[tor-bugs] #20179 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Require absolute path for `$TARBALLTARGETDIR` in `src/main/resources/create-tarballs.sh`

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20179: Require absolute path for `$TARBALLTARGETDIR` in `src/main/resources
/create-tarballs.sh`
---+-
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+-
 The comment in `src/main/resources/create-tarballs.sh` says that "OUTDIR
 and TARBALLTARGETDIR have to be given absolute or relative to WORKDIR",
 but a relative path for `$TARBALLTARGETDIR` doesn't work anymore since
 that script also updates symlinks (commit 94278aa).  Here's what the
 script is running on the main CollecTor instance with default values:

 {{{
 cd /srv/collector.torproject.org/collector/
 ln -f -s -t archive/bridge-descriptors/statuses/ ../data/bridge-
 statuses-20??-??.tar.xz
 }}}

 That last path does not exist, so `ln` places a link to that non-existant
 path into its `archive/` directory structure.  So, this won't work with a
 path that is relative to `$WORKDIR`, which is required for creating
 tarballs.  I'd say it's easiest to just require an absolute path there.
 At least that's how I resolved the issue on the main CollecTor instance.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #3555 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Pin *.torproject.org's certs in TBB

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#3555: Pin *.torproject.org's certs in TBB
--+--
 Reporter:  tagnaq|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-firefox-patch |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Indeed. This got implemented upstream.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #15852 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Remove/synchronize Torbutton SOCKS pref logic

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15852: Remove/synchronize Torbutton SOCKS pref logic
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:  brade
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-4.5-regression, tbb-torbutton-   |  Actual Points:
  conversion, TorBrowserTeam201609R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorU
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-4.5-regression, tbb-torbutton-conversion,
 TorBrowserTeam201608R => tbb-4.5-regression, tbb-torbutton-conversion,
 TorBrowserTeam201609R


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Re: [tor-bugs] #3555 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Pin *.torproject.org's certs in TBB

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#3555: Pin *.torproject.org's certs in TBB
--+--
 Reporter:  tagnaq|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-firefox-patch |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by yawning):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  fixed =>


Comment:

 No.  `aus1.torproject.org` is not pinned.  Unless we don't care about just
 the alpha/hardened channels update metadata information.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19854 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Fix URLs in the downloads.json file

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19854: Fix URLs in the downloads.json file
--+
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201608R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by boklm):

 Replying to [comment:7 boklm]:
 >
 > Currently, the internal updater is using
 http://www.torproject.org/dist/torbrowser/update_2/ URLs, which is
 redirected to dist.tpo for the stable and aus1.tpo for the alpha. At some
 point we want to change the URL to aus1.tpo directly (and have a redirect
 on the old URLs for the older browsers). We have #19481 for that.

 Contrary to what I said before, we'll be moving back the alpha and
 hardened channels to dist.tpo, until we have pinning for aus1.tpo.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19854 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Fix URLs in the downloads.json file

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19854: Fix URLs in the downloads.json file
--+
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201608R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by yawning):

 Will the move back happen in the upcoming release?  Or rather, assuming I
 am writing code now, that uses the `downloads.json` file and the auto-
 update related xml files, and that I will likely publish it after the next
 release happens, can I rip out the support for handling different
 hostnames now?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #3555 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Pin *.torproject.org's certs in TBB

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#3555: Pin *.torproject.org's certs in TBB
--+--
 Reporter:  tagnaq|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-firefox-patch |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:30 yawning]:
 > No.  `aus1.torproject.org` is not pinned.  Unless we don't care about
 just the alpha/hardened channels update metadata information.

 Indeed, and this sounds like mistakenly pinned/missed subdomains:
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-
 browser.git/tree/security/manager/ssl/StaticHPKPins.h?h=tor-
 browser-45.4.0esr-6.5-1#n1112 torproject.org]
 {{{"torproject.org", false, false, false, -1, &kPinset_tor}}}, doesn't
 include subdomains
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-
 browser.git/tree/security/manager/ssl/StaticHPKPins.h?h=tor-
 browser-45.4.0esr-6.5-1#n1149 www.torproject.org]
 {{{"www.torproject.org", true, false, false, -1, &kPinset_tor}}}, do
 include subdomains

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[tor-bugs] #20180 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Pin certificates for aus1.tpo and cdn.tpo

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20180: Pin certificates for aus1.tpo and cdn.tpo
-+
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #19481
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+
 Eventually we want to point our Tor Browser update URL directly to
 aus1.tpo and want to have the additional security for cdn.tpo as well.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20180 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Pin certificates for aus1.tpo and cdn.tpo

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20180: Pin certificates for aus1.tpo and cdn.tpo
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #19481   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Quoting yawning's comment:7:ticket:19481
 {{{
  This shouldn't be done at all till it's possible to pin the cert chain
 for aus1.tpo over a prolonged period of time (not the rather short 3
 months imposed by the Let's Encrypt cert lifespan).

 WHile the scope of potential problems from not doing so should be limited
 to adversaries withholding updates (since the MARs are signed), that feels
 suboptimal.
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19481 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Change app.update.url to point to aus1.tpo

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19481: Change app.update.url to point to aus1.tpo
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201609R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:7 yawning]:
 > Replying to [comment:3 gk]:
 > > weasel said there is no key pinning for aus1.tpo nor for cdn.tpo right
 now. It might come in the future.
 >
 > This shouldn't be done at all till it's possible to pin the cert chain
 for aus1.tpo over a prolonged period of time (not the rather short 3
 months imposed by the Let's Encrypt cert lifespan).
 >
 > WHile the scope of potential problems from not doing so should be
 limited to adversaries withholding updates (since the MARs are signed),
 that feels suboptimal.

