Re: [Standards] XMPP example site - www.LiveBaseballChat.com

2009-04-10 Thread Egon Willighagen
On Tue, Apr 7, 2009 at 11:00 PM, Dean Collins d...@cognation.net wrote:
 Basically it is an ajax/xmpp site with 2430 chat rooms set up over the
 next 6 months for people to talk about specific Baseball games.

Interesting... I have been thinking about making a web front end for
IO-DATA services, assuming there must be web/JavaScript libraries to
talk over the XMPP network...

Can you please elaborate on the libraries used behind your website?

Egon

-- 
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Re: [Standards] UPDATED: XEP-0198 (Stream Management)

2009-04-10 Thread Robin Redeker
On Thu, Apr 09, 2009 at 07:19:11PM -0500, XMPP Extensions Editor wrote:
 Version 0.8 of XEP-0198 (Stream Management) has been released.
 
 Abstract: This specification defines an XMPP protocol extension for active 
 management of an XML stream between two XMPP entities, including features for 
 stanza acknowledgements and stream resumption.
 
 Changelog: [See revision history] (ff/jk/jjh/psa)
 
 Diff: 
 http://svn.xmpp.org:18080/browse/XMPP/trunk/extensions/xep-0198.xml?%40diffMode=u%40diffWrap=sr1=2933r2=3028u=3ignore=k=
 
 URL: http://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0198.html
 

Looks fine to me now, just a minor inconsistency (probably from editing):

   4. Acks
   ...
   An a/ element MUST possess an 'h' attribute.
   An r/ element SHOULD NOT possess any attributes.

But later it says:

   When an r/ element (request) is received, the recipient MUST acknowledge
   it by sending an ack element (either a/ or r/) to the sender.
   ...
   The response MUST contain a value of 'h' that is equal to the number of
   stanzas handled by the recipient of the r/ element.



Greetings,
   Robin

-- 
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el...@ta-sa.org / r.rede...@gmail.com | http://www.deliantra.net
http://www.ta-sa.org/ |


Re: [Standards] UPDATED: XEP-0198 (Stream Management)

2009-04-10 Thread Peter Saint-Andre
On 4/10/09 1:10 AM, Robin Redeker wrote:
 On Thu, Apr 09, 2009 at 07:19:11PM -0500, XMPP Extensions Editor wrote:
 Version 0.8 of XEP-0198 (Stream Management) has been released.

 Abstract: This specification defines an XMPP protocol extension for active 
 management of an XML stream between two XMPP entities, including features 
 for stanza acknowledgements and stream resumption.

 Changelog: [See revision history] (ff/jk/jjh/psa)

 Diff: 
 http://svn.xmpp.org:18080/browse/XMPP/trunk/extensions/xep-0198.xml?%40diffMode=u%40diffWrap=sr1=2933r2=3028u=3ignore=k=

 URL: http://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0198.html

 
 Looks fine to me now, just a minor inconsistency (probably from editing):
 
4. Acks
...
An a/ element MUST possess an 'h' attribute.
An r/ element SHOULD NOT possess any attributes.
 
 But later it says:
 
When an r/ element (request) is received, the recipient MUST 
 acknowledge
it by sending an ack element (either a/ or r/) to the sender.
...
The response MUST contain a value of 'h' that is equal to the number of
stanzas handled by the recipient of the r/ element.

Thanks, I'll fix that.

Peter

-- 
Peter Saint-Andre
https://stpeter.im/



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Re: [Standards] Forwarding Delivery Draft

2009-04-10 Thread Peter Saint-Andre
On 3/17/09 10:17 AM, Peter Saint-Andre wrote:
 On 3/17/09 10:10 AM, Michael Grigutsch wrote:
 Hi!
 
 Hi MiGri!
 
 In 2006 Peter Saint-Andre wrote a Draft for a JEP which would fill an
 important gap: It is about forwarding stanzas.
 You can find the document at
 http://xmpp.org/extensions/inbox/forwarding-delivery.html
 
 There was some controversy about forwarding when the XMPP Council last
 discussed it:
 
 http://logs.jabber.org/coun...@conference.jabber.org/2006-02-09.html
 
 http://logs.jabber.org/coun...@conference.jabber.org/2006-03-23.html
 
 Perhaps you could read those logs and summarize the objections? I can't
 remember what the issues were at this point. :)
 
 I would love to see the XSF publish this as an official XEP and I
 volunteer to help work on the spec so that we can complete this work.
 
