Re: [EM] MMPO(IA>MPO) (was IA/MMPO)

OK, then could we call it the "First-level-strategic Approval Winner set" or the 1SAW set for short? I suspect better names are possible, but I can't think of one. As an aside: I think exploring good ranked methods like this is worthwhile from a theoretical point of view. But from a practical pers

Re: [EM] MMPO(IA>MPO) (was IA/MMPO)

The Simmons set? 2013/10/12 Forest Simmons > Kevin, > > In the first step of the variant method MMPO[IA >= MPO] (which, as the > name suggests, elects the MMPO candidate from among those having at least > as much Implicit Approval as Max Pairwise Opposition) all candidates with > greater MPO t

Re: [EM] [CES #9235] 2 hours to get 3 pledges, or I send you $5

Abd's advice was good but luckily unnecessary. I made it to 20 pledges, which includes over 15 new members. Details later. 2013/8/25 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax > At 12:58 PM 8/25/2013, Jameson Quinn wrote: > >> In the next 2 hours, if I don't get at least 3 people to pledge $5

[EM] 2 hours to get 3 pledges, or I send you $5

In the next 2 hours, if I don't get at least 3 people to pledge $5 a month (or $60) to the Center for Election Science , I'll give everyone who's pledged $5 of my own money. Please reply to me ( jameson.qu...@gmail.com) to pledge, and pass this on via email/twitter/etc.

[EM] Gender imbalance in the voting reform community

It's no secret that these mailing lists are overwhelmingly male; to the point where even a single post by a woman is an unusual event. It's also obvious that if we want to be effective activists for voting system reform, we can't ignore half of the population. So, what can we do about this problem

[EM] Want me to give you $5? (Or maybe, to donate to the CES)?

/metapolitics.quora.com/Matching-experiment-10x-your-impact-or-Ill-give-you-5-free> but here are the basic details: - You can make one or more "pledges" by messaging me (Jameson Quinn<http://www.quora.com/Jameson-Quinn>). (email also works) - If in 1 week (before noo

Re: [EM] "Top 2+1 Approval" primaries

2013/7/26 Peter Gustafsson > from: jameson.qu...@gmail.com > Date: Wed, 24 Jul 2013 12:54:09 -0600 > To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com; > electionscie...@googlegroups.com > Subject: [EM] "Top 2+1 Approval" primaries > Here's a simple proposal for a top-two-like mechanism for primaries, >

Re: [EM] [CES #9172] An idiosyncratic 4-D chart of voting system quality

2013/7/26 Clay Shentrup > On Friday, July 26, 2013 7:47:41 AM UTC-7, Bruce R. Gilson wrote: > >> To me, voter satisfaction also includes some other elements: especially, >> as we've debated, the question of "could I have done better by voting >> differently?" And of course, Approval, as I've poin

[EM] An idiosyncratic 4-D chart of voting system quality

An idiosyncratic 4-D chart of voting system quality by Jameson Quinn on Game Theory, Politics, and Meta<http://metapolitics.quora.com/An-idiosyncratic-4-D-chart-of-voting-system-quality> In general, while I'm happy to reply to comments on this material here, I'd prefer have the

[EM] "Top 2+1 Approval" primaries

Here's a simple proposal for a top-two-like mechanism for primaries, copied from an answer of mine on Quora<http://www.quora.com/Politics-of-the-U-S/How-would-you-redesign-the-top-two-primary-system/answer/Jameson-Quinn> : The simplest good solution would be "*Top 2+1 approval*&qu

[EM] Fwd: The list might like this...

