> | Sent: Wednesday, April 20, 2016 3:28:06 PM
> | Subject: Re: [tor-dev] Questions about "Tor Messenger CONIKS integration"
>
> | Hi,
> |
> | For the first question: I understand that the private indices obfuscate
> the
> | usernames. But when computing an index i for
built as part of Tor Messenger.
Best,
Marcela
- Original Message -
| From: "Go"
| To: tor-dev@lists.torproject.org
| Sent: Wednesday, April 20, 2016 3:28:06 PM
| Subject: Re: [tor-dev] Questions about "Tor Messenger CONIKS integration"
| Hi,
|
| For the first questio
Hi,
For the first question: I understand that the private indices obfuscate the
usernames. But when computing an index i for a username u, the CONIKS
server will see u in plaintext rather than hashed or encrypted results of u
(correct me if I'm wrong). In this case, a CONIKS server controlled by a
Hi,
I think Ismail was trying to answer your first question when he described the
private indices in the CONIKS key directories. What these private indices do,
in other words, is obfuscate the usernames in the directory, so an attacker who
breaks into the server cannot see the usernames registe
Hi,
Thanks for you quick reply. I still have few questions:
1. If one CONIKS server has been compromised, and I happen to register to
this server; I guess the server can see my username in this case, right?
2. I found the ticket https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/17961.
The answer f
Hi there,
I don't know about much about the concrete plans for the Tor Messenger and
CONIKS but I'm quite familiar with the original CONIKS design. First of all:
I’m sure no one would force you to give your "real" identity, you could for
instance use large identity provider which is rather dif
Hi,
CONIKS seems to be a very useful system. Just curious: do Tor messenger
users need to hand out their real identities (facebook account, twitter
account, etc.) to CONIKS servers? If so it seems dangerous to put all the
identities in a centralized service. If the CONIKS servers have been
compro
