[peirce-l] Re: Peircean prayer, was: Re: one list archive now working
I'm glad you understood the jocular intention, Gary. I was signaling as much in referring to myself as a "heathen", which is a pejorative term one would not normally use in a self-description. In fact, what occasioned my remark was merely the impertinent fact that I had recently viewed a couple of the episodes in the HBO series "Deadwood", in which Native Americans are referred to as "heathen," and I had been idly reflecting on the question of what Peirce thought about Native Americans (American "Indians"). I don't recall encountering a single allusion to the topic in anything of his that I have read. After posting that message, I realized that the jocular intent might be misunderstood and I might well be offending somebody for no good reason. So I looked up "heathen" in -- you guessed it! -- the Century Dictionary, and it seems to have more or less the same extension as "pagan", and be similar in origin: "heathen" seems to have come from the use of "heath", which originally referred to an area of nature which has not been "civilized" by European standards of civilization, hence still infested by nature gods and demons (as the non-heathen would regard them.) A somewhat more restricted usage has it referring to any people who do not recognize the deity of the Hebrew, Christian, or Muslim religions. None of which is of any apparent relevance to us here. It is true, though, that Peirce was Christian in some sense, and it is certainly not out of place for you to reflect here upon what that might mean. I don't wish to pursue it further myself at the moment, but I will say that, as regards the efficacy of prayer, I do recall Peirce saying that this was a matter that should be settled by experimental observation. Does praying for rain tend to result in rain? People regularly pray for rain here in West Texas -- indeed, "heathens" in tribal dress are sometimes invited for the purpose in order to make sure that all bases are touched -- and I dare say one could actually check out the results of that, though I don't recall anyone ever actually doing so and reporting on what the record shows -- perhaps because that might involve certain complications in the cases where the rain comes in the form of tornadic storms! The problem of the Sorcerer's Apprentice! (Come to think of it, suspicions might then arise about Lubbock harboring Sodom or Gomorrah-like tendencies, deserving of the harsh justice of Yahweh, since the city was hit pretty hard by a twister that ripped through the center of town some thirty years ago!) But enough of that. Peirce recognized a more elevated form of prayer than this, in any case, and your comments were intended more seriously, and I don't wish to discourage exploration of his religious thinking, especially in view of the seeming overlap of the religious and the philosophical in the Neglected Argument, for example. But I'm not interested in pursuing the topic further myself at this time and will leave it to you and others to carry it further. Joe Ransdell - Original Message - From: Gary Richmond To: Peirce Discussion Forum Sent: Friday, January 13, 2006 4:40 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Peircean prayer, was: Re: one list archive now working Joe, Thanks for the update on Gmane.You also wrote: I don't myself believe in the power of prayer, unfortunately; but for those of you who make up for the deficiencies of sceptics like me, let me request that you include that search engine in your daily prayers because we certainly could use a good search engine after these many years of deprivation! (And bear in mind, too, that Peirce was himself a Christian of sorts, as you doubtless know, so your prayers will not be wasted on benefiting heathens like me in ways we do not deserve!)But Peirce was not an orthodox and certainly not a "naive" Christian so that the efficacy of prayer--if it were considered at all- would certainly not be anything like the quasi-magical power you are pointing to, but rather would tend toward the real influence of ideas, the influence, for example, of many seeing the truth together, whether it be in some corner of science or some corner of Manhattan when, as Peirce once related, a convention of young Christian people hit the town and transformed the City in some (to him) palpably sweet and uplifting way for a weekend (the truth is it's mainly been the Jewish influence on New York which has uplifted this town, for just a few examples: the great Jewish philanthropic and social agencies created here, a vast number of artistic and cultural and intellectual enterprises of all sorts---from NYU to the New York Times--originating here, etc., etc. and which have decidedly answered many of the prayers for generations of New Yorkers). I think Peirce might have conceived of prayer (if he concerned himself much with it at all,
[peirce-l] Re: Peircean prayer, was: Re: one list archive now working
Joe,
You wrote:
I do
recall Peirce saying that this was a matter that should be settled by
experimental observation.
There are several passages where Peirce says this sort of thing, for
example:
CP 1.91 But although science cannot infer any
particular violation of the ordinary course of nature, it may very well
be that it should find evidence that such violations are so frequent
and usual that this fact is itself a part of the ordinary course of
nature. For that reason, it is perfectly proper that science should
inquire, for example, into the evidences of the fulfillment of prayers,
etc. That is something open to experimental inquiry; and until such
inquiry has been instituted nobody is entitled to any opinion whatever,
or any bias, as to its results.
Of course this is simply another version of not standing in the way of
inquiry, his reminding scientists especially that they of all people
should keep an open mind in all such matters. On the other hand, such
research was personally "distasteful" to Peirce.
