Re: median voter theorem and polarization
I don't see why you would necessarily want to win your party and not the election. I would think that the MVT would want to win the average voter, not the average democrat republican. But I could see, since voters probably rarely follow the voting record of a representitive, that when voting in congress the rep has a tendency to want to win his party favor there so as to get party support. Also, does the use of voting records make this gap because the reps can only vote yea or nay? Even averaged out over the many voting instances, you can't ever voice moderate or total support, just support or not- thus while you maybe a moderate democrat, you will still likely to vote for all the bills that the party favors. Jason
Re: median voter theorem and polarization
Jason [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: . . . what explains the polarization that this article is talking about: http://slate.msn.com/?id=2060047? I found the 2D model of the house and senate especially interesting and was very surprised at the white space in between the two parties. Note that the axes do not have the same meaning from one frame (http://voteview.uh.edu/c46105.htm) to the next; their signs are determined by the continuity of incumbents. I suppose that members of each party tend to shade marginal votes toward the average of their party; that would account for the gap. -- Anton Sherwood -- http://www.ogre.nu/
median voter theorem and polarization
I am not too familiar with the MVT and would like to know more. From what I gather, this theorem says that the political parties should both move towards the center of the liberal/conservative dichotomy. Seems logical enough. Is this right? If so, then what explains the polarization that this article is talking about: http://slate.msn.com/?id=2060047? I found the 2D model of the house and senate especially interesting and was very surprised at the white space in between the two parties. Jason
