Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs and the principle of individuation
On 4/10/2017 11:46 AM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote: The unique role of the chemical elements in the composition of chemical sentences serve as an excellent model for the logical structures of other sentences in other symbol systems. I agree that the system of chemical elements is more tractable than most systems in nature, but that is only a matter of degree. Every element that occurs in nature occurs as a mixture of isotopes. Every chemical reaction depends on quantum mechanical effects, and the different masses of various isotopes shift the probabilities of side effects for different isotopes. When you add the uncertainty principle as a fundamental limit on measurements, chemical sentences have nothing special to offer "as an excellent model for the logical structures of other sentences in other symbol systems." I agree with Wittgenstein that natural languages are a better model for communication than any artificial notation -- including chemical notation. I also believe that Frank Ramsey, whom LW credited with the insights that led him to develop his later philosophy, had conveyed some Peircean insights in the discussions they had in the late 1920s. I also believe that Peirce himself would have approved of the general direction that LW pursued in his debates with Alan Turing in the late 1930s. (But I'm sure that CSP would have added much more to that debate, if he could have been present.) My claim (which I believe is compatible with the writings of both LW and CSP): 1. Every artificial notation that anyone has ever invented is a language game (Sprachspiel) whose symbols may be interpreted as abbreviations for words or phrases in at least one natural language. 2. The moves (syntactic and semantic transformations) in any such language game may be explained and taught by the same methods as those used to describe any NL. 3. Because of points #1 and #2, any statement in any artificial notation can be translated to a statement in a natural language that is just as precise as the version in the artificial notation -- however, the NL translation is likely to be much more verbose. 4. Because of points #1, #2, and #3, I believe that any artificial language may be viewed as a specialized language game whose rules and symbols are a stylized (abbreviated and rigidified) version of a natural language. I believe that the notation of chemistry is a fine example that could be used to illustrate these principles. But there are many other notations that would also be good examples. John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
> On Apr 10, 2017, at 12:44 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > How exactly would you pose "the Kantian question about 'Das Ding an sich'? > What makes you think that I am "trying to get a short way out of" it? I take it primarily as the problem of reference. While Peirce does have the index, he doesn’t require firm ground to use the index. It’s signs all the way down due to the way he conceives of signs. > "Our existing universe" is not limited to the past; it includes the future, > but it obviously does not include any other universes or "Platonic worlds." Not sure what you mean by that. - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
Kirsti, List: I am indeed exploring the hypothesis that all Signs can be classified, but not necessarily assuming that this is always easy to do. On the contrary, I recognize the difficulty in many cases, including this one in particular--which is why I sought input from the List. "Our existing universe" is not limited to the past; it includes the future, but it obviously does not include any other universes or "Platonic worlds." How exactly would you pose "the Kantian question about 'Das Ding an sich'? What makes you think that I am "trying to get a short way out of" it? Thanks, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Mon, Apr 10, 2017 at 7:29 AM, wrote: > Jon, > > The presupposition in your question(s)you do not take up is the > presupposition that all signs can and may be (easily) classified. - If you > look up some detailed versions of Peirces classifications of signs, and > you'll see what kinds of problems I mean. > > "Our existing universe" does not go hand in hand with "laws of nature". > The nature of laws is to predict what is to come, what will happen (if so > and so...). So they are about the future, just as well. > > It seems to me that you are trying to get a short way out of the Kantian > question about "Das Ding an sich", the thing in itself. - There is no short > and simple way! > That much is shown beyond doubt by today. > > Best, Kirsti Määttänen - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was semantic problem with the term)
> On Apr 8, 2017, at 10:46 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > Indeed, Peirce defined "potential" as "indeterminate yet capable of > determination in any special case" (CP 6.185; 1898), but wrote that "Ideas, > or Possibles"--i.e., the constituents of the Universe of 1ns, "whatever has > its Being in itself alone"--are "incapable of perfect actualization on > account of [their] essential vagueness" (EP 2:478-479; 1908). I found this > distinction very helpful in sorting out Peirce's cosmology when we were > discussing it on the List last fall. I think this is more the distinction for Peirce between generality and vagueness. The difference is in who is able to make the determination. Vague could mean there is a determinate quality which is simply unknown or that the thing itself is developing that quality. Whereas generality is wrapped up in being able to simply pick one and is wrapped up in his notion of continuity. My thought is that these are vague because they are symbols under growth and are coming to have the properties they will have one day. In the same way that I might only be able to speak vaguely of my son’s qualities since his life is just partially underway. > I think that both of us agree with Edwina that all three Categories were > present from the very beginning of our existing universe. I should hasten to add that I agree with that too. I take Peirce’s cosmology to be in logical time before there was anytime. Further, while I differ somewhat with Edwina regarding what Peirce believed about this, my own views are actually closer to hers.. > Gary quoted Clark as having written, "I think Peirce has [two] categories of > chance. One is discontinuous whereas the other is continuous. This ends up > being important in various ways." However, I do not recall seeing that > statement in any of Clark's messages, and it also does not show up in the > List archive. More importantly, where does this notion arise in Peirce's > writings? I could have sworn I put that in the email. Looking I realize I didn’t. Part of it arises out of the continuum behind the continuum which we’ve discussed in the past here with the blackboard metaphor. I draw a chalk line on the board. This discontinuity is one of those brute acts by which alone the original vagueness could have madea step towards definiteness. There is a certain element of continuity in this line. Where did this continuity come from? It is nothing but the original continuity of the blackboard which makes everything upon it continuous. (6.203) The one quote I’d give would be this one: My definition of a continuum only prescribes that, after every innumerable series of points, there shall be a next following point, and does not forbit this to follow at the interval of a mile. That, therefore, certainly permits cracks everywhere. (4.126) That’s not fully satisfying though although it points to the distinction. I was primarily thinking of the two tendencies after rereading Reynold’s paper “Peirce’s Cosmology and the Laws of Thermodynamics” which I referred to last week. An other way of putting the distinction is as reversible and irreversible rather than continuous and discontinuous. The idea that ideas spread continuously yet can also change really is the same distinction. - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs and the principle of individuation
