Re: [tor-bugs] #25003 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Set the browser header for the first ESR 60 based alpha to be the same as ESR 52

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25003: Set the browser header for the first ESR 60 based alpha to be the same 
as
ESR 52
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  ff60-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 If you are using that alpha then you are fingerprintable anyway due to you
 being on ESR60 with all the new features and the other users being on
 ESR52. The user agent won't hide that fact. Moreover, the idea is to test
 ESR60 in its final form (as good as possible) and setting the user agent
 to one for ESR 52 would counteract that goal. Thus, we won't do that.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24945 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser design doc says it whitelists flash and gnash as plugins

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24945: Tor Browser design doc says it whitelists flash and gnash as plugins
--+--
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff60-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:   => ff60-esr


Comment:

 This is so. Patches are welcome. We could consider that for our switch to
 ESR 60 I guess.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24995 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Truncated git hash not available in the windows expert bundle build for Tor 0.3.2.9

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24995: Truncated git hash not available in the windows expert bundle build for 
Tor
0.3.2.9
---+---
 Reporter:  TheDcoder  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:
   |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201801  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201801R => tbb-rbm,
   TorBrowserTeam201801


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23766 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Document build error when resolv.conf contains 127.0.0.1 in README.BUILD_ERRORS

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23766: Document build error when resolv.conf contains 127.0.0.1 in
README.BUILD_ERRORS
+--
 Reporter:  kkuehl@…|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201801R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Sorry, for the delay. I adapted your patch slightly and applied it to
 `master` with commit 62ee652c588858ded1aa02261510f1c05234795a, thanks!

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[tor-bugs] #25034 [Metrics/Relay Search]: inconsistent eff. family counter in Relay Search

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25034: inconsistent eff. family counter in Relay Search
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Relay Search  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 While trying to understand why atlas / Relay Search
 displays inconsistent family counters I stumbled on a minor bug.

 Unfortunately this was only observed on data from
 2018-01-26 04:00:00 UTC and the problem disappeared in the data from
 2018-01-26 05:00:00 UTC.
 (I have the full details files if need should be)

 
https://atlas.torproject.org/#search/family:FC9AC8EA0160D88BCCFDE066940D7DD9FA45495B

 The effective_family counters displayed next to the nickname is probably
 implemented
 as len(effective_family)+1 but should be len(effective_family-self)+1.

 This could be fixed in onionoo by always or never include the self
 fingerprint
 in the effective_family array.

 I like teor's suggestions for priorities so I'm including it here:> When
 someone asks for a task, they could tell you:
 > * how important it is

 This is a "nice-to-have" display fix

 > * when they need it done by

 There is no actual hard requirement.
 Maybe by the end of the year 2018?

 > * what will happen if it's not done

 A minor number of relay operators might be confused by incorrectly
 displayed eff. family member counters (but most don't know the meaning
 of that number and so it might be not that confusing after all)

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[tor-bugs] #25033 [Metrics/Website]: documentation: family arrays are not $ prefixed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25033: documentation: family arrays are not $ prefixed
-+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+--
 minor documentation bug:
 https://metrics.torproject.org/onionoo.html#details_relay_effective_family
 (and other places)
 > Array of $-prefixed fingerprints

 they are no longer $-prefixed

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24628 [Metrics/Consensus Health]: bwauth= bug in consensus health

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24628: bwauth= bug in consensus health
--+-
 Reporter:  tom   |  Owner:  tom
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Consensus Health  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by tom):

 Started digging into this using the example in #24877.  Really weird.

 {{{
 bastet  maatuskamoria   gabelmoofara
 Pg  48006080510052704160
 21  47706080511052404160
 20  47606070507052304160
 19  47506060506051904160
 18  47506050505051904150
 }}}

 That's the page value (for 2018-01-11-20-00) and the vote values (from
 collector) for surrounding hours. The consensus document says 5070, the
 page says 5070 also. So the votes are wrong.

 I parsed the moria vote with stem, and it gave me 5070.

 I searched for any vote in January, made by moria that had a Measured
 value of 5100. I got the following:

 * ./11/2018-01-11-23-00-00-vote-
 
D586D18309DED4CD6D57C18FDB97EFA96D330566-A15ABFB2A6F993F16E8645C9C3AF16E13EA7934A-r
 ForEdSnowden AaHRX5/GftBfopZv+IMGftUCzwg F+hQq2QhOd7rM7N7z+K+cBw/HCA
 2018-01-11 14:52:14 51.15.133.16 9001 0
 * ./24/2018-01-24-17-00-00-vote-
 
D586D18309DED4CD6D57C18FDB97EFA96D330566-5391D5738EF960227FDBA4776D914150BFEA1EDF-r
 ForEdSnowden AaHRX5/GftBfopZv+IMGftUCzwg lmIBHy2xp+nAsZ9PuZMBPDLm660
 2018-01-24 14:58:17 51.15.133.16 9001 0
 * ./24/2018-01-24-16-00-00-vote-
 
D586D18309DED4CD6D57C18FDB97EFA96D330566-50F9CBB890A5BF2E4919DDB8FB5577FE48C34517-r
 ForEdSnowden AaHRX5/GftBfopZv+IMGftUCzwg lmIBHy2xp+nAsZ9PuZMBPDLm660
 2018-01-24 14:58:17 51.15.133.16 9001 0

 Okay so 23:00 is nearby.

 If I expand the table:

 {{{
 bastet  maatuskamoria   gabelmoofara
 Pg  48006080510052704160
 0   48006110513052704160
 23  48006110510052704160
 22  47706110511052504160
 21  47706080511052404160
 20  47606070507052304160
 19  47506060506051904160
 18  47506050505051904150
 }}}

 I checked henryi's timezone, and it's in UTC. The filename is written out
 based on the consensus's time in the file.

 Then I ran ps. And I found 3 processes running, one that had been running
 for 30 minutes, one for 2.5 hours, and one for 3.5 hours.

 Things are starting to come together. Maybe.

 I already know the script sometimes dies due to out of memory errors. Now
 I think I see why. I call subprocess.call at the end as a convenience.
 This invokes fork, doubling the amount of memory I've used. (And it's a
 lot.)