 I've created #20180 for aus1.tpo and cdn.tpo pinning.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20162 [Metrics/CollecTor]: reduce configuration paramaters in collector.properties

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20162: reduce configuration paramaters in collector.properties
---+-
 Reporter:  iwakeh |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  CollecTor 2.0.0
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by karsten):

 Sounds good.  Some suggestions to start this process:

  - Remove the following six config options that could be used to disable
 downloading certain descriptor types in the relaydescs module:
 `DownloadCurrentConsensus`, `DownloadCurrentMicrodescConsensus`,
 `DownloadCurrentVotes`, `DownloadMissingServerDescriptors`,
 `DownloadMissingExtraInfoDescriptors`, and
 `DownloadMissingMicrodescriptors`.  These can all be hard-coded to `true`,
 which is also their current default value.  I'd argue that whoever sets up
 a CollecTor instance to download relay descriptors from the directory
 authorities will likely want to download all available descriptor types.
  - Remove the `ReplaceIpAddressesWithHashes` option but hard-code it as
 `true` rather than the current default value `false`.  There shouldn't be
 sanitized bridge descriptors with IP addresses `127.0.0.1`, but those
 should all be replaced with IP address hashes.
  - While we're at it, replace the default value of
 `BridgeDescriptorMappingsLimit` with `90`, because that's a much more
 reasonable default for a production setting than `inf`.  (And while we're
 at this, there's also a bug that makes `inf` do something different than
 one would expect, but I didn't file that one yet.)  However, let's keep
 this config option in case we ever want/have to reprocess past bridge
 descriptors.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20180 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Pin public keys for aus1.tpo and cdn.tpo (was: Pin certificates for aus1.tpo and cdn.tpo)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20180: Pin public keys for aus1.tpo and cdn.tpo
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #19481   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Description changed by gk:

Old description:

> Eventually we want to point our Tor Browser update URL directly to
> aus1.tpo and want to have the additional security for cdn.tpo as well.

New description:

 Eventually we want to point our Tor Browser update URL directly to
 aus1.tpo and want to have the additional security gained through key
 pinning for cdn.tpo as well.

--

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20168 [Core Tor/Tor]: Clarify our #if{n}def by commenting what they are at the #elif/#else/#endif

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20168: Clarify our #if{n}def by commenting what they are at the 
#elif/#else/#endif
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  cjb
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Very Low  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Trivial   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy, lorax   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.2.??? => Tor: 0.2.9.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20070 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make address choice failure log message more informative

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20070: Make address choice failure log message more informative
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.8.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  CoreTorTeam201609, ipv6, review- |  Actual Points:  0.2
  group-9|
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by dgoulet):

 Ok cool thx for clarification! Feel free to put this in `merger_ready`
 when you've made your changes.

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[tor-bugs] #20181 [- Select a component]: PK11_DigestFinal crash OSX

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20181: PK11_DigestFinal crash OSX
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a   |Version:
  component  |   Keywords:  tor browser, os x,
 Severity:  Normal   |  pk11_digestfinal, libnss
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 > The Tor Browser ( 6.0.2 ) keeps on crashing on MAC ox ( 10.11.6 ) i
 can't visit a site for more than 1 minutes before it crashes and have to
 restart

 {{{
 Process:   firefox [33279]
 Path:  /Applications/TorBrowser.app/Contents/MacOS/firefox
 Identifier:org.mozilla.tor browser
 Version:   6.0.5 (4500.1.1)
 Code Type: X86-64 (Native)
 Parent Process:??? [1]
 Responsible:   firefox [33279]
 User ID:   501

 Date/Time: 2016-09-17 11:33:20.892 +0300
 OS Version:Mac OS X 10.11.6 (15G1004)
 Report Version:11
 Anonymous UUID:63DB85D8-C0CE-773F-D3B8-862DA5A752F9


 Time Awake Since Boot: 15 seconds

 System Integrity Protection: enabled

 Crashed Thread:4  Socket Thread

 Exception Type:EXC_BAD_ACCESS (SIGSEGV)
 Exception Codes:   EXC_I386_GPFLT
 Exception Note:EXC_CORPSE_NOTIFY

 Thread 0:: Dispatch queue: com.apple.main-thread
 0   XUL 0x0001021276e7 0x101af7000 +
 6489831

 Thread 1:: Dispatch queue: com.apple.libdispatch-manager
 0   libsystem_kernel.dylib  0x7fff9b105efa kevent_qos + 10
 1   libdispatch.dylib   0x7fff8c846165
 _dispatch_mgr_invoke + 216
 2   libdispatch.dylib   0x7fff8c845dcd
 _dispatch_mgr_thread + 52

 Thread 2:: Gecko_IOThread
 0   libsystem_kernel.dylib  0x7fff9b105eca kevent + 10
 1   XUL 0x000101dd95bc 0x101af7000 +
 3024316

 Thread 3:: Closing Service
 0   libsystem_kernel.dylib  0x7fff9b104db6 __psynch_cvwait
 + 10
 1   libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x7fff9925c728
 _pthread_cond_wait + 767
 2   libnss3.dylib   0x000101a1debd PR_WaitCondVar
 + 253

 Thread 4 Crashed:: Socket Thread
 0   libnss3.dylib   0x0001018224ad
 PK11_ExitContextMonitor + 14
 1   libnss3.dylib   0x000101823398
 PK11_DigestFinal + 264
 2   XUL 0x000103a2d0e5 0x101af7000 +
 32727269

 Thread 5:: JS Helper
 0   libsystem_kernel.dylib  0x7fff9b104db6 __psynch_cvwait
 + 10
 1   libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x7fff9925c728
 _pthread_cond_wait + 767
 2   libnss3.dylib   0x000101a1debd PR_WaitCondVar
 + 253

 Thread 6:: JS Helper
 0   libsystem_kernel.dylib  0x7fff9b104db6 __psynch_cvwait
 + 10
 1   libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x7fff9925c728
 _pthread_cond_wait + 767
 2   libnss3.dylib   0x000101a1debd PR_WaitCondVar
 + 253

 Thread 7:: JS Helper
 0   libsystem_kernel.dylib  0x7fff9b104db6 __psynch_cvwait
 + 10
 1   libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x7fff9925c728
 _pthread_cond_wait + 767
 2   libnss3.dylib   0x000101a1debd PR_WaitCondVar
 + 253

 Thread 8:: JS Helper
 0   libsystem_kernel.dylib  0x7fff9b104db6 __psynch_cvwait
 + 10
 1   libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x7fff9925c728
 _pthread_cond_wait + 767
 2   libnss3.dylib   0x000101a1debd PR_WaitCondVar
 + 253