CP 6.518. . . . .As I say, the inquiry into
efficacity is distasteful to me because that is not the motive of my
prayers. Still, I should like to have an inquiry instituted into the
matter.
But looking more closely at actual prayer itself, perhaps at least
"the state of mind" that is "the soul's
consciousness of its relation to God" constitutes "
precisely the pragmatistic meaning of the name of God" (but note that
praying for "specific things" is held to be "childish. . . yet
innocent")
CP 6.516 .. . .I do not see why prayer may not
be
efficacious, or if not the prayer exactly, the state of mind of which
the prayer is nothing more than the _expression_, namely the soul's
consciousness of its relation to God, which is nothing more than
precisely the pragmatistic meaning of the name of God; so that, in that
sense, prayer is simply calling upon the name of the Lord. To pray for
specific things, not merely for the {epioution}, bread, but that it may
be better baked than yesterday's, is childish, of course; yet innocent.
But besides the matter of the efficacy of prayer (Gene Halton's
comments on the communal & participatory nature of Native American
prayer perhaps suggest a way of looking at this which may be more to
the point of our contemporary concerns), there are other reasons for
prayer according to Peirce. For one thing, he notes that perhaps even
the most prayerful of us yet spend relatively little time in the, shall
we say, numinal realm so that "religious ideas never come to form the
warp and woof of
our mental constitution, as do social ideas."
CP 6.437. Seldom do we pass a single hour of
our waking lives away from
the companionship of men (including books); and even the thoughts of
that solitary hour are filled with ideas which have grown in society.
Prayer, on the other hand, occupies but little of our time; and, of
course, if solemnity and ceremony are to be made indispensable to it
(though why observe manners toward the Heavenly Father that an earthly
father would resent as priggish?) nothing more is practicable.
Consequently, religious ideas never come to form the warp and woof of
our mental constitution, as do social ideas. They are easily doubted,
and are open to various reasons for doubt, which reasons may all be
comprehended under one, namely, that the religious phenomenon is
sporadic, not incessant.
Whatever one may think of the move, Peirce is also in many places
concerned with overcoming what he calls here "the barbaric conception
of personal identity" and prayer can assist in identifying the
individual with the All, that "pure and infinite Self" (Vedanta).
CP 7572. There is still another direction in
which the barbaric conception of personal identity must be broadened. A
Brahmanical hymn begins as follows: "I am that pure and infinite Self,
who am bliss, eternal, manifest, all-pervading, and who am the
substrate of all that owns name and form." This expresses more than
humiliation, -- the utter swallowing up of the poor individual self in
the Spirit of prayer. All communication from mind to mind is through
continuity of being. A man is capable of having assigned to him a rôle
in the drama of creation, and so far as he loses himself in that rôle,
-- no matter how humble it may be, -- so far he identifies himself with
its Author
But finally the whole point of prayer in the context of the church and
religion is suggested in this profound passages, which says in a few
sentences what I attempted to say in my earlier post in this thread,
and suggest that Peirce's position apropos religion is neither naive
nor "otherworldly" (indeed "Fears of hell and hopes of
paradise have no such reference; they are matters all sane men confess
they know nothing about") Rather, the "active motive" is " the prospect
of leaving
behind. . . fertile seeds of desirable fruits here on earth."
CP 6.451. The raison d'être of a church is to
confer upon men a life broader than their narrow personalities, a li
[peirce-l] Re: Peircean prayer, was: Re: one list archive now working
Arnold, Thanks for the reference. It reminded me that I wanted to look up exactly where Peirce had made the distinction between 'institutions of learning' and 'institutions for teaching' and found it here. CP 5.5833. . . . [I]t is necessary to note what is essentially involved in the Will to Learn. The first thing that the Will to Learn supposes is a dissatisfaction with one's present state of opinion. There lies the secret of why it is that our American universities are so miserably insignificant. What have they done for the advance of civilization? What is the great idea or where is [the] single great man who can truly be said to be the product of an American university? The English universities, rotting with sloth as they always have, have nevertheless in the past given birth to Locke and to Newton, and in our time to Cayley, Sylvester, and Clifford. The German universities have been the light of the whole world. The medieval University of Bologna gave Europe its system of law. The University of Paris and that despised scholasticism took Abelard and made him into Descartes. The reason was that they were institutions of learning while ours are institutions for teaching. In order that a man's whole heart may be in teaching he must be thoroughly imbued with the vital importance and absolute truth of what he has to teach; while in order that he may have any measure of success in learning he must be penetrated with a sense of the unsatisfactoriness of his present condition of knowledge. The two attitudes are almost irreconcilable [emphasis added] I assume this is the same passage you had in mind (you wrote "mired in sloth" whereas the above has it as "rotting with sloth" but it seems to refer to the same matter). So this shows Peirce once again to have analyzed an issue which is only now beginning to get adequate attention. As Richard Hake wrote a few days ago: In their [Barr and Tagg (1995)] landmark wake-up call to higher