RE: Reality vs. Perception of Reality
Colin writes > Hi Lee, Beat around the 'bush', why don't you! You're right. I must be more direct. Okay, here it is: Philosophy is too important to be left to the philosophers. Academically, it has become an almost completely worthless cult. (I am *not* exaggerating one bit.) > 'Reality', whatever that process is, must be responsible > for generating our perception of it. In the same way it > generates all other behaviour in the universe. > By definition: there is nothing left to claim as a causal precursor. Completely correct, and well said. I have a hunch that for the rest of the discussion it would be well to keep in mind a frog looking at the sky and water. It is a mechanism designed by natural selection for the purpose of propagating its genes (just as we are). Its environment makes certain impressions on its Central Nervous System (just like it does on ours). > I qualify this immediately by saying that the perception > does not have to 'be' relaity. A good illusion representative > and repeatable enough to serve the perceiver will do. Hm. What is "relaity"? I have not encountered the term. Moreover, I observe that I am making a very detailed analysis of your long piece. You didn't do that for my very short one. > What does this mean? It means that perception is not > ONE but TWO sources of evidence for creating models > of the natural world. > > ONE > The 'contents' of perception. This is what we use to > construct empirical models. We then say that the universe > behaves 'as if' the models were enacted by the universe, > even though we are not justified in the claim. Our > behaviour, in behaving as if this were the case, is > very useful: it can be extremely predictive. > Description ensues devoid of explanation. > > TWO > The expression of perception itself, regardless of its > contents. This is evidence of the workings of the underlying > nature of the universe. In that model is 'explanation'. I suppose so. Ultimately, there is a *lot* of evidence from various sources about how perceivers (us, or the frog) work and what they believe about their environment and about themselves. But this is getting complicated. My point was really very, very simple. What problem did you have with it? Or did you disagree? About the frog: we can see how foolish and how limited its understanding is. Ours may be as well. So let's keep it as simple as we can. Lee
Re: Reality vs. Perception of Reality
Le 26-juil.-05, à 03:12, Lee Corbin a écrit : We all admit that it's easy to become confused. I myself regularly do so every day. In fact, you can't even learn anything until you first become confused. I agree. But there is *no* reason to become more confused than is necessary. Sure. The KEY DISTINCTION is between reality and perception of reality. This must be borne in mind at all times. Absolutely so. There are two things. One is reality. Two is perception of reality. They are not at all the same thing. I guess you agree that we can hope or bet on some relations between them; Note also that there is "reality", "perception of reality", "belief on reality", "knowledge", sharable and un-sharable, etc. All this is already discussed in details in Plato, among others. If you let even for a second the key distinction between the two slip, even by the tiniest, tiniest amount, then you are doomed. It's all over. You've bought the farm. There is no recovery. You've had it. Let us for the sake of God *not* define anything. That turns out, experience teaches us, to be the worst possible response. It is a horrible mistake. First, it gives rise to many different interpretations, and the curse of Babel is upon us. Second, we *ourselves* in almost all instances that I have seen, are not able to remember and strictly observe our own definitions. So preserve us from them. To much definition can make things clumsy, but some definition can help people to realize that they were not arguing on the same things. Definition should always avoid the 1004 fallacy, i.e. not being more precise than the level of precision of the reasoning. We need to look up to and admire all the people who are *not* philosophers, people who actually go about their business in the world and achieve admirable ends. Let us pray use *their* language. Excellent. Although I would say that those who actually go about their business in world are the philosophers. But so-called "philosophy" suffers, like religion and even unions, from human institutionalization which just kill the spirit. For one thing, it will be a cold day in hell before they ever change the way they use words because some half-assed philosophers have suggested they do. OK. (note in passing the use of material implication!) Second---unlike us---they are not confused. Could depend on what. When George Bush, for example, worries about the perception of the Russian ambassador, he is being very realistic. He does not have his head up his ass. He understands the situation perfectly: The world is out there, and the Russian ambassador sees things in it. The Russian ambassador is not insane, and so he knows that what he sees and the representations in his head are not the same thing. Yet the Russian ambassador may *perceive*, for example, that such-and-such is a threat, where we happen to know (since we are the possibly threatening party) that it is not. Therefore, George Bush wisely knows that he must try to afford the Russian ambassador an *accurate* representation of reality. We can do no better than they: we *must* continue to *never* confuse reality, on the one hand, with our perceptions OF it on the other. Nor should we confuse reality with the interpretation of theories that we build from those perceptions and experiments. But we must take seriously those theories if only to be able to be refuted and to progress toward closer approximation of that reality. This needs works. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: Reality vs. Perception of Reality
Le 27-juil.-05, à 03:22, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : Now look at science. We do correlations of perceptual artefacts = _contents_ of phenomenal consiousness to the point of handing out _Nobel prizes_ for depictions of correlated artefacts of our phenomenal fields. AND THEN we deny phenomenal consciousness? Declare it unassailable by science? Delude ourselves that these descriptions actually contain causal necessity? Who does that? I don't think that, in this list, you will find someone denying phenomenal consciousness. Some have never stopped to insist on its fundamental importance, notably through the distinction from first and third person point of view. But I don't understand what you mean by causal necessity, especially when you say that: We have phenomenal consciousness, the most obvious, egregious screaming evidence of the operation of that causal necessity - the same causal necessity that results in the desciption F = MA being found by Newton... I tend to believe in some causal necessity related to consciousness, but I have no evidence that F=MA has anything to do with that. I guess you are postulating the existence of some "primitive" physical universe, aren't you? See my url for links toward a proof that such a postulate is epistemologically (or ontologically with OCCAM + some other more technical results) contradictory with the computationalist hypothesis (which is my working hypothesis). I don't pretend that this is obvious, but the missing 50% of science is not phenomenological consciousness (in this list). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: Reality vs. Perception of Reality