Jerry, List, did I get it right, that "individuation" is just a thought-experiment about what and how a thing (or law...) would be, if it was totally rid of any representation? just, what a "thing in itself" would be: Something incomprehensible for the scholastic doctors, as Gary wrote? Not only for them. But, as Gary wrote, it is possible to assume, that there is always a representation, if not by humans, then by "some vast consciousness", which is "a Deity relatively to us". Peirce called it "Quasi-mind of the universe". So- problem about the incomprehensibility of "thing in itself" solved. So why did you write, that the ""laws of nature"...are a product of the human mind"? They can also be a product of the universe´s mind, I guess, otherwise there would not have been planets before there have been humans. Other than the human representations of the laws of nature, they are a product of the human mind. Oh, I see: You wrote ""laws of nature"", in quotation marks, and these quotation marks indicate, that a representation of the human mind is meant, so your statement is correct. Did I get it right? Best, Helmut 10. April 2017 um 17:46 Uhr Von: "Jerry LR Chandler" List: The following quote deserves rigorous study. It is deeply relevant to three critical aspects of CSP’s philosophy of science: 1. issues that relate realism to idealism 2. issues that relate the physical sciences to the chemical sciences and 3. issues that relate the sciences to the relationships between reality and mathematics. (Thanks to Gary for posting this quotes from the Harvard lecture (EP2:184, CP 5.106-7): On Apr 8, 2017, at 4:17 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: All this is equally true of the manner in which the laws of nature influence matter. A law is in itself nothing but a general formula or symbol. An existing thing is simply a blind reacting thing, to which not merely all generality, but even all representation, is utterly foreign. The general formula may logically determine another, less broadly general. But it will be of its essential nature general, and its being narrower does not in the least constitute any participation in the reacting character of the thing. Here we have that great problem of the principle of individuation which the scholastic doctors after a century of the closest possible analysis were obliged to confess was quite incomprehensible to them. Analogy suggests that the laws of nature are ideas or resolutions in the mind of some vast consciousness, who, whether supreme or subordinate, is a Deity relatively to us. I do not approve of mixing up Religion and Philosophy; but as a purely philosophical hypothesis, that has the advantage of being supported by analogy. Yet I cannot clearly see that beyond that support to the imagination it is of any particular scientific service.” A literal interpretation of EP2:184, CP 5.106-7 is as follow: All this is equally true of the manner in which the laws of nature influence matter. A law is in itself nothing but a general formula or symbol. The “laws of nature” as well as the symbols of mathematics are a product of the human mind. The existence of the formula is expressed in symbol systems generated as descriptions of thoughts and observations. The formula is only one possible representation among all possible representations of a thing. Thus, the second sentence can be thought of as the inverse order of CSP’s earlier assertion regarding “thing, representation, form.” This is the basis of scientific realism and the development of the logic of the natural sciences. Note that the distinction between the laws of physics and the habits of chemistry is missing! An existing thing is simply a blind reacting thing, to which not merely all generality, but even all representation, is utterly foreign. The second part of this sentence: thing, to which not merely all generality, but even all representation, is utterly foreign. focuses on the absence of “representation” in the concept of a thing. Things, in and of themselves, lack the capacity to create symbols and to create a symbolic logic. In particular, mathematical symbols are “utterly foreign” to things. Here we have that great problem of the principle of individuation which the scholastic doctors after a century of the closest possible analysis were obliged to confess was quite incomprehensible to them. The contrast is between the general formulas of mathematics and the "the principle of individuation”. This “utter foreign”ness persists today. Two deep consequences follow from these assertions. The critical importance of this clear and crisp distinction between the “general” and the "the principle of individuation” lies in the nature of empirical observations. 1. Empirical observations can only be made on specific objects. Consequently, any generalization to mathematical symbols requires judgments and substitution of
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
> On Apr 9, 2017, at 7:41 PM, John F Sowa wrote: > > The surface is a vague boundary. All plants and animals have > exterior cells that are dead or dying (hair, skin, scales, bark) > and they have secretions (sweat, tears, oils, sap, resins). > > The outer layers are always mixed with liquids and solids from > all kinds of sources (living or non-living), and they are subject > to various abrasions and adhesions -- deliberate or accidental > (e.g., a bird preening its feathers, animals scratching, grooming > themselves or others, rolling in the dust, or washing in water). > > Even the interior is not well defined. There are many more billions > of bacterial cells than human cells in and on the human body. Some > of them are pathogens, but most are *essential* to human health. This seems right, although the word vague in a Peircean sense might not quite fit. I think not well defined is a better way to put it. I especially like the point you and Kirstima make about non-human cells. Our body is very much a symbol in a certain sense that when examined closely does not have the type of unity we like to imagine. Even ignoring the issue of the human biome, we’re finding that even the DNA of our food can end up in odd places of our body, potentially interacting in more complex ways than we can yet determine. In the bodies of mothers the remnants of their children’s DNA can remain and have effects. Lines become blurry and complex. Even the very notion of inside and outside fail us. (Is the digestion system ‘inside’ and if so when?) > Very few molecules exist in isolation. For example, salt (NaCl) > rarely consists of Na-CL pairs. In a crystal, the atoms are > organized in a lattice where each atom is surrounded by atoms > of both kinds. In water, Na ions float independently of CL ions. And the very notion of atoms and molecules when examined more technically is better seen as a quantum field which is itself a type of potentiality. We simplify both because we have to in order to reason about these things, but also because our simplifications work most of the time. Even if we could create a gigantic complex Hamiltonian to express the field of salt crystal, it wouldn’t necessarily help us. > I agree that biology is not reducible to chemistry or physics. > But I'd say that the major difference was caused by the first > quasi-minds, which created the first non-degenerate Thirdness > (purpose, goals, or intentions). I’d more put it that biological descriptions typically aren’t reducible to chemistry or physics. Although for all the problems philosophy of science created here in the 50’s through 70’s attempting to make the reduction, I think it did perhaps help in getting biologists to think more carefully about the type of descriptions they make. - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was semantic problem with the term)
> On Apr 7, 2017, at 7:40 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
>
> What you just wrote ("that the "womb of indeterminacy" is "the original
> continuity which is inherent in potentiality," and habit as "a generalizing
> tendency" emerges from that primordial continuity") reminded me that
> Aristotle's notion of potentiality is more like Peirce's idea of "would-be's"
> (3ns) than it is like the notion of simple possibility, or, "may-be's" (1ns).
