[IPsec] Question on RFC 4718 section 5.11.8. Collisions with IKE_SA Rekeying

2009-02-11 Thread Keith Welter
RFC 4718 section 5.11.8. Collisions with IKE_SA Rekeying says: The case where CHILD_SAs are being closed is even worse. Our recommendation is that if a host receives a request to rekey the IKE_SA when it has CHILD_SAs in "half-closed" state (currently being closed), it should reply wi

Re: [IPsec] Bis issue #14: Bounding the retransmit time

2009-02-11 Thread Pasi.Eronen
Yoav Nir wrote: > On the other hand, even with a window size of 1, the current text > seems to suggest that the last packet should be retained > indefinitely. This doesn't make sense, as the initiator of that > packet is also bound by the "at least a dozen times over a period of > at least several

Re: [IPsec] draft-kivinen-ipsecme-esp-null-heuristics comments

2009-02-11 Thread Tero Kivinen
Grewal, Ken writes: > >Are QOS and auditing devices really stateless? > > > >I would expect QOS devices to have all kind of reservation systems and > >so on and for those I would expect them to be keeping state? > > [Ken] QoS may be applied on the need of the underlying service. E.g. > A static ru

Re: [IPsec] draft-kivinen-ipsecme-esp-null-heuristics comments

2009-02-11 Thread Tero Kivinen
Grewal, Ken writes: > [Ken] In some cases, the certainty must be 100%, otherwise there is > no control. E.g. A new exploit has just been published for certain > types of traffic - published vulnerability where a virus/worm can > exploit a 'buffer overrun/stack overflow' condition for a given > piec