 Thread 9:: JS Helper
 0   libsystem_kernel.dylib  0x7fff9b104db6 __psynch_cvwait
 + 10
 1   libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x7fff9925c728
 _pthread_cond_wait + 767
 2   libnss3.dylib   0x000101a1debd PR_WaitCondVar
 + 253

 Thread 10:: JS Helper
 0   libsystem_kernel.dylib  0x7fff9b104db6 __psynch_cvwait
 + 10
 1   libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x7fff9925c728
 _pthread_cond_wait + 767
 2   libnss3.dylib   0x000101a1debd PR_WaitCondVar
 + 253

 Thread 11:
 0   libsystem_kernel.dylib  0x7fff9b0fef72 mach_msg_trap +
 10
 1   libsystem_kernel.dylib  0x7fff9b0fe3b3 mach_msg + 55

 Thread 12:: JS Watchdog
 0   libsystem_kernel.dylib  0x7fff9b104db6 __psynch_cvwait
 + 10
 1   libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x7fff9925c728
 _pthread_cond_wait + 767

 Thread 13:: Hang Monitor
 0   libsystem_kernel.dylib  0x7fff9b104db6 __psynch_cvwait
 + 10
 1   libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x7fff9925c728
 _pthr

[tor-bugs] #20182 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Recreating the ja .mar files on OS X is not working correctly

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20182: Recreating the ja .mar files on OS X is not working correctly
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  tbb-gitian,
 Severity:  Normal   |  TorBrowserTeam201609
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 Doing the preparations according to the fix for #19410 does not take the
 special treatment of the `ja` locale into account. Thus, neither the full
 nor the incremental MAR file are properly created.

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[tor-bugs] #20183 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Only recreate the incremental OSX MAR files if we need to take OS X signatures into account

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20183: Only recreate the incremental OSX MAR files if we need to take OS X
signatures into account
--+
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-gitian
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 In the wake of recreating the .mar files for #19410 there is no need to do
 so for non-OS X platforms. But currently this is done.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20183 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Only recreate the incremental OS X MAR files if we need to take OS X signatures into account (was: Only recreate the incremental OSX MAR files if we n

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20183: Only recreate the incremental OS X MAR files if we need to take OS X
signatures into account
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-gitian|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20181 [Applications/Tor Browser]: PK11_DigestFinal crash OSX

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20181: PK11_DigestFinal crash OSX
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-crash |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * priority:  Medium => High
 * status:  new => needs_information
 * component:  - Select a component => Applications/Tor Browser
 * severity:  Normal => Major
 * keywords:  tor browser, os x, pk11_digestfinal, libnss => tbb-crash


Comment:

 Could you update to the newest version and test whether the same crash is
 happening? If so, and this is reproducible, would could you help us
 debugging this by using a custom build with more debug information?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20181 [Applications/Tor Browser]: PK11_DigestFinal crash in Tor Browser on OSX (was: PK11_DigestFinal crash OSX)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20181: PK11_DigestFinal crash in Tor Browser on OSX
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-crash |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20181 [Applications/Tor Browser]: PK11_DigestFinal crash in Tor Browser on OSX

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20181: PK11_DigestFinal crash in Tor Browser on OSX
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-crash |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Similar [https://crash-stats.mozilla.com/report/index/f3a572bd-fb5f-
 4d18-bb97-a1e302160829  Firefox 47.0 Crash Report [@
 PK11_ExitContextMonitor ]]

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[tor-bugs] #20184 [Applications/Tor Browser]: OS X alpha builds are still not reproducible on some machines (as of 6.5a3)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20184: OS X alpha builds are still not reproducible on some machines (as of 
6.5a3)
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  tbb-gitian,
 Severity:  Normal   |  GeorgKoppen201609
 |  TorBrowserTeam201609
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 After fixing #19856 there are still issues with the reproducibility of OS
 X alpha builds. While I got only a differing `openssl` binary compared to
 boklm or ln5 the `tor` executable is still different. My guess about what
 happened is that there was more than one problem and #19856 fixed only the
 first one showing up.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20150 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser's Update window initially shows "NaN/sec"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20150: Tor Browser's Update window initially shows "NaN/sec"
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by mcs):

 * cc: brade, mcs (added)


Comment:

 This is probably also a bug in Firefox although I did not find a bug
 report at bugzilla.mozilla.org. There is a "Connecting to the update
 server…" message that is shown initially and presumably it is not supposed
 to be changed until the download size is known.

 Are you able to reproduce this reliably? On what OS? I have seen this in
 the past (but not recently) and I was not able to reproduce it with a
 6.0.4 to 6.0.5 update. From a quick read of the code, I would say it tries
 to avoid division by zero, but there are enough layers of code that I am
 not 100% sure (divide by zero does seem like the most likely root cause of
 this).

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[tor-bugs] #20185 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser alpha is broken on Linux (and probably OS X) if directory is nested too deep

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20185: Tor Browser alpha is broken on Linux (and probably OS X) if directory is
nested too deep
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major |   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #14270
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 While testing the upcoming 6.5a3 builds I got greeted with
 {{{
 Sep 20 16:28:18.534 [warn] Unix socket path '"/home/thomas/Arbeit/Tor/tor-
 browser-bundle/gitian/tor-browser_en-
 US/Browser/TorBrowser/Data/Tor/control.socket"' is too long to fit.
 Sep 20 16:28:18.534 [warn] Failed to parse/validate config: Failed to bind
 one of the listener ports.
 }}}
 And Tor Browser failed to start. Moving both the 6.5a3 and the
 6.5a3-hardened bundle into my home dir solved the problem

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20103 [Core Tor/Tor]: Crash on OpenBSD: tor invoked from Tor Browser 6.0.4

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20103: Crash on OpenBSD: tor invoked from Tor Browser 6.0.4
-+-
 Reporter:  attila   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.2.8.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bug regression 028-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Okay.  I've cleaned it up into a `bug20103_028_v3` branch, with a real
 commit message and a big pile of analysis.  Needs code review!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20185 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser alpha is broken on Linux (and probably OS X) if directory is nested too deep

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20185: Tor Browser alpha is broken on Linux (and probably OS X) if directory is
nested too deep
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #14270| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by mcs):

 Kathy and I were apparently lucky; our installation paths are fairly
 short.