Hi Bruno, > Now look at science. > > We do correlations of perceptual artefacts = _contents_ of phenomenal > consiousness to the point of handing out _Nobel prizes_ for depictions > of correlated artefacts of our phenomenal fields. > > AND THEN > > we deny phenomenal consciousness? Declare it unassailable by science? > Delude ourselves that these descriptions actually contain causal > necessity? [Bruno] Who does that? [Col] What? The entire suite of practical empirical science does that. Walk the halls. Find _any_ scientist at the coal face and ask. What planet are you from? Before your breath has finished the asking sentence you will be told you are not being scientific. [Bruno] I don't think that, in this list, you will find someone denying phenomenal consciousness. [Col] Since when has the data found on this list been _any_ scientific source of confirmation of anythng? This list is specifically more likely to include people admitting to a reality of phenomenal consciousness! They are not the ones that need their brains adjusted: It's mainstream science that needs the therapy we are the therapists. [Bruno] But I don't understand what you mean by causal necessity, especially when you say that: > We have phenomenal consciousness, the most obvious, egregious > screaming evidence of the operation of that causal necessity - the > same causal necessity that results in the desciption F = MA being > found by Newton... [Col] I think you need to (aghast) do some physics or something with a real empirical edge to it. ALL our scientific 'laws' are tautologies in relation to statisical generalisations that don;t actually exist - like 'Ms Average'. F = MA is exactly that. NONE of these laws say WHY. They only say WHAT. WHY = necessity/causality. There is causal necessity behind EVERYTHING, not just consiousness. Again- are you even in the same universe as me? Whatever generates 'everything' generates phenomenal consciousness as well. You think there is one bucnh of happenstance for phenomenal consciousness and another for eveything else? = dualist delusion. If you think the universe is run by emprical laws = rationalist delusion. If you think the universe is run by a symbolic crunching machine = computationalist delusion. These are all unfounded ascrptions and have no evidenntiary basis other than the reconfigured brain matter that results from a belief. I am talking about real, supportable verifyable science of the natural world. [Bruno] I tend to believe in some causal necessity related to consciousness, but I have no evidence that F=MA has anything to do with that. I guess you are postulating the existence of some "primitive" physical universe, aren't you? [Col] I am talking about the natural world, in which we are embedded, of which we are made as the situation inwhich we must understand the natural world. If you think that you are 'outside' looking in: another delusion = you think you are GOD. :-) [Bruno] I don't pretend that this is obvious, but the missing 50% of science is not phenomenological consciousness (in this list). Bruno [col] You are making another rationalist ascription. You assume that mathematical abstractions are the object of scientific endeavours. WRONG. You assume that fiddling with computation about will somehow bestow access to the ultimate explanation. You are not talking about science of the natural world - you are talking about the science of some other world. You assume the link between them without justification and without any proof. Proof: Just watch it come. With empirical evidence from neuroscience. I'm happy to wait until then (it may take a decade or so) and then say 'I told you so'. BTW I used to think the same way as you. I have been on a huge journey. I spent 25 years puting computers in control of the real world. All I can say is: deal with human embeddedness , HERE in our natural world, fully, comprehensively and you will get answers. Staring at maths and running symbols will not do it. The computer chips neede to make a conscious machine have not been invented yet and they will be VERY different to all von-neumann, parallel and quantum computing architectures. My morning bombast session is over... time for coffee! cheers :-) Colin Hales
RE: Reality vs. Perception of Reality
Charles writes
> [col]
> I aologise in advance for my crap spelling. My fingers
> don;t type what I think. That's the relaity of it! :-)
Do you have a spell-checker?
> Warning... I am also adopting Lee-style bombast because
> I feel like venting. Don't be too precious about it! :-)
Blast away! :-) The default rule is that anything goes
up to---but definitely not including---personal attacks,
but as an old hand on the Extropy list, you already know.
> I'm not sure it's a cult, but I am sure that its goals
> ('asking questions only') is kind of a cosy refuge for never
> actually solving anything. The result is always an argument.
> They think that a useful outcome has ensured.
That *is* another aspect of the problem, all right. But
my beef with them actually runs much deeper. The ones
who just ask questions may not be doing much good, but
the dominate teachers in academia actually inflict great
harm, especially on undergraduates. But good philosophy
*is* possible, and is necessary. Daniel Dennett is one
shining example.
> I recently attended a local seminar. Here, deep in the bowels of wet
> neuroscience, a philosopher trotted out all the usual stuff re
> philosophy of science. No answers, only questions to a profession
> (scientists) in dire need of self analysisunlikely to inspire
> them on to greater things. I love it, but the reality of its
> impotence is frustrating.
In front of scientists, he should be listening not talking.
A part of the philosopher's job is to listen to all the sciences
and attempt to articulate a contemporary world-view. Were I in
charge, all Heideggerians, for example, would be instantly
dismissed, and no one allowed a position who could not pass
a test on Pan-Critical Rationalism.
Lee
P.S. Was there more to your 30KB post? I scanned down
and down and down, looking for something not having been
posted earlier, but gave up at about the 19KB level.
A little editing goes a long way.
