Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> No, it won't be bored because there is no way for it to know that it is going
> through the
> first or the second run. The point I was trying to make is that there is no
> real basis for
> distinguishing between a recording and a program,
There is a basis for di
John,
Le 23-août-06, à 22:24, <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> As I 'believe': anything recognized by our 'senses' are our mental
> interpretations of the unattainable 'reality' (if we condone its
> validity). "My world" is a posteriori.
This is almost my favorite way to explain Plato in one
heerz
John M
- Original Message -
From: "Bruno Marchal"
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Wednesday, August 23, 2006 10:31
AM
Subject: Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS:
ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Le 23-août-06, à 03:58, Brent Mee
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent Meeker writes:
>
>
>>Almost is not completely. In any case, I don't think consciousness is
>>maintained
>>indefinitely with no inputs. I think a "brain-in-a-vat" would go into an
>>endless
>>loop without external stimulus.
>
>
> That's an assumption,
Le 23-août-06, à 03:58, Brent Meeker a écrit :
>>
>> People who believes that inputs (being either absolute-material or
>> relative-platonical) are needed for consciousness should not believe
>> that we can be conscious in a dream, given the evidence that the brain
>> is almost completely cut ou
Brent Meeker writes:
> Almost is not completely. In any case, I don't think consciousness is
> maintained
> indefinitely with no inputs. I think a "brain-in-a-vat" would go into an
> endless
> loop without external stimulus.
That's an assumption, but even if true it would only say somethin
Le 21-août-06, à 22:20, Brent Meeker a écrit :
> I thought the question was not about computation, but whether a
> program was
> intelligent or conscious. I think that intelligence means being able
> to respond to a
> variety of differenet inputs. So above |CODE| might be intelligent
> but
Peter Jones writes (quoting Bruno Marchal):
> > People who believes that inputs (being either absolute-material or
> > relative-platonical) are needed for consciousness should not believe
> > that we can be conscious in a dream, given the evidence that the brain
> > is almost completely cut out f
Brent Meeker writes (quoting SP):
> > You might say that a computer program has a two-way interaction with its
> > environment while a recording does not, but it is easy to imagine a
> > situation
> > where this can be perfectly reproduced by a recording. In run no. 1, you
> > start up
> > the
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Le 22-août-06, à 15:26, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
>
>
>>OK, I suppose you could say "I'm intelligent" but not "I + my
>>environment are intelligent".
>>That still allows that an inputless program might contain intelligent
>>beings, and you are left
>>with the prob
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 22-août-06, à 15:26, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
>
> > OK, I suppose you could say "I'm intelligent" but not "I + my
> > environment are intelligent".
> > That still allows that an inputless program might contain intelligent
> > beings, and you are left
> > with the pr
Le 22-août-06, à 15:26, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
> OK, I suppose you could say "I'm intelligent" but not "I + my
> environment are intelligent".
> That still allows that an inputless program might contain intelligent
> beings, and you are left
> with the problem of how to decide whether a
Brent meeker writes (quoting Peter Jones, Quentin Anciaux and SP):
> >>Hi,
> >>
> >>Le Dimanche 20 Août 2006 05:17, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
> >>
> >>>Peter Jones writes (quoting SP):
> >>>
> >What about an inputless computer program, running deterministically
> >like a recording. Wo
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter Jones writes:
>
>
>> And such a universe could be emulated as a running, deterministic process.
>> But
>> that won't get you into Plato's heaven, because it is a *running* process --
>> it
>> is still dynamic. A recording of the process could exist in Plato'
Peter Jones writes:
> And such a universe could be emulated
> as a running, deterministic process. But
> that won't get you into Plato's heaven,
> because it is a *running* process -- it is still
> dynamic. A recording of the process could
> exist in Plato's heaven, but it wouldn't have
> all the
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> Right!
