Re: [ActiveDir] How Secure is a Domain Controller?

2006-03-07 Thread Al Lilianstrom

Myrick, Todd (NIH/CC/DNA) [E] wrote:

Okay for you Susan, I will modify my statement... Add IPsec filter that only 
allows http traffic to update.microsoft.com.  Also, in the future MS will 
probably bake in the spyware service into the product, so it will be there 
anyway.  I think I helped flush out the KB article on AV way back.
 


Do folks really use Windows/Microsoft Update for patching DCs?

I realize I'm a bit paranoid but you're still running a web browser on a DC.

al




From: Susan Bradley, CPA aka Ebitz - SBS Rocks [MVP] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Mon 3/6/2006 2:27 PM
To: ActiveDir@mail.activedir.org
Subject: Re: [ActiveDir] How Secure is a Domain Controller?



Question?

On a DC ...why do you need anti spyware?

If spyware enters via web browsing and email...and IE should never be
used/launched on a DC... why do you need it? If the enhanced IE lockdown
is still in place that shuts off scripting and what not.

Is it on my TS box and all workstations? Yup. On my DC. No. the only
site that that box surfs to is Microsoft Update (I mean I don't even go
to Joewear on that DC)

Why introduce another thing that might introduce new code and new
false positives?

(see Spybot that flagged Microsoft's remote desktop control for RWW as
spyware, see Microsoft's Antispyware that flagged Symantec as a trojan)

And if you do a/v ensure that the needed folders and files are excluded
(see prior posts in this forum about the KB articles regarding how to
set up a/v on a domain controller and Exchange servers)

Myrick, Todd (NIH/CC/DNA) [E] wrote:


To add my 2 cents.

   1. Add Anti-virus and Anti-Spywear detection.
   2. Configure and backup your event logs. At remote sites, I would
  recommend collecting the event logs on a faster rotation.
   3. Add monitoring, You want to monitor account lockout events and
  have notification when excessive amounts of authentications are
  occurring. (Tips you off to possible brute force attacks, and
  up/down situations).
   4. Use IPSEC Policies to not allow outside traffic to your DC's. (I
  haven't tried this, but the theory seems pretty solid)
   5. Use GPO's to enforce group memberships for EA and Domain Admins.
   6. When possible do not have child domains, allows you to use
  tighter security policies.
   7. Enforce all registry changes using GPO's. Things like DNS record
  weight, fixed ports for NTDS and FRS replication, etc should be
  set this way to avoid mis-configuration.
   8. At a minimum have a MFT backup of the AD system state done at a
  central site each night. If you should lose objects, etc. Having
  this will give you options for restore. Not having it you're doomed.
   9. Make sure your account policies balance the need to thwart an
  attack but also consider the potential for brute force and
  denial of service. You don't want to come in on Monday to 40K of
  accounts locked out, and everyone waiting for you to unlock them.
  10. TBD

Todd Myrick



*From:* [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
*Sent:* Monday, March 06, 2006 11:23 AM
*To:* ActiveDir@mail.activedir.org
*Subject:* RE: [ActiveDir] How Secure is a Domain Controller?


I understand/stood what you were saying, just was hoping to bring out
a clearer answer for some of the lurker/newbies on the list (of which
there are many). And you provided exactly that clarification which was
excellent. Thank you.
**[Neil Ruston] You're welcome :)**

I still personally believe in the statement that if I can touch your
server, I own your server. There just is no good technical solution to
a physical problem, and it's part of our job responsibility to make
that clear to management.
**[Neil Ruston] Sometimes we're forced to make compromises due to
management and political pressure. Ulf has written an article which
helps to secure the DC if it finds itself physically insecure.
Ideally, the DC would not be deployed at all, but the world [of IT] is
far from ideal... :)**



*From:* [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] *On Behalf Of
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
*Sent:* Monday, March 06, 2006 9:52 AM
*To:* ActiveDir@mail.activedir.org
*Subject:* RE: [ActiveDir] How Secure is a Domain Controller?

You mis-understand :)

Ulf was suggesting that in order to protect the AD data on a poorly
protected DC, that strong passwords should be used that are harder to
crack.

In the event that the disks were compromised, the hacker would not be
able to crack a 20 char pw. He does not suggest the use of 20 char
passwords to logon to the DC but instead, it is suggested as a way to
further protect the AD data, in the event that physical protection is
weak.

hth,

neil



*From:* [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[mailto:[EMAIL 

Re: [ActiveDir] How Secure is a Domain Controller?

2006-03-07 Thread Susan Bradley, CPA aka Ebitz - SBS Rocks [MVP]
Personally Shavlik here... but the SBS boxes will be using WSUS in the 
R2 era.


Al Lilianstrom wrote:

Myrick, Todd (NIH/CC/DNA) [E] wrote:
Okay for you Susan, I will modify my statement... Add IPsec filter 
that only allows http traffic to update.microsoft.com.  Also, in the 
future MS will probably bake in the spyware service into the product, 
so it will be there anyway.  I think I helped flush out the KB 
article on AV way back.
 