 The longest Unix domain socket path that can be used on Linux is 108
 bytes. See:
 https://linux.die.net/man/7/unix

 On OSX, it is even shorter at 104 bytes:
 
https://developer.apple.com/legacy/library/documentation/Darwin/Reference/ManPages/man4/unix.4.html

 Should we be placing the sockets in /tmp instead of in the tor data
 directory? I think we would need to create a subdirectory with
 sufficiently restrictive permissions (tor does some permission checks).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20109 [Core Tor/Tor]: something wrong with commit 41cc1f612bd2112ab7cec0cc4fdeb68c26e231bf

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20109: something wrong with commit 41cc1f612bd2112ab7cec0cc4fdeb68c26e231bf
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by orionwl):

 Same problem here. I have not set any NoDNSRequest but still get that
 error consistently. I bisected it to b311f82, last working commit is
 45b4e63.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #15055 [Core Tor/Tor]: Implement ed25519 link handshake

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15055: Implement ed25519 link handshake
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, prop-220, |  Actual Points:
  027-triaged-1-in, 028-triaged, |
  201511-deferred, 201512-deferred, tor-crypto-  |
  identity, tor-ed25519-proto,   |
  TorCoreTeam201609, review-group-9  |
Parent ID:  #15054   | Points:  parent
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorU-must
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Review can be found in gitlab. Hope this help.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20176 [Core Tor/Tor]: current_consensus is an unmarked hazard

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20176: current_consensus is an unmarked hazard
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  .1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 `bug20176` is what I'd have in mind, though we shouldn't merge it till
 after #20103, and it will need a check-spaces cleanup.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20138 [Core Tor/Trunnel]: Add constified getters to trunnel

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20138: Add constified getters to trunnel
--+--
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Trunnel  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  trunnel   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  .5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by nickm):

 > I almost feel like the const getter should be the default, and one
 should call a mutable function to get a non-const pointer. But this is
 probably too big of a change for now.

 Yeah; I don't really dig breaking backward compatibility. :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20103 [Core Tor/Tor]: Crash on OpenBSD: tor invoked from Tor Browser 6.0.4

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20103: Crash on OpenBSD: tor invoked from Tor Browser 6.0.4
-+-
 Reporter:  attila   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.2.8.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bug regression 028-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by arma):

 I looked over the patch very briefly and it looks plausible (and also
 complicated in its effects).

 Assuming for the moment that it is the right patch though: are there
 things we should do to remove this trap for future developers? Maybe a
 huge comment would be an easy first step? And maybe "precompute the answer
 to what that macro was about, and locate where in the code the answer
 might change, and only change it then" as another step?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20103 [Core Tor/Tor]: Crash on OpenBSD: tor invoked from Tor Browser 6.0.4

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20103: Crash on OpenBSD: tor invoked from Tor Browser 6.0.4
-+-
 Reporter:  attila   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.2.8.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bug regression 028-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 >are  there things we should do to remove this trap for future developers?

 +1 on those, but let's call it another ticket.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20138 [Core Tor/Trunnel]: Add constified getters to trunnel

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20138: Add constified getters to trunnel
--+--
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Trunnel  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  trunnel   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  .5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by nickm):

 I've merged this patch to trunnel master, and bumped the trunnel master
 version to 1.5

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20138 [Core Tor/Trunnel]: Add constified getters to trunnel

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20138: Add constified getters to trunnel
--+-
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Trunnel  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:  trunnel   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  .5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


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Re: [tor-bugs] #19958 [Core Tor/Tor]: Implement proposal 264 (protocol versioning)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19958: Implement proposal 264 (protocol versioning)
---+---
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement| Status:
   |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorCoreTeam201608, review-group-9  |  Actual Points:  2
Parent ID:  #15055 | Points:  2
 Reviewer:  dgoulet|Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  TorCoreTeam201608, review-group-8 => TorCoreTeam201608,
 review-group-9


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Re: [tor-bugs] #16861 [Core Tor/Tor]: Pad Tor connections to collapse netflow records

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16861: Pad Tor connections to collapse netflow records
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:
 |  mikeperry
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  028-triage, 028-triaged, |  Actual Points:
  pre028-patch, 201511-deferred, |
  201512-deferred, tor-guard, TorCoreTeam-   |
  postponed-201604, nickm-deferred-20160905, |
  review-group-9 |
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  SponsorU-can
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 I've opened https://gitlab.com/nickm_tor/tor/merge_requests/8 to do the
 commentary here.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17904 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Use sufficient window dimensions in Privacy and Security Settings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17904: Use sufficient window dimensions in Privacy and Security Settings
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Minor| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security-slider, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201609R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorU
-+-

Comment (by mcs):

 Kathy and I reviewed this and it looks good. We have just a couple of
 comments:
 1. You added ids to many XUL elements, but we do not see where they are
 used. Are they needed? For example, you added `id="privacy_checkboxes"`
 Are these IDs needed?
 2. The preferences.xul file has no tabs except for one (which should
 probably be removed). Please use spaces instead of tabs to stay consistent
 with the rest of the file.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17904 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Use sufficient window dimensions in Privacy and Security Settings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17904: Use sufficient window dimensions in Privacy and Security Settings
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Minor| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security-slider, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201609R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorU
-+-
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_information


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:9 mcs]:
 > Kathy and I reviewed this and it looks good. We have just a couple of
 comments:

 Thanks for reviewing this!

 >  1. You added ids to many XUL elements, but we do not see where they are
 >  used. Are they needed? For example, you added `id="privacy_checkboxes"`
 >  Are these IDs needed?

 I actually added them because I was having trouble keeping track of nested
 XUL elements. Would you prefer if I turn them into comments?

 >  2. The preferences.xul file has no tabs except for one (which should
 >  probably be removed). Please use spaces instead of tabs to stay
 consistent
 >  with the rest of the file.

 Not sure how I ended up with tabs -- I will fix that.