An interesting article from DLW on modelling two-party voting as a battle between two networks. (The comments are depressingly stupid, though.) -- Forwarded message -- From: David L Wetzell Date: 2013/7/22 Subject: The list might like this... To: Jameson Quinn http://phys.org

Re: [EM] Preferential voting system where a candidate may win multiple seats

I have kept up with this thread only intermittently. It seems to have strayed significantly far away from its subject line, and while I've been interested in some of the points that have been made, it's hard to summarize the thread as a whole. There is one point I've wanted to make, which seems a

[EM] My Quora answer on egypt and voting systems

http://www.quora.com/Egyptian-Military-Ousts-Mohamed-Morsi-July-3-2013/What-were-the-primary-reasons-that-the-Egyptian-military-removed-Morsi-from-the-Presidency/answer/Jameson-Quinn Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] Burlington dumps IRV; Immunity from Majority Complaints (IMC) criterion

IMC seems to me to be too narrow to be a general criterion, if only one custom-built voting system passes it. WIMC is an interesting refinement of Condorcet and Smith. But neither belongs on Wikipedia without a "reliable" citation. Jameson 2013/7/5 > FairVote wrote (elsewhere, cited in EM): "..

Re: [EM] FairVote comment on Burlington dumping IRV

.) So in real life it could easily be that, say, CL and R dominate in first-choice support. Jameson 2013/7/4 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax > At 11:38 AM 7/4/2013, Jameson Quinn wrote: > >> OK. I think we can work this out. Before I make more arguments, I'm going >> to try to explai

[EM] Post-mortem on wikimedia's recent approval-with-abstention election

https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia_Foundation_elections_2013/Post_mortem I think it would be worthwhile to bring some expertise to the section at the end. But let's keep it on-topic and try to keep from getting too deep into the election theory weeds. Jameson Election-Methods mailing

Re: [EM] FairVote comment on Burlington dumping IRV

OK. I think we can work this out. Before I make more arguments, I'm going to try to explain the disagreements as I see them, and ask you more about what you're saying. A. MAV vs. ER-Bucklin (ERB, though we should probably find a better name at some point). That is, completion using above-median, o

Re: [EM] FairVote comment on Burlington dumping IRV

2013/7/3 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax > At 12:31 AM 7/3/2013, Jameson Quinn wrote: > >> Abd, I noticed something. I don't want to jump to any conclusions, so I'm >> asking you directly. >> >> 2013/7/3 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <<mailto:a...@lomaxdesign.com&g

Re: [EM] FairVote comment on Burlington dumping IRV

Abd, I noticed something. I don't want to jump to any conclusions, so I'm asking you directly. 2013/7/3 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax > > ... Bucklin ... You said "Bucklin", not "EMAV". So, two questions and a comment: Q1. Why did you change? Q2. Is there anything that would convince you to switch to

Re: [EM] Before Voting Methods and Criteria: Outcome Design Goals (long)

Kristofer nailed it as usual, I have only one small point to add: Let’s assume that we have a magical gift – a super power, if you will. >> We can know exactly what each voter thinks about each candidate. Now, >> because this comes from magic, it cannot unfortunately be used as a part >> of the e

Re: [EM] [CES #9024] Re: EMAV?

It seems to me that we're not connecting on several levels. Most importantly, on consensus process. I've participated in consensus decisions in real life, and it seems to me that there are at least two different ways they can break down. You are right that one of the ways is for a majority to lose

Re: [EM] My diffs w. Kristofer are not anti-reason.

2013/6/30 David L Wetzell > I've argued I have argued > > My next arg > > I then have argued > This is a long chain of reasoning. Each link may seem solid to you, but even if you are 80% right at each of four steps, by the end of the chain you're only 40% right. Yet you'd ne

Re: [EM] [CES #9013] Re: EMAV?

I responded with a new subject header because I was still hoping that Abd would respond to my earlier post, copied below: Abd: Frankly, I'm a bit frustrated. One of the main reasons I proposed MAV in the first place was that you seemed to support it. You've done a good job expressing the ad

Re: [EM] [CES #9004] Before Voting Methods and Criteria: Outcome Design Goals (long)

Benjamin: You are right to point out that we should have some discussion of basic principles to underly our discussion of specific systems. Here are my own views: 1. There is no single easy philosophical answer to these questions. There will always be those who, like Clay, would rather grab the q

[EM] EMAV?

Abd proposed Bucklin//Score, which he dubbed "evaluative majority approval voting". My first, and still my principal, response was: that's not bad, and if you can build were a consensus behind that, I'll sign on. I'd still like to see Abd respond to that ( and ideally commit to first mentioning a c

Re: [EM] MAV on electowiki

terion, but I wouldn't necessarily say that they're biased towards centrists; it really depends on how the voters act, and there are plausible scenarios for centrists losing in such systems. But I don't think IRV meets this bar. That is, center-squeeze is one of my main problems wit

Re: [EM] MAV on electowiki

dressing it only in its specific manifestations seems not to work, so I'm consciously deciding to be more forceful here. I hope you realize that I would not be doing this if I didn't truly respect your intelligence and insight. Jameson 2013/6/28 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax > At 06:10 PM 6/2

Re: [EM] Preferential voting system where a candidate may win multiple seats

> Another option is to introduce weights on each party for a given region. > Say that the Northern Norway region has 6 leveling seats. Then you > calculate the desired outcome for the NN region as a whole (using > Sainte-Laguë) and compare this to the current outcome (by adding up all the > county

Re: [EM] MAV on electowiki

2013/6/27 Chris Benham > Jameson, > > "I don't see it..." > > Say on an ABCD grading ballot you give your Lesser Evil X a B, and then in > the second round both X and your Greater Evil Y reach the majority > threshold. In that case you obviously might have cause to regret that you > didn't give

Re: [EM] MAV on electowiki

2013/6/26 Chris Benham > > Jameson, > > I don't like this version at all. These methods all have the problem that the voters have a strong incentive to just submit approval ballots, i.e. only use the top and bottom grades. You are right... if they believe that all other voters will act the same w

Re: [EM] [CES #8972] Score Voting and Approval Voting not practically substantially different from Plurality?

ocially acceptable. > > ** ** > > It just doesn’t seem like a nice intent to me. > > ** ** > > -Benn Grant > > eFix Computer Consulting > > b...@4efix.com > > 603.283.6601**** > > ** ** > > *From:* electionscie...@googlegroup

Re: [EM] [CES #8967] Score Voting and Approval Voting not practically substantially different from Plurality?

Benn, Warren did cross a line with you, and you were entirely justified in calling him on it. But on a list like this, with half a dozen people actively participating in each thread, it is really hard to decide whether to address people in the second or third person. I understand that after the inc

Re: [EM] [CES #8967] Score Voting and Approval Voting not practically substantially different from Plurality?

> I also believe that there is too much emphasis being given to > combatting "strategic voting". With the exception of lesser eviling, > which, I suppose, could be considered in this category, this is not > such a big problem, and certainly should not be used as an excuse for > supporting voting sy

Re: [EM] Score Voting and Approval Voting not practically substantially different from Plurality?

2013/6/25 Kristofer Munsterhjelm > On 06/25/2013 02:43 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote: > >> I've arrived at my destination, so I'll try to process through this >> thread. It's substantial, so I'll probably have several comments to >> make. I'll start wit

Re: [EM] Score Voting and Approval Voting not practically substantially different from Plurality?

I've arrived at my destination, so I'll try to process through this thread. It's substantial, so I'll probably have several comments to make. I'll start with a quick response to Kristofer. ... So, for rated methods, I suggest Majority Judgement. I absolutely agree that a median (aka Bucklin) met

Re: [EM] Richie/FairVote offer fix to Top Two primary, now let's offer to fix RCV!

This is a good idea, but it would be even better if you used a better voting system for the second round. In this case, approval or score would be adequate, but MAV or MCA would be better. If I'm going to dream, then SODA would be even better. I know, David, that you value working hand-in-hand wit

Re: [EM] [CES #8848] Re: MAV on electowiki

> Classic approval strategy suggests approving all candidates above the > expected election value. We've seen that advised again and again. > Right. Which is not necessarily the same as the average of the best and worst candidates, even in the zero-knowledge case. That's a flaw in your logic. Bu

Re: [EM] [CES #8848] Re: MAV on electowiki

> Separately: I don't understand why you insist that "D" is an unapproved >> grade. I have never treated it as anything but just another grade. >> Obviously, any candidate who won with a "D" rating would have a very weak >> mandate. >> > > ...It's a mess. Keep it simple. Right. That means, no sp

Re: [EM] MAV on electowiki

his model (unlike sparse or impartial models as criticized by Regenwetter) will allow good systems to show near-optimal BR; so MAV and Score will be have nearly the same (and nearly 0) honest BR, and the differences will be in that BR's robustness to different strategic profiles. Ja