Re: Reality vs. Perception of Reality
Hi Colin, Le 28-juil.-05, à 02:57, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : Hi Bruno, Now look at science. We do correlations of perceptual artefacts = _contents_ of phenomenal consiousness to the point of handing out _Nobel prizes_ for depictions of correlated artefacts of our phenomenal fields. AND THEN we deny phenomenal consciousness? Declare it unassailable by science? Delude ourselves that these descriptions actually contain causal necessity? [Bruno] Who does that? [Col] What? The entire suite of practical empirical science does that. Walk the halls. Find _any_ scientist at the coal face and ask. What planet are you from? Before your breath has finished the asking sentence you will be told you are not being scientific. Perhaps but what's the problem being told non scientific by people who loss the scientific attitude in front of unsolved questions? [Bruno] I don't think that, in this list, you will find someone denying phenomenal consciousness. [Col] Since when has the data found on this list been _any_ scientific source of confirmation of anythng? Since I was refering to the list. Come on, I was not trying to confirm anything. This list is specifically more likely to include people admitting to a reality of phenomenal consciousness! They are not the ones that need their brains adjusted: It's mainstream science that needs the therapy we are the therapists. Careful with the term you are using. It could be ok between us, but this list is public, and to say "we are the therapist" makes you seem (rightly) foolish. It could be a proposition of the type Dt. Those are true, but once said, they are false (or very near). The only way to cure the scientist is by helping them to single out the step where they leaves their scientific attitude. Some like Omnes in his book "explaining quantum mechanics", tells precisely to their readers where he decides to abandon Science [Bruno] But I don't understand what you mean by causal necessity, especially when you say that: We have phenomenal consciousness, the most obvious, egregious screaming evidence of the operation of that causal necessity - the same causal necessity that results in the desciption F = MA being found by Newton... [Col] I think you need to (aghast) do some physics or something with a real empirical edge to it. ALL our scientific 'laws' are tautologies in relation to statisical generalisations that don;t actually exist - like 'Ms Average'. F = MA is exactly that. NONE of these laws say WHY. They only say WHAT. WHY = necessity/causality. I agree. Actually I think that all "causality" notion can be captured by the necessity of an implication. B(p->q). (Please skip if you are "logic-anxious"). But then there are 1 of "causal" links. There is causal necessity behind EVERYTHING, not just consiousness. Of course! Again- are you even in the same universe as me? Good question! Whatever generates 'everything' generates phenomenal consciousness as well. I follow you. You think there is one bucnh of happenstance for phenomenal consciousness and another for eveything else? = dualist delusion. All right. If you think the universe is run by emprical laws = rationalist delusion. Not at all! it is a NON RATIONALIST delusion. If you think the universe is run by a symbolic crunching machine = computationalist delusion. Not at all. Please: this is a key point (which follows from the UD argument, ref in my url): if by comp you mean "the universe is run by a computer" then comp *is* contradictory or trivial. By computationalism I mean "I" would not see the difference if you replace my brain/body/universe by some digital machine. This entails that whatever the *observable* universe is, it cannot be run on a computer. To put it simply: if you are a machine then "not you" is not a machine! These are all unfounded ascrptions and have no evidenntiary basis other than the reconfigured brain matter that results from a belief. Note that the "reconfigured brain matter" is also a belief. I am talking about real, supportable verifyable science of the natural world. I hope you are willing to bet that I certainly attempt to do so. [Bruno] I tend to believe in some causal necessity related to consciousness, but I have no evidence that F=MA has anything to do with that. I guess you are postulating the existence of some "primitive" physical universe, aren't you? [Col] I am talking about the natural world, in which we are embedded, of which we are made as the situation inwhich we must understand the natural world. I don't believe in the natural world. To be short. I do believe in observation and measurement's results. The notion of natural world, it seems to me, is a lasting superstition which does not resist any serious observation, nor even serious introspection. But I know many people *want* to believe in some primitive material Nature. For me it i
Re: Reality vs. Perception of Reality
> Hi Bruno, > >> Now look at science. >> >> We do correlations of perceptual artefacts = _contents_ of phenomenal >> consiousness to the point of handing out _Nobel prizes_ for >> depictions of correlated artefacts of our phenomenal fields. >> >> AND THEN >> >> we deny phenomenal consciousness? Declare it unassailable by science? >> Delude ourselves that these descriptions actually contain causal >> necessity? > > > [Bruno] > Who does that? > > [Col] > What? > > The entire suite of practical empirical science does that. Walk the > halls. Find _any_ scientist at the coal face and ask. What planet are > you from? Before your breath has finished the asking sentence you will > be told you are not being scientific. Perhaps but what's the problem being told non scientific by people who loss the scientific attitude in front of unsolved questions? [Col] This issue has been a subject of a long investigation. A scientific investigation into what it means to be 'scientific' in relation to the natural world. Natural science, natural scientists. I think a point of confusion between us may be that when I talk about science I mean the natural world. The one in which we appear to be embedded and of which we are constructed. I think you would agree there may be an infinity of abstract domains and their relationship to our domain is also a subject of scientific endeavor. However, when I am talking of science I mean the study of the domain we are in from within it. I did a large historical survey and analysed it. Yes, there is a problem in natural scientists being unscientific. But it's not being scared off by unsolved problems. It’s that they dogmatically adhere to a definition of science that came about in the 1800s. It has been passed down over the last century like a frozen artifact of the golden age when philosophers and scientists were the same person. Now, mostly, they are not. As a result adequate review of the theory of science has simply not happened. The ghostly dogma is in the definition of 'scientific evidence'. It succeeded in staying that way simply through inattention. I have been able to declare the worst phrase