 That's great, thanks! It seems that I no longer have the original .xml
 file for that proposal, so I'll need to reconstruct it from the HTML
 output. I'll do that soon and send you the file.

Done:

http://xmpp.org/extensions/inbox/forwarding-delivery.xml

Peter

-- 
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https://stpeter.im/



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[Standards] Proposed XMPP Extension: Instant Gaming

2009-04-10 Thread XMPP Extensions Editor
The XMPP Extensions Editor has received a proposal for a new XEP.

Title: Instant Gaming

Abstract: This document defines an XMPP protocol extension for serverless 
instant gaming in a one-to-one context.

URL: http://www.xmpp.org/extensions/inbox/instant-gaming.html

The XMPP Council will decide at its next meeting whether to accept this 
proposal as an official XEP.



[Standards] Proposed XMPP Extension: Multi-User Gaming

2009-04-10 Thread XMPP Extensions Editor
The XMPP Extensions Editor has received a proposal for a new XEP.

Title: Multi-User Gaming

Abstract: This document defines an XMPP protocol extension for multi-user 
gaming.

URL: http://www.xmpp.org/extensions/inbox/multi-user_gaming.html

The XMPP Council will decide at its next meeting whether to accept this 
proposal as an official XEP.



[Standards] Proposed XMPP Extension: Tic-tac-toe

2009-04-10 Thread XMPP Extensions Editor
The XMPP Extensions Editor has received a proposal for a new XEP.

Title: Tic-tac-toe

Abstract: This document defines how to play a Tic-tac-toe game over XMPP

URL: http://www.xmpp.org/extensions/inbox/tictactoe.html

The XMPP Council will decide at its next meeting whether to accept this 
proposal as an official XEP.



[Standards] Proposed XMPP Extension: Server-based Tic-tac-toe

2009-04-10 Thread XMPP Extensions Editor
The XMPP Extensions Editor has received a proposal for a new XEP.

Title: Server-based Tic-tac-toe

Abstract: This document defines how to play a Tic-tac-toe game over XMPP

URL: http://www.xmpp.org/extensions/inbox/tictactoe-mug.html

The XMPP Council will decide at its next meeting whether to accept this 
proposal as an official XEP.



Re: [Standards] XMPP-IM - presence subscription handling

2009-04-10 Thread Peter Saint-Andre
On 2/24/09 8:53 AM, Jiří Zárevúcký wrote:
 Hello all.
 
 I've been thinking about the current subscription management in the
 XMPP-IM for some time now. I think it's not very well designed.

Where were you in 1999?!? We could have used your help back then.

 For example, there's an obvious redundancy in the roster pushes and
 subscription stanzas. For (almost) every subscription update /
 request, there is a presence stanza and a roster push. But that only
 applies to the contact, who receives the change. Also, the ask
 attribute looks like a maimed boolean and roster pushes do not contain
 all the state information - inbound request is missing.
 
 Even though the client can track most of the changes by tracking
 roster pushes and subscription stanzas, there is one change client can
 never track. When there is an inbound subscription request with no
 item and user declines it, other resources get no push and no presence
 stanza - no notification. That is not really a big problem, but all
 this inconsistency in pushes and presence stanzas makes it all seem
 very chaotic and untidy.

Yep. But what is broken? We don't make protocol changes just for aesthetics.

 Originally, I wanted to propose modifying roster pushes so they
 contain all the state information (including eventual inbound
 subscription request message), essentially leaving
 subscription-managing presence stanzas only as the mean of requesting
 the change, not presenting it to the other entity or the other
 resources. Then one thing occured to me. Do we really need a separate
 subscription handling for inbound and outbound presences? Users
 generally don't want it separate. Users want mutual subscription. Is
 there ever need to have one-side subscription?

Sometimes. But I agree that for most end users they don't need that.
IMHO this is a client interface issue, not a protocol issue.

 Providing mechanism for just a mutual subscription, where there would
 be only both-direction or pending or no subscription at all, would
 immensely simplify things for both users and implementers. Yes, I
 agree that immediate effect would be increasing complexity and need of
 additional effort to maintain backward compatibility. 

There's the rub. This kind of effort is a non-starter.

 That would be a
 tricky task, but I believe that with proper interoperability rules, it
 would be possible to make transition relatively painless. I believe
 that in a long run, such change would be a huge improvement.