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[tor-bugs] #20186 [Applications/Tor Browser]: "make update-responses" should extract mar tools

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20186: "make update-responses" should extract mar tools
--+---
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+---
 Since fixing #19528 the `make update-responses` command is using the `mar`
 command to extract a mar file to get its build id. It works if the mar
 tools were previously extracted and added to the `PATH` before running
 `make update-responses`, but it fails otherwise. The `update_responses`
 script should extract the mar tools itself so it does not need to be done
 manually.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20109 [Core Tor/Tor]: something wrong with commit 41cc1f612bd2112ab7cec0cc4fdeb68c26e231bf

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20109: something wrong with commit 41cc1f612bd2112ab7cec0cc4fdeb68c26e231bf
---+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, TorCoreTeam201609  |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID: | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * keywords:  regression => regression, TorCoreTeam201609
 * status:  accepted => needs_review
 * actualpoints:   => 0.1


Comment:

 Fix in `bug20109_029_01`.

 (No changes file as this hasn't been released.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17904 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Use sufficient window dimensions in Privacy and Security Settings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17904: Use sufficient window dimensions in Privacy and Security Settings
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Minor| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security-slider, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201609R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorU
-+-

Comment (by mcs):

 Replying to [comment:10 arthuredelstein]:
 > I actually added them because I was having trouble keeping track of
 nested XUL elements. Would you prefer if I turn them into comments?

 Yes, only because when I see an id I think "some code or CSS must
 reference this element by ID." But if you really like having them I can
 modify my thinking.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13827 [Core Tor/Tor]: Cell handling code duplication in channel.c

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13827: Cell handling code duplication in channel.c
---+---
 Reporter:  rl1987 |  Owner:  pingl
 Type:  defect | Status:
   |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  refactoring, easy, review-group-9  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  dgoulet|Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision
 * reviewer:   => dgoulet
 * points:  small/medium => 0.1


Comment:

 (I've pull your patch into `bug13827_029_01` if anyone wants to see it
 from git.tpo in my repo.)

 DG1: This worries me:
 {{{
 -  q.u.var.var_cell = var_cell;
 +  q.u.fixed.cell = cell;
 }}}

 In theory, that could work since it's a union and all cell points there
 but kind of recipe for disaster and bad semantic. What you could do is
 take a reference on the right cell member of the union while in the switch
 case and then assign it after.

 DG2: Can't you use `CELL_QUEUE_*` as the cell type?

 DG3: Few things. I would rename `ctype` to `cell_type`. The switch case
 MUST have a default branch that you could do a BUG() on and bail. Finally,
 no need for extra space between the case and the end of the function.

 Thanks for this!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19252 [HTTPS Everywhere/HTTPS Everywhere: Chrome]: Incorrect target for *.snapnames.com redirection

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19252: Incorrect target for *.snapnames.com redirection
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  jsha
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  HTTPS Everywhere/HTTPS Everywhere:   |Version:
  Chrome |
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by fuglede):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Fixed by https://github.com/EFForg/https-everywhere/pull/6908.

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[tor-bugs] #20187 [Applications/Quality Assurance and Testing]: Add a test to check that Referrer spoofing on .onions domains is working

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20187: Add a test to check that Referrer spoofing on .onions domains is working
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Quality Assurance   |Version:
  and Testing|   Keywords:  tbb-
 Severity:  Normal   |  testcase
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 Our test suite should have a test to check that the referrer spoofing for
 .onions domains implemented in #17334 is working as expected.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17334 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Move Referrer spoofing for .onion domains out of Torbutton

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17334: Move Referrer spoofing for .onion domains out of Torbutton
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:
 |  arthuredelstein
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton-conversion,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201609R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorU
-+-

Comment (by boklm):

 Replying to [comment:9 arthuredelstein]:
 >
 > It would be nice to write an automated test, but I'm not sure what the
 best approach is, as we need to be able to simulate an onion site or
 connect to a real one.

 I opened ticket #20187 for that.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16861 [Core Tor/Tor]: Pad Tor connections to collapse netflow records

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16861: Pad Tor connections to collapse netflow records
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:
 |  mikeperry
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  028-triage, 028-triaged, |  Actual Points:
  pre028-patch, 201511-deferred, |
  201512-deferred, tor-guard, TorCoreTeam-   |
  postponed-201604, nickm-deferred-20160905, |
  review-group-9 |
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  SponsorU-can
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 I've been over this one on gitlab, and asked a bunch of questions, and
 noted a few places that could use a small amount of tidying.  This patch
 is looking nice!

 Now that I've started on this review, please just add fixup commits to
 this branch, rather than rebasing or starting a new one: it will make
 changes much much easier for me to track.

 (Also, can tell me about your performance testing?)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16861 [Core Tor/Tor]: Pad Tor connections to collapse netflow records

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16861: Pad Tor connections to collapse netflow records
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:
 |  mikeperry
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  028-triage, 028-triaged, |  Actual Points:
  pre028-patch, 201511-deferred, |
  201512-deferred, tor-guard, TorCoreTeam-   |
  postponed-201604, nickm-deferred-20160905, |
  review-group-9 |
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  SponsorU-can
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


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Re: [tor-bugs] #16861 [Core Tor/Tor]: Pad Tor connections to collapse netflow records

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16861: Pad Tor connections to collapse netflow records
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:
 |  mikeperry
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  028-triage, 028-triaged, |  Actual Points:
  pre028-patch, 201511-deferred, |
  201512-deferred, tor-guard, TorCoreTeam-   |
  postponed-201604, nickm-deferred-20160905, |
  review-group-9 |
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  SponsorU-can
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 [I'll review the other tickets fixed by that branch separately]

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17604 [Core Tor/Tor]: Try to use only one canonical connection

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17604: Try to use only one canonical connection
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:
 |  mikeperry
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorCoreTeam-postponed-201604,|  Actual Points:
  nickm-deferred-20160905, review-group-9| Points:  see-
Parent ID:  #16861   |  parent
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 I've commented a little on
 ​https://gitlab.com/nickm_tor/tor/merge_requests/8 .

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17592 [Core Tor/Tor]: Clean up connection timeout logic

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17592: Clean up connection timeout logic
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:
 |  mikeperry
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorCoreTeam-postponed-201604,|  Actual Points:
  nickm-deferred-20160905, review-group-9| Points:  see-
Parent ID:  #16861   |  parent
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Haven't reviewed this one yet, but I will, on
 https://gitlab.com/nickm_tor/tor/merge_requests/8 .