 I'm going to replace those calls and hopefully it will resolve ALL of the
 weird-ass errors we've been seeing with consensus-health.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24432 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: The meek<->moat tunneling isn't set up correctly

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24432: The meek<->moat tunneling isn't set up correctly
--+--
 Reporter:  isis  |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  defect| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  moat bridgedb-dist|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24689| Points:  2
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  SponsorM
--+--

Comment (by isis):

 Replying to [comment:13 isis]:
 > On the AppEngine instance, there should be a meek-reflector from the
 same period. I just logged in however and found this notice? I have no
 idea what this means.
 >
 > [[Image(https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/raw-
 attachment/ticket/24432/Screenshot_2018-01-26_00-07-08.png)]]
 >

 Google appears to want the passport of someone named "Tor Bridges" and the
 bank statement of the prepaid credit card that I gave, and I have neither
 of these things. Perhaps we can transfer the account ownership to TPO?
 Hopefully? Otherwise we'll need to make a whole new account and do #16650
 all over again.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24432 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: The meek<->moat tunneling isn't set up correctly

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24432: The meek<->moat tunneling isn't set up correctly
--+--
 Reporter:  isis  |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  defect| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  moat bridgedb-dist|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24689| Points:  2
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  SponsorM
--+--
Changes (by isis):

 * Attachment "Screenshot_2018-01-26_00-07-08.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24432 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: The meek<->moat tunneling isn't set up correctly

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24432: The meek<->moat tunneling isn't set up correctly
--+--
 Reporter:  isis  |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  defect| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  moat bridgedb-dist|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24689| Points:  2
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  SponsorM
--+--

Comment (by isis):

 Replying to [comment:10 mcs]:
 > (I added dcf to the Cc in case he has any insight into problem 1 below).
 >
 > Thanks for your work on this Isis! I feel like we are very close to
 having a working system. Kathy and I have found two problems so far, but I
 am not ready to reopen this ticket yet because I am not sure what
 component is at fault.
 >
 > '''Problem 1:''' The meek tunnel does not work reliably for us.
 Specifically, if we use curl as the SOCKS client it seems to always work
 and if we use Tor Browser it does not. When we test with our own meek-
 server + BridgeDB, things also work fine. I am having trouble debugging
 the meek-client code, probably due to my lack of golang knowledge, but I
 wonder if there is an incompatibility between the meek-client we are
 running and the meek-server that you are running. What version of meek-
 server are you using at tor-bridges-hyphae-channel.appspot.com? Kathy and
 I are using a meek-client that was built from dcf's ​bug24642 branch (and
 I don't know of any recent changes to meek that would cause this kind of
 communication problem).
 >
 > Another data point: if I insert an socat pipe between the meek-client
 SOCKS port and Tor Browser, it started working. Maybe there is a data
 buffering issue at work here. All of our client side testing so far has
 been on macOS.

 Off the top of my head, I have no idea what this is about, other than
 perhaps the networking code in FF perhaps trying to do something "smart"
 which interacts badly with meek-server?

 Let me go see what versions are running on the appengine server and on
 polyanthum…

 The meek-server on polyanthum was from commit
 `017d0f33d7270ff102fe167f1c16def8b3e3be4a` from the end of March. That
 makes sense because that's around the time I did #16650. (I'm not sure if
 anything in the client/server implementations have changed enough to make
 this incompatible?)

 On the AppEngine instance, there should be a meek-reflector from the same
 period. I just logged in however and found this notice? I have no idea
 what this means.

 [[Image()]]

 > '''Problem 2:''' When we do manage to send a good `check` request (one
 that includes the correct response and challenge), we always receive a "No
 bridges available to fulfill request" response. We tried with both
 "vanilla" and "obfs4" transports. Here is a sample response:
 >   {"errors": [{"status": "Not Found", "code": 404, "detail": "No bridges
 available to fulfill request: None.", "version": "0.1.0", "type": "moat-
 bridges", "id": 6}]}
 > Is the Moat responder throttling things so we do not receive too many
 bridges? I don't think we have ever received any bridges from the
 production BridgeDB server via Moat, but even if we did I thought BridgeDB
 would send back the same set of bridges if we ask again. I can get new
 bridges repeatedly if I use a browser to interact with
 https://bridges.torproject.org/bridges?transport=obfs4.

 So the bridges are assigned to a distributor when they are first seen, and
 they can't be reassigned, in order to keep potential discoverability
 problems with any particular distribution method locally isolated.
 BridgeDB logs these assignments, and, grepping the latest assignments.log,
 it seems like it has 100 bridges for the moat distributor so far. (It's a
 known issue that adding a distributor would take a while to fill up with
 bridges since the way it works is that is has ratios and it assigns
 according to those ratios instead of bringing the levels to the correct
 ratios… I could fix that if we want.) But in any case, with 100 bridges,
 you should be getting at least 1 bridge back? Are you connecting to the
 meek-reflector over tor?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25032 [Metrics/Consensus Health]: Consensus health archived versions are missing (was: Consensus health archived versions are misding)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25032: Consensus health archived versions are missing
--+-
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  tom
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Consensus Health  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

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[tor-bugs] #25032 [Metrics/Consensus Health]: Consensus health archived versions are misding

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25032: Consensus health archived versions are misding
--+-
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  tom
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Consensus Health  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 At the moment, the detailed consensus health page links to each relay on
 https://consensus-health.torproject.org/consensus-
 health-2018-01-25-18-00.html

 But that page gives a 404.

 This has been happening intermittently for a while.

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[tor-bugs] #25031 [- Select a component]: tor browser and tor mobile program not working

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25031: tor browser and tor mobile program not working
--+
 Reporter:  johnsmithjs   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Hey my tickets that I create keep getting deleted without a response the
 last ticket that I created was about 300-400 words long and I can't
 remember everything that I entered into the ticket creator so I'm going to
 do my best to post the bug again.

 Tor has continued to fail loading with error messages stating failed to
 take control of tor I'm also getting multiple errors with Microsoft trying
 to take over the tor network stating that there's errors with the tor
 network when I'm on the tor network after opening 2 or more tabs and they
 try to send a report to Microsoft when its got nothing to fukn do with
 Microsoft tor should be receiving the errors not Microsoft also whenever I
 connect to tor and do a search the default search engine is duckduck and
 the search engine doesn't search I just get this website which is another
 error https://3g2upl4pq6kufc4m.onion/ this is the web site error I receive
 also a lot of the time I can't connect to the tor network I also have a
 program on my android device called orbot which use to be called orfox and
 neither of the programs work I think these programs are errors when I
 remember the other errors I will log in to this account and post them

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Re: [tor-bugs] #4187 [Core Tor/Tor]: A verified unverified-consensus should be renamed to cached-consensus

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#4187: A verified unverified-consensus should be renamed to cached-consensus
-+-
 Reporter:  anonym   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.2.33
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client, directory, rename, fs,   |  Actual Points:
  easy, 032-unreached|
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by fristonio):

 OK Got it,

 Working on the issue, will update here as soon as I fix it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25024 [Community]: Add optional spell check to makefile to check for typos in tor source code.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25024: Add optional spell check to makefile to check for typos in tor source 
code.
-+
 Reporter:  fristonio|  Owner:  alison
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Community|Version:
 Severity:  Minor| Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by fristonio):

 @teor misspell also provide a standalone binary, we can use it to check
 for the spelling mistakes. We can modify this script to fetch the binary
 from its git releases https://github.com/client9/misspell/blob/master
 /install-misspell.sh.

 What do you think ?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20244 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Move privacy checkboxes to about:preferences#privacy (proposed)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20244: Move privacy checkboxes to about:preferences#privacy (proposed)
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-usability,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201610, tbb-fingerprinting,  |
  tbb-no-uplift  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * keywords:  tbb-usability, TorBrowserTeam201610, tbb-fingerprinting =>
 tbb-usability, TorBrowserTeam201610, tbb-fingerprinting, tbb-no-uplift


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24484 [Core Tor/Tor]: free(NULL) always works (nowadays) so stop acting like it might not

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24484: free(NULL) always works (nowadays) so stop acting like it might not
--+
 Reporter:  catalyst  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by catalyst):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Code changes look good!  The autoconf test is a great idea, too.  Please
 also delete the part of the `tor_free()` comment that implies that
 `free(NULL)` won't work.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24432 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: The meek<->moat tunneling isn't set up correctly

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24432: The meek<->moat tunneling isn't set up correctly
--+--
 Reporter:  isis  |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  defect| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  moat bridgedb-dist|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24689| Points:  2
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  SponsorM
--+--

Comment (by mcs):

 I attached a log from meek-client. It includes some extra logging that
 Kathy and I added to try to make sense of what is going on... but it is
 difficult to reach any solid conclusions without access to the server side
 (it works if we use our own meek-server, although we do not have domain
 fronting in place with our server).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24432 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: The meek<->moat tunneling isn't set up correctly

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24432: The meek<->moat tunneling isn't set up correctly
--+--
 Reporter:  isis  |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  defect| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  moat bridgedb-dist|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24689| Points:  2
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  SponsorM
--+--
Changes (by mcs):

 * Attachment "meek-client-log1.txt.gz" added.

 meek-client debug log

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23061 [Core Tor/Tor]: crypto_rand_double() should produce all possible outputs on platforms with 32-bit int

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23061: crypto_rand_double() should produce all possible outputs on platforms 
with
32-bit int
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.2.14-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, security-low, privcount,  |  Actual Points:  0.5
  031-backport, 030-backport, 029-backport, 026  |
  -backport-maybe, review-group-22   |
Parent ID:  #23126   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorQ
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Sounds fine; I had fun programming the stuff above, and I look forward to
 what you do here.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24432 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: The meek<->moat tunneling isn't set up correctly

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24432: The meek<->moat tunneling isn't set up correctly
--+--
 Reporter:  isis  |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  defect| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  moat bridgedb-dist|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24689| Points:  2
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  SponsorM
--+--
Changes (by mcs):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  fixed =>


Comment:

 I am reopening now because I have steps to reproduce the Problem 1 that I
 mentioned in comment:10 (and I could still use a response for Problem 2 as
 well). I do not know if Problem 1 is caused by a problem in the meek
 implementation, a problem with the domain fronting setup, or a problem in
 BridgeDB... but we are stuck by it. We have reproduced the problem on
 macOS and Linux. Here are the steps:
 1. Build meek-client from the dcf's bug24642 branch.
 2. Start a standalone copy of the meek-client you built in step 1 and make
 note of which TCP port it is listening on: ./meek-client -url https://tor-
 bridges-hyphae-channel.appspot.com -front www.google.com
 3. Start Tor Browser 8.0a1 and let it connect directly to Tor.
 4. Open about:addons and disable all add-ons.
 5. Restart Tor Browser.
 6. Open about:config again and set network.proxy.socks.port to the port
 that the meek-client is listening on.
 7. Enter https://bridges.torproject.org/moat/fetch in the URL bar.

 Expected result: a 405 Method Now Allowed error page from BridgeDB
 (because GET is not supported for /moat/fetch)

 Actual result: "Unable to connect" error.

 Bonus step: set network.proxy.socks.port to 1 in Tor Browser and
 reload the page after starting a copy of socat:
   socat -v -v TCP-LISTEN:1,fork,reuseaddr TCP-CONNECT:127.0.0:
 (replace  with the port that your meek-client is listening on).
 In my experience, this will work: the 405 error page is correctly returned
 to Tor Browser.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24484 [Core Tor/Tor]: free(NULL) always works (nowadays) so stop acting like it might not

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24484: free(NULL) always works (nowadays) so stop acting like it might not
--+
 Reporter:  catalyst  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * owner:  (none) => nickm
 * status:  new => accepted


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24484 [Core Tor/Tor]: free(NULL) always works (nowadays) so stop acting like it might not

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24484: free(NULL) always works (nowadays) so stop acting like it might not
--+
 Reporter:  catalyst  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final => Tor: 0.3.4.x-final


Comment:

 See my branch `bug24484`

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23061 [Core Tor/Tor]: crypto_rand_double() should produce all possible outputs on platforms with 32-bit int

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23061: crypto_rand_double() should produce all possible outputs on platforms 
with
32-bit int
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.2.14-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, security-low, privcount,  |  Actual Points:  0.5
  031-backport, 030-backport, 029-backport, 026  |
  -backport-maybe, review-group-22   |
Parent ID:  #23126   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorQ
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * owner:  nickm => teor
 * status:  needs_revision => assigned


Comment:

 If you don't mind, Nick, I'll do this when I do the rest of the PrivCount
 in Tor code.
 I have to wrote a function like this in Rust anyway, and it should be
 trivial to port to C.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24902 [Core Tor/Tor]: Denial of Service mitigation subsystem

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24902: Denial of Service mitigation subsystem
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ddos, tor-relay, review-group-30,|  Actual Points:
  029-backport, 031-backport, 032-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by dgoulet):

 The branches were becoming insane in terms of commit logic and straight
 usefulness. I've created a brand new clean _04 branch that has fewer
 commits, better separation and logic. We should be at an almost final
 version here.

 Branch: `ticket24902_029_04`
 OnionGit: https://oniongit.eu/dgoulet/tor/merge_requests/19

 The git diff with _01/_03 is one single include that has been added in
 `config.c` for completion.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24860 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bug: Assertion cmux failed in circuitmux_get_policy at src/or/circuitmux.c

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24860: Bug: Assertion cmux failed in circuitmux_get_policy at 
src/or/circuitmux.c
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, tor-sched, cmux, tor- |  Actual Points:
  channel|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Could this be caused by #24700 ?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24045 [Metrics/Relay Search]: Measure and map overloaded or over-weighted relays

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24045: Measure and map overloaded or over-weighted relays
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 |  metrics-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Relay Search |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bwauth-needs, tbb-performance, tbb-  |  Actual Points:
  usability, performance, tbb-needs  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  tbb-performance, tbb-usability, performance, tbb-needs =>
 bwauth-needs, tbb-performance, tbb-usability, performance, tbb-needs


Comment:

 Thanks for working on this!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23814 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove non-exponential backoff directory download implementation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23814: Remove non-exponential backoff directory download implementation
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review


Comment:

 Code in my branch `ticket23814`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23814 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove non-exponential backoff directory download implementation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23814: Remove non-exponential backoff directory download implementation
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * owner:  (none) => nickm
 * status:  new => accepted


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24159 [Applications/Tor Browser]: The Torbutton version check does not deal properly with platform specific checks

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24159: The Torbutton version check does not deal properly with platform 
specific
checks
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201801R, tbb-backport|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * keywords:  tbb-torbutton, TorBrowserTeam201801R => tbb-torbutton,
 TorBrowserTeam201801R, tbb-backport
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Looks good to me. Merged to `master` with commit
 f8604998e58fdece9c191661121ada6a3b911499 and marking for this ticket for a
 possible backport.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23061 [Core Tor/Tor]: crypto_rand_double() should produce all possible outputs on platforms with 32-bit int

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23061: crypto_rand_double() should produce all possible outputs on platforms 
with
32-bit int
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.2.14-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, security-low, privcount,  |  Actual Points:  0.5
  031-backport, 030-backport, 029-backport, 026  |
  -backport-maybe, review-group-22   |
Parent ID:  #23126   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorQ
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final => Tor: 0.3.4.x-final


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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #23289, #23882

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #23289, #23882 by nickm:
milestone to Tor: 0.3.4.x-final

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21284 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add torrc option for non-anonymous SocksPort

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21284: Add torrc option for non-anonymous SocksPort
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very Low |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, single-onion, eotk-wants,|  Actual Points:
  wontfix?   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final => Tor: unspecified


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24968 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor's DNSPort become unreliable after I upgraded to latest 0329 stable.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24968: Tor's DNSPort become unreliable after I upgraded to latest 0329 stable.
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.9
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-dns, regression?  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => needs_information


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24023 [Core Tor/Tor]: Is proto required for alternate relay implementations?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24023: Is proto required for alternate relay implementations?
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:  easy doc tor-spec  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 e6c3257b065f7fe816843bf37de3c3b958d30ee7 in torspec to document that the
 field will become mandatory.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24023 [Core Tor/Tor]: Is proto required for alternate relay implementations?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24023: Is proto required for alternate relay implementations?
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy doc tor-spec  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by nickm):

 See also #24245.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24128 [Core Tor/Tor]: GETCONF doesn't resolve "auto" settings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24128: GETCONF doesn't resolve "auto" settings
--+
 Reporter:  catalyst  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords:  tor-control   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => not a bug


Comment:

 Closing as not-a-bug.  We could do the getinfo feature at some point in
 the future, if someone wants to put in the effort.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23406 [Core Tor/Tor]: Sampled guards are not re-weighted when a new consensus arrives

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23406: Sampled guards are not re-weighted when a new consensus arrives
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor:
   |  0.3.0.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords:  path-selection, tor-guard  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #23318 | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  SponsorV-can
---+---
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  accepted => closed
 * resolution:   => not a bug


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22739 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make routerinfo_t and routerstatus_t addresses immutable; store overrides in node_t

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22739: Make routerinfo_t and routerstatus_t addresses immutable; store 
overrides
in node_t
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * cc: teor (added)
 * status:  accepted => needs_review
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final => Tor: 0.3.4.x-final


Comment:

 I've started a branch here as `feature22739`.  I've taken the approach
 above, but only used the "rename the field" trick to identify places that
 might need a change.  I've marked those with  comments.

 This isn't done, but I wouldn't mind some feedback on this approach.

 Adding teor to cc because he's looked at this code a lot.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25013 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Move TorButton code to the tor browser repository

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25013: Move TorButton code to the tor browser repository
--+--
 Reporter:  igt0  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201801R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24855| Points:
 Reviewer:  gk, sysrqb, mcs   |Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by igt0):

 Created a patch removing torbutton from the tor-browser-build.
  ** Remove torbutton from the tor browser build **
  https://github.com/igortoliveira/tor-browser-
 build/commit/146a721e91232e4fee31dd343d4e1bfeee9b3a3a
 Replying to [comment:4 gk]:
 > Good stuff! FWIW: we'd need a `tor-browser-build` patch, too, I guess
 making sure that Torbutton is not built anymore and not shipped as an
 extension anymore in Tor Browser.

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[tor-bugs] #25030 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update release process document for Tor Browser 7.5

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25030: Update release process document for Tor Browser 7.5
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  GeorgKoppen201801,
 Severity:  Normal   |  TorBrowserTeam201801, tbb-spec
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 With Tor Browser 7.5 we switched to a reproducible build system based on
 `rbm`/`tor-browser-build`. We should update our release process document
 taking this change into account.

