Dear all,
It has been pointed out to me that the second set I checked are actually old
certificates instead of the TBSparts.
As I mention below, the counter-cryptanalysis is only valid for the exact TBS
part that has those hashes.
Therefore, I have redone my analysis on the TBS parts of the
On Tuesday, July 19, 2016 at 1:05:13 PM UTC-7, Andrew Whalley wrote:
> Greetings,
>
> I have run the tool provided by dr.ir. Marc Stevens [1] on the
> tbsCertificates provided by Symantec [2]
>
> And see no evidence of collisions:
>
> $ ./sha1dcsum_partialcoll *.tbs
>
Dear Andrew,
I have created an extended version of my collision detection library [1] that,
instead of a small selection of best disturbance vectors for SHA-1 collision
attacks,
simply tests all disturbance vectors within the two classes (see p125 of [2]).
This should rule out *all*
Le mardi 19 juillet 2016 22:05:13 UTC+2, Andrew Whalley a écrit :
> Greetings,
>
> I have run the tool provided by dr.ir. Marc Stevens [1] on the
> tbsCertificates provided by Symantec [2]
>
> And see no evidence of collisions:
>
> $ ./sha1dcsum_partialcoll *.tbs
>
Greetings,
I have run the tool provided by dr.ir. Marc Stevens [1] on the
tbsCertificates provided by Symantec [2]
And see no evidence of collisions:
$ ./sha1dcsum_partialcoll *.tbs
6ead26663275c388662dfdbc23ff0a76cdcf74dc ssl1.tsysacquiring.net.1.tbs
3365793f36c197047b2f595c0f85c67b807c765f
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