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20180 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Pin public keys for aus1.tpo and cdn.tpo

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20180: Pin public keys for aus1.tpo and cdn.tpo
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #19481   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by mcs):

 * cc: brade, mcs (added)


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[tor-bugs] #20188 [Core Tor/Tor]: hsfetch hs_desc FAILED with REASON missing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20188: hsfetch hs_desc FAILED with REASON missing
--+
 Reporter:  grarpamp  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.8.7
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Controller...

 hsfetch tries to fetch from up to 6 hsdirs.  If for any reason,
 such as network or hsdir appearing down anomalies, none of the 6
 respond (or possibly even do not respond in a recognized manner),
 hs_desc fails to print FAILURE, which means REASON is missing, and
 anything using the controller is left ambiguous.

 hs_desc event should print result of hsfetch in all cases.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20188 [Core Tor/Tor]: hsfetch hs_desc FAILED with REASON missing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20188: hsfetch hs_desc FAILED with REASON missing
--+
 Reporter:  grarpamp  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.8.7
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by grarpamp):

 .

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17904 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Use sufficient window dimensions in Privacy and Security Settings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17904: Use sufficient window dimensions in Privacy and Security Settings
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Minor| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security-slider, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201609R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorU
-+-
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * status:  needs_information => needs_review


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:11 mcs]:
 > Replying to [comment:10 arthuredelstein]:
 > > I actually added them because I was having trouble keeping track of
 nested XUL elements. Would you prefer if I turn them into comments?
 >
 > Yes, only because when I see an id I think "some code or CSS must
 reference this element by ID."

 That makes sense. I've dropped them and also got rid of the tabs:

 https://github.com/arthuredelstein/torbutton/commit/17904+1

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[tor-bugs] #20189 [Applications/Tor Browser]: MAR files should be signed with a modern signature algorithm.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20189: MAR files should be signed with a modern signature algorithm.
--+--
 Reporter:  yawning   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Mostly theoretical, and may be just a case of out of date upstream
 documentation.

 https://wiki.mozilla.org/Software_Update:MAR
 > 1: RSA-PKCS1-SHA1 (2048 bits / 256 bytes)

 We should patch the MAR related code to add something more suitable to our
 adversary model, though what's used now should be "adequate" for the near
 term future.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20147 [Applications/Tor Browser]: [PATCH] (re-)dzip.sh: various improvements

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20147: [PATCH] (re-)dzip.sh: various improvements
---+---
 Reporter:  rustybird  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement| Status:
   |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-gitian, TorBrowserTeam201609R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by mcs):

 I reviewed this and have a couple of comments on the re-dzip.sh changes.

 It would be better to use a temporary directory name that is likely to be
 unique,
 e.g., `TMPDIR=tmp-re-dzip-$$`

 Also, shouldn't this line: `(cd tmp_dzip; dzip.sh ./"$ZIPFILE_BASENAME")`
 include a dot like so: `(cd tmp_dzip; dzip.sh ./"$ZIPFILE_BASENAME" .)`

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20189 [Applications/Tor Browser]: MAR files should be signed with a modern signature algorithm.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20189: MAR files should be signed with a modern signature algorithm.
--+
 Reporter:  yawning   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  worksforme
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by mcs):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => worksforme


Comment:

 Mozilla still has an open bug for this issue
 (https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1105689) but our patched
 implementation uses SHA-512 signatures. See:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-browser.git/commit/modules/libmar?h=tor-
 browser-45.4.0esr-6.5-1&id=a1484f47c7a269a0d172a1c9e0c248f9792aeb34

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Re: [tor-bugs] #15490 [HTTPS Everywhere/HTTPS Everywhere: Chrome]: Google Videos ruleset causes 404s on Google Images with HTTPS Everywhere 2015.3.23

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15490: Google Videos ruleset causes 404s on Google Images with HTTPS Everywhere
2015.3.23
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  HTTPS Everywhere/HTTPS Everywhere:   |Version:
  Chrome |
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  httpse-ruleset-bug google images |  Actual Points:
  videos https everywhere 404 chrome |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by legind):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 This is no longer occurring since Google Video has been disabled by
 default.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19958 [Core Tor/Tor]: Implement proposal 264 (protocol versioning)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19958: Implement proposal 264 (protocol versioning)
---+---
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement| Status:
   |  needs_review
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorCoreTeam201608, review-group-9  |  Actual Points:  2
Parent ID:  #15055 | Points:  2
 Reviewer:  dgoulet|Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by isis):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #19958 [Core Tor/Tor]: Implement proposal 264 (protocol versioning)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19958: Implement proposal 264 (protocol versioning)
---+---
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement| Status:
   |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorCoreTeam201608, review-group-9  |  Actual Points:  2
Parent ID:  #15055 | Points:  2
 Reviewer:  dgoulet|Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by isis):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 I've read through Nick's code twice now, and found no major problems
 beyond what dgoulet had already found.  I still think we should strive to
 keep the "symmetry" in networkstatus lines… other than that everything
 looks good to me.

 Nick and I on IRC spoke briefly, and Nick is worried that DirAuths might
 accidentally vote to shut themselves down due to missing required
 subprotocols.  I agree that this is worrisome, but it should be an easy
 fix.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20170 [Core Tor/Tor]: Backport 0.2.9 fallback list to 0.2.8?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20170: Backport 0.2.9 fallback list to 0.2.8?
+
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.8.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor: 0.2.8.7
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  028-backport, fallback  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #20172  | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+

Comment (by teor):

 In fact, let's do both:
 * merge broken-028-fallbacks before the next 0.2.8 release, and
 * update the list based on the 0.2.9 list when it's ready.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20109 [Core Tor/Tor]: something wrong with commit 41cc1f612bd2112ab7cec0cc4fdeb68c26e231bf

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20109: something wrong with commit 41cc1f612bd2112ab7cec0cc4fdeb68c26e231bf
---+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  regression, TorCoreTeam201609  |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID: | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 merged!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20103 [Core Tor/Tor]: Crash on OpenBSD: tor invoked from Tor Browser 6.0.4

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20103: Crash on OpenBSD: tor invoked from Tor Browser 6.0.4
-+-
 Reporter:  attila   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.2.8.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bug regression 028-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 The patch looks sensible to me. And it has received some testing on
 OpenBSD, so that's good.

