Re: [Tails-dev] Tails & Truecrypt
s...@sky-ip.org wrote (05 Oct 2013 12:18:51 GMT) : > Why was TrueCrypt removed in the first place? It wasn't removed. I think the answer to all following questions is in the documentation: https://tails.boum.org/doc/encryption_and_privacy/truecrypt/ Cheers, -- intrigeri | GnuPG key @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/intrigeri.asc | OTR fingerprint @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/otr.asc ___ tails-dev mailing list tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev
Re: [Tails-dev] Tails & Truecrypt
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On 10/4/2013 11:46 PM, intrigeri wrote: > Hi Marco & all, > > Marco Calamari wrote (04 Oct 2013 17:56:04 GMT) : >> rememebr how Truecrypt is widely diffused as easy crossplaform >> tool. > > Thank you for contributing this email. I find it useful to get such > feedback. > > Just so that we're on the same page (as I do realize our existing > tickets are very confusing, and sometimes even contradicting each > other): > > First, before Marco's email, we had received almost zero feedback > since 0.20 announces the removal of TrueCrypt. Interesting, uh. > Nevertheless, I have to acknowledge how widely TrueCrypt is being > used, and no viable alternative to its on-disk format has showed up > in the recent years when it comes to plausible deniability + > cross-platform support, AFAIK. > > Second, we have a "Replace TrueCrypt" ticket on the roadmap for > Tails 2.0: > > https://labs.riseup.net/code/issues/5373 > > There are various subtasks in there, that could greatly benefit > from some help. Some are quite easy (#5705) and will allow to see > what kind of effort needs to be done to be able to replace TC > entirely. Likely some of these efforts will have to be pushed > upstream, e.g. in GNOME. Probably we're not being the ones who do > the integration in udisks and in GNOME Disks, if that's what it > takes. > > In short: whoever wants Tails to keep compatibility with > TrueCrypt, then they're warmly welcome to help make it happen, as > we probably can't do it all by ourselves :) > > If you, or anyone else wants to help, but need some guidance, > please talk to us. Even when TrueCrypt is mentionned, we don't > (always) bite *that* hard. > >> OTOH licence problem IMO can be solved in some way. > > Sure: I think the best way to "solve" it is to ship software > that's compabible with TC, and to stop shipping the TrueCrypt > software itself :) > > Cheers, > Hi, Why was TrueCrypt removed in the first place? It is useful and also indispensable for me, since I carry most of my important documents in a TrueCrypt encrypted container. Also, I always attach files to email (whenever sensitive files) in encrypted containers. I use PGP encryption sometimes, but I find TrueCrypt stronger and easier to use. So, why was it removed? Does it have a security flaw or something like this? Was it incompatible with Tails in any way? I think, if it is not a security flaw and if it is compatible with Tails it should be put back into tails. - -- PGP Public key: http://www.sky-ip.org/s...@sky-ip.org.asc ICQ #: 556561918 -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v2.0.17 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://www.enigmail.net/ iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJSUAOrAAoJEIN/pSyBJlsRupAH/R22uA+DeIa1cUGzGdy7xx+I rXX/MgOPW00brdg3/fG9eAioPunRO78U/yxENxg4o7xiaC9jG43yjLiHIYPeQqgt uRmeL5EfPe4XRPLIXOyG5smWHQk5W6G3mpDJZlyN27mBK7FF4Sf3UkTrS5aVPzLE D8IkeDl4i1M0Zk17rYDWW1IGGgDs2GyTx7LelG+GbBuA12pe8lg4DyeOwKLQHb59 VzxInR8JQev47XUoZtnJEf48FPbeE6wDd+ilBr9R06+4W2I7pujyiC7sEasWFD/P NlitAqyti+FHHzZMmO48+bwdn3RuoiWgD1UhtnhiF6ChT21nyn/Cr6XQ9h3wFm4= =cLh4 -END PGP SIGNATURE- ___ tails-dev mailing list tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev
Re: [Tails-dev] Tails & Truecrypt
Hi Marco & all, Marco Calamari wrote (04 Oct 2013 17:56:04 GMT) : > rememebr how Truecrypt is widely diffused as easy crossplaform tool. Thank you for contributing this email. I find it useful to get such feedback. Just so that we're on the same page (as I do realize our existing tickets are very confusing, and sometimes even contradicting each other): First, before Marco's email, we had received almost zero feedback since 0.20 announces the removal of TrueCrypt. Interesting, uh. Nevertheless, I have to acknowledge how widely TrueCrypt is being used, and no viable alternative to its on-disk format has showed up in the recent years when it comes to plausible deniability + cross-platform support, AFAIK. Second, we have a "Replace TrueCrypt" ticket on the roadmap for Tails 2.0: https://labs.riseup.net/code/issues/5373 There are various subtasks in there, that could greatly benefit from some help. Some are quite easy (#5705) and will allow to see what kind of effort needs to be done to be able to replace TC entirely. Likely some of these efforts will have to be pushed upstream, e.g. in GNOME. Probably we're not being the ones who do the integration in udisks and in GNOME Disks, if that's what it takes. In short: whoever wants Tails to keep compatibility with TrueCrypt, then they're warmly welcome to help make it happen, as we probably can't do it all by ourselves :) If you, or anyone else wants to help, but need some guidance, please talk to us. Even when TrueCrypt is mentionned, we don't (always) bite *that* hard. > OTOH licence problem IMO can be solved in some way. Sure: I think the best way to "solve" it is to ship software that's compabible with TC, and to stop shipping the TrueCrypt software itself :) Cheers, -- intrigeri | GnuPG key @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/intrigeri.asc | OTR fingerprint @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/otr.asc ___ tails-dev mailing list tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev
[Tails-dev] Tails & Truecrypt
As a fanatic supporter of Tails, I just want to rememebr how Truecrypt is widely diffused as easy crossplaform tool. I do not want to open another big thread about story, doubts, finding and opinions about Truecrypt, but just to point one question. We agree that the not-torified browser was an horrible but useful thing, and after careful pros&cons balance, the right decision was adopted, and now it is there. Because of this, I suggest to reconsider the log time announced Truecrypt sooner o later drop. There is no problem of space (we are in the DVD size since long), the feacture is activable only as kernel parameter, so why drop it when can be so useful for encryption-savvy people? I think that the current way to activate Truecrypt shield it from "naive" users. On the contrary, I'll prefer to see it cited explicitely in the interface as deprecated possibility (as the untorified browser is). OTOH licence problem IMO can be solved in some way. JM2C. Thanks to all. Marco -- Marco A.Calamari - Board Member marco.calam...@logioshermes.org +39.347.8530279 HERMES - Center for Transparency and Digital Human Rights Not for Profit association - Via Aretusa 34, IT-20129 Milan, Italy t. +39-02-87186005 (voicemail) f. +39-02-87162573 TaxCode: IT-97621810155 | EuropeAid: IT-2012-AOD-0806909254 w. http://logioshermes.org | m. i...@logioshermes.org signature.asc Description: This is a digitally signed message part ___ tails-dev mailing list tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev
