Re: [ActiveDir] GPMC Error
Hi Mike, This article should help you out. http://support.microsoft.com/kb/321476/EN-US/ Cheers, Matty On 09/07/05, mike kline [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I would like to delegate GPO creation to a handful of people. I open GPMC and then go to group policy objects. I select the delegation tab and try to remove the domain admins. I receive an error -- The Request is not Supported Is my only option to go into the ACL on the domain using ADUC and strip their rights that way. I realize that a lot of people on this board are going to ask why are these people domain admins? If you don't trust them to create a GPO then they probably shouldn't be a DA. I agree with those that share that sentiment but I have given up on that fight at this point. Sometimes the people the sign the checks win. Thanks Mike List info : http://www.activedir.org/List.aspx List FAQ: http://www.activedir.org/ListFAQ.aspx List archive: http://www.mail-archive.com/activedir%40mail.activedir.org/ List info : http://www.activedir.org/List.aspx List FAQ: http://www.activedir.org/ListFAQ.aspx List archive: http://www.mail-archive.com/activedir%40mail.activedir.org/
RE: [ActiveDir] GPMC Error
That's part of it. That doesn't control whether Domain Admins can create GPOs in the first place. It just controls the ACLs a new GPO object gets when its created. You have to also modify the permissions on the System\Policies container in the domain and the permissions on the Policies folder in Sysvol. -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Matt Holland Sent: Sunday, July 10, 2005 2:45 PM To: ActiveDir@mail.activedir.org Subject: Re: [ActiveDir] GPMC Error Hi Mike, This article should help you out. http://support.microsoft.com/kb/321476/EN-US/ Cheers, Matty On 09/07/05, mike kline [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I would like to delegate GPO creation to a handful of people. I open GPMC and then go to group policy objects. I select the delegation tab and try to remove the domain admins. I receive an error -- The Request is not Supported Is my only option to go into the ACL on the domain using ADUC and strip their rights that way. I realize that a lot of people on this board are going to ask why are these people domain admins? If you don't trust them to create a GPO then they probably shouldn't be a DA. I agree with those that share that sentiment but I have given up on that fight at this point. Sometimes the people the sign the checks win. Thanks Mike List info : http://www.activedir.org/List.aspx List FAQ: http://www.activedir.org/ListFAQ.aspx List archive: http://www.mail-archive.com/activedir%40mail.activedir.org/ List info : http://www.activedir.org/List.aspx List FAQ: http://www.activedir.org/ListFAQ.aspx List archive: http://www.mail-archive.com/activedir%40mail.activedir.org/ List info : http://www.activedir.org/List.aspx List FAQ: http://www.activedir.org/ListFAQ.aspx List archive: http://www.mail-archive.com/activedir%40mail.activedir.org/
Confidential Attributes (was RE: [ActiveDir] Who was asking for a list of SP1 changes? I think it was this DL......)
About confidential attributes in SP1: When you set an attribute to be confidential, mere read permission is no longer enough for you to see the attribute value. HOW TO ENABLE - Select the attribute to be set as confidential. Category 1 attributes are not possible to select, which rules most of the base schema attributes out but not all... Cat1 is marked in the corresponding attributeSchema object in its systemFlags attribute, as bit 0xF (or 16 in decimal). - Locate the corresponding attributeSchema object in the schema, and set bit 0x80 (or 128 in decimal) in its searchFlags attribute. HOW TO DELEGATE - Grant All Extended Rights for anyone, who needs to see the confidential attribute and grant this on the object, where the attribute is (or you could also use inheritance, of course). For example, grant All Extended Rights on the Sales OU, where are the user Jill and contact Carl. - SP1 ACL Editor hides All Extended Rights on object classes that don't have any extended rights associated, such as contact. In that case you would use DSACLS, such as the command dsacls cn=jill,ou=demo,dc=sanao,dc=com /G jim:ca PROS - If you delegate Read All Properties to someone, you can exclude some attributes from this All by marking them as confidential. This also applies when people have Read All Properties through the Pre-Windows 2000 compatible access group. CONS - As you need to grant All Extended Rights, the trustee who got the permissions, gets not just permission to see a confidential attribute, but she also gets all current and future extended rights on the target object. For example, if you want Jim to see the users' social security numbers, he will also get permission to reset their passwords. And if one year later a directory-enabled application adds its own extended right to your AD, Jim will have that new permission right away on the affected users. - Account Operators have Full Control over user objects, so they also have All Extended Rights, so they are able to read users's confidential attributes. If this feature were implemented as a new access mask bit, it would have removed the first described drawback. Yours, Sakari === From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of joe Sent: Monday, May 09, 2005 4:31 PM To: ActiveDir@mail.activedir.org Subject: RE: [ActiveDir] Who was asking for a list of SP1 changes? I think it was this DL.. Excellent thanks ~Eric... This looks to be a good document. However, anyone else think this info on confidential attributes is a bit weak in the documentation Improved security to protect confidential attributes To prevent Read access to confidential attributes, such as a Social Security number, while allowing Read access to other object attributes, you can designate specific attributes as confidential by setting a search flag on the respective attributeSchema object. By default, only domain administrators have Read access to confidential attributes, but this access can be delegated. For more information about access to attributes, see How Security Descriptors and Access Control Lists Work on the Microsoft Web site http://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkId=45972 at http://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkId=45972. The link takes you to a document from March 28, 2003 which I highly doubt has more info about confidential attributes. This is something that actually requires you to make changes to use, not like saying hey we also keep SID Histories in the tombstone objects now which doesn't take any action on the part of the admins From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Eric Fleischman Sent: Monday, May 09, 2005 12:22 AM To: ActiveDir@mail.activedir.org Subject: [ActiveDir] Who was asking for a list of SP1 changes? I think it was this DL.. http://www.microsoft.com/downloads/details.aspx?familyid=C3C26254-8CE3-46E2-B1B6-3659B92B2CDEdisplaylang=en I didn't read it for completeness, but spot checked, and many are there. Though certainly not every one I'm sure. ~Eric List info : http://www.activedir.org/List.aspx List FAQ: http://www.activedir.org/ListFAQ.aspx List archive: http://www.mail-archive.com/activedir%40mail.activedir.org/
Re: Confidential Attributes (was RE: [ActiveDir] Who was asking for a list of SP1 changes? I think it was this DL......)
