At 11:11 AM 09/10/2001 +1000, Greg Rose wrote:
>At 12:44 AM 9/9/2001 -0400, Sandy Harris wrote:
>>Does using non-adaptive compression save the day?
>
>Huffman coding using a fixed code table is not a bad way to go. You can
>even peek at the characteristics of the input and choose a table based on
--
On 10 Sep 2001, at 0:26, Jay Sulzberger wrote:
> All "interactive digital" systems that directly connect to the
> net will have to licensed. Most that do not connect directly
> will also have to be licensed. License costs will be high
> enough so that only a few large companies can afford
At 12:26 PM 09/09/2001 +0100, Carsten Kuckuk wrote:
>Am I right in that this bill would effectively outlaw all free
>open-source operating systems like Linux, OpenBSD, FreeBSD, etc.?
Only if the free operating system hasn't developed a
US-government-certified-copy-protection-system
and paid the U
Hi all --
I just sat down and read the proposed text of the Holling's SSSCA bill.
http://cryptome.org/sssca.htm
Boy is this bill breathtaking in its breadth! I have tried to understand
its language. It says in Section 101:
"It is unlawful to manufacture, import, offer to the publi
On Sun, 9 Sep 2001, Carsten Kuckuk wrote:
> Am I right in that this bill would effectively outlaw all free
> open-source operating systems like Linux, OpenBSD, FreeBSD, etc.?
>
> Carsten Kuckuk
Yes.
All "interactive digital" systems that directly connect to the net will
have to licensed. Mos
At 12:44 AM 9/9/2001 -0400, Sandy Harris wrote:
>Does using non-adaptive compression save the day?
Huffman coding using a fixed code table is not a bad way to go. You can
even peek at the characteristics of the input and choose a table based on
that... having standardised tables for English tex
In message <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, John Kelsey writes:
>-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
>
>[ To: Perry's Crypto List ## Date: 09/08/01 07:35 pm ##
> Subject: Field slide attacks and how to avoid them. ]
>
>Guys,
>
>I've been noticing a lot of ways you can mess up a cryptographic
>protocol due to
Scott A. Crosby writes:
> TrustedPC is coming, the question is will it fail like Divx, or not.. All
> this law would probably do is to require that people use 'trusted PC', and
> make manufacturing of non-digitally-controlled hardware illegal. That can
> be 'encouraged' without any law to enfo
Hadmut Danisch wrote:
>
> On Sat, Sep 08, 2001 at 10:45:14PM -0400, John Kelsey wrote:
> >
> > where the encryption preserves length (e.g., RC4 encryption). Suppose
> > someone is sending a secret S in these messages, and the attacker gets
> > to choose some prefix or suffix to send, e.g.
> >
>
Does anyone have an open source implementation of Rijndael in
assembler for the Pentium?
Perry
--
Perry E. Metzger[EMAIL PROTECTED]
--
NetBSD Development, Support & CDs. http://www.wasabisystems.com/
-
The Cry
Peter Wayner wrote:
>
> >
> >
> >b. I'm hoping to find out if anyone else has seen similar work
> >anywhere. I've not been able to find any references to this kind of
> >attack, though once you've had the idea to try it, it's really pretty
> >straightforward. (And I know there are a couple of
On Sat, Sep 08, 2001 at 10:45:14PM -0400, John Kelsey wrote:
>
> where the encryption preserves length (e.g., RC4 encryption). Suppose
> someone is sending a secret S in these messages, and the attacker gets
> to choose some prefix or suffix to send, e.g.
>
> X[0] = S+suffix[0]
> X[1] = S+suffi
>
>
>b. I'm hoping to find out if anyone else has seen similar work
>anywhere. I've not been able to find any references to this kind of
>attack, though once you've had the idea to try it, it's really pretty
>straightforward. (And I know there are a couple of occasional posters
>on this list wh
Sandy Harris wrote:
>
> John Kelsey wrote:
>
> > The basic result: Lossless compression algorithms leak data about their
> > input in the size of their output. ... However, compressors like Zip
> > deflate and Unix compress maintain state, which is changed as new bytes
> > of text are processed
Amir Herzberg wrote:
>
> John says,
>
> > I've been noticing a lot of ways you can mess up a cryptographic
> > protocol due to the "sliding around" of fields within a
> > signed or MACed
> > message. The classic example of this is the old attack on PGP
> > fingerprints, which let you use some o
The scariest part of this proposed bill is its definition of the term
"Interactive Digital Device":
The term "interactive digital device" means "any machine, device,
product, software, or technology, whether or not included with or as
part of some other machine, device, product, software, o
At 9:27 PM -0400 9/8/2001, Jay Sulzberger wrote:
>On Sat, 8 Sep 2001, Harald Koch wrote:
>
>> > It would be a civil offense to create or sell any kind of
>> > computer equipment that "does not include and utilize certified
>> > security technologies" approved by the federal government.
John Kelsey wrote:
>
> -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
>
> [ To: Perry's Crypto List ## Date: 09/08/01 07:35 pm ##
> Subject: Field slide attacks and how to avoid them. ]
>
> Guys,
>
> I've been noticing a lot of ways you can mess up a cryptographic
> protocol due to the "sliding around"
Am I right in that this bill would effectively outlaw all free
open-source operating systems like Linux, OpenBSD, FreeBSD, etc.?
Carsten Kuckuk
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The Cryptography Mailing List
Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography"
At 09:27 PM 09/08/2001 -0400, Jay Sulzberger wrote:
>The Hollings bill simply outlaws private ownership of home computers. It
>requires the Ministry of Infotainment to have permanent irremovable root
>privileges on every personal computer. The Ministry is required to run a
>complete log of every
John says,
> I've been noticing a lot of ways you can mess up a cryptographic
> protocol due to the "sliding around" of fields within a
> signed or MACed
> message. The classic example of this is the old attack on PGP
> fingerprints, which let you use some odd keysize, and thus get two
> diffe
John Kelsey wrote:
> The basic result: Lossless compression algorithms leak data about their
> input in the size of their output. ... However, compressors like Zip
> deflate and Unix compress maintain state, which is changed as new bytes
> of text are processed. This state basically is used to
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