On 29 March 2014 19:27, Bruno Marchal
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wrote:
On 28 Mar 2014, at 23:41, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 29 March 2014 03:24, Bruno Marchal
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wrote:
On 27 Mar 2014, at 18:21, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
A functionalist could agree that a computer can replicate his
consciousness but it would not really be him. There is no explicit or
implicit position on personal identity in functionalism.
This is weird. I guess you mean your notion of functionalism, which is
too much general I think, but I was still thinking it could have a relation
with functionalism in the math sense, where an object is defined by its
functional relations with other objects, and the identity *is* in the
functionality.
Then function is always used in two very different sense, especially in
computer science, as it can be extensional function (defined by the
functionality), or its intension (the code, the description, the body).
Could your functionalist say yes to a doctor, which build the right
computer (to replicate his consciousness), and add enough original atoms
to preserve the identity? Is someone saying yes to that doctor, but only if
a priest blesses the artificial brain with holy water a functionalist?
Can you describe an experience refuting functionalism (in your sense)?
Just to help me to understand. Thanks.
A person could conceivably say the following: it is impossible for a
computer to be conscious because consciousness is a magical substance that
comes from God. Therefore, if you make an artificial brain it may behave
like a real brain, but it will be a zombie. God could by a miracle grant
the artificial brain consciousness, and he could even grant it a similar
consciousness to my own, so that it will think it is me.
Hmm... OK, but usually comp is not just that a computer can be conscious,
but that it can be conscious (c= can support consciousness) in virtue of
doing computation. That is why I add sometime qua computatio to remind
this. If functionalism accept a role for a magical substance, it is
obviously non computationalism.
Of course, the computer or computing device must be doing the computations;
if not it is unconscious or only potentially consciousness.
However, it won't *really* be me, because it could only be me if we were
numerically identical, and not even God can make two distinct things
numerically identical.
Even with God. This makes the argument weird. Even if God cannot do that.
But it can make sense, with magic matter, many things can make sense.
It's not so weird, since even God or magic can't do something logically
impossible like make 1 = 2, and under one theory of personal identity
(which by the way I think is completely wrong) that is what would have to
happen for a person to survive teleportation.
I don't accept this position, but it is the position many people have on
personal identity, and it is independent of their position on the
possibility of computer consciousness.
OK.
I think you have to specify whether comp means merely that a computer
simulation of a brain can be conscious or go the whole way with Bruno's
conclusion that there is no actual physical computer and all possible
computations are necessarily implemented by virtue of their status as
platonic objects.
It is not so much in virtue of their status as platonic object (which
seems to imply some metaphysical hypothesis), but in virtue of being true
independently of my will, or even of the notion of universe, god, etc.
But there is the further notion of implementation. The obvious objection
is that computations might be true but they cannot give rise to
consciousness unless implemented on a physical computer.
Only IF you assume that one universal machine (the physical universe or
some part of it) has a special (metaphysical) status, and that it plays a
special role. Implementation in computer science is defined purely by a
relation between a universal machine/number and a machine/number (which can
be universal or not).
u implements machine x if phi_u(x,y) = phi_x(y) for all y, and that can be
defined in the theory quoted below.
A physicalist, somehow, just pick out one universal being and asserts
that it is more fundamental. The computationalist know better, and know
that the special physical universal machine has to win some competition
below our substitution level.
But most computationalists are probably physicalists who believe that
consciousness can only occur if an actual physical computer is using energy
and heating up in the process of implementing computations. They don't
believe that the abstract computation on its own is enough. They may be
wrong, but that's what they think, and they call themselves
computationalists.
Step 8 of the UDA says the physical computer is not necessary; which is a