For whom?

 So, in case you are interested in this idea, I will continue with some
 semantics I have on my mind. Otherwise, just tell me why do you think
 it is not possible / feasible / wanted to implement it. I'm pretty
 sure there is some hidden problem with this I don't realize. I suppose
 many of you won't take me too seriously, since it would require too
 massive change to the core protocol, but I'd appreciate if you thought
 about it a bit. Thanks for any feedback.

My feedback is: don't waste time on this kind of project. The problems
with backwards-compatibility make it infeasible.

Peter

-- 
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https://stpeter.im/




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Re: [Standards] Inconsistent Subscriptions in XMPP

2009-04-10 Thread Peter Saint-Andre
On 4/1/09 12:07 PM, Mridul Muralidharan wrote:
 
 If I recall right, probe can be sent to a full jid in case a directed
 presence was received from it in the past - and the behavior would be
 different (return last presence stanza sent iirc). Has that behavior
 changed or is the description below only for bare jid's ?

You can probe anything you want. :)

Peter

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https://stpeter.im/



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Re: [Standards] Inconsistent Subscriptions in XMPP

2009-04-10 Thread Peter Saint-Andre
On 4/7/09 12:45 AM, Philipp Hancke wrote:
 hijacking the thread... two concrete examples where error handling
 is needed:
 
 subscription state is none initially:
 SENT: presence to=f...@bar id=jcl_37 type='subscribe'/
 RECV: iq from='m...@local/Exodus' to='m...@local/Exodus' id='push'
 type='set'query xmlns='jabber:iq:roster'item ask='subscribe'
 subscription='none' jid='f...@bar'//query/iq
 RECV: presence from='f...@bar' to='m...@local/Exodus' type='error'
 id='jcl_37'error code='404' type='cancel'remote-server-not-found
 xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-stanzas'//error/presence
 
 after relogin and roster fetch:
 RECV: iq from='m...@local/Exodus' to='m...@local/Exodus' id='jcl_40'
 type='result'query xmlns='jabber:iq:roster'item ask='subscribe'
 subscription='none' jid='f...@bar'/
 
 The presence error (which, as can be by looking at the id attribute,
 is a reply to the initial subscribe) does not affect the subscription
 state.

IMHO the server needs to periodically resend the subscribe to the
contact if the state remains ask=subscribe (no reply received from the
contact). I'm pretty sure that I added something about this to rfc3921bis.

 subscription state is both initially:
 SENT: iq id=jcl_50 type=setquery xmlns=jabber:iq:rosteritem
 jid=s...@jid subscription=remove//query/iq
 RECV: iq from='m...@local/Exodus' to='m...@local/Exodus' id='push'
 type='set'query xmlns='jabber:iq:roster'item subscription='remove'
 jid='s...@jid'//query/iq
 RECV: iq from='m...@local/Exodus' to='m...@local/Exodus' id='jcl_50'
 type='result'/
 RECV: presence from='s...@jid' to='m...@local/Exodus' type='error'error
 code='404' type='cancel'remote-server-not-found
 xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-stanzas'//error/presence
 RECV: presence from='s...@jid' to='m...@local/Exodus' type='error'error
 code='404' type='cancel'remote-server-not-found
 xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-stanzas'//error/presence
 
 The subscription state is none afterwards - which is the users intention.
 The presence errors are replies to unsubscribe/unsubscribed stanzas
 generated by the server and should imo never have been sent to the
 client.

Agreed -- the server should eat those.

 The question is: how do error replies to presence subscription
 stanzas affect the subscription state?

That's up to the server. Smart servers will do the right thing. So we
need smarter servers (and to provide some advice in rfc3921bis).

Peter

-- 
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https://stpeter.im/



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Re: [Standards] various rfc3920bis feedback

2009-04-10 Thread Peter Saint-Andre
On 2/24/09 11:04 AM, Pavel Simerda wrote:
 On Tue, 24 Feb 2009 09:14:13 +
 Dave Cridland d...@cridland.net wrote:
 
 What I would like... is to have an easy-to-understand and
 easy-to-implement piggybacking feature without unnecessary hassle.
 
 In fact, by specifying how to do this without actually doing  
 dialbacks, but instead by verifying the identity of the sender based  
 on the X.509 cert, we can actually get rid of SASL EXTERNAL and just  
 use X.509 only, which eliminates the difference between the first  
 authorization and subsequent ones.
 