Re: [EM] MAV on electowiki

I've reworked the description. See what you think. 2013/6/18 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax > At 04:25 PM 6/18/2013, Juho Laatu wrote: > >> I quickly read the article. Here are some observations. >> >> - Term "Bucklin system" has not been defined. I can guess that it >> probably refers to Bucklin style ste

[EM] MAV on electowiki

http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Majority_Approval_Voting Please help build up the article and work on the clearest consensus wording. This article is all my own voice so far; my goal is for it not to be. Jameson Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] [CES #8791] Upper-Bucklin naming (was: Median systems, branding....)

New running tally, including Andy Jennings's latest votes (which went out on only one of the lists). Current voting tallies in parentheses, ordered JQ/AL/RB/AJ/DSH/BG/BRG. Options have been placed in descending order, which I expect to be stable from here on. Abd: please vote on MAV, MSV, CAV, AAV

Re: [EM] HELP: Re: inline replies and Outlook 201x

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#cite_note-16>" 2013/6/18 Benjamin Grant > OK, I have been dealing with a huge issue, and that is using Outlook to > perform inline replies.**** > > ** ** > > When, for example, Jameson Quinn sends a long and nuance post to the

Re: [EM] Participation Criteria and Bucklin - perhaps they *can* work together after all?

2013/6/17 Benjamin Grant > *From:* Jameson Quinn [mailto:jameson.qu...@gmail.com] > *Sent:* Monday, June 17, 2013 3:14 PM > > *Subject:* Re: Participation Criteria and Bucklin - perhaps they *can* > work together after all? > > ** ** > > Unfortunately, Buckli

Re: [EM] Participation Criteria and Bucklin - perhaps they *can* work together after all?

2013/6/17 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax > At 01:23 PM 6/17/2013, Jameson Quinn wrote: > > 2013/6/17 Benjamin Grant > <<mailto:b...@4efix.com>benn@**4efix.com >> > >> >> >> Is *this* an example of Bucklin failing Participation? >> >> 5: A>B&g

Re: [EM] [CES #8791] Upper-Bucklin naming (was: Median systems, branding....)

I got votes from Bruce Gilson (BRG). New running tally. Current voting tallies in parentheses, ordered JQ/AL/RB/AJ/DSH/BG/BRG. Instant Runoff Approval Voting: (B/A/F/C/F/F/C) Median C. Descending Approval Threshold Voting: (A/B-/B/C/C/F/A) Median B-; votes above B, 2. *Majority Approval Voting

Re: [EM] Participation Criteria and Bucklin - perhaps they *can* work together after all?

Unfortunately, Bucklin systems fail that one too. However, it passes "Adding one more ballot that votes X as highest preference, and a ballot (either the same one or a second one) that votes Y as lowest preference, should never change the winner from X to Y". You can change "highest" to "above the

Re: [EM] [CES #8791] Upper-Bucklin naming (was: Median systems, branding....)

New running tally. Current voting tallies in parentheses, ordered JQ/AL/RB/AJ/DSH/BG. Note the new option for Additive Approval Voting, which could be a winner if Abd, Andy, and Ben like it enough. Current contenders for best are in bold. Instant Runoff Approval Voting: (B/A/F/C/F/F) Median C/F.

Re: [EM] Participation Criteria and Bucklin - perhaps they *can* work together after all?

2013/6/17 Benjamin Grant > Is **this** an example of Bucklin failing Participation? > > ** ** > > 5: A>B>C > > 4: B>C>A > > ** ** > > A wins > Right > > > ** ** > > But add these in: > > 2: C>A>B > > ** ** > > B wins. > Yes, with your "tiebreaker". Good job. But for ot

Re: [EM] [CES #8791] Upper-Bucklin naming (was: Median systems, branding....)

2013/6/17 Benjamin Grant > You just scared me, asking me how I vote, I don’t feel qualified to have > an opinion, I haven’t even focused on the conversation enough to know the > precise system you are talking about, so I was mostly just trying to stay > out of the way and let me elders do their b

Re: [EM] Participation Criteria and Bucklin - perhaps they *can* work together after all?