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[tor-bugs] #25029 [Webpages/Website]: Update torproject.org logo

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25029: Update torproject.org logo
--+
 Reporter:  steph |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Update to: https://styleguide.torproject.org/static/images/color.svg

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Re: [tor-bugs] #14039 [Core Tor/Tor]: Many unnecessary CPU wakeups per second

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#14039: Many unnecessary CPU wakeups per second
---+---
 Reporter:  andersk|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.2.5.10
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client sponsor8-maybe  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor8-can
---+---
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final => Tor: 0.3.4.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23146 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop280: Finish privcount-in-Tor proposal (280)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23146: prop280: Finish privcount-in-Tor proposal (280)
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  3
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  SponsorQ
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  accepted => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 I believe the proposal process here is done.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24914 [Core Tor/Tor]: Maybe make relay_digest_matches() not use tor_malloc()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24914: Maybe make relay_digest_matches() not use tor_malloc()
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet   |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Okay.  Squashed it, and holding it in merge_ready till the 0.3.4 merge
 window opens.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25026 [Core Tor/Tor]: Update HiddenServiceVersion in tor.1.txt to only allow one of the HS version 2 or 3

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25026: Update HiddenServiceVersion in tor.1.txt to only allow one of the HS
version 2 or 3
--+
 Reporter:  ahf   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:  032-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 Merged!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24902 [Core Tor/Tor]: Denial of Service mitigation subsystem

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24902: Denial of Service mitigation subsystem
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ddos, tor-relay, review-group-30,|  Actual Points:
  029-backport, 031-backport, 032-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by dgoulet):

 Branch _01 has all the fixups and new commit from the review.

 Branch _03 is squashed with the latest.

 Everything includes asn's latest unit tests as well. Might be a bit
 difficult to follow the latest because a lot has been fixed and added so
 let me know how I can make this as smooth as possible.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24045 [Metrics/Relay Search]: Measure and map overloaded or over-weighted relays

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24045: Measure and map overloaded or over-weighted relays
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 |  metrics-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Relay Search |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-performance, tbb-usability,  |  Actual Points:
  performance, tbb-needs |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Worked on this a bit more: https://github.com/ana-
 cc/atlas/compare/24045.patch

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[tor-bugs] #25028 [Applications/Tor Messenger]: Update logo for new Tor Launcher design

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25028: Update logo for new Tor Launcher design
+--
 Reporter:  arlolra |  Owner:  sukhbir
 Type:  defect  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Messenger  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  |   Keywords:
Actual Points:  |  Parent ID:
   Points:  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  |
+--
 In https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-messenger-
 build.git/commit/?id=62d6599a292d0f47b5fb14dc8f920eacfa4dc104 we bumped to
 tor-launcher@0.2.14.3 with the new design.

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[tor-bugs] #25027 [Webpages/Website]: Virtual Host for bjk3o77eebkax2ud.onion (donate.torproject.org) misconfigured

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25027: Virtual Host for bjk3o77eebkax2ud.onion (donate.torproject.org)
misconfigured
--+
 Reporter:  Parckwart |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 According to http://yz7lpwfhhzcdyc5y.onion/ the onion service version of
 https://donate.torproject.org/ is http://bjk3o77eebkax2ud.onion/. If you
 visit that URL however, you only get the default virtual host of that
 machine (geyeri). A virtual host for bjk3o77eebkax2ud.onion needs to be
 configured. The problem might also just be with this one machine, if
 multiple servers host that onion service via OnionBalance, I can't tell.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25023 [Applications/Tor Browser]: visually mark alpha tor browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25023: visually mark alpha tor browser
--+--
 Reporter:  akrey |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-branding |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by boklm):

 Replying to [comment:2 tom]:

 > AFAIK the nightly builds don't update but if they did they could get
 their own treatment. (They could get that even if they didn't update but I
 guess if they updated the user base could grow.)

 There are plans to make the nightly builds update: #18867

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25023 [Applications/Tor Browser]: visually mark alpha tor browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25023: visually mark alpha tor browser
--+--
 Reporter:  akrey |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-branding |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 >  The alpha and stable tor browser bundle look exactly alike, making it
 hard to track which one you are using.

 Lol just go to `about:tor`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25018 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Block downloading of add-ons from mozilla or any websites.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25018: Block downloading of add-ons from mozilla or any websites.
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25000| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  reopened => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Stop vandalizing my comments which pointed out the duplicates and pay the
 toil in BTCs.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25026 [Core Tor/Tor]: Update HiddenServiceVersion in tor.1.txt to only allow one of the HS version 2 or 3

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25026: Update HiddenServiceVersion in tor.1.txt to only allow one of the HS
version 2 or 3
--+
 Reporter:  ahf   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:  032-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25026 [Core Tor/Tor]: Update HiddenServiceVersion in tor.1.txt to only allow one of the HS version 2 or 3

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25026: Update HiddenServiceVersion in tor.1.txt to only allow one of the HS
version 2 or 3
--+
 Reporter:  ahf   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:  032-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 lgtm; I'll merge after the alpha comes out today.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24914 [Core Tor/Tor]: Maybe make relay_digest_matches() not use tor_malloc()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24914: Maybe make relay_digest_matches() not use tor_malloc()
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet   |Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by dgoulet):

 lgtm;

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24914 [Core Tor/Tor]: Maybe make relay_digest_matches() not use tor_malloc()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24914: Maybe make relay_digest_matches() not use tor_malloc()
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet   |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Yeah: I don't see an attack from not zeroing it, but I think it's
 generally good to zero crypto stuff reflexively.

 I've added a couple of fixup commits; better now?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25026 [Core Tor/Tor]: Update HiddenServiceVersion in tor.1.txt to only allow one of the HS version 2 or 3

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25026: Update HiddenServiceVersion in tor.1.txt to only allow one of the HS
version 2 or 3
--+
 Reporter:  ahf   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:  032-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by ahf):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Patch in: https://oniongit.eu/ahf/tor/merge_requests/4

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24914 [Core Tor/Tor]: Maybe make relay_digest_matches() not use tor_malloc()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24914: Maybe make relay_digest_matches() not use tor_malloc()
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet   |Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by dgoulet):

 Replying to [comment:6 nickm]:
 > The rationale for not using crypto_digest_assign() here is that
 crypto_digest_t is opaque, so it can't be stack-allocated.  Does that seem
 plausbile?
 >
 > I agree that the memset should be memwipe.