 Replying to [comment:23 nickm]:
 > >are  there things we should do to remove this trap for future
 developers?
 >
 > +1 on those, but let's call it another ticket.

 Don't we have a handle abstraction sitting around somewhere?
 Isn't it exactly what we want here?
 (Of course, that means re-writing every rs access, right?)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20103 [Core Tor/Tor]: Crash on OpenBSD: tor invoked from Tor Browser 6.0.4

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20103: Crash on OpenBSD: tor invoked from Tor Browser 6.0.4
-+-
 Reporter:  attila   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.2.8.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bug regression 028-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 What if we updated all the nodes to point to the new consensus _before_ we
 freed the old one?

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[tor-bugs] #20190 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove broken fallbacks from the 0.2.8 list

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20190: Remove broken fallbacks from the 0.2.8 list
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.8.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.8.7
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  fallback
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #20170
   Points:  0.1   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Please merge my branch broken-028-fallbacks to both 0.2.8 and master.
 It comments-out fallbacks that have broken since I last checked in just
 before 0.2.8.6.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20190 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove broken fallbacks from the 0.2.8 list

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20190: Remove broken fallbacks from the 0.2.8 list
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.8.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.8.7
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  fallback  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #20170| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20170 [Core Tor/Tor]: Backport 0.2.9 fallback list to 0.2.8?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20170: Backport 0.2.9 fallback list to 0.2.8?
+
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.8.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor: 0.2.8.7
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  028-backport, fallback  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #20172  | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:4 teor]:
 > In fact, let's do both:
 > * merge broken-028-fallbacks before the next 0.2.8 release, and

 Split off into #20190.

 > * update the list based on the 0.2.9 list when it's ready.

 This ticket.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20190 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove broken fallbacks from the 0.2.8 list

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20190: Remove broken fallbacks from the 0.2.8 list
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.8.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.8.7
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  fallback  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #20170| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20185 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser alpha is broken on Linux (and probably OS X) if directory is nested too deep

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20185: Tor Browser alpha is broken on Linux (and probably OS X) if directory is
nested too deep
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #14270| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Please use $XDG_RUNTIME_DIR if it's set:
 https://specifications.freedesktop.org/basedir-spec/basedir-spec-0.7.html
 "The directory MUST be owned by the user, and he MUST be the only one
 having read and write access to it. Its Unix access mode MUST be 0700."
 It tends to be something short like "/run/user/1000".

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20103 [Core Tor/Tor]: Crash on OpenBSD: tor invoked from Tor Browser 6.0.4

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20103: Crash on OpenBSD: tor invoked from Tor Browser 6.0.4
-+-
 Reporter:  attila   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.2.8.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bug regression 028-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 (Merged the patch above to 0.2.8 and master.)

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[tor-bugs] #20191 [Core Tor/Tor]: Prevent a recurrence of #20103

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20191: Prevent a recurrence of #20103
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  .2|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 On #20103, Roger sensibly asks:
 > Assuming for the moment that it is the right patch though: are there
 things we should do to remove this trap for future developers? Maybe a
 huge comment would be an easy first step? And maybe "precompute the answer
 to what that macro was about, and locate where in the code the answer
 might change, and only change it then" as another step?

 Yes, let's.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20103 [Core Tor/Tor]: Crash on OpenBSD: tor invoked from Tor Browser 6.0.4

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20103: Crash on OpenBSD: tor invoked from Tor Browser 6.0.4
-+-
 Reporter:  attila   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.2.8.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bug regression 028-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 I've created #20191 to track the "make this code safer" task.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20103 [Core Tor/Tor]: Crash on OpenBSD: tor invoked from Tor Browser 6.0.4

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20103: Crash on OpenBSD: tor invoked from Tor Browser 6.0.4
-+-
 Reporter:  attila   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.8.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.8.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  bug regression 028-backport  |  Actual Points:  1
  TorCoreTeam201609  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  accepted => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20103 [Core Tor/Tor]: Crash on OpenBSD: tor invoked from Tor Browser 6.0.4

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20103: Crash on OpenBSD: tor invoked from Tor Browser 6.0.4
-+-
 Reporter:  attila   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.8.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.8.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bug regression 028-backport  |  Actual Points:  1
  TorCoreTeam201609  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  bug regression 028-backport => bug regression 028-backport
 TorCoreTeam201609
 * status:  needs_review => accepted
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final => Tor: 0.2.8.x-final
 * owner:   => nickm
 * actualpoints:   => 1


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20163 [Core Tor/Tor]: Keep the interface address order returned by the OS

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20163: Keep the interface address order returned by the OS
-+
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.2.7.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  029-proposed easy intro  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by teor):

 This issue was reported by René Mayrhofer.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20163 [Core Tor/Tor]: Keep the interface address order returned by the OS

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20163: Keep the interface address order returned by the OS
-+
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.2.7.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  029-proposed easy intro  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by teor):

 (Hmm, do we do unicode in our changelogs? Otherwise it's going to be hard
 to credit René without a misspelling.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20163 [Core Tor/Tor]: Keep the interface address order returned by the OS

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20163: Keep the interface address order returned by the OS
-+
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.2.7.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  029-proposed easy intro  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by nickm):

 UTF-8 unicode is fine.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20150 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser's Update window initially shows "NaN/sec"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20150: Tor Browser's Update window initially shows "NaN/sec"
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:1 mcs]:
 > This is probably also a bug in Firefox although I did not find a bug
 report at bugzilla.mozilla.org. There is a "Connecting to the update
 server…" message that is shown initially and presumably it is not supposed
 to be changed until the download size is known.
 >
 > Are you able to reproduce this reliably? On what OS? I have seen this in
 the past (but not recently) and I was not able to reproduce it with a
 6.0.4 to 6.0.5 update. From a quick read of the code, I would say it tries
 to avoid division by zero, but there are enough layers of code that I am
 not 100% sure (divide by zero does seem like the most likely root cause of
 this).