you can give a philosopher: 'category error' in the definition of science. I have already outlined it, but I'll state it a more obvious way: It stems from Aristotle...embedded in the basic scientific method is that the described aspect of the natural world shall be experienced. If you can't experience it then you are not doing science (of the _natural_ world!!!). Or - you are being unscientific. All is well until you try and 'be scientific' about that part of the natural world that creates your experiences. What happens? "What is this visual field? What generates it? It seems to be in brain matter. Let's have a look...". You open up a brain. All you see is brain cells and the neural correlates of what you seek. "Oh NO! you declare. I can't experience the experiences of someone else's experiencing system! There's no 'objective view' to share. I can't do science! This is not science. Oh no, better stop unless someone tells me I'm being unscientific!" So instead of being objective about an apparently paradoxical evidentiary process, science put it in an iron box with spikes in the inside and a label 'beware - career ending stuff lurks here' on it. And hid it in the 'metaphysics department' for the philosophers to play with. That way they could also jeer at philosophers. There it resides to this day. Everything else in our email-swap comes down to this aspect of the natural world. Dogma in one tiny little corner of science. It is a key to a door. Behind that door is the remaining 50% of the science of the natural world. I am saying they key to 'everything' is to investigate brain material and identify what class of universe could give rise to the experiential fields we use to describe the natural world. That we DEMAND are used in the process of doing science on pain of being unscientific, and then lock out of reach of science for no good reason. To see how dogmatic this belief science has: Go back..open up brain...Consider what the 'apparent lack of evidence' is telling you. Is it evidence that phenomenal consciousness does not exist? No. Lack of evidence is not evidence of absence. That is the key category error made in the definition of science. Is it evidence that proves we can't 'be scientific' about phenomenal consciousness? No. Yes. No. Yes. Well..only if you force science to adopt a dogmatic view of itself. What you have in the evidentiary paradox is crucial evidence of how subjective experience works! The evidence provided is that when your observing system tries to see another observing systems observations it can't. Any further declarations (such as 'you therefore can't be scientific') are unfounded cultural preference only). Here is another slight disagreement from our original post: >> >> These are all unfounded
Re: Reality vs. Perception of Reality
May I offer the following quote as a potential catalyst for Bruno and Colin: If thought is laryngeal motion, how should any one think more truly than the wind blows? All movements of bodies are equally necessary, but they cannot be discriminated as true and false. It seems as nonsensical to call a movement true as a flavour purple or a sound avaricious. But what is obvious when thought is said to be a certain bodily movement seems equally to follow from its being the effect of one. Thought called knowledge and thought called error are both necessary results of states of brain. These states are necessary results of other bodily states. All the bodily states are equally real, and so are the different thoughts; but by what right can I hold that my thought is knowledge of what is real in bodies? For to hold so is but another thought, an effect of real bodily movements like the rest. . . These arguments, however, of mine, if the principles of scientific [naturalism]... are to stand unchallenged, are themselves no more than happenings in a mind, results of bodily movements; that you or I think them sound, or think them unsound, is but another such happening; that we think them no more than another such happening is itself but yet another such. And it may be said of any ground on which we may attempt to stand as true, Labitur et labetur in omne volubilis aevum ["It flows and will flow swirling on forever" (Horace, Epistles, I, 2, 43)]. (H. W. B. Joseph, Some Problems in Ethics (Oxford University Press, 1931), pp. 14-15) Regards, Tom Caylor
Re: Reality vs. Perception of Reality
On 29-Jul-05, you wrote: > May I offer the following quote as a potential catalyst for Bruno and > Colin: > > If thought is laryngeal motion, how should any one think more truly > than the wind blows? All movements of bodies are equally necessary, but > they cannot be discriminated as true and false. It seems as nonsensical > to call a movement true as a flavour purple or a sound avaricious. But > what is obvious when thought is said to be a certain bodily movement > seems equally to follow from its being the effect of one. Thought > called knowledge and thought called error are both necessary results of > states of brain. These states are necessary results of other bodily > states. All the bodily states are equally real, and so are the > different thoughts; but by what right can I hold that my thought is > knowledge of what is real in bodies? For to hold so is but another > thought, an effect of real bodily movements like the rest. . . These > arguments, however, of mine, if the principles of scientific > [naturalism]... are to stand unchallenged, are themselves no more than > happenings in a mind, results of bodily movements; that you or I think > them sound, or think them unsound, is but another such happening; that > we think them no more than another such happening is itself but yet > another such. And it may be said of any ground on which we may attempt > to stand as true, Labitur et labetur in omne volubilis aevum ["It flows > and will flow swirling on forever" (Horace, Epistles, I, 2, 43)]. (H. > W. B. Joseph, Some Problems in Ethics (Oxford University Press, 1931), > pp. 14-15) > > Regards, > Tom Caylor So what? Of course without any context, simply looking at physical processes doesn't allow one distiguish "true opinion" for "false opinion". True and false are the linguistic analogues of effective and ineffective action. Wiiliam S. Cooper as written a nice little book on this called "The Evolution of Reason - Logic as a Branch of Biology". Brent Meeker
Re: Reality vs. Perception of Reality