>
I think this is right, although I’d add that Aristotle’s use comes from Plato
albeit modified somewhat. I think I mentioned Plato’s The Sophist before where
he talks of the lively possibility (dunamis) of being. It’s that discussion
that as I recall Aristotle uses to distinguish between potential and actual. So
the dynamic contains the possibility of being represented. Peirce of course
uses that to great effect.
I’ll fully admit that I don’t know the full history of Platonism nor all the
texts Peirce undoubtedly read. From what I can tell it was how Peirce took up
the nature of possibility that was somewhat unique that differentiated his own
thought from at least how Plato or the neoPlatonists like Proclus were normally
read. I also think it marks a big difference from Hegel, although again my
knowledge of the details of Hegel is fragmentary enough I am potentially on
shaky ground there. I believe though that Hegel sees the shift from Plato to
Aristotle as the move to see the ideas of Plato as mere potentiality. For Hegel
the focus is how the actual (which for Hegel is the real) reveals itself. So
reality or Aristotle's entelechy is the realization of the essence in phenomena.
Peirce’s move away from this nominalistic element in Hegel thus in a certain
sense a move back to taking both Plato more seriously yet retaining this view
of Plato of Hegel. (Which I assume was widely held and not limited to Hegel in
the 19th century) Of course Peirce keeps the idea of actuality but transforms
it quite a deal. What’s most interesting about Peirce, at least to me, is how
he slowly develops this more and more robust sense of modal realism.
The other thing to question, and here I’m far less confident, is where the
phrase “womb of indeterminacy” comes from. It certainly sounds like it is out
of The Timaeus where Plato calls the khora or place the womb within which ideal
forms and essences are created. My guess is that this part of “A Guess at the
Riddle” is making an explicit reference to Plato’s Khora but I may well be
wrong. A lot of those passages sound quite similar to the Platonists. For
instance,
So Plato said that time came into being with the world, but motion even before
the world’s birth. There was then no time, for neither was there arrangement,
measure or mark of division, only an indefinite motion, as it were the
unformed, unwrought matter of time. (Qu. Pl. 1007c)
> So, in several papers and on this list I have sometimes extended Peirce's
> term "would-be's" in just this direction by writing that we should think of
> potentialites as "would-be's were the conditions in place for their coming
> into being.”
This is important to note. Peirce’s shift is to see differentiation or
privation (to use the platonic term) as constraints that limit possibilities.
-
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs and the principle of individuation
List: The following quote deserves rigorous study. It is deeply relevant to three critical aspects of CSP’s philosophy of science: 1. issues that relate realism to idealism 2. issues that relate the physical sciences to the chemical sciences and 3. issues that relate the sciences to the relationships between reality and mathematics. (Thanks to Gary for posting this quotes from the Harvard lecture (EP2:184, CP 5.106-7): > On Apr 8, 2017, at 4:17 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: > > All this is equally true of the manner in which the laws of nature influence > matter. A law is in itself nothing but a general formula or symbol. An > existing thing is simply a blind reacting thing, to which not merely all > generality, but even all representation, is utterly foreign. The general > formula may logically determine another, less broadly general. But it will be > of its essential nature general, and its being narrower does not in the least > constitute any participation in the reacting character of the thing. Here we > have that great problem of the principle of individuation which the > scholastic doctors after a century of the closest possible analysis were > obliged to confess was quite incomprehensible to them. Analogy suggests that > the laws of nature are ideas or resolutions in the mind of some vast > consciousness, who, whether supreme or subordinate, is a Deity relatively to > us. I do not approve of mixing up Religion and Philosophy; but as a purely > philosophical hypothesis, that has the advantage of being supported by > analogy. Yet I cannot clearly see that beyond that support to the imagination > it is of any particular scientific service.” > A literal interpretation of EP2:184, CP 5.106-7 is as follow: > All this is equally true of the manner in which the laws of nature influence > matter. A law is in itself nothing but a general formula or symbol. The “laws of nature” as well as the symbols of mathematics are a product of the human mind. The existence of the formula is expressed in symbol systems generated as descriptions of thoughts and observations. The formula is only one possible representation among all possible representations of a thing. Thus, the second sentence can be thought of as the inverse order of CSP’s earlier assertion regarding “thing, representation, form.” This is the basis of scientific realism and the development of the logic of the natural sciences. Note that the distinction between the laws of physics and the habits of chemistry is missing! > An existing thing is simply a blind reacting thing, to which not merely all > generality, but even all representation, is utterly foreign. The second part of this sentence: > thing, to which not merely all generality, but even all representation, is > utterly foreign. focuses on the absence of “representation” in the concept of a thing. Things, in and of themselves, lack the capacity to create symbols and to create a symbolic logic. In particular, mathematical symbols are “utterly foreign” to things. > Here we have that great problem of the principle of individuation which the > scholastic doctors after a century of the closest possible analysis were > obliged to confess was quite incomprehensible to them. The contrast is between the general formulas of mathematics and the "the principle of individuation”. This “utter foreign”ness persists today. Two deep consequences follow from these assertions. The critical importance of this clear and crisp distinction between the “general” and the "the principle of individuation” lies in the nature of empirical observations. 