Thus spake Theodore Bagwell (torus...@imap.cc):
On Sun, 28 Nov 2010 17:54 -0800, Mike Perry mikepe...@fscked.org
wrote:
Rather than cripple the network by forcing more clients to use slower
nodes more often, we have opted to try to document the process of
running a high capacity Tor exit
On Sun, 28 Nov 2010 17:54 -0800, Mike Perry mikepe...@fscked.org
wrote:
Rather than cripple the network by forcing more clients to use slower
nodes more often, we have opted to try to document the process of
running a high capacity Tor exit node:
I don't take issue with these particular nodes, nor the method in which
they are multiplied.
What concerns me is that any single entity (person/organization) is
capable of convincing my Tor client to use it in the majority of
circuits I build. The clusters I pointed out before have been vouched
Thus spake Theodore Bagwell (torus...@imap.cc):
I don't take issue with these particular nodes, nor the method in which
they are multiplied.
What concerns me is that any single entity (person/organization) is
capable of convincing my Tor client to use it in the majority of
circuits I
On 25.11.2010 08:17, Damian Johnson wrote:
The reason the operators of the largest tor relays (Blutmagie,
TorServers, and Amunet) operate multiple instance is because this is
the best way in practice for utilizing large connections.
yep, all four blutmagie nodes are running on a single quad
Am 25.11.2010 03:38, schrieb Theodore Bagwell:
** I speak primarily of torserversNet_ numbers 1-5, and PPrivCom___
numbers 004-052.
hi there,
would you mind to broaden your research covering blutmagie1-4? Its last
24h sustained bandwidth is higher than the cumulated bandwidth of all
Hi,
would it be noticed if an adversary modifies Tor's source code in order
to report a fake observed bandwidth (a few KB), fake uptime data, and
Windows as OS to the directories? Probably nobody will notice even if
those relays carry a significant amount of traffic.
Olaf
A quick look at my cache-descriptors show the following for PPrivComXXX.
family PPrivCom001 PPrivCom002 PPrivCom003 PPrivCom004 PPrivCom005
PPrivCom006 PPrivCom007 PPrivCom008 PPrivCom009 PPrivCom010 PPrivCom012
PPrivCom013 PPrivCom014 PPrivCom015 PPrivCom016 PPrivCom017 PPrivCom018
PPrivCom019
On Wed, 24 Nov 2010 18:38:23 -0800
Theodore Bagwell torus...@imap.cc wrote:
We recently discussed an attack on onion-routing anonymity, wherein a
well-funded adversary overwhelms the network with compromised relays,
thereby increasing his chances of monitoring anonymity-compromising
data.
Hi Theodore.
The reason the operators of the largest tor relays (Blutmagie,
TorServers, and Amunet) operate multiple instance is because this is
the best way in practice for utilizing large connections. Robert and
others are right and you should call people out if they operate
multiple relays
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