Re: Argentina, Australia and Canada (and US foreign investment)

2002-04-20 Thread Bill Rosenberg

Charles Brown wrote:

> Profits aside, two features of FDI which seem to clearly differentiate developed
> and developing countries (in the context of the US foreign investment thread,
> imperial vs neo-colonies) appear to be the balance between inward and outward
> investment stock (biased towards outward for developed countries; overwhelmingly
> inward for developing
> 
> 
> 
> CB: Might this be termed "export of capital "  ?

It could be expressed as net export of capital, but that would cover up the fact
that most capital exports are from one developed country to another.

Bill




Argentina, Australia and Canada (and US foreign investment)

2002-04-19 Thread Charles Brown

 Argentina, Australia and Canada (and US foreign investment)
by Bill Rosenberg

-clip-

Nice synthesis of these threads, Bill.


Profits aside, two features of FDI which seem to clearly differentiate developed
and developing countries (in the context of the US foreign investment thread,
imperial vs neo-colonies) appear to be the balance between inward and outward
investment stock (biased towards outward for developed countries; overwhelmingly
inward for developing



CB: Might this be termed "export of capital "  ?




Re: Re: Re: Argentina, Australia and Canada (and US foreign investment)

2002-04-19 Thread Louis Proyect

On Sat, 20 Apr 2002 00:37:28 +1200, Bill Rosenberg wrote:
>
>It's difficult to say what profit figures would
>show. The ability of TNCs to transfer their
>profits from one country another for tax,
>political or internal reasons must make the
>profit attributed to their operations in any one
>country arbitrary to a degree.

It is absolutely necessary to dispense with the idea that imperialism 
is identical to multinationals seeking out countries where labor is 
cheap and profits are high. Imperialism is operative even when there 
is not a single US corporation or subsidiary on foreign soil.

Take the petroleum industry, for example, an essential piece in the 
jigsaw puzzle of imperialism. Saudi Arabian and Venezuelan oil wells 
are owned by the government, but are forced to deal with 
Anglo-American corporations that market the finished product. With 
pliant governments, the US can continue to bleed these countries dry 
even if it is not operating on foreign soil.

This is also true of agro-export. For example, Colombia capitalists 
own all of the plantations but are forced to deal with much bigger 
and more powerful US marketing operations that buy and process the 
raw beans. In general, third world cartels for products like coffee 
beans, etc. are at a much bigger disadvantage than oil exporters, who 
can at least cause shocks to the world system if they cut back on 
production. Higher coffee prices might cause grumbling at Starbucks, 
but they won't bring the advanced countries' economy crashing down.

Finally, many maquilas are typically not owned directly by US 
corporations or subsidiaries. Nike would prefer to line up local 
subcontractors who it can then blame for abuses to the work-force.

This, of course, is not to say that North American auto production in 
places like Mexico is driven by the need to compete with Korea and 
Japan. There is a drive to the bottom. However, to fully understand 
the operations of imperialism, you have to look at the full 
constellation of class relations not just multinational behavior.


-- 
Louis Proyect, [EMAIL PROTECTED] on 04/19/2002

Marxism list: http://www.marxmail.org




Re: Re: Argentina, Australia and Canada (and US foreign investment)

2002-04-19 Thread Bill Rosenberg

Ratios of inward and outward FDI stock to GDP, and FDI flows to gross fixed
capital formation are tabulated for most countries in the various World
Investment Reports of UNCTAD. They also calculate a "transnationality index" of
FDI host countries, which averages the four shares: FDI flows (as a percentage
of GFCF), FDI inward stocks as a percentage of GDP, value added of foreign
affiliates as a percentage of GDP, and employment of foreign affiliates as a
precentage of total employment. The developed countries which the 2000 report
tabulates (with New Zealand at the top!) average around 13%, and the tabulated
developing countries 14%.

Unfortunately they don't seem interested in tabulating profits!

It's difficult to say what profit figures would show. The ability of TNCs to
transfer their profits from one country another for tax, political or internal
reasons must make the profit attributed to their operations in any one country
arbitrary to a degree.

Even without deliberate transfer pricing, it is conceivable that (say) Nike
would put up with lower rates of profit in Indonesia because the manufacture of
its shoes is such a small part of the cost. Most of the profits may well be made
elsewhere in the chain of distribution and sale. I'm not saying that it
necessarily happens like that, but it is quite conceivable.

To say TNCs chase cheap labour is to oversimplify. Certainly that is an
important part of their motivation, but since around 76% of FDI was to developed
countries (in 1999) - and 90% of mergers and acquisitions - it isn't the whole
story. Other motivations include domination of their selected markets,
increasing scale for competitive reasons, and security of investment.

Profits aside, two features of FDI which seem to clearly differentiate developed
and developing countries (in the context of the US foreign investment thread,
imperial vs neo-colonies) appear to be the balance between inward and outward
investment stock (biased towards outward for developed countries; overwhelmingly
inward for developing); and greenfield vs mergers/acquisition investment (over
80% of FDI was M&As for all countries in 1999; but about one third of FDI to
developing countries).

Grant Lee remarks below that Singapore's "inward FDI is still  well above
outward FDI in this city-state where annual trade is also 160%  !!!  of GDP".
Singapore has unusually high FDI, but its high level of trade is no mystery.
Like Hong Kong, it has a huge entrepot function, with high levels of
"re-exports" - importing for the purpose of re-exporting with little or no work
done on the goods on the way through. In 1999 Hong Kong (popn about 6 million)
had the world's 10th largest international trading volume (mainland China was
9th). In 2000 88.5% of its exports were re-exports, a third of these to mainland
China. Its foreign investment is even more remarkable (and
statistics-distorting!): with the exceptions of China and its former colonial
master, the U.K., the top-ranked sources and destinations of Hong Kong
investment are the tax havens of the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands,
and Bermuda (1998 figures). The ownership of this investment is certainly
elsewhere, including the U.S., Europe, Hong Kong itself, and China.

Bill


Grant Lee wrote:
> 
> Bill Burgess <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> 
> > country inward FDI stock/GDPoutward FDI stock/GDP
> > Canada  23.9%   26.9%
> > Australia   28.117.1
> > UK  23.335.9
> > France  11.715.9
> > Singapore   85.856.1
> > Malaysia67.022.7
> > Indonesia   73.32.4
> > Argentina   13.95.4
> > Brazil  17.11.4
> 
> Interesting figures. I haven't had time to look at the comparable figures
> for other countries. In any case they don't prove a permanent/structural
> exclusion from "imperial" activity. For example, what about Hong Kong
> (pre-1997, not that it is yet a homogenous part of China)? The last I heard
> there was hardly any manufacturing left in Hong Kong because proprietors had
> shifted operations to the mainland. South Africa? Saudi Arabia?
> 
> > Note the
> > obvious difference in rates of outward FDI, plus the fact that most FDI by
> > Canada, France, etc. is in other imperialist countries while most FDI by
> > Indonesia, Argentina, etc. is in fellow semi-colonies.
> 
> Every bourgeoisie has to start somewhere. For example --- and I'm not going
> to revisit the complexities and vitriol of the "Kenya Debate" --- but I just
> came across this on the web:
> 
> Andrea Goldstein and Njuguna S. Ndung'u, OECD Development Centre Technical
> Paper No. 171: "New Forms Of Co-Operation And Integration In Emerging Africa
> Regional Integration Experience, March 2001.
> 
> quote: (p. 16) Table 5. Import Sources (1997)*
> 
> (From)Kenya Tanzan