1. Empirical observations can only be made on specific objects. Consequently, any generalization to mathematical symbols requires judgments and substitution of mathematical symbols for symbols representing “things” 2. "the principle of individuation” plays a fundamentally different role in the physical and chemical sciences in the following sense, a sense which a consequence of the representation of things. (CSP ignores the physical concept of mass!) The table of chemical elements represents individual forms of matter, each form of matter carries intrinsic physical assets of mass and electricity. The compositions of matter (molecules, cells, organisms, human bodies,…, planets,…,???) are directly reducible to the individual members of the chemical table of elements. "the principle of individuation” is applicable to all compositions of individuals. Generality in the sense of mathematical symbols infers the loss of individuality. For examples, the mathematical terms, such as token, type and category are “utterly foreign" to the concept of individuality. A direct pragmatic consequence of "the principle of individuation” is the language of chemistry. Each unique molecule must be assigned a specific name that represents the thing itself. Each and every atom in the molecular formula must
Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
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John, a very nice post - but I do have some quibbles. I don't think
that you can reduce the differentiation and subsequent networking of
these differences that is the basis of complexity- to vagueness.
That is, complexity, which operates via both differentiations and
commonalities, is a key factor in the ability of the universe to
prevent entropy.
Therefore, the development of differentiation of Form, which implies
boundaries to that Form, and a severance of This from That, and thus
enables Secondness, is a reality in our universe. Just as is the
vagueness of Firstness and the commonalities of Thirdness.
Edwina
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On Sun 09/04/17 9:41 PM , John F Sowa s...@bestweb.net sent:
Helmut, Edwina, Jon, list,
Few borders in any realm, animate or inanimate, are clearly defined.
There is a continuum. The inanimate realm has extremes from sharp
boundaries (a crystal) to extremely vague boundaries (the earth's
atmosphere). The borders of living things are an intermediate case.
HR
> In animate world, organisms have clear borders, their skin
surface.
The surface is a vague boundary. All plants and animals have
exterior cells that are dead or dying (hair, skin, scales, bark)
and they have secretions (sweat, tears, oils, sap, resins).
The outer layers are always mixed with liquids and solids from
all kinds of sources (living or non-living), and they are subject
to various abrasions and adhesions -- deliberate or accidental
(e.g., a bird preening its feathers, animals scratching, grooming
themselves or others, rolling in the dust, or washing in water).
Even the interior is not well defined. There are many more billions
of bacterial cells than human cells in and on the human body. Some
of them are pathogens, but most are *essential* to human health.
HR
> I was thinking, that a token is something separate (discontinuous)
> by nature. But if it isn´t necessarily...
Many discontinuities are caused by the way we think and talk.
The Russian ruka corresponds to English hand + wrist + forearm.
We count trees by the number of trunks that grow out of the ground,
but an aspen may consist of a single root system with dozens of
trunks.
ET
> The fact that [a molecule's] composition is specific; i.e.,
> a specific number of electrons/protons/neutrons - gives it
> a distinct identity that differentiates it from another TYPE
> of chemical.
Very few molecules exist in isolation. For example, salt (NaCl)
rarely consists of Na-CL pairs. In a crystal, the atoms are
organized in a lattice where each atom is surrounded by atoms
of both kinds. In water, Na ions float independently of CL ions.
ET
> in the biological realm, ... Each token is more or less unique
> from other tokens even if they all belong to the same TYPE. That
is,
> a particular species of dog will, each one, be slightly different
> in temperament and even look, but all will be members of ONE
> particular Type/Breed of dog...
There are no clear boundaries between breeds (varieties) and
species. Dogs interbreed with wolves, which interbreed with
coyotes. Domestic cats interbreed with many kinds of wild cats.
The methods of genetic engineering use the same mechanisms as
gene transfers that occur naturally.
Furthermore, the DNA of every living thing is constantly changing
throughout life. Most epigenetic changes are normal and necessary
for maturation. Others may be harmful, beneficial, or neutral.
And many can be inherited. The only reason why DNA remains
relatively stable is that repair mechanisms in each cell are
constantly fixing errors -- but they don't catch all errors.
ET
> in the physico-chemical realm, the majority of tokens are similar.
> This gives the physico-chemical realm a great deal of stability.
The stability results from laws of nature (or known approximations
called laws of physics): conservation of mass-energy, momentum,
angular momentum, charge, etc.
But the question of "majority" depends on what you're counting.
Photons from the early universe can be stable for billions of
years. But the instant they hit your retina or a photocell in
a camera, they change.
Electrons, protons, and neutrons are relatively stable, but most
other particles are highly unstable. In quantum electrodynamics,
the vacuum supposedly consists of virtual particles that are
constantly popping in and out of a shadowy state that is on the
borderline of existence.