First off I don't really know security, so I'm like 43% confident in the accuracy of what I'm about to say ... Two things: A) Small note, 0xF is 15 decimal and is equivalent to 4 bits set (0b), you either meant 0x10 (16 decimal) or 0x8 (8 decimal) probably. Really you should understand which bits you want to set, be careful with that. B) Why can't you grant the explicit extended right for reading the confidential attribute? I assume there is one, there has to be. Finally, I'd say any All Extended Rights should not be granted to anyone. Other stuff, like the right to replicate changes in or out, go in that bucket, it would be dangerous. So I'm not sure what the problem is ... is the problem that the tools (ACL editor and DSACLS) don't provide a way to explicitly and easily grant the desired extended right? That wouldn't be the first time such a thing got dropped. :P BTW, this might work, download ADAM, and install tools, and use the ldp.exe from the %windir%\ADAM directory. This ldp.exe has an ACL Editor in it that is vastly superior more powerful, providing very explicit control over almost everything about the ACL. Cheers, -BrettSh [msft] Building 7 Garage Door Operator Posting AS IS ... On Mon, 11 Jul 2005, Sakari Kouti wrote: About confidential attributes in SP1: When you set an attribute to be confidential, mere read permission is no longer enough for you to see the attribute value. HOW TO ENABLE - Select the attribute to be set as confidential. Category 1 attributes are not possible to select, which rules most of the base schema attributes out but not all... Cat1 is marked in the corresponding attributeSchema object in its systemFlags attribute, as bit 0xF (or 16 in decimal). - Locate the corresponding attributeSchema object in the schema, and set bit 0x80 (or 128 in decimal) in its searchFlags attribute. HOW TO DELEGATE - Grant All Extended Rights for anyone, who needs to see the confidential attribute and grant this on the object, where the attribute is (or you could also use inheritance, of course). For example, grant All Extended Rights on the Sales OU, where are the user Jill and contact Carl. - SP1 ACL Editor hides All Extended Rights on object classes that don't have any extended rights associated, such as contact. In that case you would use DSACLS, such as the command dsacls cn=jill,ou=demo,dc=sanao,dc=com /G jim:ca PROS - If you delegate Read All Properties to someone, you can exclude some attributes from this All by marking them as confidential. This also applies when people have Read All Properties through the Pre-Windows 2000 compatible access group. CONS - As you need to grant All Extended Rights, the trustee who got the permissions, gets not just permission to see a confidential attribute, but she also gets all current and future extended rights on the target object. For example, if you want Jim to see the users' social security numbers, he will also get permission to reset their passwords. And if one year later a directory-enabled application adds its own extended right to your AD, Jim will have that new permission right away on the affected users. - Account Operators have Full Control over user objects, so they also have All Extended Rights, so they are able to read users's confidential attributes. If this feature were implemented as a new access mask bit, it would have removed the first described drawback. Yours, Sakari === From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of joe Sent: Monday, May 09, 2005 4:31 PM To: ActiveDir@mail.activedir.org Subject: RE: [ActiveDir] Who was asking for a list of SP1 changes? I think it was this DL.. Excellent thanks ~Eric... This looks to be a good document. However, anyone else think this info on confidential attributes is a bit weak in the documentation Improved security to protect confidential attributes To prevent Read access to confidential attributes, such as a Social Security number, while allowing Read access to other object attributes, you can designate specific attributes as confidential by setting a search flag on the respective attributeSchema object. By default, only domain administrators have Read access to confidential attributes, but this access can be delegated. For more information about access to attributes, see How Security Descriptors and Access Control Lists Work on the Microsoft Web site http://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkId=45972 at http://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkId=45972. The link takes you to a document from March 28, 2003 which I highly doubt has more info about confidential attributes. This is something that actually requires you to make changes to use, not like saying hey we also keep SID Histories in the tombstone objects now which doesn't take any action on the part of the admins
RE: Confidential Attributes (was RE: [ActiveDir] Who was asking for a list of SP1 changes? I think it was this DL......)
