On Mon, May 20, 2024 at 10:31:53AM -0400, Steven Rostedt wrote:
> On Mon, 20 May 2024 15:02:26 +0800
> "Ubisectech Sirius" wrote:
>
> > Hello.
> > We are Ubisectech Sirius Team, the vulnerability lab of China ValiantSec.
> > Recently, our team has discovered a issue in Linux kernel 6.7. Attached to
> > the email were a PoC file of the issue.
> >
> > Stack dump:
> > UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in fs/bcachefs/super-io.c:310:18
> > shift exponent 127 is too large for 32-bit type 'int'
> > CPU: 0 PID: 14408 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 6.7.0 #2
> > Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1
> > 04/01/2014
> > Call Trace:
> >
> > __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
> > dump_stack_lvl+0x136/0x150 lib/dump_stack.c:106
> > ubsan_epilogue lib/ubsan.c:217 [inline]
> > __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds+0x24b/0x430 lib/ubsan.c:387
> > validate_sb_layout.cold+0x1a/0x51 fs/bcachefs/super-io.c:310
> > bch2_read_super+0x980/0x1000 fs/bcachefs/super-io.c:786
> > bch2_fs_open+0x471/0x3890 fs/bcachefs/super.c:1922
> > bch2_mount+0x538/0x13c0 fs/bcachefs/fs.c:1863
> > legacy_get_tree+0x109/0x220 fs/fs_context.c:662
> > vfs_get_tree+0x93/0x380 fs/super.c:1771
> > do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:3337 [inline]
> > path_mount+0x679/0x1e40 fs/namespace.c:3664
> > do_mount fs/namespace.c:3677 [inline]
> > __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3886 [inline]
> > __se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3863 [inline]
> > __x64_sys_mount+0x287/0x310 fs/namespace.c:3863
> > do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
> > do_syscall_64+0x43/0x120 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
> > entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6f/0x77
> > RIP: 0033:0x7f41e1091b3e
> > Code: 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb aa e8 be 0d 00 00 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
> > 00 0f 1f 40 00 f3 0f 1e fa 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff
> > ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
> > RSP: 002b:7f41e1d22e38 EFLAGS: 0202 ORIG_RAX: 00a5
> > RAX: ffda RBX: 5d82 RCX: 7f41e1091b3e
> > RDX: 20005d80 RSI: 2100 RDI: 7f41e1d22e90
> > RBP: 7f41e1d22ed0 R08: 7f41e1d22ed0 R09: 0080
> > R10: 0080 R11: 0202 R12: 20005d80
> > R13: 2100 R14: 7f41e1d22e90 R15: 20005e00
> >
> >
> > Thank you for taking the time to read this email and we look forward to
> > working with you further.
>
> I'm not sure why this is getting Cc'd to linux-trace-kernel. That's for
> anything to do with the tracing code (trace events, tracepoints, kprobes,
> uprobes, function tracer etc).
>
> What part of tracing is this for?
Everything I've seen from Ubisectech has been duplicates of stuff syzbot
found awhile ago and is already fixed.