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http://www.russiajournal.com/weekly/article.shtml?ad=5945 The Russia Journal MARCH 22-28, 2002 Vol.5, No.10 (153) Of nukes, maneuvers and stubborn perceptions By GORDON M. HAHN / The Russia Journal -U.S. nuclear weapons target some 2,000 sites in Russia. Others are the targets of British and French nuclear arms. American troops are now being stationed across the C.I.S. – as of now "only" in four states: Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. NATO member Turkey is ethnically close to Azerbaijan, and some leaders in Baku have called for a NATO presence in their country. -All of this heightens the effect of another recent event. Last week, NATO conducted military maneuvers near Russia’s borders. Besides NATO members, the exercise, "Strong Resolve 2002," involved Estonia, Lithuania, Finland, Sweden, Austria, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. The scenario envisioned an enemy attack on NATO from the north and a simultaneous invasion of a Central European NATO member state. Unless Latvia – the only northern state besides Russia not included in the exercise – is regarded as a potential enemy of the very alliance it is about to join and, unless Belarus is considered a potential invader, the only possible enemy in this scenario is Russia. With the next Russian-American summit two months away, the West has still failed to squarely face the fundamental and by now decade-old questions undermining its relationship with Russia. Which side has greater capabilities, the West or Russia? If the tables were turned, how would U.S. decision-makers, as "rational actors," respond to the overwhelming countervailing capabilities Russia "perceives" and encounters from the West? The news that the United States has included Russia on a list of countries to be targeted by American nuclear weapons – along with China, North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Syria and Libya – has sent shock waves through political elites here and across the Big Pond. On the one hand, this "news" is not surprising; on another, it is shocking, raising serious doubts about the ability of Western bureaucracies to overcome old habits. It has been known for a long time that Russia was not "de-targeted" by the United States after the Cold War. That Russia has preserved such status might be regarded an achievement of sorts: It has retained one trait that marked its superpower greatness. The cycle in which the United States annually rediscovers that the Cold War is over and promises to develop a "new relationship" with Russia is more striking. This is news because it spectacularly debunks a fashionable argument made by U.S. officials and analysts. Russia should not be so disturbed by America’s nuclear arsenal, the argument goes, because the United States is not unsettled by British or French nuclear warheads and vice versa. Friends do not begrudge friends’ "defense capabilities." Unfortunately, this formula leaves out the most important variables: U.S. weapons are not zeroed in on London or Paris, nor are British and French nuclear projectiles aimed at Washington. To understand Russian reaction to the West’s military posture, we should consider a concise statement made by George Shultz, who served as secretary of state during Ronald Reagan’s presidency. In regards to the fundamental principle that should inform national security decision-making, he noted that states design policy not on the basis of the intentions of other states, but on the basis of their capabilities. Repeat this to yourself, several times if need be, and then take a gander at the world through the security calculus of the Kremlin or, say, from Arbatskaya Ploshchad, where Russia’s General Staff divines defense policy. U.S. nuclear weapons target some 2,000 sites in Russia. Others are the targets of British and French nuclear arms. American troops are now being stationed across the C.I.S. – as of now "only" in four states: Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. NATO member Turkey is ethnically close to Azerbaijan, and some leaders in Baku have called for a NATO presence in their country. A high-ranking delegation of U.S. officers recently visited Armenia to discuss stepping up military cooperation. The U.S.-Georgian operation in the Pankisi Gorge will target only Taliban and al-Qaida forces, giving Chechen terrorists a pass. Later this year, the three former Soviet Baltic republics, along with as many as four other countries near Russia’s western borders, will join NATO, already the most powerful military machine in history. All of this heightens the effect of another recent event. Last week, NATO conducted military maneuvers near Russia’s borders. Besides NATO members, the exercise, "Strong Resolve 2002," involved Estonia, Lithuania, Finland, Sweden, Austria, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. The scenario envisioned an enemy attack on NATO from the north and a simultaneous invasion of a Central European NATO member state. Unless Latvia – the only northern state besides Russia not included in the exercise – is regarded as a potential enemy of the very alliance it is about to join and, unless Belarus is considered a potential invader, the only possible enemy in this scenario is Russia. This is reminiscent of another NATO celebration held two years ago, which involved supporting Ukraine’s state integrity against an uprising by a national minority supported by a foreign compatriot state. Unless a Crimean Tatar state that I do not know about has materialized, the only possible enemy in that scenario also was our "partner" Russia. In short, it does not take much, if any, paranoia for a Russian, not to mention a Russian general, to feel threatened by the United States and NATO. Capabilities are always malignant. If Russian generals subscribe to the Shultz Principle, they are simply duty-bound to muster all resources to counter the hard facts of the potential Western threat. A general’s charge is not to protect an economic transition or the consolidation of democracy. He can rationally conclude that any capability is a potential threat, regardless of its improbability. Moreover, perceptions are stubborn things, especially when they have a history behind them. They can persist long after the reality they once reflected has changed. In the case of the end of the Cold War, the persistence of old perceptions has been evident on both sides. The policy of mutual threat reduction that used to define Soviet-American relations has not eliminated "mutual threat perception." Given the preponderance of Western power, Russian "perceptions" are a rational reaction to Western capabilities, prolonging the inertia of the Cold War legacy and traditional "zapadnophobia." Western and American perceptions reflect mostly the memory of Soviet capabilities on top of ancient European Russophobia. Irrational misperceptions should be more easily shed by the Cold War’s victors than by its vanquished. The historical lessons of Weimar, Versailles and the Marshall Plan counsel magnanimity in victorious hegemony and efforts to assuage the suspicions of beleaguered former foes. (Dr. Gordon M. Hahn is The Russia Journal’s political analyst and a visiting research fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University.) __________________________________________________ Do You Yahoo!? Yahoo! Movies - coverage of the 74th Academy Awards® http://movies.yahoo.com/ --------------------------- ANTI-NATO INFORMATION LIST ==^================================================================ This email was sent to: archive@jab.org EASY UNSUBSCRIBE click here: http://topica.com/u/?a84x2u.a9617B Or send an email to: [EMAIL PROTECTED] T O P I C A -- Register now to manage your mail! http://www.topica.com/partner/tag02/register ==^================================================================