 Ah indeed. Ok makes sense for both. I'm not sure we need to zero it here
 also but maybe it is security related so no strong opinion.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24823 [Metrics/Website]: Avoid sending an error after a (partial) response

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24823: Avoid sending an error after a (partial) response
-+--
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  iwakeh   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by iwakeh):

 * reviewer:   => iwakeh


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24729 [Metrics/Onionoo]: Find reason for 'null' values in Onionoo document

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24729: Find reason for 'null' values in Onionoo document
-+--
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf|  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24155   | Points:
 Reviewer:  iwakeh   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by iwakeh):

 * reviewer:   => iwakeh


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24914 [Core Tor/Tor]: Maybe make relay_digest_matches() not use tor_malloc()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24914: Maybe make relay_digest_matches() not use tor_malloc()
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet   |Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 The rationale for not using crypto_digest_assign() here is that
 crypto_digest_t is opaque, so it can't be stack-allocated.  Does that seem
 plausbile?

 I agree that the memset should be memwipe.

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #19282, #20234, #20287, #20325, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #19282, #20234, #20287, #20325, #23348, #24028, #24222, 
#24294, #24290, #18732, #17861, #18798, #20224, #20542, #21219, #20489, #19169, 
#20395, #19828 by iwakeh:


Action: reassign

Comment:
Move to metrics-team as these are not worked on by me during the next week.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19754 [Metrics/Statistics]: Restructure metrics-web backend

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19754: Restructure metrics-web backend
+
 Reporter:  iwakeh  |  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Statistics  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  metrics-2018|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by iwakeh):

 * status:  accepted => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 This was accomplished with the move to Jetty.
 Closing.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25023 [Applications/Tor Browser]: visually mark alpha tor browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25023: visually mark alpha tor browser
--+--
 Reporter:  akrey |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-branding |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by tom):

 Chrome:
 Release and Beta are indistinguishable, Canary uses the same name but a
 different icon.

 Firefox:
 Release and Beta are indistinguishable, Dev Edition uses a different icon
 and name, Nightly uses a different icon and name.



 I'd suggest that Alpha should use a different icon and a different
 application name (Tor Browser Alpha).

 AFAIK the nightly builds don't update but if they did they could get their
 own treatment. (They could get that even if they didn't update but I guess
 if they updated the user base could grow.)

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[tor-bugs] #25026 [Core Tor/Tor]: Update HiddenServiceVersion in tor.1.txt to only allow one of the HS version 2 or 3

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25026: Update HiddenServiceVersion in tor.1.txt to only allow one of the HS
version 2 or 3
--+
 Reporter:  ahf   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor |   Keywords:  032-backport
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 The current `HiddenServiceVersion` man page entry for `tor` is:

 {{{
 [[HiddenServiceVersion]] **HiddenServiceVersion**
 __version__,__version__,__...__::
 }}}

 Which reads like the config entry takes a list of version where in reality
 it only accept either 2 or 3.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25025 [Webpages/Website]: Add icon for next-generation onions in the style guide

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25025: Add icon for next-generation onions in the style guide
--+--
 Reporter:  ahf   |  Owner:  antonela
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by antonela):

 * owner:  (none) => antonela
 * status:  new => assigned


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25025 [Webpages/Website]: Add icon for next-generation onions in the style guide

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25025: Add icon for next-generation onions in the style guide
--+
 Reporter:  ahf   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by antonela):

 * cc: tor@… (added)
 * keywords:   => ux-team


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24554 [Core Tor/Tor]: sched: Have per-scheduler type data in a channel_t

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24554: sched: Have per-scheduler type data in a channel_t
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-sched |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #23993| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final => Tor: 0.3.4.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25009 [Core Tor/Tor]: I think KIST can use hash tables much less.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25009: I think KIST can use hash tables much less.
---+---
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  032-backport, tor-sched, kist  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #23777 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  accepted => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Since #24554 removes both hashtables, this is a duplicate.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25019 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add a setting to hide the size of the maximized browser window

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25019: Add a setting to hide the size of the maximized browser window
---+--
 Reporter:  David_Hedlund  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting-resolution  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by David_Hedlund):

 * type:  defect => enhancement


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24914 [Core Tor/Tor]: Maybe make relay_digest_matches() not use tor_malloc()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24914: Maybe make relay_digest_matches() not use tor_malloc()
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet   |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by Hello71):

 * cc: alex_y_xu@… (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24715 [Core Tor/Tor]: Job for tor.service failed when /var/run is tmpfs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24715: Job for tor.service failed when /var/run is tmpfs
-+-
 Reporter:  vilhelmgray  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.6-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tmpfs, tor.service, systemd  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24914 [Core Tor/Tor]: Maybe make relay_digest_matches() not use tor_malloc()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24914: Maybe make relay_digest_matches() not use tor_malloc()
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet   |Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by Hello71):

 also, this is the only non-test caller of crypto_digest_assign, so it
 seems that we could obsolete that.

 also, I'm suspicious of the memset(0). I don't totally understand, but
 either this is security-critical, and we should use memwipe, or it isn't,
 and don't bother zeroing it at all. I suspect gcc will optimize this
 memset out anyways.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17796 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make crypto_digest_t allocated using minimal memory

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17796: Make crypto_digest_t allocated using minimal memory
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.8.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by Hello71):

 * cc: alex_y_xu@… (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #17796 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make crypto_digest_t allocated using minimal memory

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17796: Make crypto_digest_t allocated using minimal memory
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.8.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by Hello71):

 I think that this is technically not defined by ISO C. it would be
 "better" to use a char flexible array member here. that would actually
 make the code simpler, since we use the digest as a "black box" anyways
 and just pass it to openssl. unfortunately, that requires C11 alignas.
 fortunately, MSVC supports that already.

 but... in practice, I highly doubt any compiler will compile this in an
 unexpected manner, especially since we only pass the buffer as a pointer
 to openssl anyways.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #14429 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Automated rounding of content window dimensions

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#14429: Automated rounding of content window dimensions
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:
 |  arthuredelstein
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting-resolution, tbb-  |  Actual Points:
  torbutton  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by David_Hedlund):

 **Background to this intervention**

 Tor Browser popup this message when you maximize the browser window:
 > Maximizing Tor Browser can allow websites to determine your monitor
 size, which can be used to track you. We recommend that you leave Tor
 Browser windows in their original default size.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25018 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Block downloading of add-ons from mozilla or any websites.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25018: Block downloading of add-ons from mozilla or any websites.
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25000| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  duplicate =>


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[tor-bugs] #25025 [Webpages/Website]: Add icon for next-generation onions in the style guide

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25025: Add icon for next-generation onions in the style guide
--+
 Reporter:  ahf   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor |   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 It would be useful to have an icon like the `onion` and `onion-alt` that
 symbolises that it's a "next-generation" onion service. This would allow
 website owners to use the `onion/onion-alt` icon to link to their version
 2 onion service and the `onion-ng/onion-ng-alt` icon to link to their
 next-generation onion service (version 3).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24996 [Metrics/Statistics]: OnionPerf showing >200% timeouts

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24996: OnionPerf showing >200% timeouts
+--
 Reporter:  irl |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Statistics  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  iwakeh  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by iwakeh):

 * reviewer:   => iwakeh


Comment:

 Added to my review list.

