Re: [SC-L] Re: [WEB SECURITY] On sandboxes, and why you should care

2006-05-27 Thread George Capehart
Dinis Cruz wrote: > After my explanations in this email do you still think that this is > correct? Or can you accept now that it is possible to build a Sandboxed > environment that is able to protect against the majority of the serious > security issues that affect web apps today? > > If you do

RE: [SC-L] Re: [WEB SECURITY] On sandboxes, and why you should care

2006-05-27 Thread Jeff Williams
Dinis Cruz wrote: > If you do accept that it is possible to build such sandboxes, then we > need to move to the next interesting discussion, which is the 'HOW' > > Namely, HOW can an environment be created where the development and > deployment of such Sandboxes makes business sense. It's the "b

[SC-L] Re: [WEB SECURITY] On sandboxes, and why you should care

2006-05-27 Thread Stephen de Vries
Hi Dinis, On 24 May 2006, at 05:34, Dinis Cruz wrote: In the solution that I am envisioning, you will have multiple Sandboxes, one inside the other, separated by very clearly defined layers (the input choke points / attack surface) where each sandbox is allocated privileges accordingly

Re: [SC-L] Re: [WEB SECURITY] On sandboxes, and why you should care

2006-05-24 Thread Andrew van der Stock
Dinis, Sandboxing prevents a machine from having bad system() and buffer overflows causing system compromise. Sure that's bad enough. However, sandboxing does not prevent: * all types of cross-site scripting * SQL injection * Command injection via SQL injection (xp_cmdshell and similar Orac

[SC-L] Re: [WEB SECURITY] On sandboxes, and why you should care

2006-05-23 Thread Dinis Cruz
(sorry for the long time that it took for this response, see comments inline) Stephen de Vries wrote: Hi Dinis, I think you're overestimating the effectiveness of a sandbox in preventing common web app vulnerabilities, and you're instead focussing on the tiny fraction of specific attacks tha