Re: increasing failed sshd logins/clearing breadcrumb trails

2004-09-16 Thread Glenn Sieb
John DeStefano said the following on 9/16/2004 10:40 AM:
The easiest way to protect this is to check your sshd_config and
 

set:
   

PermitRootLogin no
 

Interestingly, this option did not exist in my config file (I added
it), but all other options were commented out.  Is this the default? 
Is it wise to leave it this way?
 

Yes--it's in man sshd_config:
PermitRootLogin
Specifies whether root can login using ssh(1).  The 
argument must
be ``yes'', ``without-password'', ``forced-commands-only'' or
``no''.  The default is ``no''.  Note that if
ChallengeResponseAuthentication is ``yes'', the root user 
may be
allowed in with its password even if PermitRootLogin is set to
``without-password''.

If this option is set to ``without-password'' password 
authenti-
cation is disabled for root.

If this option is set to ``forced-commands-only'' root 
login with
public key authentication will be allowed, but only if the
command option has been specified (which may be useful for 
taking
remote backups even if root login is normally not allowed). All
other authentication methods are disabled for root.

If this option is set to ``no'' root is not allowed to login.
Best,
Glenn
--
"They that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary 
safety deserve neither liberty nor safety.  
 ~Benjamin Franklin, Historical Review of Pennsylvania, 1759

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Re: increasing failed sshd logins/clearing breadcrumb trails

2004-09-16 Thread John DeStefano
> Date: Wed, 15 Sep 2004 12:21:29 +0930
> From: Tim Aslat <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Subject: Re: increasing failed sshd logins/clearing breadcrumb trails
> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Message-ID: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Tim Aslat <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> once said:
> 
> In the immortal words of Glenn Sieb <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>...
> > I've been getting this for weeks. They're all under APNIC, and
> emails
> > to [EMAIL PROTECTED] involved networks has gone unanswered.
> 
> I've been getting these as well, but from a multitude of address
> spaces.
>  Not just APNIC.
> 
> > The easiest way to protect this is to check your sshd_config and
> set:
> > PermitRootLogin no
Interestingly, this option did not exist in my config file (I added
it), but all other options were commented out.  Is this the default? 
Is it wise to leave it this way?

> Agreed.  However if you 'Absolutely' require something to be done
> remotely as root, make it a pub/priv key sequence and limit the
> command
> using the keys.  ie:
> change sshd_config to PermitRootLogin without-password
> and set up
> command="/usr/local/bin/rsync --server --daemon ." ssh-dss  actual
> key> 
> in the authorized_keys file.  This limits the abilities of the remoe
> login to just running the rsync command with the specified switches. 
> Anything else just doesn't work.
> 
> > Which, if you're exposed to the 'Net would be a sane
> practice--force 
> > people to log in as themselves and su (or sudo or sudoscript) to
> root.
> 
> Very sane practice
> 
Indeed.

> > Admittedly, I am not sure about the rest of your posting. When I
> run 
> > last, (on 4.10-STABLE) it shows logins back to the 1st of
> September.
> 
> It is possible that the box was compromised and the utmp/wtmp log
> removed/edited/etc, and I would start looking immediately for other
> traces of a possible intrusion.
> 
My current wtmp log, which dates from today back to Aug 30, is quite
small and shows only two logins... I've logged in twice since
reporting this incident to the list. There exists no utmp file in
/var/log/.

I'm really starting to feel as if the machine were compromised, or at
least perused, and my utter lack of security knowledge has become
glaringly apparent.

What other traces could I look for; what other files might give me a
clue?  And where would I begin looking for files that might have been
planted on the machine (scripts, server threads)?

> Cheers & good luck
Thanks, but it doesn't seem any luck I've got at this point would be good

> 
> Tim
> 
~John
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Re: increasing failed sshd logins/clearing breadcrumb trails

2004-09-14 Thread Glenn Sieb
Tim Aslat said the following on 9/14/2004 10:51 PM:
In the immortal words of Glenn Sieb <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>...
 

I've been getting this for weeks. They're all under APNIC, and emails
to [EMAIL PROTECTED] involved networks has gone unanswered.
   

I've been getting these as well, but from a multitude of address spaces.
Not just APNIC.
 

I should have been clearer--the ones coming in on *my* server have all 
been from APNIC :-/

Agreed.  However if you 'Absolutely' require something to be done
remotely as root, make it a pub/priv key sequence and limit the command
using the keys.
*nod* But I really can't think of any reason to have an exposed machine 
allow a direct-root login... Probably I just haven't had that particular 
need or experience yet...