 I don't see any reason to get rid of SASL EXTERNAL. I quite like the
 concept of using the same authentication flows for all
 authenticated connections.
 
 It would be nice to be able to authenticate each virtual connection
 separately. It's a multiplex, anyway, if one associations fails, others
 should remain working.

Right, we need a way to say once we have a secure connection, we can
add new domains. Joe Hildebrand and I have been talking with some of
the TLS and SASL people about this. One of these days we'll at least
write up the requirements...

Peter

-- 
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https://stpeter.im/



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Re: [Standards] various rfc3920bis feedback

2009-04-10 Thread Peter Saint-Andre
On 2/25/09 8:55 AM, Pavel Simerda wrote:
 On Tue, 24 Feb 2009 20:14:27 +0100
 Philipp Hancke fi...@goodadvice.pages.de wrote:
 
 Pavel Simerda wrote:
 * connection reuse for multiple s2s links would be a very useful
   feature, ask Dave for details
 Piggybacking.
 Which is subtly broken in RFC 3920 - at least 50% of it.
 host-unknown/ makes 'target piggybacking' (different to)
 unusable, as you risk the entire stream.
 Please provide more specific info about how to fix it in bis 
 I fixed in in my working copy of 220 by completly getting rid of
 host-unknown for dialback. type='error' seems a good fix.

   and if/why it is broken now.

 The relevant passage from 3920 about piggybacking is:
 After successful dialback negotiation, the Receiving Server SHOULD
   accept subsequent db:result/ packets (e.g., validation requests
 sent to a subdomain or other hostname serviced by the Receiving
 Server) from the Originating Server over the existing validated
 connection; this enables piggybacking of the original validated
 connection in one direction.

 If the receiving server is 'jabber.org', validation requests sent
   to a subdomain or other hostname serviced by the Receiving Server
 means that I can piggyback stanzas to 'users.jabber.org' on that
 connection (target piggybacking, google uses source piggybacking).

 draft-saintandre-rfc3920bis-08.html added the host-unknown stream
 error to dialback with the following description:
 the value of the 'to' attribute provided by the initiating entity in
 the stream header does not correspond to a hostname that is hosted by
 the ^
 server.

 Now what happens should I attempt to piggyback the users.jabber.org
 connection on the jabber.org connection? jabber.org kills my stream.
 
 As I said to Peter
 
 IMO the whole idea of piggybacking is misguided. Piggybacking means
 re-using a connection A for data that would otherwise come in B.
 
 It would be better to think about it as a generic multiplex. Then all
 virtual connections would be equal (A and B, specifically). One would
 immediately see the consequences of closing the physical connection
 (that should only be closed if all virtual connections are closed).
 
 Keeping this as an optional feature (I believe that is a near consensus)
 will further simplify the most basic implementations.

That's the general idea, yes.

Peter

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Re: [Standards] various rfc3920bis feedback

2009-04-10 Thread Peter Saint-Andre
On 2/24/09 12:14 PM, Philipp Hancke wrote:
 Pavel Simerda wrote:
 * connection reuse for multiple s2s links would be a very useful
   feature, ask Dave for details
 Piggybacking.
 Which is subtly broken in RFC 3920 - at least 50% of it.
 host-unknown/ makes 'target piggybacking' (different to)
 unusable, as you risk the entire stream.

 Please provide more specific info about how to fix it in bis 
 
 I fixed in in my working copy of 220 by completly getting rid of
 host-unknown for dialback. type='error' seems a good fix.
 
 and if/why it is broken now.
 
 The relevant passage from 3920 about piggybacking is:
 After successful dialback negotiation, the Receiving Server SHOULD
  accept subsequent db:result/ packets (e.g., validation requests sent
  to a subdomain or other hostname serviced by the Receiving Server) from
  the Originating Server over the existing validated connection; this
  enables piggybacking of the original validated connection in one
  direction.
 
 If the receiving server is 'jabber.org', validation requests sent
  to a subdomain or other hostname serviced by the Receiving Server
 means that I can piggyback stanzas to 'users.jabber.org' on that
 connection (target piggybacking, google uses source piggybacking).
 
 draft-saintandre-rfc3920bis-08.html added the host-unknown stream
 error to dialback with the following description:
 the value of the 'to' attribute provided by the initiating entity in the
 stream header does not correspond to a hostname that is hosted by the
 ^
 server.
 