JAS
> biological Types are less restrictive and thus more flexible than
> most physico-chemical Types--which is one reason why biology is
> not reducible to chemistry and/or physics.
I agree that biology is not reducible to chemistry or physics.
[PEIRCE-L] Re: Laws of Nature as Signs
Kirsti, Thanks for the notice. Of course that setup is barely a beginning. It is only the grounds out of which understanding must grow, IF our understanding is to proceed on these two conditions: MAT. We take the methods and tools that C.S. Peirce gave us seriously. COR. We take the context of research in scientific inquiry seriously. In practice, of course, we do not take the whole actual universe U as our starting point, but begin by constructing concrete examples of systems, say, a system defined by its state space X, and we try to determine what sort of conditions X must satisfy in order for X to possess any sort of representation at all of its own structure. That is the sort of thing has been investigated a lot when it comes to ordinary sorts of axiom systems and computational systems, where people speak of the system having a “reflective property” but there needs to be much more work done with reflection in semiotic systems. Regards, Jon On 4/10/2017 9:25 AM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote: Jon A. Seems valid to me. But it does not answer the quest for understanding. - If you see my point. Kirsti Jon Awbrey kirjoitti 7.4.2017 02:02: Jon, List ... I've mentioned the following possibility several times before, but maybe not too recently. A sign relation L is a subset of a cartesian product O×S×I, where O, S, I are the object, sign, interpretant domains, respectively. In a systems-theoretic framework we may think of these domains as dynamical systems. We often work with sign relations where S = I but it is entirely possible to consider sign relations where all three domains are one and the same. Indeed, we could have O=S=I=U, where the system U is the entire universe. This would make the entire universe a sign of itself to itself. A very general way to understand a system-theoretic law is in terms of a constraint — the fact that not everything that might happen actually does. And that is nothing but a subset relation. So the law embodying how the universe represents itself to itself could be nothing other than a sign relation L ⊆ U×U×U. Regards, Jon http://inquiryintoinquiry.com [3] On Apr 6, 2017, at 3:36 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: List: With the discussions going on in a couple of threads about semeiosis in the physico-chemical and biological realms, a question occurred to me. What class of Sign is a law of nature? I am not referring to how we _describe_ a law of nature in human language, an equation, or other _representation_ of it; I am talking about the law of nature _itself_, the real general that governs actual occurrences. As a law, it presumably has to be a Legisign. What is its Dynamic Object--the inexhaustible continuum of its _potential_ instantiations, perhaps? How should we characterize its S-O relation? It is not conventional (Symbol), so is it an existential connection (Index)? What is its Dynamic Interpretant--any given _actual _instantiation, perhaps? How should we characterize its S-I relation--Dicent, like a proposition, or Rheme, like a term? Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2] Links: -- [1] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [2] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [3] http://inquiryintoinquiry.com -- inquiry into inquiry: https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ academia: https://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey oeiswiki: https://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
What an excellent post! Just an addition to what John said on bacteria: It seems hard to (in prevalent culture) to understand the fact that we are not directly nourished by our intake of nutritients (food), but via the bacteria in our digestive system. We feed the (kinds of) bacteria, which feed us. It is all mediated by the bacteria. We provide the bacteria, they provide us. - In other words: We cultivate the bacteria, which cultivates us. - See the ancient meaning of "culture"! Kirsti John F Sowa kirjoitti 10.4.2017 04:41: Helmut, Edwina, Jon, list, Few borders in any realm, animate or inanimate, are clearly defined. There is a continuum. The inanimate realm has extremes from sharp boundaries (a crystal) to extremely vague boundaries (the earth's atmosphere). The borders of living things are an intermediate case. HR In animate world, organisms have clear borders, their skin surface. The surface is a vague boundary. All plants and animals have exterior cells that are dead or dying (hair, skin, scales, bark) and they have secretions (sweat, tears, oils, sap, resins). The outer layers are always mixed with liquids and solids from all kinds of sources (living or non-living), and they are subject to various abrasions and adhesions -- deliberate or accidental (e.g., a bird preening its feathers, animals scratching, grooming themselves or others, rolling in the dust, or washing in water). Even the interior is not well defined. There are many more billions of bacterial cells than human cells in and on the human body. Some of them are pathogens, but most are *essential* to human health. HR I was thinking, that a token is something separate (discontinuous) by nature. But if it isn´t necessarily... Many discontinuities are caused by the way we think and talk. The Russian ruka corresponds to English hand + wrist + forearm. We count trees by the number of trunks that grow out of the ground, but an aspen may consist of a single root system with dozens of trunks. ET The fact that [a molecule's] composition is specific; i.e., a specific number of electrons/protons/neutrons - gives it a distinct identity that differentiates it from another TYPE of chemical. Very few molecules exist in isolation. For example, salt (NaCl) rarely consists of Na-CL pairs. In a crystal, the atoms are organized in a lattice where each atom is surrounded by atoms of both kinds. In water, Na ions float independently of CL ions. ET in the biological realm, ... Each token is more or less unique from other tokens even if they all belong to the same TYPE. That is, a particular species of dog will, each one, be slightly different in temperament and even look, but all will be members of ONE particular Type/Breed of dog... There are no clear boundaries between breeds (varieties) and species. Dogs interbreed with wolves, which interbreed with coyotes. Domestic cats interbreed with many kinds of wild cats. The methods of genetic engineering use the same mechanisms as gene transfers that occur naturally. Furthermore, the DNA of every living thing is constantly changing throughout life. Most epigenetic changes are normal and necessary for maturation. Others may be harmful, beneficial, or neutral. And many can