2013/6/17 Benjamin Grant > *From:* Jameson Quinn [mailto:jameson.qu...@gmail.com] > *Sent:* Monday, June 17, 2013 1:25 PM > > *Subject:* Re: Participation Criteria and Bucklin - perhaps they *can* > work together after all? > > ** ** > > So to make a ranked ex

Re: [EM] [CES #8791] Upper-Bucklin naming (was: Median systems, branding....)

2013/6/17 Benjamin Grant > A humorous (but utterly non-serious) thought just occurred to me: > > ** ** > > What voting method are you guys going to use to elect a name for this new > system? > The system itself, of course. So what do you vote? It's fine if you leave out any vote under C. An

Re: [EM] Participation Criteria and Bucklin - perhaps they *can* work together after all?

added 12 candidates there, but I'm sure with a little work I could get it down to somewhere in the range of just 4-8 extra candidates. But the point is made. Jameson 2013/6/17 Benjamin Grant > ** ** > > *From:* Jameson Quinn [mailto:jameson.qu...@gmail.com] > *Sent:* Monday, June

Re: [EM] [CES #8791] Upper-Bucklin naming (was: Median systems, branding....)

Two points: 1. I chatted with Rob Brown about the "upper Bucklin naming" question. His votes were: IRAV: F DAT: B Median Ranking: A Median Rating: A Median Grade: A Cumulative Best Approval (CBA): B I myself would give those latter four options C, C, B, and A respectively. Here are my votes on

Re: [EM] Voting Criteria 101, Four Criteria

2013/6/17 Kristofer Munsterhjelm > On 06/16/2013 06:55 PM, Benjamin Grant wrote: > >> With your kind indulgence, I would like some assistance in understanding >> and hopefully mastering the various voting criteria, so that I can more >> intelligently and accurately understanding the strengths and

Re: [EM] Participation Criteria and Bucklin - perhaps they *can* work together after all?

2013/6/17 Benjamin Grant > It occurred to me that the reason we are failing the Participation > Criteria with Bucklin in the below example: > > ** ** > > 49: X:1st Y:4th > > 50: X:5th Y:4th > > Y wins. > > ** ** > > Now we add two votes: > > 2: X:3rd Y:2nd > > X wins

Re: [EM] A dissent for Ben

I respect David's position and am happy to let him express it, but I would like to point out one moment when he steers close to building a straw man out of the rest of us: 2013/6/16 David L Wetzell > > ...we don't need to figure out the best single-winner election rule... > Those of us on this l

Re: [EM] List question

I have no idea what happened with your mailbox, but I got your message, and indeed just sent a somewhat lengthy response. Jameson 2013/6/16 Benjamin Grant > I submitted a post I was hoping for feedback on called “[EM] Voting > Criteria 101, Four Criteria” at around 1PM EST today. Now it’s about

Re: [EM] Voting Criteria 101, Four Criteria

2013/6/16 Benjamin Grant > ...I would like to explain what I understand about some of these voting > criteria, a few at a time... > Thanks for doing this, and again, welcome. *Name*: *Plurality* > > *Description*: If A gets more “first preference” ballots than B, A must > not lose to B. > >

Re: [EM] Absolutely new here

but I really want to “get” > all this. > By no means is it a problem. On the contrary, it's healthy for the list to go over the basics once in a while. Thanks, Jameson > > > ** ** > > Thanks. > > ** ** > > -Benn Grant > > eFix Computer Consulting > > b.

Re: [EM] Absolutely new here

As one of the principal advocates for Bucklin systems on this list, I thought I'd expand a bit on Kristofer's excellent response. 2013/6/16 Kristofer Munsterhjelm > On 06/16/2013 05:26 AM, Benjamin Grant wrote: > >> [...IRV discussion...] >> > > [...good response...] > > 2)I haven’t seen a voti

Re: [EM] [CES #8790] Upper-Bucklin naming (was: Median systems, branding....)

