Re: Mozilla's Expectations for OCSP Incident Reporting

2020-05-15 Thread Tom Delmas via dev-security-policy
Browsers by default just ignore any OCSP error. So while the browser might have seen an error getting the OCSP reply, the user is not aware of it. And why Browsers do ignore OCSP errors? Because some CA don't take OCSP errors seriously. So yes, it has an impact: it comfort Browsers in that s

Re: Mozilla's Expectations for OCSP Incident Reporting

2020-05-15 Thread Hanno Böck via dev-security-policy
On Fri, 15 May 2020 10:13:01 -0400 Lee via dev-security-policy wrote: > How is this situation different from the time when the google ocsp > service was down? Maybe some clarification here: The Google OCSP was the OCSP for end entity certificates. The Identrust OCSP was the OCSP server for inter

Re: Mozilla's Expectations for OCSP Incident Reporting

2020-05-15 Thread Lee via dev-security-policy
On 5/15/20, Peter Gutmann via dev-security-policy wrote: > Hanno Böck writes: > >>The impact it had was a monitoring system that checked whether the >>certificate of a host was okay, using gnutls-cli with ocsp enabled (which >>also uncovered a somewhat unexpected inconsistency in how the gnutls c

Re: Mozilla's Expectations for OCSP Incident Reporting

2020-05-15 Thread Kurt Roeckx via dev-security-policy
On 2020-05-15 08:47, Peter Gutmann wrote: Hanno Böck writes: The impact it had was a monitoring system that checked whether the certificate of a host was okay, using gnutls-cli with ocsp enabled (which also uncovered a somewhat unexpected inconsistency in how the gnutls cli tool behaves[1]).

Re: Mozilla's Expectations for OCSP Incident Reporting

2020-05-14 Thread Peter Gutmann via dev-security-policy
Hanno Böck writes: >The impact it had was a monitoring system that checked whether the >certificate of a host was okay, using gnutls-cli with ocsp enabled (which >also uncovered a somewhat unexpected inconsistency in how the gnutls cli tool >behaves[1]). Sure, but if the only impact was on a spe

Re: Mozilla's Expectations for OCSP Incident Reporting

2020-05-13 Thread Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
On Wed, May 13, 2020 at 12:12 AM Peter Gutmann wrote: > Ryan Sleevi writes: > > >>Following up on this, would it be correct to assume that, since no-one > has > >>pointed out any impact that this had on anything, that it's more a > >>certificational issue than anything with real-world consequenc

Re: Mozilla's Expectations for OCSP Incident Reporting

2020-05-12 Thread Hanno Böck via dev-security-policy
On Wed, 13 May 2020 02:29:07 + Peter Gutmann via dev-security-policy wrote: > Following up on this, would it be correct to assume that, since > no-one has pointed out any impact that this had on anything, that > it's more a certificational issue than anything with real-world > consequences?

Re: Mozilla's Expectations for OCSP Incident Reporting

2020-05-12 Thread Peter Gutmann via dev-security-policy
Ryan Sleevi writes: >>Following up on this, would it be correct to assume that, since no-one has >>pointed out any impact that this had on anything, that it's more a >>certificational issue than anything with real-world consequences? > >That seems quite a suppositional leap, don't you think? It'

Re: Mozilla's Expectations for OCSP Incident Reporting

2020-05-12 Thread Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
On Tue, May 12, 2020 at 10:29 PM Peter Gutmann via dev-security-policy wrote: > > >Just to understand the scope of this, what was the impact on end users? > > Following up on this, would it be correct to assume that, since no-one has > pointed out any impact that this had on anything, that it's mo

Re: Mozilla's Expectations for OCSP Incident Reporting

2020-05-12 Thread Peter Gutmann via dev-security-policy
>Just to understand the scope of this, what was the impact on end users? Following up on this, would it be correct to assume that, since no-one has pointed out any impact that this had on anything, that it's more a certificational issue than anything with real-world consequences? Peter. _

Re: Mozilla's Expectations for OCSP Incident Reporting

2020-05-11 Thread Ben Wilson via dev-security-policy
Just an FYI - I've also started a thread on the CA/Browser Forum list to see about establishing OCSP uptime requirements in the Baseline Requirements. On Mon, May 11, 2020 at 5:45 AM Kurt Roeckx via dev-security-policy < dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > On 2020-05-08 21:03, Wayne T

Re: Mozilla's Expectations for OCSP Incident Reporting

2020-05-11 Thread Kurt Roeckx via dev-security-policy
On 2020-05-08 21:03, Wayne Thayer wrote: It was recently reported [1] that IdenTrust experienced a multi-day OCSP outage about two weeks ago. Other recent OCSP issues have resulted in incident reports [3][4], so I am concerned that IdenTrust didn't report this, and I created a bug [5] to ensure t

Re: [FORGED] Mozilla's Expectations for OCSP Incident Reporting

2020-05-09 Thread Peter Gutmann via dev-security-policy
Wayne Thayer via dev-security-policy writes: >It was recently reported [1] that IdenTrust experienced a multi-day OCSP >outage about two weeks ago. Just to understand the scope of this, what was the impact on end users? If it went on for multiple days then presumably no-one noticed it, the sec

Mozilla's Expectations for OCSP Incident Reporting

2020-05-08 Thread Wayne Thayer via dev-security-policy
It was recently reported [1] that IdenTrust experienced a multi-day OCSP outage about two weeks ago. Other recent OCSP issues have resulted in incident reports [3][4], so I am concerned that IdenTrust didn't report this, and I created a bug [5] to ensure that we track the issue (assuming the report