[Ace] Last Call: (Additional OAuth Parameters for Authorization in Constrained Environments (ACE)) to Proposed Standard

2019-11-29 Thread The IESG


The IESG has received a request from the Authentication and Authorization for
Constrained Environments WG (ace) to consider the following document: -
'Additional OAuth Parameters for Authorization in Constrained
   Environments (ACE)'
   as Proposed Standard

The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits final
comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
last-c...@ietf.org mailing lists by 2019-12-13. Exceptionally, comments may
be sent to i...@ietf.org instead. In either case, please retain the beginning
of the Subject line to allow automated sorting.

Abstract


   This specification defines new parameters for the OAuth 2.0 token and
   introspection endpoints when used with the framework for
   authentication and authorization for constrained environments (ACE).
   These are used to express the proof-of-possession key the client
   whishes to use, the proof-of-possession key that the AS has selected,
   and the key the RS should use to authenticate to the client.




The file can be obtained via
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ace-oauth-params/

IESG discussion can be tracked via
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ace-oauth-params/ballot/


No IPR declarations have been submitted directly on this I-D.




___
Ace mailing list
Ace@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ace


[Ace] Last Call: (Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE) using the OAuth 2.0 Framework (ACE-OAuth)) to Proposed Standard

2019-11-29 Thread The IESG


The IESG has received a request from the Authentication and Authorization for
Constrained Environments WG (ace) to consider the following document: -
'Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE)
   using the OAuth 2.0 Framework (ACE-OAuth)'
   as Proposed Standard

The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits final
comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
last-c...@ietf.org mailing lists by 2019-12-13. Exceptionally, comments may
be sent to i...@ietf.org instead. In either case, please retain the beginning
of the Subject line to allow automated sorting.

Abstract


   This specification defines a framework for authentication and
   authorization in Internet of Things (IoT) environments called ACE-
   OAuth.  The framework is based on a set of building blocks including
   OAuth 2.0 and CoAP, thus transforming a well-known and widely used
   authorization solution into a form suitable for IoT devices.
   Existing specifications are used where possible, but extensions are
   added and profiles are defined to better serve the IoT use cases.




The file can be obtained via
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ace-oauth-authz/

IESG discussion can be tracked via
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ace-oauth-authz/ballot/

The following IPR Declarations may be related to this I-D:

   https://datatracker.ietf.org/ipr/3123/



The document contains these normative downward references.
See RFC 3967 for additional information: 
rfc4949: Internet Security Glossary, Version 2 (Informational - Independent 
Submission Editor stream)



___
Ace mailing list
Ace@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ace


[Ace] Review for draft-palombini-ace-coap-pubsub-profile

2019-11-29 Thread Cigdem Sengul
Hello,


As I remotely promised in the WG meeting in Singapore, here is my review of
the pubsub-coap document.


When reviewing the document, I have kept two things in mind: how the
document reads now, and whether it can easily be extended to include MQTT
as well.  I’ve understood including MQTT is in scope for this document in
the workgroup meeting in Singapore. I would be happy to help, if you need
me to, for MQTT-specific contributions to this draft.  Doing this would
allow the mqtt_tls profile to progress independently of this document by
stating that content protection is out of scope for mqtt_tls profile and
referring to this document for a solution.


I want to repeat my support for the adoption of this profile, as it
addresses a significant problem for publishers to constrain the content of
their publications to only their subscribers. It does handle the multiple
publishers to a single topic case well (allowing subscribers to learn about
all the publishers to a specific topic).


In the following, I list a few things reading the draft made me think,
especially in its applicability to MQTT:

(1) What is planned to make this document a generic pubsub solution? Will
there a generic architecture section, and specific descriptions for each of
the protocols?

For instance, if an MQTT client implements this,  the client would talk to
AS1 to get a token based on the way we describe in the mqtt-tls profile,
and then get keying material for topics from AS2.

I expect the MQTT client would use a different profile name like
mqtt_tls_app to signal to AS1 that it is supporting the application layer
security. This is because the draft hints that there should be a policy
agreement between AS1 and AS2: “Note that AS1 and AS2 might either be
co-resident or be 2 separate physical entities, in which case access
control policies must be exchanged between AS1 and AS2, so that they agree
on rights fo  joining nodes about specific topics.”


(2) If we keep AS1 as the mqtt-tls profile AS, then for consistency sake,
the MQTT client would expect to talk to HTTPS to AS2, but the coap-pubsub
draft describes these, expectedly, in CoAP. Will there be support for HTTPS?


(3) In the mqtt_tls profile, the AS grants tokens that identify both
“publish” and “subscribe” rights and the topics by adding scopes in the
format, e.g. “publish_topic1” “subscribe_topic2/#”.  This format allows
representing all publish/subscribe permissions concisely for the client
which may be acting both as a publisher and a subscriber.

In the coap-pubsub, this is separated between AS1 and AS2. “AS1 hosts the
policies about the Broker: what endpoints are allowed to Publish on the
Broker.” “The AS2 hosts the policies about the topic: what endpoints are
allowed to access what topic. “

The coap-pubsub also permits that AS1 can host policies about what
endpoints are allowed to Subscribe to the Broker.


However, wouldn’t this separation between AS1 and AS2 have the following
issue: Publisher P, having the permission to publish to topic1 and hence,
successfully getting an access token from AS1, then goes ahead and sends a
PUBLISH on topic 2, which it doesn’t have a right to publish.

Wouldn't the broker would pass this message to subscribers, and the
subscribers would discard the message because the publisher does not belong
to their “publishers list” (subscribers have all the public keys of all
publishers). Have I missed something, does the draft protect against this
at the broker?


Differently, with the current way mqtt_tls scopes are described, AS1 would
need to know not only who can publish or subscribe, but also the policies
on topics.


(4) That brings me to another point regarding this note in coap-pubsub
profile. The profile says: “How the policies are exchanged [between AS1 and
AS2] is out of scope for this specification.” I wonder whether the token
the client gets from AS1 should also be usable towards AS2, and AS2 is
replaced with an RS for retrieving the keying material for topics (more on
this later), i.e., AS2 does not need to host/manage/coordinate policies
with AS1.


(5) Regarding groups and group memberships, it seems like for the draft
group = a single topic.


In MQTT, topics can have level separators and multi-level (#) and
single-level (+) wildcards.  Similarly, CoAP would also have hierarchies.


Consider the case when a PUBLISHER is allowed to publish to
sport/tennis/player1/# but not sport/tennis/player2/#.  The players'
directory may have sub-levels like “rankings”.

And a subscriber has permissions to get content from sport/tennis/#.

It seems like sport/tennis/player1 would be a group, and
sport/tennis/player2 be another group.

And, the subscriber needs to be in two groups. This is fine, I believe,
according to this document.


In MQTT token scopes, we also accepted that a publisher represents its
PUBLISH rights with topic filters (note a PUBLISH message cannot be sent to
a filter, but the topic filters are useful in summarising 

[Ace] Minutes of IETF106

2019-11-29 Thread Daniel Migault
Hi,

The minutes of the ACE meeting at IETF 106 have been uploaded. If you have any 
comments, please feel free to raise any issue. We would like to thank those 
that volunteered to take the minutes, that is Jim, Ludwig and Ryo.

https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/minutes-106-ace/

Yours,
Jim and Daniel
___
Ace mailing list
Ace@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ace