be inherited. The only reason why DNA remains relatively stable is that repair mechanisms in each cell are constantly fixing errors -- but they don't catch all errors. ET in the physico-chemical realm, the majority of tokens are similar. This gives the physico-chemical realm a great deal of stability. The stability results from laws of nature (or known approximations called laws of physics): conservation of mass-energy, momentum, angular momentum, charge, etc. But the question of "majority" depends on what you're counting. Photons from the early universe can be stable for billions of years. But the instant they hit your retina or a photocell in a camera, they change. Electrons, protons, and neutrons are relatively stable, but most other particles are highly unstable. In quantum electrodynamics, the vacuum supposedly consists of virtual particles that are constantly popping in and out of a shadowy state that is on the borderline of existence. JAS biological Types are less restrictive and thus more flexible than most physico-chemical Types--which is one reason why biology is not reducible to chemistry and/or physics. I agree that biology is not reducible to chemistry or physics. But I'd say that the major difference was caused by the first quasi-minds, which created the first non-degenerate Thirdness (purpose, goals, or intentions). John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirc
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Laws of Nature as Signs
Jon A. Seems valid to me. But it does not answer the quest for understanding. - If you see my point. Kirsti Jon Awbrey kirjoitti 7.4.2017 02:02: Jon, List ... I've mentioned the following possibility several times before, but maybe not too recently. A sign relation L is a subset of a cartesian product O×S×I, where O, S, I are the object, sign, interpretant domains, respectively. In a systems-theoretic framework we may think of these domains as dynamical systems. We often work with sign relations where S = I but it is entirely possible to consider sign relations where all three domains are one and the same. Indeed, we could have O=S=I=U, where the system U is the entire universe. This would make the entire universe a sign of itself to itself. A very general way to understand a system-theoretic law is in terms of a constraint — the fact that not everything that might happen actually does. And that is nothing but a subset relation. So the law embodying how the universe represents itself to itself could be nothing other than a sign relation L ⊆ U×U×U. Regards, Jon http://inquiryintoinquiry.com [3] On Apr 6, 2017, at 3:36 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: List: With the discussions going on in a couple of threads about semeiosis in the physico-chemical and biological realms, a question occurred to me. What class of Sign is a law of nature? I am not referring to how we _describe_ a law of nature in human language, an equation, or other _representation_ of it; I am talking about the law of nature _itself_, the real general that governs actual occurrences. As a law, it presumably has to be a Legisign. What is its Dynamic Object--the inexhaustible continuum of its _potential_ instantiations, perhaps? How should we characterize its S-O relation? It is not conventional (Symbol), so is it an existential connection (Index)? What is its Dynamic Interpretant--any given _actual _instantiation, perhaps? How should we characterize its S-I relation--Dicent, like a proposition, or Rheme, like a term? Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2] Links: -- [1] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [2] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [3] http://inquiryintoinquiry.com - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
John, I found it very interesting that you took up metaphor in connection with "laws of nature". I once got across with a study on metaphors in science with a side note by the researchers that natural scientist often got angry on any hint that they may have been using such. - It was just something unthinkable for them. I assume something like that is still going on within computer science. Artificial Intelligence being notoriously unable to handle anything like that. - To the detriment of all of us. You used the term in a very, vary vague sense. - The quote you were commenting on, nothing metaphorical was intended. You presented your point very nicely, by taking up a language game "gone on a holiday". Have you given any thought on the difference between unintended and intended metaphors? And on kinds of metaphors which work, do the job, and kinds which fail? I also thank you for the papers you have shared in the List. Truly admiradle, truly clear. Best, Kirsti Määttänen John F Sowa kirjoitti 7.4.2017 00:35: Jon What class of Sign is a law of nature? I am not referring to how we /describe/ a law of nature in human language, an equation, or other /representation/ of it; I am talking about the law of nature /itself/, the real general that governs actual occurrences. Edwina But a symbol is not merely convention; ... could it be a reference to the general laws held within the Dynamic Object such that a 'shared reality' could be developed. That phrase "general laws held within the Dynamic Object" is strange. Wittgenstein would call it a fragment of a language game that "has gone on a holiday". It takes a phrase "general laws" from a language game of science, mixes it with a phrase "Dynamic Object" from Peirce's language game of semiotic, combines it with a physical language game of "holding something", and applies it to something "really real" for which we have no words for describing. In short, it's a metaphor. To analyze that metaphor, consider some examples: Galileo's law of falling bodies on earth: If you drop something in a vacuum, the distance x that it falls in time t is proportional to t squared: x = ½ gt² Kepler's law of planetary orbits: Planets in the solar system travel in elliptical orbits with the sun at one focus of each ellipse. Newton's law of gravity: A generalization that explains the laws of Galileo and Kepler plus many related phenomena. Einstein's general relativity: A generalization that explains all the above plus many more phenomena. Note that each of these laws makes true predictions within its domain of applicability. The more general laws, which cover a broader range of phenomena, are closer approximations to reality -- but each one is still a law of science. In summary, I believe that the term 'law of nature' is a metaphor for aspects of nature that we can only describe. The ultimate laws that science might discover in the far, far distant future might be very accurate. But when stated, they would be signs expressed in the same ways as other laws of science. John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
