Re: crontab(1) confused by su(1)?

2013-07-24 Thread Jan Stary
On Jul 16 13:23:01, h...@stare.cz wrote:
 crontab(1) says
 
  -u user   Specifies the name of the user whose crontab(5) is to be
  edited.  If this option is not given, crontab examines ``your''
  crontab(5); i.e., the crontab of the person executing the
  command.  Note that su(1) can confuse crontab and that if you
  are running inside of su(1) you should always use the -u option
  for safety's sake.
 
 Is this actually true?
 For me, it has always done the expected thing,
 i.e., run as the user su(1)'d to.

Realy,

 Could someone please provide an example
 where su(1) confuses crontab(1)?
 
   Jan



Re: suspend/resume not working on thinkpad X41

2013-07-24 Thread James Griffin
Wed 24.Jul'13 at  0:31:22 +0300, haris
 
[ ... ]

 Everything back to normal and suspend resume is working like a charm
 after testing as many times as I could during the day.

You must have looked insane opening and shutting your laptop continuously 
throughout the day

;-)


-- 


James Griffin: jmz at kontrol.kode5.net 

A4B9 E875 A18C 6E11 F46D  B788 BEE6 1251 1D31 DC38



Re: Hang possibly related to pipex

2013-07-24 Thread Marko Cupać
On Mon, 8 Jul 2013 11:45:38 +0200
Marko Cupać marko.cu...@mimar.rs wrote:

 I have just upgraded to:
 OpenBSD 5.3-current (GENERIC.MP) #25: Sat Jul  6 17:01:33 MDT 2013

No hangs since upgrade. Thank you for your help.
-- 
Marko Cupać



OT: the term ``hackathon'' - even the U.N. does it

2013-07-24 Thread MERIGHI Marcus
I learned about this via 
http://www.infosecnews.org/subscribe-to-infosec-news/

Thread 'term hackathon trademarked in Germany':
http://marc.info/?l=openbsd-miscm=136766877107167

Bye, Marcus

- Forwarded from InfoSec News alerts {at} infosecnews (dot) org

Date: Wed, 24 Jul 2013 07:29:07 + (UTC)
From: InfoSec News alerts [at] infosecnews (dot) org
To: isn (at) lists [dot] infosecnews {dot} org
Subject: [ISN] How Would the U.S. Respond to a Nightmare Cyber Attack?

http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=how-would-us-respond-nightmare-cyber-attack

By Josephine Wolff
Scientific American
July 23, 2013

It???s been a busy summer for computer security mavens. The U.S. and
China locked horns on cyber espionage, Edward Snowden allegedly leaked
classified intelligence about National Security Agency (NSA)
monitoring programs that target communication networks, and the Cobalt
malware took 13 U.S. oil refineries offline. If you missed that last
one, that???s because it was fictional -- a scenario created for a
student cyber attack challenge held on June 15 at American University
in Washington, D.C.

The event was a sort of a hybrid Model U.N. hackathon cyber war games
exercise, involving 65 college and graduate students (including
myself) who are training for careers as future cyber warriors and
policy makers. In many ways the Cyber 9/12 Student Challenge mirrors
the U.S. government???s own Cyber Storm exercises, with the important
exception that the student exercise isn???t mandated by Congress to
strengthen cyber preparedness in the public and private sectors.

The Cobalt malware -- an invention of the Atlantic Council, which
hosted the event - was fake, but its target was a real-life
vulnerability: the U.S. energy infrastructure, specifically the oil
refineries and pipelines that produce and transport gasoline and other
refined fuel products all across the country. Almost any discussion or
description of a doomsday cyber scenario involves an attack on U.S.
critical infrastructure. You can see this play out in the Cyber Storm
exercises hosted every few years by the Department of Homeland
Security for government and industry organizations to practice cyber
threat responses. In three simulations that took place in 2006, 2008
and 2010, catastrophic cyber attacks caused clear and serious physical
damage. A computer virus that turns off the lights, shuts down the
telephone system and halts military operations could cost lives.

[...]

- End forwarded message -



Re: OT: the term ``hackathon'' - even the U.N. does it

2013-07-24 Thread Scott McEachern

On 07/24/13 08:32, MERIGHI Marcus wrote:

cyber-attack

cyber espionage

cyber attack

cyber war games

cyber warriors
Cyber 9/12
Cyber Storm

cyber preparedness

cyber scenario
Cyber Storm

cyber threat
cyber attacks



Right now, there are a lot of drunk college students out there.

--
Scott McEachern

https://www.blackstaff.ca

Those who would give up essential liberty to purchase a little temporary safety 
deserve neither liberty nor safety. -- Benjamin Franklin



pf scrub options in OpenBSD 5.3

2013-07-24 Thread Maxim Khitrov
Hi all,

A few questions about the operation of pf scrub options in OpenBSD 5.3:

1. In 2010 Henning advised against the use of reassemble tcp (link
below). Is this advice still applicable and what are the known issues
that this option may cause in the current implementation?

http://marc.info/?l=openbsd-miscm=126343406308201w=2

2. Am I correct in assuming that the following example ruleset would
be more efficient (and work the same way) if the 'match on LAN' rule
was removed, or if scrubbing was only done for inbound packets (match
in ...)?

match on WAN scrub (no-df random-id)
match on LAN scrub (no-df random-id)
pass

I'm trying to figure out exactly when options like random-id and
reassemble tcp are applied. My current understanding is that a
packet passing from LAN to WAN with the above ruleset will have its id
randomized twice, and the same thing will happen for any returning
packet that matches the two state entries. If I change both match
rules to 'match in ...', then packets in both directions are scrubbed
just once, but the returning packets are scrubbed as they leave the
firewall instead of when they are first received. Is all of that
right?

If so, does it actually matter that the returning packets are not
scrubbed when they are first received? For example, if reassemble
tcp or min-ttl options are used and the other side lowers its TTL
value to the point where the response packet expires upon reaching the
firewall, then the TTL check will have no effect, since the OS
wouldn't forward the packet to the outbound interface or run the
second state check.

- Max