Principia Cybernetica Web
Is anyone familiar with this, at http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/ ? It's a collaborative effort to develop and organize philosophical theories in a kind of organic, constantly improving structure. While reading the archives of this list, I've been blown away by how much good material there is in there -- it's been at least as enjoyable, and more informative, than reading any few pop-science books. But I doubt that many people will have the patience to wade through it all. Has anyone given any thought to organizing the information? It occurs to me that something like the PCP (Principia Cybernetica Project) would work. But I don't know how to get such a thing started. Perhaps one of you academics might. -- Chris Maloney http://www.chrismaloney.com Knowledge is good -- Emil Faber
Re: Why physical laws
Alastair Malcolm wrote: Christopher, I have found your recent posts to everything-list very interesting, and the ideas presented overlap to a degree with my own, but there is one question that I have, if I may, which I mention below. From: Christopher Maloney [EMAIL PROTECTED] In Tegmark's paper, in section 2G, he makes a crucial point that the fewer axioms you use to define your mathematical structure, the larger is the ensemble. This provides a concrete justification for the principle of Occam's Razor. Similarly to the argument given above, we would expect to find ourselves in worlds with fairly few laws of physics, since those admit the most SAS's. You can always add any bizarre behavior to the structure by adding ad hoc axioms, but worlds in which that is the case have a smaller measure than those that do not. Could you please explain how Tegmark justifies that fewer axioms give rise to larger ensembles? I have read his article and can't see how he has convincingly made a case for this. Naively one might think that there are more complex mathematical structures than simple ones, so that we ought to be in a more complex universe than we are (hence by a kind of reductio ad absurdem, Tegmark's scheme could not hold up). I've reread section two of his paper, and noticed what you are talking about -- he never does support that claim. In fact, in section 2-G, he twice refers us to earlier in the paper, but as I said, I've just reread it, and can't find anything that's refered to. It almost seems as if section 2-G were originally in some other part of the paper, and he moved it to its current spot as a last-minute edit. Evidence for that is that he refers to ensembles before ever having defined what he means by that term. When you say there are more complex mathematical structures than simple ones, that is not the same as talking about the ensemble of structures that hold a given SAS, and I think that's what Tegmark was refering to. -- Chris Maloney http://www.chrismaloney.com Knowledge is good -- Emil Faber
Re: Fwd: COUNTERFACTUALS
This reply is a little stale, but here goes anyway: Marchal wrote: George Levy wrote: In a message dated 99-06-30 11:20:07 EDT, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: Precisely: Maudlin and me have proved that: NOT compORNOT sup-phys i.e. computationalism and physical supervenience thesis are incompatible. Forgive me for I am only a lowly engineer. Does the above mean that according to Marchal and Maudlin consciousness is either due to software or hardware but not both? Using these terms would make it much easier for me to understand. Put in these termes + simplifying a bit, what Maudlin and me have showed is that EITHER the appearance of hardware and consciousness is explain(able) by the theory of possible softwares (computer science, ...) OR the computationalist hypothesis is false. That is why I ask for, ultimately, a serious consideration on Church's thesis. Please explain this, if you have time. I'm sorry if you've already given more detail in other posts, perhaps you could point me to the archives. What exactly is the computationalist hypothesis? I gather from the above that the physical supervenience thesis has something to do with explaining consciousness as a software program, but I'm confused. I would have *guessed* that that is the computationalist hypothesis, but you say that those are incompatible, so it can't be. Anyway, Bruno, when I read your posts, I must admit that I feel completely ignorant. I'm coming to this list as a software engineer who happens to have taken a little bit of QM, but I don't know anything about these heady issues of the mathematically rigorous computationalist theory (hell, I don't even know what to call it). Could you suggest any introductory textbooks on this topic? I am definitely convinced that your (and others on and off this list) approach is a valid and powerful technique for exploring these issues. Thanks! -- Chris Maloney http://www.chrismaloney.com Knowledge is good -- Emil Faber
Re: Devil's advocate against Max Tegmark's hypothesis
Alastair Malcolm wrote: - Original Message - From: Higgo James [EMAIL PROTECTED] As for flying rabbits, one appeared on my ceiling as I was reading your post, but as it was only there for 10E-43 seconds, I did not notice it. The odds against it remaining there for two consecutive Planck times are vanishingly small. Flying rabbits from contrived universes (ie from some of the more complex mathematical structures which should outnumber our own (presumed) one if the challenge to Tegmark's hypothesis is correct) do not have to obey the Uncertainty Principle. Alastair Right! Nothing has to obey the Uncertainty Principle. Remember that the outcome of any experiment can only be predicted with a probability. So it's possible that we could make consecutive alternate measurements of an electron's position and momentum, and find that they seem to be well defined. But that's not usually what is seen. The odds of that are very small. I think (if I may be so bold) that James was trying to point out that we are in a universe that has a lot of non-sensical things going on - just very rarely. If we assume that this idea of a measure over universes is possible to define, then there *will* be some mathematically derivable laws of physics (read, laws of probability) based on the relative SSA - that is, what the next conscious observer moment will be, given the current conscious observer moment. We'd like to show that these laws are the ones we observe. Regardless, it seems plausible to assume that the laws connecting observer moments when the observer is, say, 10 years old, are qualitatively the same as those when she's, say, 30 years old. Hence consistency. Hence, no flying rabbits. -- Chris Maloney http://www.chrismaloney.com Knowledge is good -- Emil Faber
Re: The Game of Life