Jon, The presupposition in your question(s)you do not take up is the presupposition that all signs can and may be (easily) classified. - If you look up some detailed versions of Peirces classifications of signs, and you'll see what kinds of problems I mean. "Our existing universe" does not go hand in hand with "laws of nature". The nature of laws is to predict what is to come, what will happen (if so and so...). So they are about the future, just as well. It seems to me that you are trying to get a short way out of the Kantian question about "Das Ding an sich", the thing in itself. - There is no short and simple way! That much is shown beyond doubt by today. Best, Kirsti Määttänen Jon Alan Schmidt kirjoitti 7.4.2017 00:51: John S., List: JFS: In summary, I believe that the term 'law of nature' is a metaphor for aspects of nature that we can only describe. Again, I am asking about those aspects of nature _themselves_, not our linguistic or mathematical descriptions of them. What class of Signs are they? Obviously, in posing this question I am presupposing that general laws of nature are real, and that our existing universe consists of Signs all the way down; i.e., "all this universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs." Thanks, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2] On Thu, Apr 6, 2017 at 4:35 PM, John F Sowa wrote: Jon and Edwina, Jon What class of Sign is a law of nature? I am not referring to how we /describe/ a law of nature in human language, an equation, or other /representation/ of it; I am talking about the law of nature /itself/, the real general that governs actual occurrences. Edwina But a symbol is not merely convention; ... could it be a reference to the general laws held within the Dynamic Object such that a 'shared reality' could be developed. That phrase "general laws held within the Dynamic Object" is strange. Wittgenstein would call it a fragment of a language game that "has gone on a holiday". It takes a phrase "general laws" from a language game of science, mixes it with a phrase "Dynamic Object" from Peirce's language game of semiotic, combines it with a physical language game of "holding something", and applies it to something "really real" for which we have no words for describing. In short, it's a metaphor. To analyze that metaphor, consider some examples: Galileo's law of falling bodies on earth: If you drop something in a vacuum, the distance x that it falls in time t is proportional to t squared: x = ½ gt² Kepler's law of planetary orbits: Planets in the solar system travel in elliptical orbits with the sun at one focus of each ellipse. Newton's law of gravity: A generalization that explains the laws of Galileo and Kepler plus many related phenomena. Einstein's general relativity: A generalization that explains all the above plus many more phenomena. Note that each of these laws makes true predictions within its domain of applicability. The more general laws, which cover a broader range of phenomena, are closer approximations to reality -- but each one is still a law of science. In summary, I believe that the term 'law of nature' is a metaphor for aspects of nature that we can only describe. The ultimate laws that science might discover in the far, far distant future might be very accurate. But when stated, they would be signs expressed in the same ways as other laws of science. John Links: -- [1] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [2] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
[PEIRCE-L] Jaakko Hintikka - Memorial Issue - Logica Universalis
Jaakko Hintikka Memorial Special Issue of Logica Universalis Edited by Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen Call for Papers Any paper related to the work of Hintikka is welcome, in particular those dealing with the following topics: - Knowledge and Belief - Independence-friendly logic - Lingua Universalis vs Calculus Ratiocinator - Game-Theoretical Semantics - The Principles of Mathematics Revisited - The Logic of Scientific Discovery - Hintikka and Wittgenstein - Hintikka and Aristotle For more details Have a look at http://www.logica-universalis.org Jean-Yves Beziau Editor-in-Chief Logica Universalis - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatism and Sign as holon as mind-body as tool
>”I don't really need a response to any of these questions, because they were >only posed to reveal the sloppy thinking, logical gaps and inconsistencies in >your posting. At the very least, individual statements (definitions, axioms, >predictions) should be able to stand up to scrutiny, before asserting those >statements can all be combined into a coherent theory.” I always welcome objections, provided that they are stated coherently, because it shows when someone is paying attention, and receptive to the point being made. But this? My initial reaction is “pearls to swine”, but I only just got back from Friedrichshofen Aero show and I’m tired… if you are serious, I suggest that read my linked article, Pragmatism, Neural Plasticity and Mind-body Unity, and then rephrase the point that you want to make, otherwise I just can’t be bothered. sj From: Thomas903 [mailto:ozzie...@gmail.com] Sent: Thursday, April 6, 2017 10:08 PM To: Stephen Jarosek Cc: PEIRCE-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatism and Sign as holon as mind-body as tool Stephen J., List ~ A - "The notion of body-as-tool is a very important one because it sheds light on so many things." B- “If Your Only Tool Is a Hammer Then Every Problem Looks Like a Nail” If my body is a tool (hands, feet, eyes, etc.), then how can my ONLY tool be a hammer or any other external object? After saying (A) the body is a tool, then statement (B) is wrong on its face. Statement (B) suggests that people are limited-function robots. If my only (external) tool is a hammer and I wish to attach two boards together, I can walk to my neighbor's house (feet and legs) and ask him (voice) to glue or screw them together, or use various wood-wood bonds such as mortise-and-tenon. Why must I stay at home and insist on using my only tool to bond the boards with nails? If my house is on fire, I could use my body (hands, arms, feet, etc.) as tools to fight the fire, or a hose as a tool to convey water to the site, or social arrangements such as a telephone call to the fire department. There's more: "An ape can never use language to communicate with humans." Humans and apes have already communicated. If a man or woman learns the sounds made by an ape under various circumstances, then the ape can communicate with a human using its own language. The ape doesn't need to do anything unusual. Dolphins can communicate via sound/language with humans. Some birds use the language of birds of another species to trick them. Babies and pets use non-language sounds to communicate with adult humans. "Why can’t cats be taught to use a fork and knife"? I have never heard of a cat using silverware to eat, but I have seen a crow use a chop stick to pick up its food. (One stick, not two.) Monkeys sometimes use sticks, too, to pick up food (esp. ants). But