Tom wrote: >> May I offer the following quote as a potential catalyst for Bruno and >> Colin:>> >> If thought is laryngeal motion, how should any one think more truly >> than the wind blows? All movements of bodies are equally necessary, but >> they cannot be discriminated as true and false. It seems as nonsensical >> to call a movement true as a flavour purple or a sound avaricious. But >> what is obvious when thought is said to be a certain bodily movement >> seems equally to follow from its being the effect of one. Thought >> called knowledge and thought called error are both necessary results of >> states of brain. These states are necessary results of other bodily >> states. All the bodily states are equally real, and so are the >> different thoughts; but by what right can I hold that my thought is >> knowledge of what is real in bodies? For to hold so is but another >> thought, an effect of real bodily movements like the rest. . . These >> arguments, however, of mine, if the principles of scientific >> [naturalism]... are to stand unchallenged, are themselves no more than >> happenings in a mind, results of bodily movements; that you or I think >> them sound, or think them unsound, is but another such happening; that >> we think them no more than another such happening is itself but yet >> another such. And it may be said of any ground on which we may attempt >> to stand as true, Labitur et labetur in omne volubilis aevum ["It flows >> and will flow swirling on forever" (Horace, Epistles, I, 2, 43)]. (H. >> W. B. Joseph, Some Problems in Ethics (Oxford University Press, 1931), >> pp. 14-15)>> >> Regards,>> Tom Caylor>>So what? Of course without any context, simply looking at physical>processes doesn't allow one distiguish "true opinion" for "false opinion". >True and false are the linguistic analogues of effective and ineffective>action. Wiiliam S. Cooper as written a nice little book on this called>"The Evolution of Reason - Logic as a Branch of Biology".> >Brent MeekerI don't think Colin and Bruno were talking merely about opinion and effectiveness, but I'll let them speak for themselves. Tom
Re: Reality vs. Perception of Reality
Le 29-juil.-05, à 18:40, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : May I offer the following quote as a potential catalyst for Bruno and Colin: If thought is laryngeal motion, how should any one think more truly than the wind blows? All movements of bodies are equally necessary, but they cannot be discriminated as true and false. It seems as nonsensical to call a movement true as a flavour purple or a sound avaricious. But what is obvious when thought is said to be a certain bodily movement seems equally to follow from its being the effect of one. Thought called knowledge and thought called error are both necessary results of states of brain. These states are necessary results of other bodily states. All the bodily states are equally real, and so are the different thoughts; but by what right can I hold that my thought is knowledge of what is real in bodies? For to hold so is but another thought, an effect of real bodily movements like the rest. . . These arguments, however, of mine, if the principles of scientific [naturalism]... are to stand unchallenged, are themselves no more than happenings in a mind, results of bodily movements; that you or I think them sound, or think them unsound, is but another such happening; that we think them no more than another such happening is itself but yet another such. And it may be said of any ground on which we may attempt to stand as true, Labitur et labetur in omne volubilis aevum ["It flows and will flow swirling on forever" (Horace, Epistles, I, 2, 43)]. (H. W. B. Joseph, Some Problems in Ethics (Oxford University Press, 1931), pp. 14-15) I am not sure I follow that (very well written) statements. It is a little bit wrong like the argument of those who use determinism against free will. By looking at yourself at some low level it *looks* there is no sense, but this just shows that from your personal point of view you are not "living" at that level. You take the risk at dismissing all theories by pointing that they are all produce by and then you are using a theory for describing some level. The fact that Schroedinger was obeying to its one wave equation cannot be used to invalidate it! Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: Reality vs. Perception of Reality
[-Original Message-Tom Caylor wrote:] May I offer the following quote as a potential catalyst for Bruno and Colin: If thought is laryngeal motion, how should any one think more truly than the wind blows? All movements of bodies are equally necessary, but they cannot be discriminated as true and false. It seems as nonsensical to call a movement true as a flavour purple or a sound avaricious. But what is obvious when thought is said to be a certain bodily movement seems equally to follow from its being the effect of one. Thought called knowledge and thought called error are both necessary results of states of brain. These states are necessary results of other bodily states. All the bodily states are equally real, and so are the different thoughts; but by what right can I hold that my thought is knowledge of what is real in bodies? For to hold so is but another thought, an effect of real bodily movements like the rest. . . These arguments, however, of mine, if the principles of scientific [naturalism]... are to stand unchallenged, are themselves no more than happenings in a mind, results of! bodily movements; that you or I think them sound, or think them unsound, is but another such happening; that we think them no more than another such happening is itself but yet another such. And it may be said of any ground on which we may attempt to stand as true, Labitur et labetur in omne volubilis aevum ["It flows and will flow swirling on forever" (Horace, Epistles, I, 2, 43)]. (H. W. B. Joseph, Some Problems in Ethics (Oxford University Press, 1931), pp. 14-15) Regards, Tom Caylor [Brent Meeker wrote:] So what? Of course without any context, simply looking at physical processes doesn't allow one distiguish "true opinion" for "false opinion". True and false are the linguistic analogues of effective and ineffective action. Wiiliam S. Cooper as written a nice little book on this called "The Evolution of Reason - Logic as a Branch of Biology". Brent Meeker [Bruno wrote] I am not sure I follow that (very well written) statements. It is a little bit wrong like the argument of those who use determinism against free will. By looking at yourself at some low level it *looks* there is no sense, but this just shows that from your personal point of view you are not "living" at that level. You take the risk at dismissing all theories by pointing that they are all produce by and then you are using a theory for describing some level. The fact that Schroedinger was obeying to its one wave equation cannot be used to invalidate it! Bruno [Col replies---] Tom, in your very eloquent fashion you have touched upon the essence of my approach to the issue of a theory of everything. Somewhat spooky in coincidence: as Brent Meeker tells us of Cooper's "Evolution of Reason - Logic as a Branch of Biology" I happen to have that very book in front of me. In that book is yet another very handsome structured linguistic metaphor for the structure of thought and reasoning. Once again I think to myself(very paradoxical, this act!) if I build one will it truly reason like us? The usual answer is 'maybe'. You simply can never resolve the question with linguistic frameworks (artifacts of brain material). Note in the case of Brent and Bruno (and I do this too... putting it aside has been