But with protected machines? Sure--at my old job (at Lumeta) we had our 
"one trusted" machine which was allowed to ssh as root (using keys only) 
to our internal machines. For purposes of pushes/pulls/upgrades/stuff 
along those lines.

Very sane practice
 

*nod* I'd like to think Tal rubbed off on me a bit :)
It is possible that the box was compromised and the utmp/wtmp log
removed/edited/etc, and I would start looking immediately for other
traces of a possible intrusion.
 

*nod* Hopefully he wasn't hacked--that would be major suckage :-/
Best,
Glenn
--
"They that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary 
safety deserve neither liberty nor safety.  
 ~Benjamin Franklin, Historical Review of Pennsylvania, 1759


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Re: increasing failed sshd logins/clearing breadcrumb trails

2004-09-14 Thread Tim Aslat
In the immortal words of Glenn Sieb <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>...
> I've been getting this for weeks. They're all under APNIC, and emails
> to [EMAIL PROTECTED] involved networks has gone unanswered.

I've been getting these as well, but from a multitude of address spaces.
 Not just APNIC.

> The easiest way to protect this is to check your sshd_config and set:
> PermitRootLogin no

Agreed.  However if you 'Absolutely' require something to be done
remotely as root, make it a pub/priv key sequence and limit the command
using the keys.  ie:
change sshd_config to PermitRootLogin without-password
and set up
command="/usr/local/bin/rsync --server --daemon ." ssh-dss  
in the authorized_keys file.  This limits the abilities of the remoe
login to just running the rsync command with the specified switches. 
Anything else just doesn't work.

> Which, if you're exposed to the 'Net would be a sane practice--force 
> people to log in as themselves and su (or sudo or sudoscript) to root.

Very sane practice

> Admittedly, I am not sure about the rest of your posting. When I run 
> last, (on 4.10-STABLE) it shows logins back to the 1st of September.

It is possible that the box was compromised and the utmp/wtmp log
removed/edited/etc, and I would start looking immediately for other
traces of a possible intrusion.

Cheers & good luck

Tim

-- 
Tim Aslat <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Spyderweb Consulting
http://www.spyderweb.com.au
Phone: +61 0401088479
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Re: increasing failed sshd logins/clearing breadcrumb trails

2004-09-14 Thread Glenn Sieb
John DeStefano said the following on 9/14/2004 10:15 PM:
I've noticed a few posts over the past week or so regarding users'
servers being probed by remote ssh attempts.  Coincidentally (or
perhaps not so), around that time, I began getting quite a few records
of such attempts to my server, at the rate of about 3 tries per IP, and
about three IPs per night.  Unfortunately, last night (Mon Sep 13),
this attack was much more concentrated and persistent: someone from (or
spoofing from) one IP (211.250.185.100) hammered my server with login
attempts over a 20-minute period.  The last report I got was a final,
failed root password at 20:22:13 Eastern Time (GMT-5:00).
 

I've been getting this for weeks. They're all under APNIC, and emails to 
[EMAIL PROTECTED] involved networks has gone unanswered.

The easiest way to protect this is to check your sshd_config and set:
PermitRootLogin no
Which, if you're exposed to the 'Net would be a sane practice--force 
people to log in as themselves and su (or sudo or sudoscript) to root.

Admittedly, I am not sure about the rest of your posting. When I run 
last, (on 4.10-STABLE) it shows logins back to the 1st of September.

Best,
Glenn
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increasing failed sshd logins/clearing breadcrumb trails

2004-09-14 Thread John DeStefano
I've noticed a few posts over the past week or so regarding users'
servers being probed by remote ssh attempts.  Coincidentally (or
perhaps not so), around that time, I began getting quite a few records
of such attempts to my server, at the rate of about 3 tries per IP, and
about three IPs per night.  Unfortunately, last night (Mon Sep 13),
this attack was much more concentrated and persistent: someone from (or
spoofing from) one IP (211.250.185.100) hammered my server with login
attempts over a 20-minute period.  The last report I got was a final,
failed root password at 20:22:13 Eastern Time (GMT-5:00).

I just read this record and logged into my server, and ran "last",
which gave me a blank record, saying only:

wtmp begins Tue Sep 14 22:01:55 EDT 2004

...which happened to be the exact time I just logged into my server. 
I'm wondering if it is a normal clean-up occurrance for the 'last' log
to turn over at a certain time/date, or if this ssh-er finally got into
my system and cleaned up his/her tracks?  I realize the power of  one
who has root privelages, but what logs would they have wiped out to
remain invisible, and what others might I have a possible chance of
looking at to determine what happened?





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