Sadly, a misstep on the part of our friendly garage door operator. use the ldp.exe from the %windir%\ADAM directory The LDP required for this is the LDP in R2's ADAM, not in the currently shipping one. Sorry. We can send this to you if you need it now, or just fetch it out of the R2 beta bits.[1] I'll go ahead and pass this along to garage door operator management, perhaps move him to a garage door painter role. This way he has the time required to really focus without the distractions of being a full garage door operator. - Select the attribute to be set as confidential. Category 1 attributes are not possible to select, which rules most of the base schema attributes out but not all... Cat1 is marked in the corresponding attributeSchema object in its systemFlags attribute, as bit 0xF (or 16 in decimal). We actually block all base schema elements if I remember correctly. B) Why can't you grant the explicit extended right for reading the confidential attribute? I assume there is one, there has to be. I agree with Brett. Please see CONTROL_ACCESS. ~Eric [1] - There goes my mail quota for the week. -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Brett Shirley Sent: Sunday, July 10, 2005 4:56 PM To: ActiveDir@mail.activedir.org Subject: Re: Confidential Attributes (was RE: [ActiveDir] Who was asking for a list of SP1 changes? I think it was this DL..) First off I don't really know security, so I'm like 43% confident in the accuracy of what I'm about to say ... Two things: A) Small note, 0xF is 15 decimal and is equivalent to 4 bits set (0b), you either meant 0x10 (16 decimal) or 0x8 (8 decimal) probably. Really you should understand which bits you want to set, be careful with that. B) Why can't you grant the explicit extended right for reading the confidential attribute? I assume there is one, there has to be. Finally, I'd say any All Extended Rights should not be granted to anyone. Other stuff, like the right to replicate changes in or out, go in that bucket, it would be dangerous. So I'm not sure what the problem is ... is the problem that the tools (ACL editor and DSACLS) don't provide a way to explicitly and easily grant the desired extended right? That wouldn't be the first time such a thing got dropped. :P BTW, this might work, download ADAM, and install tools, and use the ldp.exe from the %windir%\ADAM directory. This ldp.exe has an ACL Editor in it that is vastly superior more powerful, providing very explicit control over almost everything about the ACL. Cheers, -BrettSh [msft] Building 7 Garage Door Operator Posting AS IS ... On Mon, 11 Jul 2005, Sakari Kouti wrote: About confidential attributes in SP1: When you set an attribute to be confidential, mere read permission is no longer enough for you to see the attribute value. HOW TO ENABLE - Select the attribute to be set as confidential. Category 1 attributes are not possible to select, which rules most of the base schema attributes out but not all... Cat1 is marked in the corresponding attributeSchema object in its systemFlags attribute, as bit 0xF (or 16 in decimal). - Locate the corresponding attributeSchema object in the schema, and set bit 0x80 (or 128 in decimal) in its searchFlags attribute. HOW TO DELEGATE - Grant All Extended Rights for anyone, who needs to see the confidential attribute and grant this on the object, where the attribute is (or you could also use inheritance, of course). For example, grant All Extended Rights on the Sales OU, where are the user Jill and contact Carl. - SP1 ACL Editor hides All Extended Rights on object classes that don't have any extended rights associated, such as contact. In that case you would use DSACLS, such as the command dsacls cn=jill,ou=demo,dc=sanao,dc=com /G jim:ca PROS - If you delegate Read All Properties to someone, you can exclude some attributes from this All by marking them as confidential. This also applies when people have Read All Properties through the Pre-Windows 2000 compatible access group. CONS - As you need to grant All Extended Rights, the trustee who got the permissions, gets not just permission to see a confidential attribute, but she also gets all current and future extended rights on the target object. For example, if you want Jim to see the users' social security numbers, he will also get permission to reset their passwords. And if one year later a directory-enabled application adds its own extended right to your AD, Jim will have that new permission right away on the affected users. - Account Operators have Full Control over user objects, so they also have All Extended Rights, so they are able to read users's confidential attributes. If this feature were implemented as a new access mask bit, it would have removed the first described drawback. Yours, Sakari === From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[ActiveDir] OT: DHCP Capacity Planning
Has anyone got some insight/links about a scenario like this? Three DHCP servers (could offload to separate machines). ~650 sites, 2 subnets a pop, ~70K dhcp clients (maybe another 10K, no idea what the mac population is). What kind of hardware requirement would I have to support this on Windows 2003 doing DHCP for this kind of setup. I havent a faintest clue what the load on the current environment is (runs AIX). Also wondering what DNS servers running hundreds if not thousands of zones looks like from a hardware standpoint. Thanks, Brian Desmond [EMAIL PROTECTED]