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[tor-bugs] #25024 [Community]: Add optional spell check to makefile to check for typos in tor source code.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25024: Add optional spell check to makefile to check for typos in tor source 
code.
-+
 Reporter:  fristonio|  Owner:  alison
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Community|Version:
 Severity:  Minor|   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+
 We should add a spell check to tor makefile somewhat like
 [https://github.com/client9/misspell] This ticket is an extension to
 #23650 [https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/23650]

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25023 [Applications/Tor Browser]: visually mark alpha tor browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25023: visually mark alpha tor browser
--+--
 Reporter:  akrey |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-branding |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:   => ux-team, tbb-branding
 * owner:  (none) => tbb-team
 * component:  - Select a component => Applications/Tor Browser


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[tor-bugs] #25023 [- Select a component]: visually mark alpha tor browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25023: visually mark alpha tor browser
--+
 Reporter:  akrey |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 The alpha and stable tor browser bundle look exactly alike, making it hard
 to track which one you are using.

 We could have an alpha sign on the green onion left to the url bar, or use
 a different color instead of the green there. (Violet comes to mind.)

 The same goes for the application switcher and task bar in windows
 (green/gray? globe logo).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24715 [Core Tor/Tor]: Job for tor.service failed when /var/run is tmpfs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24715: Job for tor.service failed when /var/run is tmpfs
-+-
 Reporter:  vilhelmgray  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.6-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tmpfs, tor.service, systemd  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by vilhelmgray):

 * Attachment "tmpfs_runtime_fix.patch" added.

 Add runtime options to resolve failure on tmpfs

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24914 [Core Tor/Tor]: Maybe make relay_digest_matches() not use tor_malloc()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24914: Maybe make relay_digest_matches() not use tor_malloc()
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet   |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision
 * reviewer:   => dgoulet


Comment:

 Why not use `crypto_digest_assign()` and `crypto_digest_t` in the new
 checkpoint data structure (inline)?

 Asking because `crypto_digest_checkpoint()` and `crypto_digest_restore()`
 really looks like the assign function.

 Also extra whitespaces:

 {{{
 +crypto_digest_checkpoint(crypto_digest_checkpoint_t *checkpoint,
 +  const crypto_digest_t *digest)
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23650 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor source code has many typos

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23650: Tor source code has many typos
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  arma
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Very Low  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Trivial   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by fristonio):

 Yeah, also they provide a standalone binary for the same so we can use it
 for the typos check, I will open a new ticket for it and we can have this
 discussion there.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23777 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor spends a lot of time in malloc/free

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23777: tor spends a lot of time in malloc/free
--+
 Reporter:  Hello71   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by dgoulet):

 If I may point this ticket I opened some days ago: #24914

 One dup() we could avoid at each cell right there.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25009 [Core Tor/Tor]: I think KIST can use hash tables much less.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25009: I think KIST can use hash tables much less.
---+---
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  032-backport, tor-sched, kist  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #23777 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * keywords:  032-backport => 032-backport, tor-sched, kist


Comment:

 Yes, it is known issue that has been addressed in #24554. However, it
 hasn't been planned for backport so maybe we could do a simple patch that
 fixes this massive amount of allocation and then port it to #24554.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25022 [Metrics/Website]: Convert all scripts used for building to Ant tasks

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25022: Convert all scripts used for building to Ant tasks
-+--
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by iwakeh):

 * status:  new => accepted
 * owner:  metrics-team => iwakeh


Comment:

 Grabbing this as I'm already into this task.

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[tor-bugs] #25022 [Metrics/Website]: Convert all scripts used for building to Ant tasks

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25022: Convert all scripts used for building to Ant tasks
-+--
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+--
 `convert-sh` comes to mind.  This tasks should also look for other hidden
 shell scripts and streamline the usage of `exec` in ant tasks, e.g.,
 always log to the ant log etc.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25018 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Block downloading of add-ons from mozilla or any websites.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25018: Block downloading of add-ons from mozilla or any websites.
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25000| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 OK, I did the work for you: #14924, #21983. Can you pay me now? Here's my
 BTC address: `1EjLT5YRYLnMkkHF2G9SLiRmzjC8FhTu7e`

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24217 [Metrics/Statistics]: Specify data format and aggregation process of new IPv6 relay statistics

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24217: Specify data format and aggregation process of new IPv6 relay statistics
+--
 Reporter:  karsten |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Statistics  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  iwakeh  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by iwakeh):

 Please find two commits on [https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/iwakeh
 /metrics-web.git/log/?h=task-24217 my branch].

 Thanks for supplying the script!  I converted it to an Ant task and will
 create a new ticket for other scripts in this product.  Aiming at having
 all build steps in build.xml, no matter what final format we use the ant
 task should be adapted.

 Usage: `ant generate-reproducible-spec`  File will be in `.generated/spec
 /reproducible-metrics.html`

 The second commit adds comments and ideas to the spec file.  I'll add some
 questions to our meeting agenda too.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21256 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update tor browser spec for Tor Browser 7.0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21256: Update tor browser spec for Tor Browser 7.0
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-spec, GeorgKoppen201801, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201801   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Changelog for interested folks: https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-browser-
 spec.git/commit/?id=2a7263dbf42a6f4ce879a19945fe34bdde1ffad2

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25018 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Block downloading of add-ons from mozilla or any websites.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25018: Block downloading of add-ons from mozilla or any websites.
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25000| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  reopened => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:3 cypherpunks]:
 > Unless you can provide the ID you can't say 100%.
 That's false obviously.