Do folks really use Windows/Microsoft Update for patching DCs?

I realize I'm a bit paranoid but you're still running a web browser on 
a DC.


al




From: Susan Bradley, CPA aka Ebitz - SBS Rocks [MVP] 
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]

Sent: Mon 3/6/2006 2:27 PM
To: ActiveDir@mail.activedir.org
Subject: Re: [ActiveDir] How Secure is a Domain Controller?



Question?

On a DC ...why do you need anti spyware?

If spyware enters via web browsing and email...and IE should never be
used/launched on a DC... why do you need it? If the enhanced IE lockdown
is still in place that shuts off scripting and what not.

Is it on my TS box and all workstations? Yup. On my DC. No. the only
site that that box surfs to is Microsoft Update (I mean I don't even go
to Joewear on that DC)

Why introduce another thing that might introduce new code and new
false positives?

(see Spybot that flagged Microsoft's remote desktop control for RWW as
spyware, see Microsoft's Antispyware that flagged Symantec as a trojan)

And if you do a/v ensure that the needed folders and files are excluded
(see prior posts in this forum about the KB articles regarding how to
set up a/v on a domain controller and Exchange servers)

Myrick, Todd (NIH/CC/DNA) [E] wrote:


To add my 2 cents.

   1. Add Anti-virus and Anti-Spywear detection.
   2. Configure and backup your event logs. At remote sites, I would
  recommend collecting the event logs on a faster rotation.
   3. Add monitoring, You want to monitor account lockout events and
  have notification when excessive amounts of authentications are
  occurring. (Tips you off to possible brute force attacks, and
  up/down situations).
   4. Use IPSEC Policies to not allow outside traffic to your DC's. (I
  haven't tried this, but the theory seems pretty solid)
   5. Use GPO's to enforce group memberships for EA and Domain Admins.
   6. When possible do not have child domains, allows you to use
  tighter security policies.
   7. Enforce all registry changes using GPO's. Things like DNS record
  weight, fixed ports for NTDS and FRS replication, etc should be
  set this way to avoid mis-configuration.
   8. At a minimum have a MFT backup of the AD system state done at a
  central site each night. If you should lose objects, etc. Having
  this will give you options for restore. Not having it you're 
doomed.

   9. Make sure your account policies balance the need to thwart an
  attack but also consider the potential for brute force and
  denial of service. You don't want to come in on Monday to 40K of
  accounts locked out, and everyone waiting for you to unlock them.
  10. TBD

Todd Myrick

 



*From:* [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
*Sent:* Monday, March 06, 2006 11:23 AM
*To:* ActiveDir@mail.activedir.org
*Subject:* RE: [ActiveDir] How Secure is a Domain Controller?


I understand/stood what you were saying, just was hoping to bring out
a clearer answer for some of the lurker/newbies on the list (of which
there are many). And you provided exactly that clarification which was
excellent. Thank you.
**[Neil Ruston] You're welcome :)**

I still personally believe in the statement that if I can touch your
server, I own your server. There just is no good technical solution to
a physical problem, and it's part of our job responsibility to make
that clear to management.
**[Neil Ruston] Sometimes we're forced to make compromises due to
management and political pressure. Ulf has written an article which
helps to secure the DC if it finds itself physically insecure.
Ideally, the DC would not be deployed at all, but the world [of IT] is
far from ideal... :)**

 



*From:* [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] *On Behalf Of
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
*Sent:* Monday, March 06, 2006 9:52 AM
*To:* ActiveDir@mail.activedir.org
*Subject:* RE: [ActiveDir] How Secure is a Domain Controller?

You mis-understand :)

Ulf was suggesting that in order to protect the AD data on a poorly
protected DC, that strong passwords should be used that are harder to
crack.

In the event that the disks were compromised, the hacker would not be
able to crack a 20 char pw. He does not suggest the use of 20 char
passwords to logon to the DC but instead, it is suggested as a way to
further protect the AD data, in the event that physical protection is
weak.

hth,

neil


RE: [ActiveDir] There must be an easier way...

2006-03-07 Thread Larry Wahlers
Thanks, everybody, for your helpful replies. Just to clarify:

We have an empty root domain.
We have several child domains, one of which is our main domain with most
of the objects. That main domain has 5 sites. One of those sites has one
DC in it. That physical site also has an administrator who talked me
into promoting one of his servers to a dc in the root domain, since only
I know the root domain administrator password.

The plan was that we would let things replicate, then ghost the two
DC's, bring the two DC's over to my location, cut the wire between us,
demote the two DC's and remove them from the domain, take them back over
to the site that's leaving, re-ghost the machines back so they're DC's
again in their copy of our domains, change the root domain
administrator password to something those guys know, and let them have
at it in their own copy of our domain. Then, their users continue to
log on to their copy of our domain in their own forest, while the IT
group gets stuff migrated over to what will be their real new forest.