2013/6/15 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax > At 07:52 PM 6/14/2013, Jameson Quinn wrote: > >> So. Abd and I now agree that a Bucklin system which uses just the >> above-median votes to break ties is probably the best first step towards >> median voting. >> > > Let's s

Re: [EM] Upper-Bucklin naming (was: Median systems, branding....)

2013/6/15 Andy Jennings > I also report that I was talking with a progressive activist (and former > legislator) here in Arizona last year who didn't like branding of the word > "majority". He was afraid it would be a turn-off to those who feel like > the wrong majority is already too dominant.

[EM] Upper-Bucklin naming (was: Median systems, branding....)

So. Abd and I now agree that a Bucklin system which uses just the above-median votes to break ties is probably the best first step towards median voting. I'd like to get the details worked out, so we can stop using different terms ("Bucklin", "MJ", "GMJ") and settle on a single clearly-defined prop

Re: [EM] Median systems, branding, and activism strategy

I just had a minor realization. As I said to Abd, his Bucklin-ER (as I understand it) has slightly less resistance to the chicken dilemma than GMJ, because the Bucklin-ER tiebreaker effectively ends up focusing slightly below the median in the grade distribution, while GMJ focuses on a region balan

Re: [EM] Median systems, branding, and activism strategy

2013/6/12 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax > At 09:55 AM 6/12/2013, Jameson Quinn wrote: > >> As voting reform activists, we must work together as much as possible. In >> general, that means that raising awareness should start with teaching >> people about approval. Still, if someone

Re: [EM] Median systems, branding, and activism strategy

2013/6/12 Richard Fobes > On 6/12/2013 7:55 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote: > >> >> ... (As far as I know, MJ can only be expressed in one >> way). ... >> > > I wrote the following brief description of Majority Judgment. Is this > correct? If so,

Re: [EM] Electorama wiki requires login to view????

I think we could have plenty of question captchas of the form: - What letters are missing in "E_ecto_ama" (in order, no spaces)? - What letters are missing in "Gibba_d-Satterth_aite" (in order, no spaces)? etc. (Note the link

[EM] Median systems, branding, and activism strategy

As voting reform activists, we must work together as much as possible. In general, that means that raising awareness should start with teaching people about approval. Still, if someone is unsatisfied with the expressivity of approval, we should have a backup offering. Personally, I think that medi

[EM] Electorama wiki requires login to view????

The electorama wiki is an important resource for communicating about new methods. It allows linking to or searching for canonical definitions of the methods we like to discuss here, and that many of us hope to promote for real-world use. I just noticed that it has been set to not display pages exce

Re: [EM] Does Top Two Approval fail the Favorite Betrayal Criterion

;Joe" joke, then you didn't realize what I was talking about and implied I was serious. Misunderstanding. Cheers, Jameson 2013/6/7 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax > At 10:51 AM 6/7/2013, Jameson Quinn wrote: > >> I'm sorry, I don't want to get into an interminable back

Re: [EM] Does Top Two Approval fail the Favorite Betrayal Criterion

Lomax > At 06:28 PM 6/6/2013, Jameson Quinn wrote: > > 2013/6/6 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <<mailto:a...@lomaxdesign.com>a** >> b...@lomaxdesign.com > >> Subject was: Re: [EM] Someone thinks that Approval should meet the >> Mutual Majority Criterion >> >> Ja

Re: [EM] Does Top Two Approval fail the Favorite Betrayal Criterion

2013/6/6 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax > Subject was: Re: [EM] Someone thinks that Approval should meet the Mutual > Majority Criterion > > At 01:56 PM 6/6/2013, Jameson Quinn wrote: > > 2013/6/6 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <<mailto:a...@lomaxdesign.com>a** >> b...@lomaxdesig

Re: [EM] Someone thinks that Approval should meet the Mutual Majority Criterion

2013/6/6 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax > Another issue that was left a bit hanging in discussions on the CES list: > > Does top-two Approval fail the Favorite Betrayal Criterion? There are > really two forms of top-two Approval to be considered, plus a third detail. > > 1. Top two approval where two candid

Re: [EM] [CES #8565] Re: The chicken dilemma, median systems, and the pivotal voter

I don't think I've expressed my "pivotal voter" argument very well. Warren's response clearly points to some holes in what I've *said*, but I think my underlying argument is still firm. So before responding point-by-point, let me try again to say what I'm trying to get at. Assume a chicken scenar

[EM] The chicken dilemma, median systems, and the pivotal voter

I have argued before that median systems like MJand GMJ are more resistant to chicken dilemma pathologies than most other systems*. The various arguments I've made all come from the same underlying dynamics, but they express

Re: [EM] A simple thought experiment.

