Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 18-juil.-06, à 18:42, 1Z a écrit :
> >> and I would say experimentally vague since the birth of experimental
> >> quantum philosophy (EPR, Bell, Shimoni, Feynman, Deutsch, Bennett
> >> ...).
> >
> > Huh Electrons and photons are still matter...what *do* you mean ?
Le 18-juil.-06, à 18:42, 1Z a écrit :
>
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> Le 12-juil.-06, à 18:06, 1Z a écrit :
>>
>>>
>>> I mean that is what material exists regardless of any mathematical
>>> justification.
>>
>> So this is your main hypothesis: what is material exist.
>> Now my problem is that a
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >> No. But what actually *seems* to exist, could emerge from mathematical
> >> truth.
> >
> > No, same problem. There's no more any phenomenality to be
> > found in maths than any substantiallity.
>
>
>
>
> But there is no more any phenomenality to be found in physics,
T
Le 18-juil.-06, à 17:02, 1Z a écrit :
>
> It is far from obvious that a simulation even
> contains 1stP POV's.
I agree with you. That is why I postulate comp to begin with.
> In any case
> that doesn't effect the logic: simulations
> *might* be detectable, so they are not necessarily
> i
Bruno and 1Z:
both of you write extraordinary wise remarks in
approx. 3-4 times as many words than I can attentively
folloow.
However - with mostly agreeing with the positions of
BOTH OF YOU - I may remark (hopefully in less words??)
*
I consider the epistemic development of our experience
about
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 12-juil.-06, à 18:06, 1Z a écrit :
>
> >
> > I mean that is what material exists regardless of any mathematical
> > justification.
>
> So this is your main hypothesis: what is material exist.
> Now my problem is that a term like "material" is very vague in physics,
Huh
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 18-juil.-06, à 16:37, 1Z a écrit :
>
>
> > A computer simulation is obviously computable.
>
>
> Not necessarily from the first person povs.
It is far from obvious that a simulation even
contains 1stP POV's. In any case
that doesn't effect the logic: simulations
*might*
Le 18-juil.-06, à 16:37, 1Z a écrit :
> A computer simulation is obviously computable.
Not necessarily from the first person povs.
> The word "emerge" is often used to hide magic.
I agree with you. Often, but not necessarily always.
> What actually exists cannot emerge from mere tru
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 18-juil.-06, à 12:30, 1Z a écrit :
>
> >> Quentin Anciaux: Because if you were in a "simulation" and you have
> >> managed to get out of it,
> >> how can you know you have reach the bottom level of reality (ie: the
> >> material
> >> world then) ? How can you know the ne
Le 18-juil.-06, à 12:30, 1Z a écrit :
>> Quentin Anciaux: Because if you were in a "simulation" and you have
>> managed to get out of it,
>> how can you know you have reach the bottom level of reality (ie: the
>> material
>> world then) ? How can you know the new real world you are now in is
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> Le Mercredi 12 Juillet 2006 23:54, 1Z a écrit :
> > Bruno-computationalism is standard computationalism+platonism.
> > Since I reject platomnism, I reject Bruno-computationalism
> > (whilst having rather less problem with the standard computational
> > thesis, that "cogn
1Z wrote:
Erratum:
> http://www.geocities.com/peterdjones/diagrams/time_growing.jpg
>
> http://www.geocities.com/peterdjones/met_time2.html
--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" grou
Jesse Mazer wrote:
> 1Z wrote:
>
> >
> >Jesse Mazer wrote:
> >IOW, if MMW heories worked, MMW theories would work.
>
> No, that is not a fair paraphrase of what I said. I meant exactly what I
> said I meant--if a hypothesis is not well-defined enough to tell you the
> relative probability of di
Jesse Mazer wrote:
> 1Z wrote:
>
> >
> >Jesse Mazer wrote:
> > > 1Z wrote:
> > >
> >
> > > If a theory can't predict the relative probabilities of X vs. Y, that is
> >not
> > > in any way equivalent to the statement that it predicts X and Y are
> >equally
> > > likely. One is an absence of any p
Le 12-juil.-06, à 18:06, 1Z a écrit :
>
> I mean that is what material exists regardless of any mathematical
> justification.
So this is your main hypothesis: what is material exist.