Unfortunately, the very evening that I promoted their DC, this guy cut
the line. So, now I have to run ntdsutil to clean up.

But, fortunately, I just happened to be signed up for an intermediate AD
class in which we did that very thing today. So, I think I'm OK, along
with the great suggestions here.

As I see it, the steps are:

1. Run NTDSUTIL and remove the two DC's.
2. Wait until tomorrow - overnight should be plenty of time for
replication. (We only have about 800 users total)
3. Go into Sites and Services and delete the computers from the site,
and then the site itself. 
4. Probably have to delete the connections to either of the deleted
computers from the many other DC's.

Thanks again, all. If there's something I've missed, I'm all ears!

-- 
Larry Wahlers
Concordia Technologies
The Lutheran Church - Missouri Synod
mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
direct office line: (314) 996-1876
List info   : http://www.activedir.org/List.aspx
List FAQ: http://www.activedir.org/ListFAQ.aspx
List archive: http://www.mail-archive.com/activedir%40mail.activedir.org/


RE: [ActiveDir] There must be an easier way...

2006-03-07 Thread deji
You will then need to look in DNS and delete every reference to any of the
DCs in any zone or sub-zone.
You will then go into ADUC, Domain Controller OU, and manually delete the DCs
from there.
 
 
Sincerely,

Dèjì Akómöláfé, MCSE+M MCSA+M MCT
Microsoft MVP - Directory Services
www.readymaids.com - we know IT
www.akomolafe.com
Do you now realize that Today is the Tomorrow you were worried about
Yesterday?  -anon



From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] on behalf of Larry Wahlers
Sent: Tue 3/7/2006 2:46 PM
To: ActiveDir@mail.activedir.org
Subject: RE: [ActiveDir] There must be an easier way...



Thanks, everybody, for your helpful replies. Just to clarify:

We have an empty root domain.
We have several child domains, one of which is our main domain with most
of the objects. That main domain has 5 sites. One of those sites has one
DC in it. That physical site also has an administrator who talked me
into promoting one of his servers to a dc in the root domain, since only
I know the root domain administrator password.

The plan was that we would let things replicate, then ghost the two
DC's, bring the two DC's over to my location, cut the wire between us,
demote the two DC's and remove them from the domain, take them back over
to the site that's leaving, re-ghost the machines back so they're DC's
again in their copy of our domains, change the root domain
administrator password to something those guys know, and let them have
at it in their own copy of our domain. Then, their users continue to
log on to their copy of our domain in their own forest, while the IT
group gets stuff migrated over to what will be their real new forest.

Unfortunately, the very evening that I promoted their DC, this guy cut
the line. So, now I have to run ntdsutil to clean up.

But, fortunately, I just happened to be signed up for an intermediate AD
class in which we did that very thing today. So, I think I'm OK, along
with the great suggestions here.

As I see it, the steps are:

1. Run NTDSUTIL and remove the two DC's.
2. Wait until tomorrow - overnight should be plenty of time for
replication. (We only have about 800 users total)
3. Go into Sites and Services and delete the computers from the site,
and then the site itself.
4. Probably have to delete the connections to either of the deleted
computers from the many other DC's.

Thanks again, all. If there's something I've missed, I'm all ears!

--
Larry Wahlers
Concordia Technologies
The Lutheran Church - Missouri Synod
mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
direct office line: (314) 996-1876
List info   : http://www.activedir.org/List.aspx
List FAQ: http://www.activedir.org/ListFAQ.aspx
List archive: http://www.mail-archive.com/activedir%40mail.activedir.org/


List info   : http://www.activedir.org/List.aspx
List FAQ: http://www.activedir.org/ListFAQ.aspx
List archive: http://www.mail-archive.com/activedir%40mail.activedir.org/


[ActiveDir] WMIDiag is a New Utility for Diagnosing and Helping in Repairing Problems with the WMI Service

2006-03-07 Thread Alain Lissoir




For those of you interested ...

WMIDiag is a New 
Utility for Diagnosing and Helping in Repairing Problems with the WMI 
Service.
It works from Windows 
2000 up to 2003 (including XP and all SPs).

WMIDiag 
usage:
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/scriptcenter/topics/help/wmidiag.mspx

WMIDiag 
Download:
http://www.microsoft.com/downloads/details.aspx?FamilyID=d7ba3cd6-18d1-4d05-b11e-4c64192ae97dDisplayLang=en

WMIDiag webcast 
tomorrow:
Title: 
Troubleshooting Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI)Date/Time: 3/8/2006 
9:30 AM PacificDuration: 60 minutesPresenter: Alain 
Lissoir
Attendee Registration URL: http://msevents.microsoft.com/CUI/EventDetail.aspx?EventID=1032290320Culture=en-US

Regards,/Alain 


  
  
Alain 
  LISSOIR




  [EMAIL PROTECTED]
  Home Page: 
  http://www.LissWare.Net
  Where am 
  I? http://map.LissWare.Net