>
>
>
>
>
>>From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>>To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
>>Subject: Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
>>Date: Sun, 2
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter Jones writes:
>
> > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > > Peter Jones writes:
> > >
> > > > > Is it possible that we are currently actors in a single,
> > > > > deterministic, non-branching
> > > > > computer program, with the illusion of free will and if-then
> >
Peter Jones writes:
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > Peter Jones writes:
> >
> > > > Is it possible that we are currently actors in a single, deterministic,
> > > > non-branching
> > > > computer program, with the illusion of free will and if-then
> > > > contingency in general
> > > > being du
Right!
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
> Subject: Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
> Date: Sun, 20 Aug 2006 10:18:18 +0200
>
>
> Hi,
>
> Le Dimanche
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> Hi,
>
> Le Dimanche 20 Août 2006 05:17, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
> > Peter Jones writes (quoting SP):
> > > > What about an inputless computer program, running deterministically
> > > > like a recording. Would that count as a program at all,
> > >
> > > It would be a
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter Jones writes:
>
> > > Is it possible that we are currently actors in a single, deterministic,
> > > non-branching
> > > computer program, with the illusion of free will and if-then contingency
> > > in general
> > > being due to the fact that we don't know the
Le 19-août-06, à 15:36, Günther wrote:
>> The existence of numbers is not like the existence of objects, and I
>> don't
>> think that most mathematical Platonists would say that it is.
I agree with them. We have to distinguish many forms of "internal" or
epistemological existence, build from
Hi,
Le Dimanche 20 Août 2006 05:17, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
> Peter Jones writes (quoting SP):
> > > What about an inputless computer program, running deterministically
> > > like a recording. Would that count as a program at all,
> >
> > It would be a trivial case.
>
> Trivial does not mea
Peter Jones writes:
> > Is it possible that we are currently actors in a single, deterministic,
> > non-branching
> > computer program, with the illusion of free will and if-then contingency in
> > general
> > being due to the fact that we don't know the details of how the program
> > will pl
Peter Jones writes (quoting SP):
> > What about an inputless computer program, running deterministically like a
> > recording.
> > Would that count as a program at all,
>
> It would be a trivial case.
Trivial does not mean false.
> > and could it be a conscious program, given that
> > compu
Le 18-août-06, à 22:59, complexitystudies a écrit :
>>
>
> As 1Z has so nicely put, existence implies causal interaction.
> Numbers cannot causally interact, therefore they do not exist,
> save as thoughts in our brains.
Don(t say this to a logician. there are as many notion of "causality"
tha
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Günther writes:
>
> > Well, let's see: in Alice in Wonderland, Humpty Dumpty fell off a
> > wall. This is true, isn't it? It is certainly true independent
> > of our minds. Indeed, it is true in such a way that even when
> > all humans have died, this universe will ha
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Is it possible that we are currently actors in a single, deterministic,
> non-branching
> computer program, with the illusion of free will and if-then contingency in
> general
> being due to the fact that we don't know the details of how the program will
> play
>
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter Jones writes (quoting SP):
>
> > > I've never really understood why computationalists insist that a system
> > > must be able to handle counterfactuals in order for consciousness to
> > > occur,
> >
> > I've explained that several times: computer programmes con
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 18-août-06, à 17:02, 1Z a écrit :
>
> > It is for Pythagorenas and Platonists to explain what they mean by
> > "exist".
> >
> > However, if you are going to claim that we are actually *in* Platonia,
> > (mathematical monism) there must be some equivalence between the
> >
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 18-août-06, à 17:38, 1Z a écrit :
>
> > That is an explanation of mind-independence, not of existence.
> > The anti-Platonist (e.g. the formalist) can claim that
> > the truth of mathematical statments is mind-independent,
> > but their existence isn't.
>
>
> "Their" ex
Le 18-août-06, à 17:38, 1Z a écrit :
> That is an explanation of mind-independence, not of existence.
> The anti-Platonist (e.g. the formalist) can claim that
> the truth of mathematical statments is mind-independent,
> but their existence isn't.
"Their" existence ? Mathematical statements ne
Le 18-août-06, à 17:02, 1Z a écrit :
> It is for Pythagorenas and Platonists to explain what they mean by
> "exist".
