Re: [OAUTH-WG] [Openid-specs-ab] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend authorization code instead of implicit

2018-11-27 Thread n-sakimura
Not really. It is not a requirement of SIOP to leverage the device’s secure element to create key-pairs. So, the keys can be exported and ported to other devices as well. There could be key syncing mechanism as well, like 1password, but it is not standardized. Re: discovery In the use-case of

Re: [OAUTH-WG] [Openid-specs-ab] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend authorization code instead of implicit

2018-11-27 Thread n-sakimura
Tom, It is good to hear that you will be there. I understand John will also be there. To your question, self-issued ID does not require a (semi-)permanent URL as the user’s identifier, as it is always “localhost”. The identifier is derived as the hash of the public key that was generated by the

Re: [OAUTH-WG] [Openid-specs-ab] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend authorization code instead of implicit

2018-11-27 Thread Nat Sakimura
Self Issued OP is described in Chapter 7 of the OpenID Connect Core 1.0. It lives on a local machine, typically a phone. Even if it did provide an authorization code to the client, the client cannot establish a direct connection to the local machine (phone) as it is not addressable. Therefore, a to

Re: [OAUTH-WG] [Openid-specs-ab] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend authorization code instead of implicit

2018-11-27 Thread Torsten Lodderstedt
I still don’t understand why the use case must be solved using a flow issuing something in the front channel. I would also like to take a closer look. Can you or Nat provide pointers to existing implementations? > Am 27.11.2018 um 21:36 schrieb John Bradley : > > I understand that, but hat i

Re: [OAUTH-WG] [Openid-specs-ab] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend authorization code instead of implicit

2018-11-27 Thread Torsten Lodderstedt
> Am 27.11.2018 um 21:54 schrieb William Denniss : > > +1 to have language recommending against the use in most cases (without > needing to exclude Nat's use-case). Can you (or someone else) propose text? smime.p7s Description: S/MIME cryptographic signature ___

Re: [OAUTH-WG] [Openid-specs-ab] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend authorization code instead of implicit

2018-11-27 Thread William Denniss
In BCP 212 we currently recommend against using implicit flow for native apps (Section 8.2), due to the inability to protect against interception with PKCE. AppAuth iOS & Android don't implement it, and the JS version didn't initially although it was requested by users who needed to do implicit aut

Re: [OAUTH-WG] [Openid-specs-ab] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend authorization code instead of implicit

2018-11-27 Thread John Bradley
I understand that, but hat is Nat's concern as I understand it. When we say no implicit people, have a problem because implicit is imprecise. We are saying no AT returned in the response from the authorization endpoint. Nat points out that id_token may contain AT for the self issued client.

Re: [OAUTH-WG] [Openid-specs-ab] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend authorization code instead of implicit

2018-11-27 Thread Torsten Lodderstedt
Hi John, as you said, self issued IDPs (https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html#SelfIssued) are supposed to provide the response type „id_token“ only. I don’t think the proposal being discussed here is related to this OIDC mode. best regards, Torsten. > Am 27.11.2018 um 20:54

Re: [OAUTH-WG] [Openid-specs-ab] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend authorization code instead of implicit

2018-11-27 Thread John Bradley
I talked to Nat about this a bit today. The thing he is concerned about is mostly around the self issued IDP that doesn't have a token endpoint(atleast not easaly). The main use case for that is the id_token response type where claims are retuned in the id_token. Because it is fragment encoded s