agonising) is an assumption. That assumption is that within the products of thought some direct correspondence with the natural world has been achieved. The reality of the situation is that what has been achieved is a cogent way of arguing for the position, not that the position has touched upon the true nature of things. Cooper has not done this. Nor has Crick, Koch, Edelman or anyone else... The acid test is to make empirical predictions in relation to brain material or some other testable physical situation. If a metaphor ( a model) can’t do that then you're never going to resolve it. Indeed that you can ever really resolve it is as open to criticism. The prediction/observation of the behaviour of the natural world, in particular novel technology, is the only way any progress can be made. Even then the relationship model to the natural world can never be assumed more than verisimilitude in respect of the predicted outcome. This sounds ever so dry and empirical, but it has teeth! If the only evidence you can find in support of 'truth' X is brain material reporting the belief - you are wasting your time. You will be going around in linguistic circles rearranging mental beliefs of other beliefs of other beliefs of. I would commend everyone to take a moment to simply look at things the way Tom has. A collection of matter, a human, made of the natural world, within the natural world, has made an utterance 'about' that natural world. Consider the bare reality of that situation. Forget everything else you have ever read about it. There may be an infinity of abstract do
Re: Reality vs. Perception of Reality
In message <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Brent Meeker writes: > On 31-Jul-05, you wrote: > > > [-Original Message-Tom Caylor wrote:] May I offer the following quote > > as a potential catalyst for Bruno and Colin: > ... > > Our scientific evidentiary process is based on the fallacy of the assumed > > existence of an 'objective view'. To push the so-called 'objective view' > > of corroborative science aside and allocate primacy to the subjective is > > not going to be an easy adjustment. To do that and retain the validity of > > all science to date (because it works) is ultimately what is required. > > > > Reality vs perception of reality? I vote we work really hard on the latter > > and drop all ascription in relation to the former. A significant dose of > > humility indeed. > > > > Cheers > > > > Colin hales > > > Science is not based on a fallacious assumption of objectivity. It is based > on a model which explains various agreements between our subjective > experiences by the existence of a "reality" that is independent of us. > This is not an assumption. Philosophically it is a hypothesis; one that is > extremly well supported. In fact it is also supported by having been > hardwired into our brains by evolution; so that it comes to us so > intuitively that we have to learn philosophy before we can see that it is a > model. > > Brent Meeker > > I said: > > Our scientific evidentiary process is based on the fallacy of the assumed > > existence of an 'objective view'. You said: > Science is not based on a fallacious assumption of objectivity. Objectivity and an objective view are not the same thing. The former is a procedural norm relating to the use of the latter objective view. The latter is a construct of appearances. We are not talking about the same thing. 'Evidence' derived from the apparent objective view says NOTHING about the existence or character of the objective view. 5000 different brains could be proposed that provide 5000 different 'objective views' of the same natural phenomenon. Procedural objectivity means all 5000 could result in the same scientific outcome (say some description involving a generalisation X). Which of the 5000 is the 'real' objective view. All? None? Now take away phenomenal consciousness completely. How many views do you have then? NONE. Can you do science then? NO. No amount of 'objectivity' will make up for it. You wont even be able to perceive another scientist, let alone do anything scientific! The logical holes in the assumptions we make are fairly loud and obvious. Colin Hales
Re: Reality vs. Perception of Reality
I thought this article might be useful! Stephen http://www.skepticalinvestigations.org/objectivity/bogusskepticism.htm The Objectivity of Science Seven Warning Signs of Bogus Skepticism by Rochus Boerner The progress of science depends on a finely tuned balance between open-mindedness and skepticism. Be too open minded, and you'll accept wrong claims. Be too skeptical, and you'll reject genuine new discoveries. Proper skepticism must be careful not to throw the baby out with the bathwater. Unfortunately, much of what comes out of the "skeptical" community these days is not proper skepticism, but all-out, fundamentalist disbelief. Such skepticism can be called pseudo-skepticism, pathological skepticism or bogus skepticism. Here are the warning signs of bogus skepticism. 1. The Skeptic has reached her skeptical opinion not after careful research and examination of the claim, but simply based on media reports and other forms of second-hand knowledge. Example: Pathological cold fusion skeptic Robert L. Park revealed in his March 1st 2002 What's New column that Science was going to publish an article on Sonofusion, and that even though he had not seen the paper, talked to the researchers or conducted any personal research in the area, he already knew that the Sonofusion discovery would turn out to be "a repeat of the cold fusion fiasco". Park used every bit of influence he had in a behind-the-scenes attempt to kill the paper. Luckily, the Science editor didn't cave and decided to publish. 2. Making uncontrolled criticisms. A criticism is uncontrolled if the same criticism could equally be applied to accepted science. For example, Park makes such a criticism in his book Voodoo Science (p.199). In the context of a discussion of an obviously pseudoscientific Good Morning America report on anomalous phenomena (debunkery by association: as if TV shows were the principal outlet for reporting the results of psi research!), Park writes Why, you may wonder, all this business of random machines? Jahn has studied random number generators, water fountains in which the subject tries to urge drops to greater heights, all sorts of machines. But it is not clear that any of these machines are truly random. Indeed, it is generally believed that there are no truly random machines. It may be, therefore, that the lack of randomness only begins to show up after many trials. Besides, if the mind can influence inanimate objects, why not simply measure the static force the mind can exert? Modern ultramicrobalances can routinely measure a force of much less than a billionth of an ounce. Why not just use your psychokinetic powers to deflect a microbalance? It's sensitive, simple, even quantitative, with no need for any dubious statistical analysis. Where does Park's assessment that effects that are only indirectly