On Thu, Mar 24, 2011 at 15:12:56 -0430,
Patrick O'Callaghan wrote:
>
> Even if that's true, it doesn't belie what I just said. If you don't
> trust the CA, don't use their services at all.
There is a difference between trusting them to certify a site and to not
resell data about you. Some peop
On Thu, 2011-03-24 at 14:10 -0500, Bruno Wolff III wrote:
> On Thu, Mar 24, 2011 at 14:16:49 -0430,
> Patrick O'Callaghan wrote:
> >
> > Wierd advice IMHO. There are a number of practical reasons for not
> > checking CRLs (Certificate Revocation Lists) all the time, but sending
> > cert serial
On Thu, Mar 24, 2011 at 14:16:49 -0430,
Patrick O'Callaghan wrote:
>
> Wierd advice IMHO. There are a number of practical reasons for not
> checking CRLs (Certificate Revocation Lists) all the time, but sending
> cert serial numbers to the CA is not among them. The serial number is
> not secret
On Thu, 2011-03-24 at 13:29 -0500, Bruno Wolff III wrote:
> On Thu, Mar 24, 2011 at 07:58:48 -0700,
> johhny_at_poland77 wrote:
> > https://blog.torproject.org/blog/detecting-certificate-authority-compromises-and-web-browser-collusion
> >
> > "Users of Mozilla Firefox that are concerned about t
On Thu, Mar 24, 2011 at 07:58:48 -0700,
johhny_at_poland77 wrote:
> https://blog.torproject.org/blog/detecting-certificate-authority-compromises-and-web-browser-collusion
>
> "Users of Mozilla Firefox that are concerned about this issue should enable
> security.OCSP.require in the about:config
https://blog.torproject.org/blog/detecting-certificate-authority-compromises-and-web-browser-collusion
"Users of Mozilla Firefox that are concerned about this issue should enable
security.OCSP.require in the about:config dialog."
How can i enable this feature in Google Chrome/Chromium?
--
user
