Rat choice (fwd)
Jim Devin asked: >how does the "rat choice" method of PoliSci differ from that of >economics? >supposedly, rat choice logic is one of the major theoretical tools that >sharpens rather than obscures economic thinking, right? Yes and No. It depends on what we mean by "economic thinking". If economics is defined in terms of utility maximizing individual, rational agency model and free market, i think rational choice theory perfectly fits into and sharpens this mainstream definition of economics. On the other hand, since rational choice theory is an "ideology", it obscures fundamental political-economic realities already built into the assumptions of economics. I don't know perfectly the specific application of rational choice theory in economics dicipline. What i know is that this branch of study has come to dominate political science since the 1970s under the influence of economists and political economists such as Buchanan (1975), Anthony Downs (1957), Mancur Olson (1965), William Riker (1962) Gordon Tullock (1965) and recently Robert Bates (1981). An alternative to conservative rational choice theory has evolved through the works of so called leftist economists among whom John Roamer, Adam Przeworski, Jon Elster and Erik Wright are of particular interests to comparative political economists. Their work is an extension of neo-classical ideology in its emphasis on equilibrium analysis and rational decision making. Political scientists in the radical tradition complain about this recent trend by pointing out the "imperialization of social sciences" under a hegemony led by economics (rational choice, game theory, formal modeling). Of couse, I am talking about what is happening in the "core" of political science. On the other hand, the "consolation" of our own diciplines such as polscie, history and sociology, etc.. is that we are still able to generate alternative radical visions to mainstream views more so stringently than economics. As it is applied in one version of political science, rational choice theory is primarily ideology and assumes that all individuals can be rational. With the studies of economists like James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock on decision making in government institutions, an argument was made that an "analysis of the market should be based on rational individuals who pursue their own self-interests". Following this has emerged methodological individualism in which benefits and costs are calculated concerning how efficiently government institutions should shape "individual preferences about public goods". As an alternative to rational choice economists, rational choice "political scientists" in the 60s and 70s have turned their attention to economics to explain political bahavior in different socio-economic contexts. However, without challenging the false assumptions of rational chioce theory, they instead combined it with historical, sociological and antropological sciences to be able deal with the utilities of people cross-culturally "across the social strata and overtime". This effort can be seen in the work of Robert Bates (1981) on Africa and Third World political economy (agrarian question).His work is still, in my view, heavily influenced by rational choice theory (despite its critic of conventional economics) because of its biased treatment of Marxian works on peasentary and class location in the third world. The ideological fallacy of rational choice theory and economic theories alike are manifold.1) they create individualistic theories that can not move in space and time 2)they are ahistorical because they can not effectively deal with historical change 3) they are dogmatic because refuse to accept conceptions of exploitation and class. Rational choice economists in the leftist tradition pursue the same neo-classical bias by trying to reorient (and distort) marxist epistemology and its assumptions towards subjective social analysis. In attempting to build Marxist thery in micro foundations, rational choice marxists (Elster, Roemer), have argued that actions of class can be reducable to individual preferences (See Elster's _Making Sense of Marx_). In contrast to Elster, Wrighta and Przeworski placed more emphasis on structurally determined individual preferences. With a much better twist, Roemer employed rational choice to show exploitation occurs as a consequence of unequally distributed property relations, not as a result of what happens in the process of production. On the other hand, Wright has shifted emphasis from class contradictions and labor process towards more subjective analysis like political power groups and coalition building theories. While ephasis on power groups has generated some important insights (as in Bates too), it is also misleading because the importance of production and exploitation is obscured by attention to
Rat choice
>But I agree that more recently Bates's insights have seemed to me to be >more obscured than sharpened by the "rational choice" methodology in >political science... how does the "rat choice" method of PoliSci differ from that of economics? supposedly, rat choice logic is one of the major theoretical tools that sharpens rather than obscures economic thinking, right? Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] & http://liberalarts.lmu.edu/~JDevine
[PEN-L:2867] illusions of rat-choice (was: AIDS and the blow back)
