Hi Forest,
I should say, it seems I went too far in describing the "potential approval
winner set" idea. That idea is only descriptive for the ordinary Plurality
criterion that is based on strict first preferences (because you can assume
that the approvals for those candidates would still be th
Someone at EM (when he was more honest?) said that the chicken dilemma
is voting-systems' most intractable problem.
But others here say or imply that it won't be a problem. Sure, if
you're a committed advocate of Beatpath, and if Beatpath is vulnerable
to chicken dilemma, then you're going to have
OK, then could we call it the "First-level-strategic Approval Winner set"
or the 1SAW set for short? I suspect better names are possible, but I can't
think of one.
As an aside: I think exploring good ranked methods like this is worthwhile
from a theoretical point of view. But from a practical pers
Kevin and Jameson,
thanks for the insights and suggestions. It's kind of you to suggest my
name, Jameson, but I would rather something more descriptive similar to
"the potential approval winner set" of Chris and Kevin or more public
relations friendly like the Democratically Acceptable Set. My or
For votinig-systems, properties are really important. That should be
obvious. What else is important in choosing among voting-systems?
At such time as any voting-system may be proposed to the public, it
would obviously be necessary to tell its properties. Especiallly its
purported advantages in t
Merit ranking of methods, for the Green scenario:
1. Woodall
2. Benham
3. AIRV (defined below)
4. IRV
5. Beatpath, RP, Approval, Score
AIRV (Approval-IRV):
Same as IRV, except allows equal ranking (at least for 1st place), and
all the candidates currently sharing top position in a ranking are
re