>
> However, if you are going to claim that we are actually *in* Platonia,
> (mathematical monism) there must be some equivalence between the
> existence we
> have and the existen
Le 19-août-06, à 08:48, Brent Meeker wrote quoting Stathis Papaioannou
>>
>> What more could we possibly ask of a theorem other than that it be
>> true relative to some
>> axioms? That a theorem should describe some aspect of the real world,
>> or that it should
>> be discovered by some mathem
Brent Meeker writes (quoting SP):
> >>But the fact that a theorem is true relative to some axioms doesn't make it
> >>true
> >>or existent. Some mathematicians I know regard it as a game. Is true that
> >>a
> >>bishop can only move diagonally? It is relative to chess. Does chess
> >>exis
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent Meeker writes:
>
>
>>>Even if you say that, there is still a sense in which arithmetic is
>>>independent of the
>>>real world. The same can be said of Euclidian geometry: it follows from
>>>Euclid's axioms
>>>*despite* the fact that real space is not Euclid
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent Meeker writes:
>
>
>>>Even if you say that, there is still a sense in which arithmetic is
>>>independent of the
>>>real world. The same can be said of Euclidian geometry: it follows from
>>>Euclid's axioms
>>>*despite* the fact that real space is not Euclid
Günther writes:
> Well, let's see: in Alice in Wonderland, Humpty Dumpty fell off a
> wall. This is true, isn't it? It is certainly true independent
> of our minds. Indeed, it is true in such a way that even when
> all humans have died, this universe will have a contained a life-form
> which pro
Brent Meeker writes:
> 1Z wrote:
> >
> > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> ...
> >>I've never really understood why computationalists insist that a system
> >>must be able to handle counterfactuals in order for consciousness to occur,
> >
> >
> > I've explained that several times: computer program
Brent Meeker writes:
> > Even if you say that, there is still a sense in which arithmetic is
> > independent of the
> > real world. The same can be said of Euclidian geometry: it follows from
> > Euclid's axioms
> > *despite* the fact that real space is not Euclidian. The fact that real
> >
Peter Jones writes (quoting SP):
> > I've never really understood why computationalists insist that a system
> > must be able to handle counterfactuals in order for consciousness to occur,
>
> I've explained that several times: computer programmes contain
> if-then statements.
>
> > other th
>
>
>
> 1Z wrote:
>
>> Not even remotely. I fact, what I have said can be written as two valid
>> syllogisms.
>>
>> Existence is availability for causal interaction
>> Numbers are not available for causal interaction
>> Numbers do not exist
>>
>> Platonism is the claim that numbers exist
>> Number
complexitystudies wrote:
>
>>I think it has been said several times :
>>
>>The existence of a number/arithmetical proposition is the fact that its
>>existence/truth does not depend on the fact that you exist/that it exists
>>conscious beings capable of thinking of it.
>>
>>So the truth value of
complexitystudies wrote:
...
>
>
> Not exactly. Animals and babies can distinguish up to 2-3 objects
> (innate arithmetic, subitizing). The experiments with which this has
> been ascertained are both fascinating and entertaining (google is your
> friend ;-)
> This ability has an evolutionary adv
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Le 17-août-06, à 00:14, complexitystudies a écrit :
> I recall it is just the belief that the
> propositions of elementary arithmetic are independent of you. Do you
> sincerley belief that 37 could be a non prime number? Or that the
> square root of 2 can equal to a r
Hi,
Le Vendredi 18 Août 2006 22:17, complexitystudies a écrit :
> > I think it has been said several times :
> >
> > The existence of a number/arithmetical proposition is the fact that its
> > existence/truth does not depend on the fact that you exist/that it exists
> > conscious beings capable o
Brent Meeker wrote:
> 1Z wrote:
> >
> > Brent Meeker wrote:
> >
> >>1Z wrote:
> ...
> >>>If two systems differ counterfactually, they are not physically
> >>>identical.
> >>
> >>I don't think I understand this either.