 I am on OS X. I am also on networks where latency is high (~100-500ms), so
 that could be a factor.

 I'll see if I can replicate the issue with Tor Browser 6.0.4 -> 6.0.5.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17592 [Core Tor/Tor]: Clean up connection timeout logic

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17592: Clean up connection timeout logic
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:
 |  mikeperry
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorCoreTeam-postponed-201604,|  Actual Points:
  nickm-deferred-20160905, review-group-9| Points:  see-
Parent ID:  #16861   |  parent
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Okay, review done.  I have probably misunderstood a few important things.
 Please feel free  to focus on correcting my misunderstandings here, so
 that I can say smarter things about the code.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #15055 [Core Tor/Tor]: Implement ed25519 link handshake

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15055: Implement ed25519 link handshake
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, prop-220, |  Actual Points:
  027-triaged-1-in, 028-triaged, |
  201511-deferred, 201512-deferred, tor-crypto-  |
  identity, tor-ed25519-proto,   |
  TorCoreTeam201609, review-group-9  |
Parent ID:  #15054   | Points:  parent
 Reviewer:  isis |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorU-must
-+-
Changes (by isis):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review
 * reviewer:   => isis


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20177 [Core Tor/Tor]: When checking existing fallbacks, report those fallbacks at warning log level

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20177: When checking existing fallbacks, report those fallbacks at warning log
level
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.8.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  fallback  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by teor):

 We should also do this for candidate fallbacks.

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[tor-bugs] #20192 [Core Tor/Tor]: When outputting potential new fallbacks, blacklist the whitelist

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20192: When outputting potential new fallbacks, blacklist the whitelist
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  fallback
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  0.5   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 When we look for potential new fallback directory mirrors, we want to
 ignore existing whitelisted fallbacks, as well as the blacklist.

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[tor-bugs] #20193 [Metrics/Onionoo]: OnionOO stops serving data after about 15MB

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20193: OnionOO stops serving data after about 15MB
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 When I download the following URL from OnionOO:
 
https://onionoo.torproject.org/uptime?first_seen_days=7-&flag=V2Dir&type=relay&last_seen_days=-7
 It should serve about ~100MB of data.

 Instead, it serves around 15MB, and then stops serving data. I've checked
 this over Tor and directly, so it's not just my connection.

 When using python to download, I see the following error:
 {{{
   File "scripts/maint/updateFallbackDirs.py", line 338, in
 load_possibly_compressed_response_json
 return json.load(response)
   File
 
"/opt/local/Library/Frameworks/Python.framework/Versions/2.7/lib/python2.7/json/__init__.py",
 line 287, in load
 return loads(fp.read(),
   File
 
"/opt/local/Library/Frameworks/Python.framework/Versions/2.7/lib/python2.7/socket.py",
 line 355, in read
 data = self._sock.recv(rbufsize)
   File
 
"/opt/local/Library/Frameworks/Python.framework/Versions/2.7/lib/python2.7/httplib.py",
 line 588, in read
 return self._read_chunked(amt)
   File
 
"/opt/local/Library/Frameworks/Python.framework/Versions/2.7/lib/python2.7/httplib.py",
 line 648, in _read_chunked
 value.append(self._safe_read(amt))
   File
 
"/opt/local/Library/Frameworks/Python.framework/Versions/2.7/lib/python2.7/httplib.py",
 line 705, in _safe_read
 raise IncompleteRead(''.join(s), amt)
 httplib.IncompleteRead: IncompleteRead(532 bytes read, 7660 more expected)
 }}}

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[tor-bugs] #20194 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add "update fallbacks" to "Preliminaries" in Tor's doc/HACKING/ReleasingTor.md

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20194: Add "update fallbacks" to "Preliminaries" in Tor's
doc/HACKING/ReleasingTor.md
--+-
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.8.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  fallback, doc, 029-proposed
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  0.1   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 When we added fallback directory mirrors, we should have also listed them
 as something we need to update every major release:

 {{{
 2. Early in the alpha series for each new major release, at least a month
 before the code freeze, update the list of fallback directory mirrors
 using the instructions in:
 
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/UpdatingFallbackDirectoryMirrors
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20194 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add "update fallbacks" to "Preliminaries" in Tor's doc/HACKING/ReleasingTor.md

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20194: Add "update fallbacks" to "Preliminaries" in Tor's
doc/HACKING/ReleasingTor.md
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.8.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fallback, doc, 029-proposed  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Description changed by teor:

Old description:

> When we added fallback directory mirrors, we should have also listed them
> as something we need to update every major release:
>
> {{{
> 2. Early in the alpha series for each new major release, at least a month
> before the code freeze, update the list of fallback directory mirrors
> using the instructions in:
> https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/UpdatingFallbackDirectoryMirrors
> }}}

New description:

 When we added fallback directory mirrors, we should have also listed them
 as something we need to update every major release:


   2. Early in the alpha series for each new major release, at least a
 month before the code freeze, update the list of fallback directory
 mirrors using the instructions in:
 
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/UpdatingFallbackDirectoryMirrors

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20190 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove broken fallbacks from the 0.2.8 list

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20190: Remove broken fallbacks from the 0.2.8 list
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.8.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.8.7
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  fallback  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #18828| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * parent:  #20170 => #18828


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20190 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove broken fallbacks from the 0.2.8 list

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20190: Remove broken fallbacks from the 0.2.8 list
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.8.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.8.7
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  fallback  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #20172| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * parent:  #18828 => #20172


Comment:

 Oops

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18828 [Core Tor/Tor]: Regenerate fallback list for 0.2.9

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18828: Regenerate fallback list for 0.2.9
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorCoreTeam201609, 029-accepted  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #20172   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  SponsorU-
 |  can
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 I am up to step 2 of
 
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/UpdatingFallbackDirectoryMirrors
 , but I can't seem to get a good OnionOO uptime document (#20193), so I'm
 kind of stuck.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20150 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser's Update window initially shows "NaN/sec"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20150: Tor Browser's Update window initially shows "NaN/sec"
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 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by teor):

 No, I can't replicate this issue with Tor Browser 6.0.4 -> 6.0.5. I think
 it requires the update download to be particularly slow.

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Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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