s surveillance on its own, as stated business
> practice. Also, I'm pretty sure if another Manning-like case
> appears, NSA would immediately command Facebook to offer the
> related user identification.
Not everyone's adversary is the NSA.
str4d
>
> If there's
quest comes in on
spamalot.com and shortly after multiple requests come in on
slstatic.com, it should mark those as the same session, somehow
(whether by adding a query parameter or header to the static requests,
or being more intelligent on the server side).
str4d
>
> best, Griffin
>
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Jeffrey Burdges wrote:
> I've no read much of the NORNET article, although not yet carefully
> enough, very interesting.
>
> On Sat, Jul 25, 2015 at 12:21 AM, str4d wrote:
>
>> In this design, I would say the major probl
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Seth David Schoen wrote:
> str4d writes:
>
>> * No replay detection - packet replay is ignored within the
>> lifetime of a session. They suggest that adversaries would be
>> deterred by the risk of being detected by
>>
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str4d wrote:
> * Stateless data transmission (as they say on the box) - the
> routing info is replicated in every data packet, removing the need
> for local lookups. This increases the data packet header size (7
> hops requires 344 byte
t specify how a path from source to destination
would be determined, but merely assumes that such a path can be found.
It should therefore be possible to implement a HORNET-based routing
overlay using server-side software instead of network hardware,
similar to Tor and I2P. Such a scheme would however no
ains
the site uses. But this would probably need to be repeated each time
the circuit changes (like the CAPTCHAs already need to be).
str4d
>
> Unfortunately I cannot share the website as doing so could identify
> me. Also, I have been unsuccessful getting th
uot;solves" this by
implementing the protection itself, including some general rate
limiting features in server tunnels that drop connections before the
webserver ever sees them. It also includes a unique local address per
client feature like [0] for use with off-the-shelf applications, but
th
tacks that Sybil enables harder to
carry out (because a Sybil on its own is not an attack), as well as
general network growth to make obtaining a large enough network
fraction more difficult (we estimate there are currently around 25,000
I2P routers).
str4d
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as BadExit.
My point is, the MyFamily declaration is completely unauthenticated,
and cannot be relied upon for anything more than providing contact
information. There is a newer iteration being discussed that would
prevent relays from joining families without permission, but then a
malicious e
t that's not much help
> here)
There is if you use bash (or a similar shell environment):
alias git='TZ=UTC git'
If you only want to force UTC for occasional commands then just add
"TZ=UTC" in front of the command, but I personally prefer redefining
the git command l
atch the video. Both of
> which should be linked above. It's worth looking at.
>
It is an interesting protocol. I am reviewing the whitepapers, and
intend to publish a comparison page on the I2P website[1] once I have
a good understanding of the differences.
str4d
[0] http:/
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I use Polly on my laptop with no lock-out yet. I do regularly get
"Unable to connect to Twitter" error messages, from the exit node my
circuit has switched to being blocked by Twitter (I assume).
str4d
Brian Kroll wrote:
> I use Tw
hich fixes the disclosed vulnerability. Disabling I2P by
default was done to reduce the potential attack surface; I2P itself is
no longer vulnerable to that attack.
str4d
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The solution that I2P is considering for this is to remove the
requirement for a global IPv6 <-> .b32.i2p mapping, and instead use a
local ephemeral mapping on a virtual interface combined with a local
DNS resolver. This would enable backwards compatibility for
applications that suppor
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On 07/05/2014 11:13 AM, grarpamp wrote:
> On Fri, Jul 4, 2014 at 6:02 PM, Paweł Zegartowski
> wrote: i2p does have 'exits' you can compare to
> tor as well. Anyone can run an exit. But users have first find one
> on a wiki list or somesuch, and the
2P sphere:
Syndie [0] - distributed forum system that can sync data from various
sources at any desired interval.
I2P-Bote [1] - distributed encrypted email. Can be configured so that
emails are stored via relays which delay before passing on packets, so
the "visible" store of an encry
ipermail/cypherpunks/2013-October/001242.html
str4d
On 10/07/2013 08:11 PM, Jerzy Łogiewa wrote:
> Do you mean if Tor wold have distributed data store like freenet?
>
> Nice idea, please implement this. :~
>
> -- Jerzy Łogiewa -- jerz...@interia.eu
>
> On Oct 6, 2013, at
cause postman's mail system has been
running since 2004, so he could be a useful source of info for you.
And I think that having the operators of two similar mail systems
talking with each other would be beneficial to the development of
these systems :)
str4d
On 09/18/2013 12:41 PM, Conrad Rocken
d=9
Incidentally, by postman's ratings, (Sylpheed) Claws comes out on top :)
(For those without I2P I have pasted the page contents to
http://pastebin.com/TDD5NzTn - postman doesn't allow access to his
site via I2P inproxies)
str4d
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