Re: AN idea of non-public exit-nodes

2009-11-26 Thread Scott Bennett
On Wed, 25 Nov 2009 12:21:39 -0500 Gregory Maxwell wrote: >On Tue, Nov 24, 2009 at 8:05 PM, Ted Smith wrote: >> On Tue, 2009-11-24 at 19:49 -0500, Roger Dingledine wrote: >>> See especially point #1: "even if we didn't tell clients about the >>> list of >>> relays directly, somebody could st

Re: AN idea of non-public exit-nodes

2009-11-25 Thread Gregory Maxwell
On Wed, Nov 25, 2009 at 1:08 PM, Paul Syverson wrote: > Two words: Hidden service Okay. I'm now running a HTTP forwarder to LJ as a hidden service. Email me for the hidden service address and port number. ... I'll be posting the mapping of the LJ accounts and passwords of everyone who uses it t

Re: AN idea of non-public exit-nodes

2009-11-25 Thread Paul Syverson
On Wed, Nov 25, 2009 at 12:21:39PM -0500, Gregory Maxwell wrote: > On Tue, Nov 24, 2009 at 8:05 PM, Ted Smith wrote: > > On Tue, 2009-11-24 at 19:49 -0500, Roger Dingledine wrote: > >> See especially point #1: "even if we didn't tell clients about the > >> list of > >> relays directly, somebody co

Re: AN idea of non-public exit-nodes

2009-11-25 Thread Gregory Maxwell
On Tue, Nov 24, 2009 at 8:05 PM, Ted Smith wrote: > On Tue, 2009-11-24 at 19:49 -0500, Roger Dingledine wrote: >> See especially point #1: "even if we didn't tell clients about the >> list of >> relays directly, somebody could still make a lot of connections >> through >> Tor to a test site and bu

Re: AN idea of non-public exit-nodes

2009-11-25 Thread Andrew Lewman
On 11/25/2009 02:20 AM, James Brown wrote: >> It's like a bridge, but for exits. They would probably have to be a lot >> less friend-to-friend than bridges, but it might still be doable. I >> think this is what the original poster meant, anyways. > > Yes, I meant exactly that. If I understand t

Re: AN idea of non-public exit-nodes

2009-11-24 Thread Scott Bennett
On Wed, 25 Nov 2009 09:09:16 +0300 James Brown wrote: >Roger Dingledine wrote: >> On Wed, Nov 25, 2009 at 02:51:57AM +0300, James Brown wrote: >> >> Alas, livejournal's hand here might be forced by their new owners. In >> that case, the only answer I can think of is for everybody in the affe

Re: AN idea of non-public exit-nodes

2009-11-24 Thread James Brown
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Ted Smith wrote: > On Tue, 2009-11-24 at 19:49 -0500, Roger Dingledine wrote: > > It's like a bridge, but for exits. They would probably have to be a lot > less friend-to-friend than bridges, but it might still be doable. I > think this is what the o

Re: AN idea of non-public exit-nodes

2009-11-24 Thread James Brown
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Roger Dingledine wrote: > On Wed, Nov 25, 2009 at 02:51:57AM +0300, James Brown wrote: > > Alas, livejournal's hand here might be forced by their new owners. In > that case, the only answer I can think of is for everybody in the affected > countries t

Re: AN idea of non-public exit-nodes

2009-11-24 Thread Flamsmark
I'm not sure that the correlation attacks for `bridge exits' are better than those for normal bridges. However, the `exit risk' would likely be more discouraging to such `bridge exits'. However, as a more general question, making the Tor network difficult to completely enumerate might be interestin

Re: AN idea of non-public exit-nodes

2009-11-24 Thread Damian Johnson
Interesting idea, but seems like it could be pretty dangerous. If an attacker was able to figure out the subset of Tor users taking advantage of these special exits and ran one themselves then correlation probably wouldn't be too difficult. In addition, abuse issues makes finding exit operators a l

Re: AN idea of non-public exit-nodes

2009-11-24 Thread Ted Smith
On Tue, 2009-11-24 at 19:49 -0500, Roger Dingledine wrote: > See especially point #1: "even if we didn't tell clients about the > list of > relays directly, somebody could still make a lot of connections > through > Tor to a test site and build a list of the addresses they see." > > I guess we cou

Re: AN idea of non-public exit-nodes

2009-11-24 Thread Roger Dingledine
On Wed, Nov 25, 2009 at 02:51:57AM +0300, James Brown wrote: > In the context of the above information concerning the ban of Tor's > nodes by the LJ (and in other such cases) I have an idea to provide in > the Tor net for non-public exit-notes. You might find this faq entry useful: https://wiki.to

Re: AN idea of non-public exit-nodes

2009-11-24 Thread Ted Smith
On Wed, 2009-11-25 at 02:51 +0300, James Brown wrote: > In the context of the above information concerning the ban of Tor's > nodes by the LJ (and in other such cases) I have an idea to provide in > the Tor net for non-public exit-notes. > This solution will be very, very useful for residents of th

AN idea of non-public exit-nodes

2009-11-24 Thread James Brown
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 In the context of the above information concerning the ban of Tor's nodes by the LJ (and in other such cases) I have an idea to provide in the Tor net for non-public exit-notes. This solution will be very, very useful for residents of the countries und