Stan, Joseph,
I don’t see any general advantage of a process philosophy over a philosophy of
things, though Every Thing Must Go argues that things are misleading in modern
physics, and aren’t needed anyway. We argue that in many cases processes work
better, bu7t we don’ argue solely in favour of processes, either, since they
have their own problems. Instead we argue for the more inclusive idea of
structures, which are definitionally relational. They are more accessible than
things, but don’t rule out entire metaphysics that includes things, qualia and
much else. Structuralism merely imposes some discipline on the chaos. It does
not propose oppositions (though many are constructed in its name)
Processes come in subsets, but only as types. This follows fro9m the definition
of set. Interlinking of processes spatiotemporally produces networks.
Retaining two-valued logic in some cases at least seems me to be an advantage.
Logic is an apparatus, a tool, and to predefine which tools are to be useful is
as fallacious on one side as on the other. Especially when the subject matter
appears to be confused. It becomes much too easy to give in too quickly. In
particular, applying logic to itself seems to require a two-valued approach to
avoid degenerating into Babaylonic nihilism (Zi’inovev). The most appropriate
application of two valued logic is to logic itself. It illuminates logic an a
way that nothing else is able to.
Two valued logic give birther to a myriad of logics. I am not a big fan of
pluralism, preferring simplicity if it can be effectrive, but sometimes it is
the best we can do, given our mental limitations and the inherent complexity of
some of the things we study (see both Bill Wimsatt’s methods for finite minds
and Paul Cilliers’ positive postmodernism here. There is room for, nay need
for, at least four basic foundational but complexly inter-related metaphysical
attitudes going back at least to the Greeks, and found in many other cultures
as well. (See William Irwin Thomson’s excellent, At the Edge of History and/or
Cosmography in the Review of Metaphysics starting in the mid-50s.)
John Collier
Professor Emeritus and Senior Research Associate
University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier
From: Fis [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On Behalf Of Stanley N Salthe
Sent: Sunday, 08 May 2016 4:13 PM
To: Joseph Brenner ; fis
Subject: Re: [Fis] Fw: Clarifying Posting. Speculative Realism
Joseph -- Regarding:
?As it turns out, however, Speculative Realism possesses its own set of
weaknesses which can be ascribed in a general way to its retention of concepts
embodying classical binary, truth-functional logic. These include an ontology
of 'things' rather than processes as the furniture of the world, a logic of
non-contradiction and a ground of existence that has reason and value, but
excludes the possibility of a ground of existence which includes incoherence
and contradiction.
S: Well, why cannot processes be described by subsetting? As in: {energy
dissipation {work {building a box}}}
and
{energy dissipation {finds quickest route around an obstruction {fails to win
the race}}}
STAN
On Fri, May 6, 2016 at 9:32 PM, Joseph Brenner
> wrote:
Dear Friends and Colleagues,
The last couple of postings have opened the discussion in a direction their
authors may not have intended. Bob's felt personal plea for a phenomenological
approach to biology, and hence to other sciences, and as the foundation of a
philosophy, begs the question of non-phenomenological approaches which may be
equally or more valid.
We all agree the mind is capable of phenomenal experience and is not a machine,
but the (correct) arguments being made seem to me expressions, in various
styles, of the non-fundamentality of matter and energy. Unless I am wrong, this
is at least a still open question. Further, Terry's (again correct) statements
about the importance of the Liar and Goedel paradoxes perhaps overlooks one
aspect of them: they (the paradoxes) themselves are only relatively simple
binary cases that can be considered reduced versions of some more fundamental,
underlying princple governing relationships in the real, physical world. These
relationships are crucial to an understanding of the non-binary properties of
information.
A recent book by Tom Sparrow is entitled "The End of Phenomenology". It
proposes a new science-free doctrine, Speculative Realism, to provide a link
between phenomena and reality which in my opinion also fails, but may be of
interest to some of you. I wrote about this doctrine:
As it turns out, however, Speculative Realism possesses its own set of
weaknesses which can be ascribed in a general way to its retention of concepts
embodying classical binary, truth-functional logic. These include an ontology
of 'things' rather than processes as the