In a message dated 11/5/01 10:55:39 AM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
in the account-based financial transaction ... the requestor is the
card-holder/consumer and the authorization or service entity is the
card-holder's financial institution.
I think you have nailed it on the head. When
In a message dated 11/5/01 11:28:57 AM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
then
you can only 'authenticate' between entities that share some
fairly complex secret information. Anything else can be spoofed
pretty easily.
The information does not have to be secret at all. It can be open, but not
In a message dated 11/2/01 8:46:25 PM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
the following from a thread on some of the fees related to fraud issues at
Again, this is only a very small part of the problem. The Inspector General's
office reports that the average identity fraud in the Social Security
In a message dated 11/1/01 11:09:21 AM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
It appears that a lot
of work has to be done and a lot of money spent before even a small amount of
trust in an individual's proof of identity (on a world- or Internet-wide
scale) can be established.
Not really. The problem
In a message dated 10/31/01 3:09:38 PM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
but do not PKI, encryption, [and] digital certificates, de-
pending on their use, actually help to PROVE one's identity through reliable,
trusted, or otherwise authoritative third parties?
In closed systems, yes. However, even