Now my problem is that a term like "material" is very vague in physics,
and I would say experimentally vague s
1Z wrote:
>
>Jesse Mazer wrote:
> > 1Z wrote:
> >
>
> > > > But it is a straw man to say "everything-theories makes the
>prediction
> > >that
> > > > Harry Potter universes should be just as likely as lawlike ones",
> > >because in
> > > > fact they do *not* make that definite prediction. If you
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Deutsch uses this to explain "objectivity", and argues, with such a
> criteria due to Johnson, that math is objective. Perhaps some
> materialist use this to define matter but then there need to define
> "kicking back", and thus interaction, etc.
Johnson' demonstration wa
Le Mercredi 12 Juillet 2006 23:54, 1Z a écrit :
> Bruno-computationalism is standard computationalism+platonism.
> Since I reject platomnism, I reject Bruno-computationalism
> (whilst having rather less problem with the standard computational
> thesis, that "cognition is computation").
If computa
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> > You could at least state them.
>
> I do it in all paper on this subject, and I have done it at nauseam in
> this list. It is computationalism: the doctrine according to which
> there is a level of substitution such that I survive a digital graft
> made correctly at that
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> Hi,
>
> 1Z wrote:
> > I will take the stuff that seems solid to me as primary reality until
> > demostrated
> > otherwise.
>
> This was not the point... the point was to make you understand that
> Bruno has proved that *IF* computationalism is true *THEN* primary
> realit
Hi,
1Z wrote:
> I will take the stuff that seems solid to me as primary reality until
> demostrated
> otherwise.
This was not the point... the point was to make you understand that
Bruno has proved that *IF* computationalism is true *THEN* primary
reality does not exists ! It even doesn't mean a
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 11-juil.-06, 21:06, 1Z a crit :
>
> > And mathematical MWI *would* be in the same happy position *if*
> > it could find a justification for MWI or classical measure.
>
> See my work and this list for some path toward it.
>
>
> > To have material existence is to have n
Le 12-juil.-06, à 03:53, Jesse Mazer a écrit :
> Well, I don't think the world obeys mathematical laws because it is
> causally
> interacting with platonic forms, any more than I think the world obeys
> the
> law of noncontradiction because it is causally interacting with
> platonic
> laws of
Le 12-juil.-06, à 02:11, Brent Meeker a écrit :
BM (Bruno):
>> For the same reason they are far more Christians than Buddhist. And
>> none of your materialist even try to define matter. They take it for
>> granted, following mainly Aristotle. Almost all materialist react by
>> knocking a table w
Le 11-juil.-06, 21:06, 1Z a crit :
> And mathematical MWI *would* be in the same happy position *if*
> it could find a justification for MWI or classical measure.
See my work and this list for some path toward it.
> To have material existence is to have non-zero measure,
> and vice-versa.
Jesse Mazer wrote:
> 1Z wrote:
>
> > > But it is a straw man to say "everything-theories makes the prediction
> >that
> > > Harry Potter universes should be just as likely as lawlike ones",
> >because in
> > > fact they do *not* make that definite prediction. If you had just said
> > > something
>I would say ontology is about the most exhaustive possible
>list of objective truths, and any entity referred to in this exhaustive
>list
>of objectively true statements "exists" by definition. With something like
>a
>unicorn, once you have all true statements about peoples' *concepts* of
>unic
1Z wrote:
>
>
>
>Jesse Mazer wrote:
> > IZ wrote:
> >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >Jesse Mazer wrote:
> > > > IZ wrote:
> > > >
> > >
> > > > >And mathematical MWI *would* be in the same happy position *if*
> > > > >it could find a justification for MWI or classical measure.
> > > > >
> > > > >However
Brent Meeker wrote:
> > For the same reason they are far more Christians than Buddhist. And
> > none of your materialist even try to define matter. They take it for
> > granted, following mainly Aristotle. Almost all materialist react by
> > knocking a table when they want me to realize matter e
Jesse Mazer wrote:
> IZ wrote:
>
> >
> >
> >
> >Jesse Mazer wrote:
> > > IZ wrote:
> > >
> >
> > > >And mathematical MWI *would* be in the same happy position *if*
> > > >it could find a justification for MWI or classical measure.
> > > >
> > > >However, in the absence of a satifactory theory of
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Le 11-juil.-06, à 16:24, 1Z a écrit :
>
>
>>>How could a substantial world be' a modest metaphysical posit?
>>
>>By explaining a lot from on e premiss.