detected, by statistical analysis, are suspect, leave conventional science? Deprived of one of its most powerful tools of analysis. The cherished 1992 COBE discovery of minute fluctuations in the cosmic microwave background radiation would have to be thrown out, since it was entirely statistical in nature, and therefore by Park's argument, 'dubious'. The most celebrated discoveries of particle physics, such as the 1995 discovery of the top quark, or the results of neutrino detection experiments, or the synthesis of superheavy, extremely short-lived elements, would have to be thrown out, since they, too, are indirect and statistical in nature. Modern medicine would have to be invalidated as well because it relies on statistical analysis (of double- blind trials) to prove the efficacy of drugs. For comparison: the American Institute of Physics's Bulletin of Physics News, #216, March 3, 1995 gives the odds against chance for the top quark discovery as a million to one. A 1987 meta-analysis performed by Dean Radin and Roger Nelson of RNG (random number generator) experiments between 1959 and 1987 , on the other hand, shows the existence of an anomalous deviation from chance with odds against chance exceeding one trillion to one (see Radin, The Conscious Universe, p. 140). Park's argument is the quintessential uncontrolled criticism: accepted scientific methods that constitute the backbone of modern science suddenly become questionable when they are used on phenomena that don't fit his ideological predilections. 3. The Pseudoskeptical Catch-22: "unconventional claims have to be proved before they can be investigated!" This way, of course, they will never be investigated or proved. Parapsychology has been significantly hampered by this pseudoskeptical attitude. Pseudoskeptics complain that effect sizes are not bigger; but at the same time, they scream bloody murder if any grant-making agency even so much considers doing something about it. Radin writes in The Conscious Universe: The tactics of the extreme skeptics have been more than merely ann
Re: Reality vs. Perception of Reality
[Col replies---] Tom, in your very eloquent fashion you have touched upon the essence of my approach to the issue of a theory of everything. I need to make sure that everyone knows that the "very eloquent" words are not mine, but those of H.W.B. Joseph in the reference at the end of the quote. Tom
Re: Reality vs. Perception of Reality
Colin Hales wrote: So when I said that a rocket motor didn't fire last March because corrosion products in the IRFNA pickup tube clogged the line, all those people who thought this was an explanation were simply fooled. No. I am being very specific about the words. When I say explanation I mean WHY (underlying causal necessity) and not WHAT. In common language based on a previous description (a scientific law), an 'explanation' can be formulated. In this context, however, that is not what I mean. Certainly fundamental physics is mathematical description and causal relations are reduced to mathematical descriptions like "time-like separated". But I don't see that as a disadvantage. This is an unfounded ascription: That the physics - the mathematical description is somehow directly invoked. This ascription maps a description (in the form of a mathematical generalisation) onto an explanation. Without justification. The universe behaving 'as if' the law is driving causality does not justify any position that it is doing so. There is NOTHING WRONG with the mathematical law! I am not proposing to throw out anything. It works. Read the quote at the bottom of the last email. I am saying that 50% of scientific characterisations of the natural world is simply missing. Do you propose to provide "real causal necessities"? YES. Well I don't. Others do, though. Jobs already started. A small group of scientists around the world are already doing it. The problem is a) They don't realise they are working on explanatory models, not descriptive models and b) They don't understand the relationship of their work to phenomenal consciousness. I didn't say reality was accessed. I said we create models of reality. We only have access to the model. We're never sure about the "reality". Not so. An assumption. The underlying reality is accessible. Very difficult, very different but doable. You just haven't seen how its done. When you understand what causally necessitates phenomenality then phenomenality acts as evidence for explanatory models (phenomenality itself) and descriptive models (appearance provided by phenomenality). The same universe that necessitates that F = MA also necessitates phenomenality. Unless you believe phenomenality projected in by a god or through some other dualistic framework. This latter is just another untestable theory. Better to believe in the great galactic pumpkin. When you say "I think there are objective models of reality" you are making a very big assumption: That's not an assumption. It's just an observation. We have the germ theory of disease, the Newtonian model of the solar system, the Standard Model of elementary particles, the solid object model of tables and chairs. I'm not *assuming* these models describe reality. I only observe that they work and that's the best evidence we can hope for. I don't pretend that we can access what's "really real". But the fact that our models make successful predictions beyond what was used to construct them makes them more than tautologies. You misunderstand. 'Tautology' is not being perjorative! It's simply the natural structure of all correct descriptive laws correlating phenomenal artefacts. Also you assume that the evidentiary trail ends with the traditional view. Not so! See above. You are No I am NOT. Of course all experience is by subjects. All models must be built form what we have. Do you propose some mystical access independent of subjective experience? NO. Read what I have said above. Nothing mystical at all. Very real. Any model for causal necessity must a) predict phenomenality and b) the natural world's appearance appearance within it using a brain that results in us concluding F = MA for example. It's all quite consistent. You just have to get over all the prejudicial training. Does that help? No. Oh well :-) These issues only arise when you try and apply scientific method to the phenomenality responsible for observation. You find you have to modify science, not modify/create theorems within science. Science is behaving pathologically at this boundary condition and I'm not going to stop until someone else gets it. Once you have worked out what the revised model for science actually is then it all falls into place. It's a seamless upgrade, by the way. So what's the revised model? Is it a model of reality? Yes. But once again it too only a MODEL. There are 2 sets of models that apply equally. Both empirically supported by phenomenality. There is an entire class of solutions to the 'underlying physics' based on structured noise. I have been able to show how phenomenality arises in the entire class. Recently I formulated the mathematical basis for it, adding to the ontological version for those comfy with particle-like physics. For that reason I have more confidence that the structured noise models are actually involved in some way. Future work will help