education "From Teaching to Learning: A New Paradigm for Undergraduate Education," they wrote: "A paradigm shift is occurring in American higher education. Under the traditional, dominant 'Instruction Paradigm' colleges are institutions that exist to *provide instruction." Subtly but profoundly, however, a 'Learning Paradigm' is taking hold, whereby colleges are institutions that exist to *produce learning*. This shift is both needed and wanted, and it changes everything." If only the President of Harvard, or the trustees of the Carnegie Foundation, or etc , etc. been able to see the vast potential value of Peirce's research, how much further along semeiotic, etc. might be today. (I'm also reminded that Hake took me to task for copying the material below my signature and am trying to remember to delete earlier copied posts in the interest of not encumbering the Gmane archive.) Gary --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Peircean prayer, was: Re: one list archive now working
Gary, List It's actually quite amusing to see how people are speaking of a `papradigm shift' in the universities, when the very concept of a `paradigm' is rooted in the question of what exemplars (i.e. paradigms) to employ in teaching the public about science. My take on this topic comes from understanding TS Kuhn (or more likely, the bandwagoners who liked to assume the label `Kuhnians') as not taking account of the distinction between teaching, research, and inquiry: Peirce definitely distinguishes between teaching and inquiry (the settlement of real doubt, learning) in the passage you followed up (okay, I got the mired bit wrong but it's the passage I had in mind: thanks) whereas the paradigm model doesn't. There is also a draft in the 1902 Carnegie Proposal where Peirce explicates on this in relation to the Economy of Research, that is worth looking up. In some respects, establishing universities as teaching institutions actually does a major disfavour to the institutions that are supposed to teach, the schools. My experience here has been that more and more of the responsibility for teaching the basics of intellectual life is being left to universities, while the schools become more and more focused on `life skills' and `vocational training'. The ability, and discipline required, to write clearly, which naturally entails a comparable ability and discipline to read clearly, is all but absent amongst the annual intake of freshers. Ever greater slices of the budget are being poured into Bridging Programmes and the like so that new students can at least begin to follow what their lecturers are showing them. We become a sort of follow-up school that tries to tidy up the mess left behind by a public schooling system that just does not seem to accomplish its mission. In this light, one can appreciate Peirce's ongoing attempts to get some public form of logic learning going, both in his trials at correspondence learning and through his association with the Lowell Institute. Teaching is based in logica utens; learning requires both a familiarity with, and the ability to extend, the logica docens of the subject-matter about which our doubts have arisen. By all means let the universities take on the paradigm model: long may the resistance flourish!! But to talk of this as a `paradigm shift' is, to me, already to hand the victory to one's opponents before the battle lines have even been drawn. Cheers Arnold On 1/23/06, Gary Richmond <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: Arnold,Thanks for the reference. It reminded me that I wanted to look up exactly where Peirce had made the distinction between 'institutions of learning' and 'institutions for teaching' and found it here. CP 5.5833. . . . [I]t is necessary to note what is essentially involved in the Will to Learn. The first thing that the Will to Learn supposes is a dissatisfaction with one's present state of opinion. There lies the secret of why it is that our American universities are so miserably insignificant. What have they done for the advance of civilization? What is the great idea or where is [the] single great man who can truly be said to be the product of an American university? The English universities, rotting with sloth as they always have, have nevertheless in the past given birth to Locke and to Newton, and in our time to Cayley, Sylvester, and Clifford. The German universities have been the light of the whole world. The medieval University of Bologna gave Europe its system of law. The University of Paris and that despised scholasticism took Abelard and made him into Descartes. The reason was that they were institutions of learning while ours are institutions for teaching. In order that a man's whole heart may be in teaching he must be thoroughly imbued with the vital importance and absolute truth of what he has to teach; while in order that he may have any measure of success in learning he must be penetrated with a sense of the unsatisfactoriness of his present condition of knowledge. The two attitudes are almost irreconcilable [emphasis added] I assume this is the same passage you had in mind (you wrote "mired in sloth" whereas the above has it as "rotting with sloth" but it seems to refer to the same matter). So this shows Peirce once again to have analyzed an issue which is only now beginning to get adequate attention. As Richard Hake wrote a few days ago: In their [Barr and Tagg (1995)] landmark wake-up call to higher education "From Teaching to Learning: A New Paradigm for Undergraduate Education," they wrote: "A paradigm shift is occurring in American higher education. Under the traditional, dominant 'Instruction Paradigm' colleges are institutions that exist to *provide instruction." Subtly but profoundly, however, a 'Learning Paradigm' is taking hold, whereby colleges are institutions that exist to *produce learning*. This shift is both needed and wanted, and it changes everything." If only the President of Harvard, or