>
>
>
> I could agree that it eases the mind. Like God's notion. But it
> explains nothing, like when "God" is use
IZ wrote:
>
>
>
>Jesse Mazer wrote:
> > IZ wrote:
> >
>
> > >And mathematical MWI *would* be in the same happy position *if*
> > >it could find a justification for MWI or classical measure.
> > >
> > >However, in the absence of a satifactory theory of measure,
> > >no-once can say that the posit
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> Hi,
>
> Le Mardi 11 Juillet 2006 21:52, 1Z a écrit :
> > Bruno Marchal wrote:
> > > Le 11-juil.-06, à 16:24, 1Z a écrit :
> > > Now if you assume "primary matter", no doubt you need to reject comp,
> > > giving that what I show is that you cannot have both.
> >
> > Brains
Jesse Mazer wrote:
> IZ wrote:
>
> >And mathematical MWI *would* be in the same happy position *if*
> >it could find a justification for MWI or classical measure.
> >
> >However, in the absence of a satifactory theory of measure,
> >no-once can say that the posit of matter, of material existence
Hi,
Le Mardi 11 Juillet 2006 21:52, 1Z a écrit :
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
> > Le 11-juil.-06, à 16:24, 1Z a écrit :
> > Now if you assume "primary matter", no doubt you need to reject comp,
> > giving that what I show is that you cannot have both.
>
> Brains are material. Computers are material.
I
IZ wrote:
>
>
>
>Jesse Mazer wrote:
> > 1Z wrote:
> > >
> > >The clue is our failure ot observe HP universes,
> > >as predicted by Platonic theories.
> > >
> > >It a theory predicts somethig which is not observed,
> > >it is falsified.
> >
> > But this is a bit of a strawman, because most on this
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 11-juil.-06, à 16:24, 1Z a écrit :
>
> >>
> >> How could a substantial world be' a modest metaphysical posit?
> >
> > By explaining a lot from on e premiss.
>
>
> I could agree that it eases the mind. Like God's notion. But it
> explains nothing, like when "God" is used
Jesse Mazer wrote:
> 1Z wrote:
> >
> >The clue is our failure ot observe HP universes,
> >as predicted by Platonic theories.
> >
> >It a theory predicts somethig which is not observed,
> >it is falsified.
>
> But this is a bit of a strawman, because most on this list who subscribe to
> the view t
This discussion is very interesting to me. Not addressing anyone in
particular, I only have time to make a quick comment, and hope that I
can get time for later:
In my reading about Plato, it seems that Plato didn't have the answers
either. It might be helpful to remember that Plato not only ha
Le 11-juil.-06, à 16:24, 1Z a écrit :
>>
>> How could a substantial world be' a modest metaphysical posit?
>
> By explaining a lot from on e premiss.
I could agree that it eases the mind. Like God's notion. But it
explains nothing, like when "God" is used as an (empty) explanation.
Today, phy
1Z wrote:
>
>The clue is our failure ot observe HP universes,
>as predicted by Platonic theories.
>
>It a theory predicts somethig which is not observed,
>it is falsified.
But this is a bit of a strawman, because most on this list who subscribe to
the view that every possible world or observer-m
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 10-juil.-06, à 16:03, 1Z a écrit :
>
>
> > It is a modest metaphysical posit which can be used to explain
> > a variety of observed phenomena, ranging from Time and Change
> > to the observed absence of Harry Potter universes.
>
>
> How could a substantial world be' a mo
Le 10-juil.-06, à 16:03, 1Z a écrit :
> It is a modest metaphysical posit which can be used to explain
> a variety of observed phenomena, ranging from Time and Change
> to the observed absence of Harry Potter universes.
How could a substantial world be' a modest metaphysical posit?
First nobo
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 09-juil.-06, à 17:15, Lennart Nilsson a écrit :
>
> > I really think that we should infer both the substantial world and the
> > numerical world from the middleground so to speak, from our
> > observations.
>
>
> But why should we infer a substantial world? Substantial
Le 09-juil.-06, à 17:15, Lennart Nilsson a écrit :
> I really think that we should infer both the substantial world and the
> numerical world from the middleground so to speak, from our
> observations.
But why should we infer a substantial world? Substantial or primary or
primitive matter is
I really think that we should infer both the substantial world and the
numerical world from the middleground so to speak, from our observations.
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