esolve esolve:
> what I meant is:
>
> Let me say that an attacker controls some nodes. At a certain time, one of
> the controlled nodes is used as entry node by a tor client, if the
> attacker doesn't know that the node is used as entry node, then the
> attacker can't identify the client. Even if
On 08.12.2012 05:43, Maimun Rizal wrote:
> Hi All,
> I confused about bandwidth in TOR, there are Bandwidth Max, Burst, and
> Observed.
> Where I can get information about them?
> When will we use three of them?
Maximum bandwidth is the average bandwidth limit for both incoming and
outgoing traffi
Maimun Rizal:
> Hi All,
> I confused about bandwidth in TOR, there are Bandwidth Max, Burst, and
> Observed.
> Where I can get information about them?
> When will we use three of them?
>
> Thank
> Regards,
> MR
A quote form the manual[1]:
"BandwidthRate N bytes|KB|MB|GB
A token bucket limits th
On Fri, Dec 07, 2012 at 09:50:32PM +, Aaron Brouard wrote:
> I'm trying to make my hidden service more secure. It runs on a server
> running Ubuntu 12.04.1 LTS server version. I have set up full disk
If you can't place the service on physically distinct machines,
private (RFC1918) address spac
t;
> > Low latency networks such as Tor suffer from traffic correlation,
> > which has not been defeated yet. As far as I know this would be very
> > hard to accomplish, if at all.. (I'm not experienced enough with this
> > topic.)
>
> There is a relatively simple
Downloading and gpg verifying Tor Browser each time there is an update
gets really tiresome and I think many people either never gpg verified
or don't do it sometimes.
What if we had a Debian package which contains a Tor Browser updater?
I could eventually provide something like this:
sudo apt-g
Hello fellas,
As a follow-up to the discussion we started on Twitter, I wanted to
start this thread here as well to get the discussion going.
The main point of the discussion were:
- What can be done to stop botnets abusing Tor for concealing its
infrastructure?
- What kind of impact would a large
adrelanos wrote (08 Dec 2012 13:02:54 GMT) :
> What if we had a Debian package which contains a Tor
> Browser updater?
While working on the Tails incremental updates feature [1],
I discovered (thanks to Robert Ransom) that, in some threat models one
often considers when using Tor, upgrades are muc
intrigeri:
> adrelanos wrote (08 Dec 2012 13:02:54 GMT) :
>> What if we had a Debian package which contains a Tor
>> Browser updater?
>
> While working on the Tails incremental updates feature [1],
> I discovered (thanks to Robert Ransom) that, in some threat models one
> often considers when usin
I think some of the hysteria over this is overdone.
> - What can be done to stop botnets abusing Tor for concealing its
> infrastructure?
For unpublished nodes, nothing that I'm aware of. Hidden services are
called that for a reason, and it's necessarily a dual-use technology.
You can't weaken
Hi,
Are settings like ReachableAddresses guaranteed to aggregate in torrc?
E.g., is
ReachableAddresses 1.2.3.4:56
ReachableAddresses 7.8.9.1:78
equivalent to
ReachableAddresses 1.2.3.4:56, 7.8.9.1:78
It is the case in my tests, but would like to be sure.
Also, does obfs2 transport always us
On Sat, Dec 08, 2012 at 05:50:53PM +0100, clau...@shadowserver.org wrote 0.8K
bytes in 23 lines about:
: - What can be done to stop botnets abusing Tor for concealing its
: infrastructure?
First off, remember hidden services are just an addressing and routing
scheme. They don't actually provide a
On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 5:47 AM, wrote:
> I'd be interested if gnunet or i2p have seem similar usage by
> botnets.
I was going to write that for I2P it is highly unlikely due to
autonomous daemon configuration complexity, a dependency on Java, and
unreliability wrt. network configuration changes,
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