 Now what happens should I attempt to piggyback the users.jabber.org
 connection on the jabber.org connection? jabber.org kills my stream.

Really? Why?

Peter

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Re: [Standards] various rfc3920bis feedback

2009-04-10 Thread Peter Saint-Andre
On 2/24/09 3:10 AM, Philipp Hancke wrote:
 Dave Cridland wrote:
 On Tue Feb 24 00:31:25 2009, Pavel Simerda wrote:
 * bidirectional s2s could be announced in stream:features sent
   right after the opening stream tag from the initiator.
 
 Unidirectional S2S has been around for too long, I do not see a real
 gain in fixing that now.

That was an artifact of dialback. If we have mutual authentication via
TLS+SASL then why not have a bidirectional s2s connection?

 * connection reuse for multiple s2s links would be a very useful
   feature, ask Dave for details
 Piggybacking.
 
 Which is subtly broken in RFC 3920 - at least 50% of it.
 host-unknown/ makes 'target piggybacking' (different to)
 unusable, as you risk the entire stream.

I'm not so sure about that. host-unknown/ means you're trying to
communicate with a domain that I don't host at my server.

 What I'd like to do here is use the dialback elements as an
 authorization request mechanism.
 
 Dialback is 50% authorization request, 50% key verification.
 Splitting it up accordingly simplifies the description.

As long as it's backwards-compatible.

 In fact, by specifying how to do this without actually doing
 dialbacks, but instead by verifying the identity of the sender based
 on the X.509 cert, we can actually get rid of SASL EXTERNAL and just
 use X.509 only, which eliminates the difference between the first
 authorization and subsequent ones.
 
 There is no 'subsequent' auth with 0178 yet, is there?

There is no subsequent auth anywhere, yet.

 There are three different options:
 1) do 0178 and add subsequent auth (including graceful failure)
 2) do 0178 for the first authorization and use piggybacking (with
graceful failure again) for subsequent authorization... err...
verification
 3) ignore any 0178 offers and do piggybacking for everything.
Might be a problem if servers require 0178 and really mean it.
 
 The dialback flow then becomes:

 1) O2R : db:result/
 2) R: If TLS, and X.509 cert matches requested domain, goto ACCEPT
 
 Assumes that the originating server does not check with the
 authoritative server that the receiving server has verified
 the key.
 
 3) R: Connect to A
 4) R2A: Establish TLS.
 5) R2A: If A's certificate matches O's, goto ACCEPT
 
 Nice optimization ;-)
 
 6) R2A: db:verify/
 7) A2R: db:verify/, goto ACCEPT
 ACCEPT:
 8) R2O: Authorize O as requested domain, send db:result/

It's still not clear to me what TLS+dialback really means. If you're
going to do TLS, use real certs and then you can do authentication via
SASL EXTERNAL.

Peter

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Re: [Standards] various rfc3920bis feedback

2009-04-10 Thread Peter Saint-Andre
On 2/24/09 2:14 AM, Dave Cridland wrote:
 On Tue Feb 24 00:31:25 2009, Pavel Simerda wrote:
 * bidirectional s2s could be announced in stream:features sent
   right after the opening stream tag from the initiator.


 Well...
 
 What you need is to:
 
 a) Signal the ability of the receiver to handle features sent by the
 initiator.
 
 b) Signal the ability of the initiator to handle bidi streams.
 
 c) Turn this on, which presumably involves an authorization phase.
 
 I was thinking that the receiver has a stream:feature to handle
 stream:features, the initiator then sends these, and the receiver can
 then proceed as the initiator in the other direction. So the initiator
 would send SASL mechanisms, and the receiver would act as a SASL client
 to the initator and request authorization.

Interesting. I think we need a separate thread about this topic. I'll
try to start that soon.

 * connection reuse for multiple s2s links would be a very useful
   feature, ask Dave for details


 Piggybacking.
 
 What I'd like to do here is use the dialback elements as an
 authorization request mechanism.

I think that connection re-use is broader than dialback.

 In fact, by specifying how to do this without actually doing dialbacks,
 but instead by verifying the identity of the sender based on the X.509
 cert, we can actually get rid of SASL EXTERNAL and just use X.509 only,
 which eliminates the difference between the first authorization and
 subsequent ones.

I'm not convinced of that. Why get rid of SASL EXTERNAL? (It seems
preferable to use TLS+SASL for both c2s and s2s.) And what does it mean
to just use X.509?

