain. If not, even me, can do a brain prothesis that reproduce the consciousness of a sleeping dreaming person, ... OK, I guess you mean the full I/O behavior, but for this, I am not even sure that my actual current brain can be enough, ... if only because I from the first person point of view is distributed in infinities of computations, and I cannot exclude that the qualia (certainly stable lasting qualia) might rely on that. provided that brain physics is computable, or functionalism if brain physics is not computable. Non-comp functionalism may entail, for example, that the replacement brain contain a hypercomputer. OK. Bruno -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
