Re: depleting the random number generator

1999-07-18 Thread Ben Laurie
David Honig wrote: > > At 04:45 PM 7/17/99 -0400, John Denker wrote: > >Hi Folks -- > > > >I have a question about various scenarios for an attack against IPsec by way > >of the random number generator. The people on the linux-ipsec mailing list > >suggested I bring it up here. > > >>..worries

Re: depleting the random number generator

1999-07-18 Thread Donald E. Eastlake 3rd
RFC 1750 recommends the Blum Blum Shub generator. Donald From: bram <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Date: Sat, 17 Jul 1999 16:18:20 -0700 (PDT) To: Eugene Leitl <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED] In-Reply-To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Message-ID: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset

Re: depleting the random number generator

1999-07-18 Thread bram
On Sun, 18 Jul 1999, Bill Stewart wrote: > /dev/urandom will give you pseudo-random bits if it's run out of entropy, > so you've got the security risks inherent in that. > As David Honig points out, you can't avoid those alternatives, Yes you can, if there's a 'pool' of entropy in memory which

Re: depleting the random number generator

1999-07-18 Thread Bill Stewart
At 10:04 PM 7/17/99 -0700, Mike Brodhead wrote: >> Step 3a) If Whitney is getting key material from /dev/random, the result is >> a denial of service. All the IPsec tunnels will time out and will be >> replaced slowly or not at all, because of the entropy shortage. > >seems to me that the reaso

Re: depleting the random number generator

1999-07-18 Thread Sandy Harris
bram wrote: > > > Most of the fancy reseedable PRNG schemes people have come up with are > > > based on using secure hashes. > > > > They are sure validated, but are they the best we can do? MD5, the > > nonplusultra, really? > > The main reason for secure hashes being the primary primitive us

Re: depleting the random number generator

1999-07-18 Thread David Honig
At 04:45 PM 7/17/99 -0400, John Denker wrote: >Hi Folks -- > >I have a question about various scenarios for an attack against IPsec by way >of the random number generator. The people on the linux-ipsec mailing list >suggested I bring it up here. >>..worries that /dev/random exhaustion -> DoS,

Re: depleting the random number generator

1999-07-18 Thread bram
On Sat, 17 Jul 1999, Eugene Leitl wrote: > bram writes: > > > Most of the fancy reseedable PRNG schemes people have come up with are > > based on using secure hashes. > > They are sure validated, but are they the best we can do? MD5, the > nonplusultra, really? The main reason for secure has