2013/5/29 David L Wetzell > Let's agree tentatively that Alternatives to IRV don't really outshine IRV > unless the number of competitive candidates exceeds 4. > I think that's false (the number should be 2.5), but OK, let's see where you're going with this. Then, if we used a 1+ the output of

[EM] Does IRV pass strategic condorcet?

If there is a majority Condorcet winner, any voting system that passes the majority criterion will elect that candidate in a unique strong Nash equilibrium. But the standard version of chicken dilemma involves a non-majority Condorcet winner: 40: X 35: Y>Z 25: Z>Y Y is the CW, but the victory over

Re: [EM] [CES #8439] "true expressivities" of voting methods

Interesting, that you can usually calculate the median using 1.5 bits per grade. That would seem to indicate that a 3-level Bucklin system such as MCA uses approximately all the info on the ballot. I've also noticed before that 3-level ballots have another interesting property: the differences betw

Re: [EM] [CES #8174] Criteria satisfied (and not) by score voting

What's with renaming later-no-harm as "secret preferences"? If you want to make the argument that the name should be changed in general, this one obscure web page seems to be a funny place to do so. Sometimes it's worth just using the same words other people do. 2013/5/11 Warren D Smith > http:/

Re: [EM] Article on BSMB

> Forum question: Speaking of that awful voting method, is there a name for > the idea of each voter getting a specific number of points (such as 100 per > voter) and then distributing those points among the choices and then > assuming that the choices with the most points are the most popular? > >

Re: [EM] Current SODA not monotonic; fixable. (mono-voter-raise)

man Lomax > At 01:09 PM 4/19/2013, Jameson Quinn wrote: > >> Consider the following scenario in SODA: >> >> 1: A(>C>B>D) >> 2: B,X >> 2: C(>B>A>D) >> 1: D(>A>C>B) >> 1: null >> >> Presume all ties are predictab

Re: [EM] Current SODA not monotonic; fixable. (mono-voter-raise)

2013/4/19 Richard Fobes > On 4/19/2013 11:09 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote: > >> ... >> >> So, what do people think? Should I change the default definition of SODA >> to make it have better compliances? Or should I keep it the way it is >> because the change would

[EM] Current SODA not monotonic; fixable. (mono-voter-raise)

Consider the following scenario in SODA: 1: A(>C>B>D) 2: B,X 2: C(>B>A>D) 1: D(>A>C>B) 1: null Presume all ties are predictably broken for the alphabetically-first candidate (without this presumption, you'd need larger numbers, but you could still make a similar scenario). Under SODA with rationa

Re: [EM] Cloneproofing Random Pair and Random Candidate?

2013/4/4 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax > At 01:54 PM 4/4/2013, Jameson Quinn wrote: > > Hay voting seems to have been invented to encourage the expression of >> sincere utilities, as distinct from von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities, and >> there is a whole practically knee-jerk assump

Re: [EM] Cloneproofing Random Pair and Random Candidate?

By the way, I should have credited Warren smith for this realization: However, there are crazy circumstances of incomplete information where > non-semi-honest strategies are rational, for all three kinds of methods. > As I said, I think it's not relevant to the real world, but it is quite interes

Re: [EM] Cloneproofing Random Pair and Random Candidate?

> Hay voting seems to have been invented to encourage the expression of > sincere utilities, as distinct from von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities, and > there is a whole practically knee-jerk assumption in voting system theory > that "strategy" is "bad." You've made that assertion, that people are

Re: [EM] Cloneproofing Random Pair and Random Candidate?

2013/4/4 Kristofer Munsterhjelm > > > Not as I understood the description. > Right; you beat me to it. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] Cloneproofing Random Pair and Random Candidate?