> >
> >
> > Either that, or counterfactuallity is asupernatural phenomenon.
>
1Z wrote:
> Not even remotely. I fact, what I have said can be written as two valid
> syllogisms.
>
> Existence is availability for causal interaction
> Numbers are not available for causal interaction
> Numbers do not exist
>
> Platonism is the claim that numbers exist
> Numbers do not exist
> I think it has been said several times :
>
> The existence of a number/arithmetical proposition is the fact that its
> existence/truth does not depend on the fact that you exist/that it exists
> conscious beings capable of thinking of it.
>
> So the truth value of a proposition is independa
1Z wrote:
>
> Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>>1Z wrote:
...
>>>If two systems differ counterfactually, they are not physically
>>>identical.
>>
>>I don't think I understand this either.
>
>
> Either that, or counterfactuallity is asupernatural phenomenon.
>
>
>>Computer programs contain if-then
>>s
Brent Meeker wrote:
> 1Z wrote:
> >
> > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> ...
> >>I've never really understood why computationalists insist that a system
> >>must be able to handle counterfactuals in order for consciousness to occur,
> >
> >
> > I've explained that several times: computer programmes c
Brent Meeker wrote:
> But the fact that a theorem is true relative to some axioms doesn't make it
> true
> or existent.
It doesn't make it *false* relative to those axioms. It has
to be estbalished that a mathematical statement needs to or
can aspire to further kinds of truth,
--~--~
1Z wrote:
>
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
...
>>I've never really understood why computationalists insist that a system
>>must be able to handle counterfactuals in order for consciousness to occur,
>
>
> I've explained that several times: computer programmes contain
> if-then statements.
>
>
>
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent Meeker writes (quoting Peter Jones and SP):
>
>
Arithemtical Platonism is the belief that mathematical
structures *exist* independently of you,
not just that they are true independently of you.
>>>
>>>
>>>What's the difference?
>>>
>>>Stathis Papaio
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> Le Vendredi 18 Août 2006 14:21, 1Z a écrit :
> > Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> > > Hi,
> > >
> > > Le vendredi 18 août 2006 11:52, 1Z a écrit :
> > > > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > > > > Peter Jones writes (quoting Bruno Marchal):
> > > > > > > Frankly I don't think so. Set
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> Le Vendredi 18 Août 2006 17:02, 1Z a écrit :
> > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > > Peter Jones writes:
> > > > > What's the difference?
> > > >
> > > > Things that exist are available for causal interaction. Numbers aren't.
> > >
> > > What could it possibly mean for numbe
Le Vendredi 18 Août 2006 17:02, 1Z a écrit :
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > Peter Jones writes:
> > > > What's the difference?
> > >
> > > Things that exist are available for causal interaction. Numbers aren't.
> >
> > What could it possibly mean for numbers to "exist" in the sense you claim
> >
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter Jones writes:
>
> > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > > Peter Jones writes:
> > >
> > > > A claim about truth as opposed to existence cannot
> > > > support the conclusion that matter does not actually exist.
> > >
> > > It can if you can show that the mental does
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter Jones writes:
> > > What's the difference?
> >
> >
> > Things that exist are available for causal interaction. Numbers aren't.
>
> What could it possibly mean for numbers to "exist" in the sense you claim
> they do not? Could I be mugged by a burly number 6 in
Le Vendredi 18 Août 2006 14:21, 1Z a écrit :
> Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> > Hi,
> >
> > Le vendredi 18 août 2006 11:52, 1Z a écrit :
> > > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > > > Peter Jones writes (quoting Bruno Marchal):
> > > > > > Frankly I don't think so. Set platonism can be considered as a
> > > >
Peter Jones writes:
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > Peter Jones writes:
> >
> > > A claim about truth as opposed to existence cannot
> > > support the conclusion that matter does not actually exist.
> >
> > It can if you can show that the mental does not supervene
> > on the physical.