even if cats were disposed to use silverware, how would you know? The silverware have to be scaled for the size and shape of the cat's paws, and shaped appropriately for the food the cat is eating. A human wouldn't use silverware if each utensil were 20' long and weighed 200 lbs, and people don't use a fork to eat soup or potato chips. I don't really need a response to any of these questions, because they were only posed to reveal the sloppy thinking, logical gaps and inconsistencies in your posting. At the very least, individual statements (definitions, axioms, predictions) should be able to stand up to scrutiny, before asserting those statements can all be combined into a coherent theory. Regards, Tom Wyrick On Wed, Apr 5, 2017 at 4:00 AM, Stephen Jarosek wrote: List, Allow me to take advantage of this lull in postings to elaborate on the relationship between pragmatism and the mind-body unity. The notion of body-as-tool is a very important one because it sheds light on so many things, from sex differences in most species to gender roles in culture, to why cats don’t boogie, to why dogs don’t wear suits. Or, why can’t dogs ever be taught to drive? Because their mind-bodies do not predispose them to caring about all the contexts that must come together to make driving a “thing”. Why can’t cats be taught to use a fork and knife instead of gulping down their cat-food from a bowl? Because their mind-bodies provide no basis upon which they should define table manners as relevant. But can’t you just indoctrinate the most stubborn of critters by repetition, or shouting instructions at them more often and more loudly? No, because you cannot cross pragmatism’s mind-body barrier. If something cannot matter to an entity, then no manner of shouting at it is going to change their minds. To a cat with four paws and no vocal chords with which to voice approval or dissent, a fork and knife will bear no relationship to food, and it never can. Now you might be able to make table-manners matter by the force of will and the thre
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatism and Sign as holon as mind-body as tool
Thanks Ben, glad to see that you get it. While the concepts are not all that difficult, one needs to step outside of their existing assumptions and make an effort to review the totality of what is being said. That’s why I write such articles as the one referenced. By contrast, someone nitpicking over a couple of sentences will only take what is being said out of context, and they’ll miss the point entirely. It’s also why I wrote my book. Providing explanations, individually, are a waste of time because, at the very least, people need the initiative to develop their own narratives around the core principles. Basically, what I am doing in this forum is rephrasing what many people here already know, but placing it in a more practical and specific context that can, to some extent, be experimentally verified. I’m trying to make 2-dimensional flat theory 3-dimensional and “real”. But ultimately we still come up against a quite intractable problem, and it is this… In order to understand the relationship between meaning, choices and experience, people need to experience experience. What I mean… they need to live out their theories and test them, and experience the effect that different choices and experiences have on their changing perspectives. There is no other way. Why? Because we need to formulate our own internal narratives and explanations that are far too involved to “explain” to fellow academics. The only thing that one CAN do is outline the basic principles, along the lines of established Peircean theory, but the real LIVING of them is a personal responsibility. It is only by LIVING the theory that you can grasp the truth of the theory. Become whistleblower, stand up for what you believe in, or if that’s too hard, travel, relocate… and then see how your world view changes… that kind of thing… trying to “explain” what is going on inside your head will just bore other mortals to death, and that’s why the best that can ever be explained is basic principles (eg, Peirce… or even, Buddhism or Christianity). sj From: Ben Novak [mailto:trevriz...@gmail.com] Sent: Thursday, April 6, 2017 10:40 PM To: Thomas903 Cc: Stephen Jarosek; PEIRCE-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatism and Sign as holon as mind-body as tool Dear Stephen: I read your piece on Neural Plasticity, at https://www.academia.edu/3236559/Pragmatism_Neural_Plasticity_and_Mind-Body_Unity and it makes a lot of sense to me. I suspect Tom's questions will dissolve upon reading it, too. Ben N. Ben Novak 5129 Taylor Drive, Ave Maria, FL 34142 Telephone: (814) 808-5702 "All art is mortal, not merely the individual artifacts, but the arts themselves. One day the last portrait of Rembrandt and the last bar of Mozart will have ceased to be—though possibly a colored canvas and a sheet of notes may remain—because the last eye and the last ear accessible to their message will have gone." Oswald Spengler On Thu, Apr 6, 2017 at 4:08 PM, Thomas903 wrote: Stephen J., List ~ A - "The notion of body-as-tool is a very important one because it sheds light on so many things." B- “If Your Only Tool Is a Hammer Then Every Problem Looks Like a Nail” If my body is a tool (hands, feet, eyes, etc.), then how can my ONLY tool be a hammer or any other external object? After saying (A) the body is a tool, then statement (B) is wrong on its face. Statement (B) suggests that people are limited-function robots. If my only (external) tool is a hammer and I wish to attach two boards together, I can walk to my neighbor's house (feet and legs) and ask him (voice) to glue or screw them together, or use various wood-wood bonds such as mortise-and-tenon. Why must I stay at home and insist on using my only tool to bond the boards with nails? If my house is on fire, I could use my body (hands, arms, feet, etc.) as tools to fight the fire, or a hose as a tool to convey water to the site, or social arrangements such as a telephone call to the fire department. There's more: "An ape can never use language to communicate with humans." Humans and apes have already communicated. If a man or woman learns the sounds made by an ape under various circumstances, then the ape can communicate with a human using its own language. The ape doesn't need to do anything unusual. Dolphins can communicate via sound/language with humans. Some birds use the language of birds of another species to trick them. Babies and pets use non-language sounds to communicate with adult humans. "Why can’t cats be taught to use a fork and knife"? I have never heard of a cat using silverware to eat, but I have seen a crow use a chop stick to pick up its food. (One stick, not two.) Monkeys sometimes use sticks, too, to pick up food (esp. ants). But even if cats were disposed to use silverware, how would you know? The silverware have to be scaled for the size and shape of the cat's paws,