2013/4/4 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax > At 02:24 AM 4/3/2013, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: > >> However, there is a rated method that is also strategy-proof. It is >> called Hay voting. Some time ago, I stumbled across >> http://www.panix.com/~tehom/**essays/hay-extended.html

Re: [EM] Election-Methods Digest, Vol 106, Issue 2

2013/4/3 Forest Simmons > > > On Wed, Apr 3, 2013 at 12:07 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm < > km_el...@lavabit.com> wrote: > >> On 04/03/2013 12:01 AM, Forest Simmons wrote: >> >>> Jobst has suggested that ballots be used to elicit voter's "consensus >>> thresholds" for the various candidates. >>> >>

Re: [EM] proportional constraints - help needed

2013/2/11 Kristofer Munsterhjelm > On 02/09/2013 09:41 PM, Richard Fobes wrote: > >> > 2013/2/6 Richard >> Fobes >> >: >> >> How many candidates would/could compete for the five (open) >> >> party-list positions? >> On 2/6/2013 3:12 PM, Peter Zbornik wrote: >> > Say twenty, for instance. >>

Re: [EM] proportional constraints - help needed

I think I've figured this out. Use a quota of 2/11 for normal slots. The quota for quoted slots will be somewhere between 3/22 and 2/11; thus the remainder will be between 1/11 and 2/11. When you hit a quoted slot, first see who would win the remaining slots under normal STV — call that set Ⓐ. Th

Re: [EM] proportional constraints - help needed

I think V should be 3/4 (if quoted-in) or 1 (if would have won that same seat anyway). Thus, the quota would be 2/11, and the leftover (unrepresented) quota at the end would be between 1/11 (Hare-like) and 2/11 (Droop-like). Jameson 2013/2/7 Juho Laatu > I try to address the targets one more ro

Re: [EM] proportional constraints - help needed

oportionality within each > gender, but rather proportionality of quoted-in candidates. > > PZ > > > 2013/2/6 Jameson Quinn : > > STV is not my personal favorite PR rule (my favorites are Bucklin > > Transferrable Vote or PAL Representation, and Schulze PR is also bett

Re: [EM] proportional constraints - help needed

STV is not my personal favorite PR rule (my favorites are Bucklin Transferrable Vote or PAL Representation, and Schulze PR is also better than STV). However, if you're starting from STV, the way to do the quota is clear. When the quota makes one gender ineligible for a seat, simply ignore that gend

Re: [EM] The successful repeal of Approval by the Dartmouth Board of Trustees

2013/1/27 Gervase Lam > I was looking through the Approval Voting article and noticed that it > mentioned that in 2009 the Dartmouth Board of Trustees had Approval > successfully repealed. > > It quotes an article in the web saying: "When the alumni electorate > fails to take advantage of the app

Re: [EM] Canadian politician supports "a preferential ballot, or a ranked ballot"

2013/1/18 Kristofer Munsterhjelm > On 01/17/2013 06:07 PM, Richard Fobes wrote: > > Soon enough, just as has happened in Aspen (CO) and Burlington (VT), the >> weaknesses of IRV counting will get exposed. In the meantime, just >> getting people to talk about, and think about, the possibility of

Re: [EM] Jameson: How we can get voting-system reform

2013/1/16 Michael Ossipoff > 2013/1/14 Michael Ossipoff > > > 2013/1/14 Michael Ossipoff > > > > > > IRV will be the next voting system, and that's very much ok. > > > > > > > > Michael's statement above is based on the idea that voting reform will > > happen through a third party gaining major

Re: [EM] Jameson: How will voting system reform happen?

2013/1/14 Michael Ossipoff > 2013/1/14 Michael Ossipoff > > > > IRV will be the next voting system, and that's very much ok. > > > > > Michael's statement above is based on the idea that voting reform will > happen through a third party gaining majority power. I believe that this > is, frankly,

Re: [EM] Lomax: IRV, Bucklin, TTR

2013/1/14 Michael Ossipoff > > IRV will be the next voting system, and that's very much ok. > > Michael's statement above is based on the idea that voting reform will happen through a third party gaining majority power. I believe that this is, frankly, a pipe dream. Third parties can and should ha

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