Jerry Clark wrote: Such 'Life' evolution raises an interesting question: These SAS's would ... Sooner or later a physicists would hear about this new development and the realisation would be made that their universe *is* a Life simulation. Would it? This is a questions I've thought about some. Would the fundamental mechanism of the life simulation be deducible by these SAS's? Perhaps the only things that would be knowable by these SAS's would be higher level structures, which they might interpret as, for example, eleven dimensional quantum mechanical strings, or something. But, assuming that the lowest level structure of their world is discernable, I would expect there to be a significant difference between the measure of those creatures and the measure of other creatures - us perhaps. So if we further assume that our universe is *not* a game of life, and if the AUH is true, then by the SSA I would conclude that the probability of any SAS finding itself to be in a game of life is probably zero. That is, the set of SAS's inside a game of life is of measure zero relative to the set of SAS's inside universes like ours. In the bizarre nature of infinite sets, not all SAS's are in universes like ours, but in fact the probability of being in a universe like ours is 100%. More interestingly still: when are *we* going to discover some CA or similar which turns out to be *our* universe? In my lifetime I hope. CA? -- Chris Maloney http://www.chrismaloney.com Donuts are so sweet and tasty. -- Homer Simpson
Re: Fwd: zombie wives - The relativistic point of view
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: You all seem to assign to measure a soul-like quality as if measure had any value, as if it is good to maximize measure, as if measure has an objective, and absolute existence.. like the Ether. I believe that in fact, the probability of observing an event LINKED TO YOUR OWN EXISTENCE is a relative quantity. Depending in which frame of reference you decide to follow you will end up with different results. After reading 142 E-mails, I am too tired now to work out the math, but is is clear that from the bird eye view of an outside observer, you'll come up with one probability value, and from the frame of reference attached to the person being copied (or fused) you'll end up with a different probability value. George But, George, all any of us has is a subjective perspective. From the point of view of each of us, we attempt to discern the laws of physics, and make predictions. I'm just making the assumption that it is possible for us to know those laws (probabilistically) and then looking at Wei Dai's thought experiment. What do you propose as an alternative? -- Chris Maloney http://www.chrismaloney.com Donuts are so sweet and tasty. -- Homer Simpson
Re: Q Wars Episode 10^9: the Phantom Measure
Higgo James wrote:
Well said, but I'm not sure your definition of 'I' holds. There are
infinitely many 'Chris Maloneys' born in a hospital of the same name of
parents of the same name... etc etc etc who are in no way connected with
you. Besides, these identifiers are all social naming conventions. And
perhaps you'll change your name tomorrow.
Okay, you're right. I was just trying to define a root of the tree
somewhere. Perhaps I should have said, go back in time along the
thread that me-here-now is on, to the exact time of my birth, and
then define that thing as C(0,{}). There are still conceivably
problems with that, if you consider that worlds might fuse as well
as split, then there's no unique path back in time.
But another point I was trying to make, and which you emphasize when
you say perhaps you'll change your name tomorrow, is that there
are people walking around who are me in the sense that they are in
the set C(t,B), but who have very little resemblance to me-here-now.
So you have to be careful when using terms like me, or even
me-like objects.
--
Chris Maloney
http://www.chrismaloney.com
Knowledge is good
-- Emil Faber
Re: Extra Terrestrials
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I just want to be more explicit in my characterization of the guardian angels, the fatalisitic slobs and the narcissistic gods. George, I don't know how you justify dividing the ETs into such neat categories, based on the MWI and the feasability of QS. That is not clear to me at all from your posts so far. Why couldn't an ET who understands MWI and QS (and, assuming that QS *is* feasable) still behave like one of the ones that SETI is searching for? I.e. broadcast their presence and interact with other civilizations? -- Chris Maloney http://www.chrismaloney.com Let us recommend ourselves to Providence. -- Candide (Voltaire)
Re: Which universe are we in?
Hi all -- it's been a long time since I've participated in this group. I've been lurking for a few days, and am very pleased with the quality of the posts that I've read! It's good to see that this discussion continues! Some comments below. Tim May wrote: On Monday, July 8, 2002, at 03:40 PM, Hal Finney wrote: Future uncertainty is familiar to us, but one of the things that the many universe model introduces is past uncertainty. There is a sense in which the past is not unique and determined. My mental state is consistent with many macroscopically distinct pasts. I like this concept quite a lot. It's esthetically pleasing -- treating the past and the future more symmetrically than usual. I'm not convinced that this is so. Sure, there are many views of past events, of history, faulty memories, changing memories, etc. However, the single past model is quite well-supported by science and a kind of convergence of knowledge: Do you know that this is so -- that the single past is supported to the exclusion of the multiple past concept? I agree that many possible causal pasts lead up to what you are. The placement of grains of sand on a beach in Greece is not going to significant affect who you are right now, so this is just one of a vast multitude of possible causal pasts which will not affect your currrent mental state. But this does not mean these possible pasts have equal actuality. For example, two different observers may have carefully photographed the patch of beach where the possible variations occurred. The more accurate their observations or photographs are, the more closely they will agree on what that past was (again, assuming honest observers). Ah, but you missed the point, I think. Even if those grains have been observed by other humans, they still haven't been observed by *me*. My present mental state is consistent with lots of different possibilities with regards to position of the grains of sand, *and* to the observation or non-observation, *and* to the meta-observation, etc. Think Schroedinger's cat. Nothing in science points to the many actual pasts possibility, even though I acknowlege your point that many _possible_ pasts would lead to a indistinguishable equal mental state for you or me. I *think* that this topic is treated in Victor Stenger's Timeless Reality. Has anyone read it? I started it, but as often happens, I got distracted before I finished it. In other words, science points to a single actual past. There is, so far, no evidence for multiple actual paths. --- [This E-mail scanned for viruses by friend.ly.net.]