Re: Reality vs. Perception of Reality
The discussion 'Brent vs Colin' is exciting. I am still confused about the ">" and ">>" lines, I assume the latter is Colin's saying while both the ">" and the unmarked text (*** - *** below) comes from Brent. My apologies, if I missed the boat. I want to reply to issues anyway, not persons. Will quote only the sentences to which I try to add my tuppence. And here come the unnamed quotes and my remarks to them (first the initial pattern): * --- Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Colin Hales wrote: > >>So when I said ...SNIP -- * > > This is an unfounded ascription: That the physics > - the mathematical > > description is somehow directly invoked. This > ascription maps a description > > (in the form of a mathematical generalisation) > onto an explanation. Without > > justification. The universe behaving 'as if' the > law is driving causality > > does not justify any position that it is doing so. [JM]: Amen. (Not in a theological sense, I must add). "WE" deduct that it looks like being 'causally driven' in "our" interpretation which does not cover the totality. Math IMO covers even part of what we could cover, restricting it into the math ways of thinking, disallowing the "NONmath ways" from the model. > > > > There is NOTHING WRONG with the mathematical law! > I am not proposing to > > throw out anything. It works. Read the quote at > the bottom of the last > > email. I am saying that 50% of scientific > characterisations of the natural > > world is simply missing. [JM]: I smile at the optimism of ">" assuming that we 'know' 50%. Denigrating our ignorance? > > > > > >>Do you propose to provide "real causal > necessities"? > > > > > > YES. Well I don't. Others do, though. Jobs already > started. A small group of > > scientists around the world are already doing it. > The problem is a) They > > don't realise they are working on explanatory > models, not descriptive models [JM]: Amen, again. > > > > > >>I didn't say reality was accessed. I said we > create models of reality. > >>We only have access to the model. We're never sure > about the "reality". > > > > > > Not so. An assumption. The underlying reality is > accessible. Very difficult, > > very different but doable. You just haven't seen > how its done. When you > > understand what causally necessitates > phenomenality then phenomenality acts > > as evidence for explanatory models (phenomenality > itself) and descriptive > > models (appearance provided by phenomenality). [JM]: I feel some circularity here: WE construct the model and the "model" shows the reality behind it. The reality is beyond the impact upon our interpretation and we have no ways to access it. Whatever we deduce is based on the limited model we created. Read on: * > >>When you say "I think there are objective models > of reality" you are > >>making a very big assumption: > > > >>That's not an assumption. It's just an > observation. SNIP > >>I'm not *assuming* these models describe reality. > I only observe that they work and that's the best evidence we can hope for. > I don't pretend that we can access what's "really real". But the fact that our models make > >>successful predictions beyond what was used to > construct them makes > >>them more than tautologies. [JM]: strictly WITHIN our model-based image. Reductionism (drawing universal and final conclusions from our model-based thinking upon the mode-based world - as ongoing science does) is VERY successful in having developed our technology (in a braoder sense) - and with proper calcaulations "completed" the missing links caused by the excluded un-model parts of the similarly interacting (causalian?) "rest of the world". And of course the (model based) conclusions, predictions, are consistent with the model. Calculation based deductions do not include the infinite veriables of the totality and the infinite and unaccountable influences from them in tortuous undefinable ways. Our model thinking is not omniscient The BIG question comes below: SNIP > > ... Of course all experience is by > subjects. All models > >>must be built form what we have. Do you propose > some mystical > >>access independent of subjective experience? > > > > > > NO. Read what I have said above. Nothing mystical > at all. Very real. Any > > model for causal necessity must a) predict > phenomenality and b) the natural > > world's appearance appearance within it using a > brain that results in us > > concluding F = MA for example. It's all quite > consistent. You just have to > > get over all the prejudicial training. [JM]: isn't this postulate exactly the essence of the prejudical training? Our thinking follows the so called scientific brainwashing we all got in college. More than a decade ago I had a hard discussion (and succeeded) with psych-minded academics that "objective reality" is indeed "subjective virtuality" because we know not better than interpret subjectively (1st pers) whatever impact we get as our virt
Re: Reality vs. Perception of Reality
Le 01-août-05, à 03:18, [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Colin Hales) a écrit : Reality vs perception of reality? I vote we work really hard on the latter and drop all ascription in relation to the former. A significant dose of humility indeed. I don't think "objective reality" can be perceived (only subjective reality can be perceived). Nevertheless, "objective reality" is an ideal we should always tend to. I agree very much with your intuition of the importance of humility, but then you talk as if someone has given a convincing argument of the existence of a natural world. You should give the reference :). With the comp assumption, in particular, there is no "natural world", just a web of numbers' dream (to be short). Matter emerges from the fact that numbers' dreams overlap in some non trivial way. Of course there could be, perhaps, a natural world (and comp is false, thus). I respect that belief very much, but it is a highly non trivial assumption. I can understand the recent irritation of Brent Meeker, because, although your critics of the current average science practice seems to me well-founded, you are not clear on your assumptions and you seem to fall in the very trap you describe so well. Actually, with comp, many things you say seem coherent if you substitute "natural world" by "arithmetical truth". Remember that Godel has shown there is no way to build a complete "model" of it. With Godel we have reasons to believe we are very ignorant, and with comp (+ godel) we have justifiable reasons to believe it is necessary like that. You should appreciate Godel's and Lob's theorem because it justifies the humility you defend so well. Lob's formula is often interpreted as a modesty formula. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