>
> I don
Peter Jones writes:
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > Peter Jones writes (quoting Bruno Marchal):
> >
> > > > Frankly I don't think so. Set platonism can be considered as a bold
> > > > assumption, but number platonism, as I said you need a sophisticated
> > > > form of finitism to doubt it. I rec
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> Hi,
>
> Le vendredi 18 août 2006 11:52, 1Z a écrit :
> > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > > Peter Jones writes (quoting Bruno Marchal):
> > > > > Frankly I don't think so. Set platonism can be considered as a bold
> > > > > assumption, but number platonism, as I said you ne
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter Jones writes:
>
> > A claim about truth as opposed to existence cannot
> > support the conclusion that matter does not actually exist.
>
> It can if you can show that the mental does not supervene
> on the physical.
I don't see how that is connected,
and I don'
Brent Meeker writes (quoting Peter Jones and SP):
> >>Arithemtical Platonism is the belief that mathematical
> >>structures *exist* independently of you,
> >>not just that they are true independently of you.
> >
> >
> > What's the difference?
> >
> > Stathis Papaioannou
>
> You could regard t
Hi,
Le vendredi 18 août 2006 11:52, 1Z a écrit :
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > Peter Jones writes (quoting Bruno Marchal):
> > > > Frankly I don't think so. Set platonism can be considered as a bold
> > > > assumption, but number platonism, as I said you need a sophisticated
> > > > form of fi
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter Jones writes (quoting Bruno Marchal):
>
> > > Frankly I don't think so. Set platonism can be considered as a bold
> > > assumption, but number platonism, as I said you need a sophisticated
> > > form of finitism to doubt it. I recall it is just the belief that t
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter Jones writes (quoting Bruno Marchal):
>
>
>>>Frankly I don't think so. Set platonism can be considered as a bold
>>>assumption, but number platonism, as I said you need a sophisticated
>>>form of finitism to doubt it. I recall it is just the belief that the
>>>
Peter Jones writes:
> A claim about truth as opposed to existence cannot
> support the conclusion that matter does not actually exist.
It can if you can show that the mental does not supervene
on the physical. This is far from a generally accepted fact,
but there but I am not yet aware of conv
Peter Jones writes (quoting Bruno Marchal):
> > Frankly I don't think so. Set platonism can be considered as a bold
> > assumption, but number platonism, as I said you need a sophisticated
> > form of finitism to doubt it. I recall it is just the belief that the
> > propositions of elementary ari
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 17-août-06, à 16:41, 1Z a écrit :
>
> > Arithemtical Platonism is the belief that mathematical
> > structures *exist* independently of you,
> > not just that they are true independently of you.
>
> What is the difference between ""the proposition "it exists a prime
> num
Le 17-août-06, à 16:41, 1Z a écrit :
> Arithemtical Platonism is the belief that mathematical
> structures *exist* independently of you,
> not just that they are true independently of you.
What is the difference between ""the proposition "it exists a prime
number" is true independently of me",
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 17-août-06, à 00:14, complexitystudies a écrit :
>
> >
> >> Again we are discussing the arithmetical realism (which I just
> >> assume).
> >
> > A bold assumption, if I may say so.
>
>
> Frankly I don't think so. Set platonism can be considered as a bold
> assumption, bu
Le 17-août-06, à 00:14, complexitystudies a écrit :
>
>> Again we are discussing the arithmetical realism (which I just
>> assume).
>
> A bold assumption, if I may say so.
Frankly I don't think so. Set platonism can be considered as a bold
assumption, but number platonism, as I said you need
complexitystudies wrote:
> Hi Bruno,
>
> > Again we are discussing the arithmetical realism (which I just assume).
>
> A bold assumption, if I may say so.
>
> > To be clear on that hypothesis, I do indeed find plausible that the
> > number six is perfect, even in the case the "branes would not hav
Hi Bruno,
> Again we are discussing the arithmetical realism (which I just assume).
A bold assumption, if I may say so.
> To be clear on that hypothesis, I do indeed find plausible that the
> number six is perfect, even in the case the "branes would not have
> collide, no big bang, no physic
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