 The dialback flow then becomes:
 
 1) O2R : db:result/
 2) R: If TLS, and X.509 cert matches requested domain, goto ACCEPT
 3) R: Connect to A
 4) R2A: Establish TLS.
 5) R2A: If A's certificate matches O's, goto ACCEPT
 6) R2A: db:verify/
 7) A2R: db:verify/, goto ACCEPT
 ACCEPT:
 8) R2O: Authorize O as requested domain, send db:result/

Perhaps. :)

 * resource conflicts should be handled consistently in servers


 It's not always possible to handle conflicts in the same way.

What do we mean by handled consistently?

 * an explicit way to kick other resources might be very handy


 Here be tigers.

I'd rather punt on this one. What problem are we solving here, exactly?
Can't we use XEP-0146 for this?

 * multiple resources could have a less confusing named feature (not
   unbind, but something like multi-bind probably)


 I'm less than convinced about the validity of multiple resources as a
 solution to any problem.

I think we have consensus to remove this from rfc3920bis.

 * xml:lang per stanza seems to be pretty rare, I would prefer MAY to
   SHOULD, or even to discurage per-stanza xml:lang entirerely and
   encourage use of xml:lang only for elements with localized strings.
   Many users (and also client developers) just don't care about
   languages. Unqualified strings are (and will be) very common, I would
   use MAY even for the elements.


 In principle, the stanza-level xml:lang can be used especially over S2S
 sessions to indicate a preferred language for errors.
 
 However... various protocols have had features like this for years, and
 to the best of my knowledge nobody ever uses them.

So it seems. So perhaps Pavel's proposal is appropriate.

 * gone has a very good usecase that could be made explicit... it is
   JID redirection and could be handled by clients (e.g. the client could
   offer the user to add the new JID upon error - presence/message
   would trigger it).


 Right - a jid redirection would be useful. We'd also need to put
 together a companion protocol for users to enable it.

http://xmpp.org/extensions/inbox/forwarding-delivery.html

http://xmpp.org/extensions/inbox/forwarding-request.html

 * Consider including XEP-198 Stream Management in the RFC
 
 We need to actually prove it, first. I don't think anyone's got as far
 as coding it, yet.

Now we have Prosody on the server side and Lampiro on the client side.
Time for some testing. :)

Peter

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Re: [Standards] XMPP-IM - presence subscription handling

2009-04-10 Thread Jiří Zárevúcký
2009/4/11 Peter Saint-Andre stpe...@stpeter.im:

 My feedback is: don't waste time on this kind of project. The problems
 with backwards-compatibility make it infeasible.

 Peter


Yeah. I sometimes get very stupid ideas. Sorry about that. :)


Re: [Standards] Inconsistent Subscriptions in XMPP

2009-04-10 Thread Mridul Muralidharan



--- On Sat, 11/4/09, Peter Saint-Andre stpe...@stpeter.im wrote:

 From: Peter Saint-Andre stpe...@stpeter.im
 Subject: Re: [Standards] Inconsistent Subscriptions in XMPP
 To: XMPP Standards standards@xmpp.org
 Date: Saturday, 11 April, 2009, 4:04 AM
 On 4/1/09 12:07 PM, Mridul
 Muralidharan wrote:
  
  If I recall right, probe can be sent to a full jid in
 case a directed
  presence was received from it in the past - and the
 behavior would be
  different (return last presence stanza sent iirc). Has
 that behavior
  changed or is the description below only for bare
 jid's ?
 
 You can probe anything you want. :)


I should have clarified better.

Assume that there is mutual subscription between userA and userB.
Support we have :

userA has session us...@domain/resA
userB has session us...@domain/resB1
userB has session us...@domain/resB2


After presence has been exchanged, suppose userA blocks userB (or all users) - 
so an unavailable presence is sent to userB's resources.
Subsequent to that, suppose userA sends available to one of the resources, say 
- us...@domain/resB1

Now, iirc, if resB2 probes, userA's server must return unavailable.
But if resB1 probes, userA's server must return the last directed presence sent 
(subsequent to unavailable).

We could replace userB with muc or any other component in the above.




IIRC this was a usecase discussed quite a while back - was it removed ?
If not, my query was, how does it interact with this list below related to 
probes, etc.


Thanks,
Mridul





 
 Peter
 
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