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[tor-bugs] #25021 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update Tor Browser spec for 7.5

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25021: Update Tor Browser spec for 7.5
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-spec
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Tor Browser 7.5 is out. We should update our design document to cover all
 the new issues that are showing up in it. Highlihts are

 1) Switch to rbm/tor-browser-build
 2) The security slider copy update
 ...

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21256 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update tor browser spec for Tor Browser 7.0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21256: Update tor browser spec for Tor Browser 7.0
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-spec, GeorgKoppen201801, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201801   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Sooo, finally, the update is done. \o/

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22428 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Add webstats module

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22428: Add webstats module
---+-
 Reporter:  iwakeh |  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  CollecTor 1.5.0
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-2018   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by iwakeh):

 Replying to [comment:53 karsten]:
 > Replying to [comment:44 iwakeh]:
 > > PS: Well, actually it might be better to name the property
 `WebstatsLimits'; defaulting to true.
 >
 > Ah, well, contrary to what I just wrote, let's add a new config option.
 How about we make it an integer config option that expects the number of
 days and that defaults to 2?

 This integer would only refer to the upper limit, correct?  The lower
 limit of one day from the earliest processed date is not being altered.
 Maybe add integer properties for each, i.e. `WebstatsLowerLimit` and
 `WebstatsUpperLimit`?  The boolean property was supposed to either use
 both or none of these (hard-coded) limits.

 Thoughts?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22428 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Add webstats module

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22428: Add webstats module
---+-
 Reporter:  iwakeh |  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  CollecTor 1.5.0
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-2018   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by karsten):

 Replying to [comment:44 iwakeh]:
 > PS: Well, actually it might be better to name the property
 `WebstatsLimits'; defaulting to true.

 Ah, well, contrary to what I just wrote, let's add a new config option.
 How about we make it an integer config option that expects the number of
 days and that defaults to 2?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22428 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Add webstats module

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22428: Add webstats module
---+-
 Reporter:  iwakeh |  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  CollecTor 1.5.0
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-2018   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by karsten):

 Replying to [comment:51 iwakeh]:
 > Replying to [comment:50 karsten]:
 > > Alright, I made a few tweaks to your branch
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/karsten/metrics-db.git/log/?h=task-22428-4
 in my task-22428-4 branch] with the latest commit being 1f1adec.
 >
 > Changes look fine, thanks!  I will do further work based on this branch.

 Great!

 > > I also ran a first round of tests. Here's what I found:
 > >  - The `recent/` directory contains only 1 log file per
 physical/virtual host from 3 days ago. The reason is that the last 2 days
 are excluded as too recent. But the `recent/` directory is supposed to
 contain the last 72 hours of data produced by CollecTor, not data
 originally published within the last 72 hours. The goal is to give
 CollecTor clients 72 hours to obtain newly provided data before they need
 to fall back to archives. I think the other modules only look at last-
 modified time of provided files and delete them after 72 hours. Maybe we
 should do that here, too.
 >
 > This is related to comment:44, which quotes the relevant section of our
 spec (and still waits for comments).

 Huh, I did not see that comment. First thought is that we probably don't
 need another config option as long as we clearly document how the
 processing works. But I'll think more about this.

 > The spec allows only earliest logs from two days before the current
 date.  Providing data for the last three days of collecting results would
 mean to extend the logic to allow data from up to five days ago.  Example
 for the '''intended''' functionality:
 >Log files from (omitting the year) 1/11, 1/12, 1/13, 1/14, 1/15,
 1/16, 1/17 should result in having the logs of 1/13, 1/14, 1/15 in
 'recent'.
 >
 > If yes I'll add a patch commit.

 Well, no. 1/11 and 1/12 would be included in the `recent/` directory, too,
 at least after processing the stated files in bulk. When processing them
 in an ongoing way, we'd indeed only expect 1/13, 1/14, and 1/15 in
 `recent/`.

 Maybe it helps to ignore the 2-days logic entirely here and only look at
 the last-modified time of sanitized files. This may produce a gigantic
 `recent/` directory after the first bulk import and the 72 hours after
 that, but after that everything should stabilize.

 > >  - The regular expression in metrics-lib's `WebServerAccessLogLine` is
 too strict. It does not consider the following log line to be valid, but
 it should: `0.0.0.0 - - [22/Jan/2018:00:00:00 +] "GET
 /collector/archive HTTP/1.1" 301 -`. We should probably also compare the
 regular expression to the Apache specification for similar cases where
 we're being too strict.
 >
 > If such lines are contained and valid we should make sure it is also
 reflected in the spec.
 > I will provide a patch.

 Sounds good. Maybe also see what the Apache log file specification says
 here.

 > >  - There are subtle differences between files provided by
 webstats.tp.o and the ones produced here. We should probably write a
 simple (shell) script to convert files from webstats.tp.o to the format
 we'd have produced. Things like cutting off columns at the end or cutting
 off the `?` from parameters. We'd run that script once when copying over
 files.
 >
 > I'm objecting against the script solution.
 > The easiest way and another way of testing might be to simply import
 these using CollecTor.  Setting log level to debug will tell us what gets
 dropped and provide another good test scenario with a useful result.

 Ah, sure, that would work, too.

 > >  - I guess we'll need to extend create-tarballs script to produce
 tarballs containing webstats files. I haven't looked, though.
 >
 > Oh, true.
 >
 > >
 > > Do you want to look into these issues?
 >
 > Yep.
 > Will you later import the old logs?  I could also do that on corsicum or
 on my machine and upload there.

 I can do that.

 > > Remaining changes after those above are:
 > >  - Run another round of tests with most or even all original log files
 as input.
 > karsten's task

 Yep, I'll do that.

 >   - import the old logs (iwakeh or karsten see above)

 And this.

 > >  - Clean up `CHANGELOG.md`.
 > >  - Release metrics-lib 2.2.0 and update `build.xml`.
 > >  - Update copyrights to 2018.
 >
 > I could rebase your most recent branch on master and then add these
 changes?

 I'm happy to do this. Please keep working on the current branch.

Re: [tor-bugs] #24351 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Block Global Active Adversary Cloudflare

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24351: Block Global Active Adversary Cloudflare
-+-
 Reporter:  nullius  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  reopened
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  security, privacy, anonymity, mitm,  |  Actual Points:
  cloudflare |
Parent ID:  #18361   | Points:  1000
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * points:  100 => 1000


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