Rob: "Dropping contaminated corpses" was - of course - a historical metaphor showing the illusion of safet provided by walls, wasn't it Constantinople that not only fell to the "bacteriological warfare" but whose refugees also spread the disease across Europe? For that matter, the film "Safe" - arguably one of the best American motion pictures in the last quarter of the century -- beautifully shows the illusory safety offerred by new age "refuge communities" (no wonder why liberals and new agers hated the film). As far as responses to crises are concerned, I am really far away from rat-choice and game theories, beacuse they try to explain behaviour from omniscient hindsight assumed by the viewer. These theories assume that the actors think what the viewer does - indeed, an example of the arrogance of (social) philosophy - without trying to investigate into the actors' actual thinking, motives, definitions of the situation etc. I am much more inclined to accept a situationist point of view claiming that people re-eneac certain role that come with the definition of the situation, even if that means being harmed in the end. That point is well argued by Jack Katz in _ Seductions of crime : moral and sensual attractions in doing evil_ New York: Basic Books, 1988 -- where he shows how crime requires a ceratin cooperation between the perpetrator and the victim, each one playing the appropriate to the situation and predictable role. He furrther argues that defining the sitiuation as a certain type of crime by the perpetrator is a prerequisite of a success, for otherwise the behavior of the victim is not predictable. I am pretty sure that such is the explanation of the apparent cooperation of nazi victims - the victims simply succumbed to the definition of the situation imposed by the nazis and duly played their victims roles (cf. Richard Rubinstein, _The Cunning of History_ ). I sincerely doubt that any rat-choice calculation, e.g. "compliance will prolong my life by a few minutes" took place. I am pretty sure that had someone transgressed the nazi-imposed script and, like that proverbial child souting "the emperor has no clothes" -- the people quietly marching to the gas chamber would ceased so doing and behaved "unpredictably." That illusrates the powerful influence of collective norms on individual behavior. "Keeping up with the Jonses" may not stand up to the standards of rat-choice, but certainly reduces uncertainty. That I think may explain much of the behavior associated with capitalism - people go shopping sprees, vote & answer opinion polls in a predictable way, scapegoat the poor, flee to the burbs etc. not because of some rationally (mis)calculated risks, but because they have been lead to believe that everyone does so and hence it is the "right thing to do." They simply play out the roles they think are expected of them. That view, BTW, offers some hints about the possible scenearios for a revolution in the US Doug asked about a few days ago. Here is one. Have a few truckloads of dynamite to blow up TV stations and newspaper printing facilities and a few crates of ammo to shoot the celebrities and pundits - or find some other way to shut the tube up so people will not know anymore what is being expected of them, what script to follow. Chaos will result, but chaos is a prelude to a revolution. Best regards, Wojtek
Prostitution, marriage & rat-choice
At 04:05 PM 1/8/98 -0800, Bill Burgess wrote: >This is not only too much faith in the equality of buyer and seller in the >market, it is too bleak a view of most (physical and emotional) relations >between men and women to be taken seriously. It is not the matter of faith in the market, but of the fundamental difference in cost/benefit calculation between transaction in the market vs. one in the so-called traditional social institutions. Assuming no relation between a sex worker and her client other than a "spot" transaction exchanging sex for money, there is little opportunity cost for a sex worker passing on a particular prospective client. However, the very nature of most social institutions is to increase the opportunity cost to motivate the actor to engage rather than not to engage in a particular sort of activity. In a marriage-type relationship that opportunity may vary form informal sanctions imposed by the husband who got a cold shoulder (ranging from displaying his dissatisfaction to getting physical) to ending the relationship. Thus, the opportunity cost of sex (emotional attachment, informal and formal sanctions) for a woman is considerably higher in marriage than in a "spot" sex-for-money transaction. Of course, that is not limited to marriage. By their very nature, social institutions impose opportunity cost on certain actions which does not exist from a rat-choice perspective (assuming no relationship among actors other than how they value the exchanged objects) - and that explains why people do what they should not be doing from a rat-choice point of view. Thus, most women have little to gain from marriage, both emotionally and financially -- and if they calculated the cost/benefit from a purely rat-choice perspective, few of them would marry. That, however, is not what happens, for there is a considerable opportunity cost attached to the institution of marriage in the form of a host of informal sanctions (ostracism, loss of status, ridicule, etc.) which alter the cost/benefit marriage for the woman and push her into a relationship in which she may have little to gain personally. >There is a very good reason for the 'socialist moralism' regarding >prostitution - it reflects the plebian horror of falling into poverty, >privation, dependency, lumpenization, etc. Perhaps, but that may or may not be an important factor. I think that the fear of falling down the social ladder is much greater in the middle class than in the working class - for two reasons: working class has much less to loose than the "middle" class, and working class has social mechanism to cope with life contingencies that the "middle" class is lacking. That mechanism is social solidarity or the obligation to aid another member of the community in need. The "middle" class, by contrast, tends to rely on accumulated wealth and formal agreements (insurance, retirement accounts) rather than informal social solidarity ties. That explains, for example, why working class is less attached to their material possessions and is more willing to share them (cf. on average working class contributes a higher share of their disposable income to public causes than the middle class). IMO, the main reason behind 'working class moralism' is that not playing expected social roles jeopardizes social solidarity ties - the main mechanism of coping with contingencies. Thus, prostitution threatens the unity of the household, just as homosexulaity and any other non-conventional gender role does. In the same vein, flag burning threatens the unity of the nation. Hence the staunch oppostion of the working class to non-traditional gender roles, falg burining, and other forms of individualism that intellectuals falsely interpret as "conservatism." Regards, wojtek sokolowski institute for policy studies johns hopkins university baltimore, md 21218 [EMAIL PROTECTED] voice: (410) 516-4056 fax: (410) 516-8233
